


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A HISTORY
OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION

A HISTORY
OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION

BY
H. MORSE STEPHENS

BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD

IN THREE VOLUMES

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PREFACE.

I REGRET but can hardly apologize for, the delay in the publication of the present Volume. A Paradise haunts the dreams of the Historian, as well as of the Lover and the Fool. To glide through happy, laborious years in the eloquent silence of his library, free from the necessity for that ungrateful literary drudgery, from which he escapes only by fits and starts—in feverish haste, the balance and continuity of his ideas well-nigh lost,—to some cherished work, often laid aside, long neglected, and at last almost despaired of; to feel himself, as it were, a lily of the field, neither bound to toil nor spin Solomon-raiment for himself, but only for his thoughts; to enjoy the inestimable boon of scholarly leisure, roaming through archives and collections, with no call to grudge the hours which slip by as one investigation branches off into a hundred equally as enticing, ruminating some doubtful point, or rounding some awkward period in his twilight garden or beside his friendly study fire; to concentrate his every thought upon the *magnum opus*, towards which all his studies have for years been tending, which he sees daily growing under his pen, big with the promise of future fame; ever busily improving, reviewing, and revising, till shortly he becomes his best, and gives of his best to the world, and of his best only.

Such is the Historian's golden dream. Such was mine. For me, as for many another—alas, how much more worthy!—an Eldorado wholly unattainable; for between us and those mirage bowers stretch long years of desert sand. Shall we journey on and on, hoping that some day we may peradventure reach the ever-receding place of rest? Or shall we rather do what little we may in the hurry and press of the march? Life is short, the future is uncertain; and for me the balance has been tilted by the sympathetic insistence of one or two faithful friends, and by the encouraging appreciation of reviewers and correspondents in England, France, and America. So the volume shall go. Those who praise it will never know what it has cost me; those who blame would hardly believe how far it falls short of the ideal I had steadily cherished and once hoped to attain.

Though to unravel the tangled skein of the history of the French Revolution, without once snapping the thread, demands a continuous labour and an undivided attention, which were not always mine to bestow, surely it cannot be that so much pains and anxiety should wholly fail to add something to the fund of historical knowledge, to present a fairly veracious picture of the period—a mere sober study in “black and white,” aiming neither at Venetian colour nor Impressionist dash,—and, perchance, to impart to a few readers here and there some contagion of interest and enthusiasm.

To Mr. F. York Powell, of Christ Church, Oxford, I am deeply indebted for unfailing encouragement, assistance, and advice, and to Mr. Arthur Hassall, of the same Society, for his kindness in reading the proof-sheets of the present

Volume. My thanks are also due to M. F. A. Aulard, Professor at the Sorbonne, who procured for me from the Archives at Paris the list (never before printed) of the deputies sent on mission at the beginning of 1794, which appears in Appendix X., and to Mr. G. K. Fortescue, of the British Museum, whose extensive knowledge of the pamphlets of the period was always at my service.

If there still remain perforce unanswered some of the very many kind and helpful letters, which my earlier chapters called forth, I here beg the writers to accept my regretful excuses.

By a slight modification of plan, this volume closes at the end of 1793, instead of with the fall of Robespierre. During the last five years hardly a week has passed without some book, pamphlet, or article throwing new light upon obscure subjects and important facts in my period. I try to keep up with this ever-growing literature, but having already in my former Preface pointed out its main features, I refrain from its detailed analysis till I put out my last volume, to which I hope to prefix a complete biographical introduction, explaining the nature of the new authorities and the use I have made of them.

H. MORSE STEPHENS.

OXFORD, 1891.

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WHEN Mirabeau advocated the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, in 1790, and the summons of a new legislature, he begged the king to insist upon an interval of some three months before the meeting of the second assembly, during which the executive might recover some of its proper power; but if he had perceived the advantage which such an interval would give to the royal authority, the leading members of the Constituent Assembly saw it equally clearly, and had no intention of giving royalty this last chance. They decreed, therefore, that the first elections under the new Constitution should begin upon August 25, and be over by September 25, and that the new Assembly should meet on October 1, 1791, the day after the Constituent Assembly had dissolved itself. Thus there was not an interregnum of even a single day in which

the king could obtain any advantage. The composition of the new Assembly was very different from that of its predecessor. There was in the new Legislative Assembly, as in the Constituent, a large proportion of lawyers, but there was also a far greater number of professional politicians, and a far smaller number of priests. Indeed, the clerical element was conspicuous by its absence, and, with the exception of Lecoq, Fauchet, and Lamourette, such priests and bishops as did appear were not calculated to do credit to their order. The most striking feature was the large proportion of men of scientific and literary ability who were elected, among whom were Lacépède, the great naturalist; Guyton-Morveau, the chemist; Bigot de Préameneu, the jurist; Koch, the famous professor of international law; Arbogast, the mathematician; Ramond, the geologist; Broussonet, the naturalist and secretary of the Agricultural Society of Paris; Carnot, the engineer; Cerutti, the ex-Jesuit journalist and correspondent of Mirabeau; Quatremère de Quincy, the author of the articles on architecture in the "Encyclopédie;" Dusaulx, the translator of Juvenal; François de Neufchâteau, the poet and dramatist; and Condorcet, the Secretary of the Academy of Sciences, who supplied arguments to his party, though his weakness of speech prevented him from being an orator. The new Assembly at once split up into sections, but there was no great central party such as had formed the majority in the Constituent Assembly, and the line of demarcation between right and left was from the first distinctly drawn. Both the right and the left were divided into two marked sections. On the right there sat, side by side, the Royalists and the Feuillants; while on the left there agreed together for the time the elements of the two parties of the Girondins and the Jacobins which were to fight so fierce a battle for supremacy one year afterwards.

The Royalists were few in number, but contained many men of ability, and, what was more rare, of courage to support a falling cause. It is true that there were no such bigoted supporters of the ancien régime as d'Esprémesnil and Mira-

beau-Tonneau; but the place of Cazalès was well filled by the fiery young Dutchman, Daverhoul; and the wisdom of Malouet was well matched by the experience of Vaublanc. Vincent Marie Viennot, ci-devant Comte de Vaublanc, was the son of a Burgundian nobleman by a rich creole, and was born in the island of San Domingo in 1755. At the age of seven he was taken to Paris, and educated at the military school there. In 1774 he became an officer in the Régiment de la Sarre, and then went to San Domingo, where he married. On his return to France in 1782 he left the army and established himself near Melun. He took part in the elections of 1789, and acted as secretary to the noblesse of the bailliage of Melun, though he did not succeed in being elected a deputy. He followed the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly with great interest, particularly its behaviour with regard to San Domingo, and in 1791 he was elected deputy to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Seine-et-Marne.¹ He was a representative of the Royalist party of a very different type from Daverhoul. His attachment to the monarchy was not due to youthful enthusiasm and romantic sentiment, but to a belief that in a strong government alone the anarchic condition of France and her colonies could find a remedy. He was by no means a hearty supporter of the new constitution, but he had sworn to observe it, and intended to keep his oath. His courage and his wisdom were more than once tried as the chief representative of the smaller section of the right, and his name occurs more than once as its leader in the most stirring debates in the Legislative Assembly.

The Royalist section was very few in numbers, though it contained, as has been just said, some men of great courage and ability. The strongest party numerically in the whole Assembly was that of the Feuillants. After the events of July 17 the club of the Feuillants, which had originally grown out of the Monarchical Club, was joined by most of the former members of the left of the Constituent Assembly, and

¹ *Mémoires* of Vaublanc in Berville and Barrière's *Collection des Mémoires*.

particularly by Barnave and his friends who had seceded from the Jacobins when they recognized the supremacy of Robespierre there. Their influence had secured the election of a large number of deputies who thought as they did, to the Legislative Assembly; but the consistency of these new deputies was not to be depended upon, and a great many who were originally elected as Feuillants or Constitutionals voted eventually, under the influence of the eloquence of the Girondins or of the threats of the Jacobins, in opposition to their own party. The main tenet of these Feuillant deputies was that the Constitution of 1791 must be adhered to at all costs, and they firmly believed it was the most wonderful conception that the human brain had ever produced. They could see no faults in it, and fought for it obstinately; and the inherent weakness of their position arose from the fact that the Constitution of 1791 was not perfect. Their two most distinguished leaders were a young soldier and aide-de-camp of Lafayette, Mathieu Dumas, and the learned jurist, Bigot de Préameneu. Mathieu Dumas was the son of a treasurer of the finances, and was born at Montpellier in 1753. He entered the army in 1767, and acted as aide-de-camp, first to the Comte de Puységur and then to General de Rochambeau, in the war of American Independence, and after serving as assistant-quartermaster-general in America, was promoted major in 1784. He there made his mark as a staff officer, and after filling two military missions at Constantinople and Amsterdam was appointed secretary to the council of war, in the place of the Comte de Guibert.¹ When the Revolution broke out he was chosen by Lafayette to be one of his aides-de-camp; and as he came frequently to the sittings, he became well known to the deputies of the Constituent Assembly, who entrusted him with two important missions, the one to put an end to the religious disturbances at Montauban,² and the other to command the various bodies of national guards, who were escorting the king from Varennes to Paris.³ He gave so much

¹ *Souvenirs du Comte Mathieu Dumas, 1770-1830*, vol. i. Paris: 1839.

² Vol. i. chap. xvi. p. 491.

³ Vol. i. chap. xv. p. 453.

satisfaction, that he was at once promoted *maréchal-de-camp*, and was sent to Metz to organize the first battery of horse artillery ever known in France. While thus engaged he was elected by the department of the *Seine-et-Oise* to the Legislative Assembly. His friendship with Lafayette and the men who made the Constitution of 1791 kept him faithful to the work they were so proud of, and he quickly gathered round him a group of young *Feuillants*, such as Beugnot, Becquey, Dumolard, Jaucourt, and Théodore de Lameth, elder brother of Charles and Alexandre de Lameth, who all believed in the new Constitution.

Félix Julien Jean Bigot de Préameneu was the son of an *avocat* at Rennes, and had been born in that famous city of great lawyers, in 1747. He had taken the degree of Doctor of Laws at the university there in 1768, and had then come to Paris to practise his profession. He had at once formed a close alliance with the deputies who were elected in Brittany to the Constituent Assembly, and was a very early member of the Jacobin Club. The numerous Breton lawyers acknowledged him their master, and through them he exercised great influence on the work of the Constituent Assembly. In December, 1790, his legal abilities were recognized by his being elected judge of the fourth *arrondissement* of Paris, and he gave such satisfaction in that capacity that in September, 1791, he was elected one of the deputies for the capital. He naturally became the leader of the older and more prudent of the *Feuillants*, for they knew that he had had great influence in the drawing up of the Constitution of 1791, and felt a personal pride in it, while at the same time he was less violent and impetuous than Dumas and his friends.

There sat, upon the opening day, on the left of the new Assembly a crowd of deputies unknown to Paris, who had all begged for admission to the Jacobin Club the moment they reached the capital. For some weeks they all seemed animated by the same aims, and to be under the influence of the same prejudices; but it was not long before a distinct difference could be observed between certain deputies who were generally

known as the "enragés" Jacobins, and that section which formed the nucleus of the future Girondin party. In opinion, indeed, all the members of the left differed but little. They all hoped for a Republic, and wished for the destruction of the Monarchy. But the Girondins dreamed of an ideal Republic in which they should be the orators and the tribunes; while the extreme section looked forward to a Republican system of government in the hope that their energies might then obtain active employment. The name Girondin was in the following year made to include many men who had no connection with the department of the Gironde, but the party took its title in this Assembly from three deputies belonging to the great city of Bordeaux, the capital of the new department of the Gironde. These three men—all men of great distinction but all dreamers—were destined to a short but brilliant career, and were all to die miserably. They were Vergniaud, Guadet, and Gensonné.

Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud, the greatest orator, not only of the Girondin party, but of the whole period of the Revolution, was the son of a contractor for provisions to the cavalry regiment stationed at Limoges, and was born in that city on May 31, 1753. At school, he showed his ability when but a little boy, and he attracted the kindly interest of Turgot when intendant of the Limousin, who gave him a bursarship, or scholarship, at the Collège du Plessis at Paris, on his father becoming a bankrupt. His indolence prevented him from winning high distinction at school or at Saint-Sulpice, where he afterwards pretended to study divinity, for he found it easier to write poetry and vers de société, which obtained him an entrance into many ladies' drawing-rooms, and in particular to the salon of Thomas, the Academician. His friends exerted themselves to get him an appointment in the Civil Service, but the drudgery disgusted him, and he threw up his post and retired to live with his ruined father at Limoges. His brother-in-law advised him to go to the bar, and he established himself in Bordeaux, where he took the degree of bachelor of laws in 1781, and was admitted an avocat in the following August. At Bordeaux he met an old Paris acquaintance, the President

of Parlement, Dupaty, who made him his secretary. He won his first cause in April, 1782, and soon obtained a large practice at the bar.¹ He also made great friends with the leading avocats of the day at Bordeaux, who then formed a society of great ability, and took the keenest interest in the progress of the Revolution. By 1790 he had made two or three remarkable public speeches, especially an "éloge" on Mirabeau, and for his eloquence was elected one of the first administrators of the department of the Gironde. He was afterwards elected fourth deputy to the Legislative Assembly, in 1791, and by his speeches during the elections justified the high reputation he had won. On his arrival in Paris he became a member of the Jacobin Club, and so distinguished himself by his eloquence in the very first debates in the Legislative Assembly, that he was elected its third president. The genius of Vergniaud was essentially oratorical and not political, and it is only necessary to remark here that his imagination had been charmed by the idea of a Republic, and that he became the orator of the Gironde and the spokesman of the Republican party in the Legislative Assembly. Only his great indolence prevented him from being a great statesman; he was a far more profound thinker than his associates, and was essentially a disciple of Montesquieu, and not of Rousseau, but though he did not mind taking an infinity of trouble over his speeches, he would not submit to the drudgery of practical politics, and therefore failed to obtain the commanding position which he deserved.

Though not such great orators or statesmen, Vergniaud's two most important colleagues in the representation of the Gironde, Guadet and Gensonné, were far more industrious politicians than he was.² Marguerite Élie Guadet, the son of the mayor of Saint Émilien, was born in 1755, and was therefore two years younger than Vergniaud. He had been admitted at an early age an avocat at Bordeaux, and was the

¹ *Vergniaud. Manuscrits, lettres et papiers, pièces, pour la plupart inédites, classées et annotées*, by Charles Vatet. 2 vols. Paris: 1873.

² *Les Girondins, leur vie privée, leur vie publique, leur proscription et leur mort*, by Joseph Guadet. 2 vols. Paris: 1861.

leader of the bar there in 1789. He had written an address to the Bordelais during the electoral period, and had acquired such a reputation for political knowledge that he would have been elected a deputy to the States-General in 1789 if he had not been considered too young by the electors. He had adopted austere Republican principles, and came up to Paris with the intention of using all his efforts to bring about a Republic. He at once joined the Jacobin Club, and soon showed his ability there, for he was immediately elected a member of the committee of the club. He allied himself with Brissot, who obtained great influence over him, and it was through Guadet that Brissot influenced Vergniaud himself. Armand Gensonné, a friend of Guadet's, and an abler though quieter man, was born at Bordeaux in 1758. In that city he had not made so great a reputation as Guadet or Vergniaud, but he was considered, and rightly, to be a more profound lawyer than either of the two more brilliant advocates,¹ and his reputation caused him to be elected, in 1791, a judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal by the Gironde. He had greatly interested himself in the affairs of San Domingo; and on behalf of the merchants of Bordeaux, whose prosperity depended greatly upon that of the colony, he had sent in to the Constituent Assembly a memoir proving that the freedom of the negroes would be advantageous to the colonies. The Constituent Assembly was favourably impressed by his memoir, and gave him a mission to examine the feelings with which the people regarded the "insermentés" priests in the departments of the west of France. He presented his report to the Legislative Assembly, and from that time was recognized as an authority in the Assembly on the question of the clergy.

The party of the Enragés was very small, but made up for its small numbers by its noisiness and vigour. The three most conspicuous members of this group were men of very different qualities and very different education; all vigorous, but not all equally honest. Undoubtedly the ablest of them,

¹ *Le Barreau de Bordeaux de 1775 à 1815*, by H. Chauvot, pp. 165-199. Paris: 1856.

who was to gain great fame as a representative on mission and as a statesman under the Convention, but who had in the Legislative Assembly his reputation to make, was Merlin of Thionville. Antoine Christophe Merlin came of an old bourgeois family of Thionville, where his father practised as a procureur, and was born in 1762. He was educated at the college of the Lazarists at Metz, and was intended to take orders, but he refused to become a monk after a sojourn, of which he has left a description, at the Chartreuse of Val Saint Pierre. He therefore studied law at Paris, and, after acting for a time as his father's clerk, was admitted an avocat at Thionville. He had a great success there, and showed his romantic disposition by marrying a blind girl, in 1787, on which occasion the little town was quite en fête.¹ Both he and his family took a keen interest in the progress of the Revolution, and when the new local authorities were chosen he was elected a municipal officer, and his father president of the directory of the district. His natural eloquence gave him great weight with the popular society of Thionville, and in 1791 he was elected a deputy to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Moselle. His eloquence and his advanced principles soon marked Merlin of Thionville out as a leader of the extreme party in the Legislative Assembly, and though he acted with some men of infamous character his life and his principles were always pure. During the session of the Legislative Assembly he was too unsparing an opponent of all the measures proposed by the king or the ministers, but when once he had shared the responsibility of government he became one of the grandest figures in the Convention, famous alike as a representative on mission and as the defender of Mayence, and after the 9th Thermidor, as a statesman with a real knowledge of foreign affairs.

Chabot and Basire had neither the high Republican spirit nor the Republican integrity of Merlin. The former had been a Capuchin friar, the latter was an avocat, who had been for

¹ *Vie et correspondance de Merlin de Thionville*, by Jean Reynaud. Paris : 1860.

some years secretary of the archives of Burgundy; they were closely connected in the Legislative Assembly and in the Convention, and both were at last guillotined upon the same day. François Chabot was the son of a college cook at Rhodéz, and was born at St. Géniez, in Rouergue, in 1759. He took orders and entered a convent of Capucins, but he seems to have had no vocation for the priesthood, and abandoned his monastery after the February decree of the Constituent Assembly. He was appointed Grand Vicar by Grégoire, Bishop of Blois, and was elected by the department of the Loir-et-Cher to the Legislative Assembly. Without the eloquence of Merlin of Thionville, he yet showed extreme vigour during the session of the Assembly; and not contented with attacking the ministry and Lafayette, he joined Basire in causing a breach between the Girondins and the Jacobins by attacking Brissot himself. In spite of his vigour and real courage, he failed to make a great reputation for himself in the Legislative Assembly from his coarseness and roughness; but, having been a monk, he was always listened to on clerical subjects. Though it must be acknowledged that he was a vigorous politician, it is impossible to feel for him the same sympathy as was inspired by his friends Merlin and Basire. Claude Basire, who, as has been said, was secretary of the archives of Burgundy, was an extremely young man, and was born at Dijon in 1764. He had there distinguished himself by his earnestness for the Revolution, and had been elected a member of the first directory of his department. His popularity secured his election for the department of the Côte d'Or, and he immediately took up his position on the extreme left of the Legislative Assembly. Though a more highly educated man than Chabot, and certainly more scrupulous, he shared with him and Merlin the leadership of the Enragé party; and if not their equal in energy and assurance, he was a more amiable character than Chabot, and his reputation has not suffered by his strenuous attempts to save the Swiss soldiery after the capture of the Tuileries on August 10.

These were the chief new men sent up from the provinces

to the Legislative Assembly, and the most notable point about them was their extreme youth. With the exception of Bigot de Préameneu, who was about forty-four, none of the leading deputies were more than forty years of age, and their youth partly accounts for their enthusiasm. It may be noticed that these deputies were, nearly without exception, men who had made their names in the new local administrations or law courts; and that they were purely local men, who represented entirely the spirit of the departments for which they were elected. Many of them, notably Guadet and Basire, had shown ability as local administrators, and had thus gained the confidence of their fellow-citizens, and were able to speak from experience of the advantages or disadvantages of the new system of local government; but, as happened with regard to the deputies to the Constituent Assembly, the fascination of Paris drew them within the magic influence of the capital, and their inspiration was not derived from their provinces but from the Jacobin Club, of which they had been elected members, or from the salons. Though some of them had slight experience of local government, but few were acquainted with great questions of national politics; and the mistake which the Constituent Assembly had made in its self-denying decree of May 10, 1791, soon appeared when the lack of experience of the members of the Legislative Assembly was shown in the same unpractical behaviour which had ruined the good intentions of the Constituent. If there was no man of the political power of Mirabeau among them, there were many whose eloquence was great, many who were sustained by their strong enthusiasm and their confidence in the cause of the Revolution, many who were destined to be drawn by its fatal excitement into courses which led to their deaths, and the different political principles which afterwards distinguished the Girondins and the Jacobins can be traced in the speeches of the representatives of these parties in the Legislative Assembly.

Brissot, from the first, took the leadership of the left, and it was not until March, 1792, that Chabot's attack upon him proved that the deputies of the left were not all moved by

the same influences. His political career as a journalist and the founder of the *Société des Amis des Noirs* belongs to the early history of the Revolution,¹ but his election to the Legislative Assembly marks a new epoch in his life. He had now got an opportunity of showing if he had any practical knowledge of politics, and he conclusively proved that he had none. While distinctly republican in his ideas, he certainly never intended to dethrone the king by force, but he was quite ready to make the position of Louis so uncomfortable that he would be glad to abdicate. What he would do when he had established a Republic he himself did not know; but whatever he did, he was determined that his own name should be in all men's mouths. If the large majority of the deputies in the Constituent Assembly were theoretical politicians, Brissot surpassed them all, and his theories were not tinged with the poetry which threw a glamour over the dreams of the other Girondins. Though far inferior to any of them in eloquence or ability, his specious pretence of knowledge of "*la haute politique*," and especially of foreign affairs, gave him extraordinary influence over the brilliant group whose policy he was for a time to direct.

The character of Paris which so greatly enthralled the Girondins and had such immense influence on the Revolution—not so much, as has been shown, because its political life differed from that of the provinces, but because it was like the sphinx, to which Mirabeau compared it—seems to have inspired every man of ability to try to drag its secret from it. Very different was the Paris which the Girondins and the new deputies came up to see, from the Paris which had received the first news of the States-General, and which had watched with such keen interest the progress of the Constituent Assembly. The salons and the journals and the clubs which had influenced the Paris of 1789 were all entirely changed, but the new Paris was not yet tired of the excitement of Revolution, and was longing still to make fresh changes, and to strike new blows at all received ideas. In only one point did the Paris of 1791

¹ Vol. i. chap. iv. pp. 100, 101.

resemble the Paris of 1789, and that was its gaiety. Theatres and gambling-houses and places of amusement had increased and multiplied, and if the new deputies had a mind—as many of them had—to enjoy themselves, they might well be excused for yielding to the magic fascination of the capital. The salons had greatly changed in power and in character since 1789. The emigration of the Royalists had deprived many of the most famous drawing-rooms of their wittiest and gayest frequenters; and in their stead new men, fresh from the provinces, had to be the heroes of the ladies. But little did the ladies mind, for those who still remained in Paris were all violent politicians. To begin with, the old Royalist salons were broken up. No longer could Madame de Chambonas or Madame de Sabran receive the flower of the French court. Their power was gone, and those ladies had themselves left France. But certain ladies still tried to maintain the influence of French political women, and to assemble the chief leaders of parties in their drawing-rooms. It cannot be said that there was a single Royalist salon now in existence. True it was that Madame de Tessé still welcomed her friends who had been so powerful in the Constituent Assembly, and that Madame de Broglie continued to receive Barnave and his associates; but those ladies were no longer able to rejoice that the most influential men in France were their guests, for without exception the old leaders of the Constituent Assembly, and even the young men of the triumvirate,¹ who, for the time, had won such great popularity, now met with a dejected air to discuss how the progress of this terrible Revolution might be checked, and how the monarchy might be preserved. The excitement and gaiety of the Paris of 1791 was to be found rather in the drawing-rooms of Madame de Genlis, Madame de Staël, and Madame Roland, than in those of Madame de Broglie and Madame de Tessé. The salon of Madame de Genlis had not changed in character since the commencement of the Revolution, but the friends who had assembled round her when governess to the children of the Duke of

¹ Duport, Barnave, Charles de Lameth: see vol. i., pp. 240-243.

Orleans had now given place to men of much greater importance. Then she had only received the friends of a discredited and disliked prince of the blood. Now she had moved from her old home in the Palais Royal, and had taken a house in the Rue St. Honoré, close to the Legislative Assembly; and there gathered round her most of her old guests and some new ones, whose names were to be yet more famous. Her husband, the *ci-devant* Marquis de Sillery, was now a man of great importance—far more so than when he had been but the colonel of the Duke of Orleans' guards,—and he brought to his wife's drawing-room to meet her former guests, Laclos and Saint-Huruge, men of the new generation of politicians, such as Guadet and Gensonné. In the same way, Madame de Beauharnais no longer received only young noblesse of liberal ideas and literary men of the former generation, but was proud to do honour to journalists who had formerly had no position, but who were now powers in the land, such as Gorsas, the disgraced schoolmaster, and Garat, the radical professor of history at the Lycée. Madame Talma still received the flower of the literary world of Paris, and at her house both Girondin and Feuillant was welcomed if only he loved the arts and the drama. But there were two new salons where two very young women entertained, which completely outshone the old meeting-places of 1789, and these were the salons of Madame de Staël and Madame Roland.

Madame de Staël, the daughter of Necker and wife of the Swedish ambassador, was at the height of her reputation as a woman of politics and fashion. She was but twenty-five years of age, and had shone in Paris ever since her marriage to the Baron de Staël-Holstein, in 1787. Until her mother had left Paris she had only been an ornament of Madame Necker's salon, but she had now completely discarded her mother's old friends and formed a coterie for herself. Of this coterie Comte Louis de Narbonne-Lara was the star. The affection which Madame de Staël entertained for him was well known to all the world, and she was not ashamed of it. The young count believed that he was the man who could change the present

state of affairs, and make it favourable to the king; and, in the drawing-room of his beloved, many plots were concocted for bringing him into the ministry. Around him and around her gathered all those believers in the Constitution who were now designated Feuillants; and though the more extreme Royalists of the Assembly refused to have anything to do with the new party, with all the ability of a loving woman she had collected around her all the men who were best able to help the Comte de Narbonne. The idea of Madame de Staël was that all the young Feuillants should give an appearance of being as advanced in their revolutionary ideas as the Girondins themselves; that they should enthusiastically applaud every patriotic sentiment, and, when they had got the ear of the Assembly and of all France, should endeavour to strengthen the power of the king. But neither king nor queen cared much for Madame de Staël and her coterie. They would not trust to her offers of alliance now, because in former years the young ambassadress had shown herself a supporter of the party of movement in the Constituent Assembly. But Madame de Staël's power in Paris had become very great, and it will be seen that the king was at last obliged to yield to her wishes and to admit the Comte de Narbonne into the ministry. But the drawing-room of Madame de Staël, though it was the head-quarters of all the young Feuillants, was by no means closed to the brilliant leaders of the Gironde, and in her rooms those who opposed each other in the Assembly met on common ground. Unfortunately, Madame de Staël's love was rather for an individual than a cause, and the Girondins, feeling that, were more at home in the yet more famous salon of Madame Roland.

Manon Jeanne Roland was the daughter of an engraver,¹ who lived at Paris towards the close of the eighteenth century. From her very childhood she declares that she had been possessed by a longing for social equality, and had been disgusted when but a mere child that the ladies of the court should be able to dress so well. With this love of social

¹ See *Étude sur Madame Roland*, by C. A. Dauban (Paris: 1866); and his edition of her *Mémoires* (Paris: 1865).

equality had grown up an equally enthusiastic love for political liberty. Plutarch had been the favourite of her childhood, and she used to study his biographies at mass instead of following her missal, just as Marie Antoinette had read a far worse book. Her enthusiastic nature had in early childhood led her into an affectionate friendship for two girls whom she knew at her convent school. To them she poured out every hope of her heart; for them, with delightful frankness, she discussed the qualities of her various lovers, and tells them why she had accepted for her husband¹ the man who is known in the history of the Revolution as the "virtuous Roland." He was old enough to be her father, but she had somehow imbibed the idea that she would like to be of assistance to him in his labours as inspector of manufactures at Lyons, and that she would thus be helping in the furtherance of the doctrine of equality. Unfortunately, Roland was a man of cold exterior and very methodical habits, and he could not win the heart of his enthusiastic young wife, though he loved her very truly indeed. Her early affections were therefore centred on her child, and, at a later period, on a member of the Constituent Assembly, who played a great part in the history of the Girondin party in the Convention, Nicolas Buzot. The contrast between husband and wife had struck Arthur Young when travelling in France in 1788,² and still more did it strike the hearts of the enthusiastic young Girondins who were brought to her drawing-room during the winter of 1791. Madame Roland was an enthusiastic Republican, and hated the queen with a personal hatred, and treated her with a want of respect and a brutality of language which she must have repented bitterly when she needed pity herself. Round this enthusiastic priestess of liberty, rather than the coquettish and plain Madame de Staël, did the young Girondins collect.

¹ *Lettres de Madame Roland aux demoiselles Cannel*, edited by C. A. Dauban. Paris: 1863.

² See Arthur Young's *Travels*, ed. 1790, vol. i. p. 275, for his visit to Roland. "This gentleman, somewhat advanced in life, has a young and beautiful wife."

Vergniaud alone, the greatest of them all, seemed careless of her attractions, and preferred the artistic society of Madame Talma and his quiet home-life with his colleague Ducos.¹ But with Buzot and Brissot ever by her side, Gensonné and Guadet usually in her drawing-room, and the younger members of the party, such as Louvet and Grangeneuve, coming to receive inspiration from her, Madame Roland indeed became a political power in Paris. Enthusiasm was the quality which gave the Girondins their influence and made them of such political importance, and it was enthusiasm which Madame Roland inspired into the numerous frequenters of her drawing-room.

These were the two chief salons of the winter of 1791, but those of two other ladies must also be noticed, who, though they cannot be called political women, had far more beauty, both of character and face, than those who have been just mentioned. Sophie de Grouchy, sister of the marquis of that name, and, since 1786, Madame de Condorcet, was one of the most charming women of the whole Revolutionary period. She was the sister of Madame Cabanis and of the future Maréchal de Grouchy, formerly an officer in the Gardes du Corps, and now colonel of the 2nd Dragoons, and had married Condorcet, in spite of his cold exterior, for love. He was as cold and stiff in his demeanour, and it might be added as plain, as Roland himself; but Sophie de Condorcet was a more womanly woman than Madame Roland, and loved her husband as dearly as he loved her. Her great beauty and her rank would have enabled her to become a leading lady of fashion, but she preferred a quiet home life; and though she never lost a friend who frequented her drawing-room, she never attempted to make it a resort for politicians. Mirabeau, who disliked Condorcet, declared that not even the beauty of his wife could secure the election of the long-winded pedant to the Council-General of the department of the Seine; but had she cared to exert her powers of pleasing, there might have been a very

¹ See the letters of Madame Ducos to her husband in Wallon's *Histoire du Tribunal Révolutionnaire*, and Aulard's *Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention*, vol. ii. pp. 579, 580.

different result. She took a pride in the fact that her husband was willing to work on quietly, without being downcast at rejection in any particular election. He had been elected to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Seine for his reputation, not for his eloquence, for his voice was so weak that it could hardly be heard. His name has been always associated with the Girondins, but at this period he was not closely connected with them, and he never attended Madame Roland's salon. He held opinions in many ways resembling theirs, but he always distrusted Brissot, who was their idol, and went quietly along a path of his own, pursuing his own ideas without any reference to them or their projects, and continuing his quiet endeavours to do good without associating himself with any faction. Madame de Condorcet assisted in his labours, and though, as has been said, she did not attempt to keep a salon, there was but one home in Paris which could rival hers for its charming domestic happiness.

The quiet little apartment of Camille and Lucile Desmoulins can hardly be termed a salon. Yet the future leaders of the Revolution, Danton and Robespierre, met there on common ground with the men who were to make their names terrible to all Europe, such as Stanislas Fréron, Robert, Brune, Fabre d'Eglantine, and Merlin de Thionville. Camille, the witty author of the "*Discours de la Lanterne*," and the "*Révolutions de France et de Brabant*," had fallen deeply in love, before the beginning of the revolutionary excitement of 1789, with a young girl named Lucile Duplessis. He had married her in the December of 1790, and among the witnesses to the marriage were Pétion, Sillery, Mercier, Brissot, and Robespierre, his old schoolfellow at the Collège Louis le Grand.¹ The marriage had been a very happy one, and, though the young couple were not rich, they could afford to entertain their friends. The conversation did not run, as in the more lofty and political salons of Madame de Staël and Madame Roland, on political subjects. Lucile Desmoulins

¹ *Camille et Lucile Desmoulins*, by Jules Claretie, p. 151. Paris: 1875.

had a gentle woman's horror of riots and bloodshed, and the conversation which took place in her little room was rather of a domestic than a political character. And this it was that made her home such a pleasant one to the men who were preparing the last great effort for the overthrow of the French monarchy. If Madame Roland inspired the Girondins with a love of liberty and a longing to dethrone the proud Marie Antoinette, it was from Lucile Desmoulins that men of strong will and strong hand learned what was the nature of the women for whom they were to fight in what must be a war of life and death with the monarchy. The main feature of the character and ideas of the Enragés Jacobins who met in her house, was their knowledge that things had gone too far for any compromise. The Feuillants hoped that the Constitution would be maintained, and that the unpractical notions of the Constituent Assembly would be allowed a fair trial. The Girondins, indeed, did not wish to overthrow that Constitution, but they wanted to establish a republic of an ideal type upon the basis it afforded. The extreme Jacobins, of whom the typical friends of Lucile Desmoulins were Robespierre and Danton, were too clear-sighted not to see through both of these fallacies. With a people wild for Revolution, with a constitution utterly unpractical in character, and with foreign enemies threatening them from abroad, neither an ideal powerless monarchy nor an ideal republic could by any possibility be maintained. Robespierre, Danton, and all the extreme Jacobins wanted a form of government which would work. They knew that the war with the ancien régime was one of extermination, and that it was impossible, on any basis at which they had yet arrived, for the two parties to sit down and shake hands with each other. These men saw the necessity for the violent measures by which they were to win their fame and establish their power. They were men who did not shrink from shedding blood, and they would have had the candour to confess that they would rather slay other men than be slain themselves. For a moment, after the massacre of July 17, this extreme party had been disheartened. Danton

had returned to his property at Arcis-sur-Aube; Marat escaped to England; Robespierre had sought shelter in the house of Duplay; and Camille had discontinued his journal. But they were not disheartened for long, and the meeting of the Legislative Assembly made them put forth all their efforts to combine Paris for further efforts, and, above all, to organize France as distinguished from Paris for the coming struggle. To such men, who knew that they were playing a desperate game, for they themselves were held up to execration both by Frenchmen and by the foreigners who were threatening to help the king against them, it was a relief to turn from crowded political assemblies and noisy popular clubs, to a quiet home where politics were not regarded as the only end of life, and where a gentle woman could be to them what Sophie de Condorcet was, in a more exalted sphere, to her friends.

The influence of the cafés of Paris in 1789 has been noticed; but by the end of 1791 they obtained a much greater political importance than in 1789. The very diminution in the number of salons increased the importance of cafés as places of rendezvous for politicians. The famous old cafés of the eighteenth century, which had been generally frequented by literary men of influence, still existed, but they never became entirely political. At the Café Procope, kept by the Italian Zoppi, whose name was well known in the pantomimes of the day, there still met some relics of the age which had seen Diderot go there every night after the performance of a new piece at the Théâtre Français on the other side of the street, but the emigration had removed many of the old frequenters of the Café Procope, and Zoppi complained that the new literary men were not so courteous as their predecessors. At the Café des Arts and the Café de Flore literary men still assembled, but the cafés which played a part in the political life of the Revolution were not the same as those which had played so great a part in the literary history of Paris in the eighteenth century. Notable among them were the cafés of the Palais Royal, and, most of all, the Cafés de Valois, de la Régence, and de Foy. At the Café de Valois the Feuillants chiefly

congregated. In it were to be heard praises of the perfect Constitution of 1791, and in it the journals which upheld that Constitution were chiefly studied. There were no such noisy scenes as had taken place in the days when the Vicomte de Mirabeau and his friends got drunk night after night in the Palais Royal; for the young Feuillants, if they did not possess the wit, certainly did not attempt to rival the impudence and debauchery of the old supporters of the Royalist cause. The Café de la Régence had been since 1789 the resort of the friends of Lafayette. The officers of the National Guard of Paris were always welcome, and were in the habit of holding their festival dinners there. Though there had been a time when the Café de la Régence had been surrounded by a cheering crowd, it had now gone by, and the officers of the Parisian National Guard heard the name of their general hooted outside their meeting place. But the most famous of all was the Café de Foy, which had a long and chequered history during the Revolution. It was at this time the chief rendezvous of the many stock-jobbers and speculators who spent the day in the neighbourhood of the Palais Royal depreciating the value of assignats, and their evenings in making a profit by their possession of specie. Large fortunes were to be made by this means, and, like most speculators, the men who made money quickly were ready to spend it lavishly at the Café de Foy,—the more so, as their profits brought upon them the hatred of the people, and there was always a chance that they might be hanged any day an enemy raised a cry against them. For it must never be forgotten that the Palais Royal, which had been in 1789 the meeting-place of the poorer politicians of Paris, was in 1791 the chosen “Bourse” of the speculators in assignats. Besides the most famous cafés of the Palais Royal, there are two or three others which deserve notice at this period. Particularly popular with the men who were to do the dirty work of the Revolution was the Café Corazza, in a back street near the Palais Royal. Here could be seen any day such men as Varlet and Proly, as yet unknown to fame, and drinking with them the men who were

to make use of them in more than one terrible crisis, such as Collot d'Herbois, the actor, and, sometimes, a deputy to the Legislative Assembly, Chabot, the unfrocked priest. On the other side of the Palais Royal, not very far from the Jacobin Club, was the Café de la Victoire, which was kept by the sapper Audouin, editor of the *Journal Universel*, who used to describe himself as the patriot sapper of the Café de la Victoire. Other cafés there were which came into note at a later date, under the Terror and during the struggle with the Girondins, such as Café du Caveau; but mention has now been made of those which were generally frequented during the first months of the Legislative Assembly.

The theatres of Paris had been affected by the revolutionary fervour, and in their pits were to be found earnest politicians, listening to plays which treated of the burning questions of the day. It is curious to notice the different plays which were performed on various occasions during the year 1791. Mention has been made of the "Charles IX." of Marie Joseph Chénier, which was performed at the Français in 1789, and in which allusions to the massacre of St. Bartholomew were so warmly taken up by people in the pit. Equally interesting is the description in the correspondence of Mirabeau with La Marck, of his enthusiastic reception when he was present at the performance of Voltaire's "Brutus" in the December of 1790. At the feast of Federation, in July, 1790, the plays performed were typical of the opinions held at the Théâtre Français and at the Opera house. There was played at the Opera "Louis IX. en Egypte," which recalled the qualities of another Louis, king of France; while at the Français were played, on different nights, "Augustin et Bayard," which treated of loyalty, and which was put on by the wish of the actors themselves, but followed, rather against the feeling of the company, by the "Famille Patriote," of Collot, and at the entry of the fédérés of Marseilles, the anti-Royalist "Charles IX." But the actors of the Théâtre Français did not approve of being made to play Republican plays, and two distinct parties appeared in the company. Grand-

mesnil attempted to steer a middle course; but at last the opposition between the Royalist and the Jacobin actors became so great, that the company broke in half in the April of 1791. At the old theatre of the Théâtre Français, where the Odéon now stands, Mandat, and Dazincourt, the chief actor of kings, with Madame Contat and Mademoiselle Raucourt remained to play pieces which flattered their Royalist proclivities, and which proportionately disgusted their audiences, especially their neighbours, the club of the Cordeliers, who, a couple of years later, secured the arrest of the entire company. On the other hand, the Jacobin actors and actresses, headed by Talma and Dugazon, Madame Sainval and Madame Desgarcins, emigrated to the Théâtre des Variétés Amusantes in the Rue Richelieu, which they called the Théâtre Français de la Rue Richelieu, and which opened with a new play of Chénier's, called "Henri VIII.," under the management of Talma and the veteran actor Grandmesnil. In revolutionary Paris it is easy to imagine which theatre was the most successful pecuniarily, and which most popular with the masses of the people. The "pièces de circonstance" deserve a slight notice, although they had not yet become as universal as they did under the Terror. The performance of the "Famille Patriote" of Collot has been noticed, but most of these "pièces de circonstance" referred to the latest reforms of the Assembly. Thus the "Victimes Cloîtrées" of Monvel was played at the Théâtre de la Nation, and Fiévée's "Rigueurs des Cloîtres" at the Théâtre Italien, but it was not until after the proclamation of the Republic that this sort of piece became popular.

If the theatre reflected the political passions of the time, still more did the journals. It is true that the year 1791 was not signalized by production of so many new journals as the year 1789. But many journals which had been started earlier gained new vitality under the Legislative Assembly, in spite of the restrictive laws passed in the last days of the old Constituent Assembly. The Royalist journals had naturally died out when the king and queen began to have other uses for their money than subsidizing libels on their opponents, and

the *Ami du Roi* of Royou was the only representative of the class of papers which had been disgraced by the obscenity, though illuminated by the wit, of Rivarol and Champcenetz. Panckoucke still continued to carry on his three journals, with their three different political aspects. The old *Gazette* was still conducted by Fontanelle, but was often bankrupt for want of subscribers. The *Mercure* still had a large sale, from Mallet du Pan's wide knowledge of continental politics and numerous correspondents all over Europe. But the *Moniteur* was Panckoucke's most successful venture, for it was conducted with the idea of giving a faithful picture of the Revolution, and abounded in revolutionary sentiments. Of the old journals started in 1789, which still continued to attract subscribers, may be mentioned Feydel's *Observateur Français*, the *Journal des Débats*, Gorsas' *Courrier de Versailles*, and the *Journal de Paris*, now under the editorship of Garat. Two journals started during the year 1790 seemed at once to have sprung into popularity. These were the *Feville Villageois*—the journal which had been started by Condorcet and Cerutti, to instruct the country districts as to what was going on in Paris,—and the *Annales Patriotiques et Littéraires*, which was under the guidance of two experienced journalists, Mercier and Carra. The *Journal Logographique* of Lehodey,¹ which was established in 1791 to publish an exact shorthand report of the debates of the Constituent Assembly was also continued, but it was hardly intended to have a very large sale, and it is rather useful for its accurate reports than for its political information. Incomparably the most important journal of this time was the *Ami du Peuple* of Marat. The persecution which he had suffered from Lafayette had endeared him to the people, and his denunciation of the folly of the Parisians seemed rather to please them than otherwise. That he libelled many innocent men there can be no doubt; that he encouraged the Parisians to bloodshed there can also be no doubt. The longer he remained a journalist the more clear-sighted he became; and his rôle during the session

¹ Vol. i., chapter iv., p. 103.

of the Legislative Assembly was of such vast importance that it will be necessary to observe his opinion on every subject that arose. Just as he had not feared Lafayette and the National Guard of Paris, he did not fear the new party which was rising into power, and attacked Brissot when the leader of a powerful party as violently as he had attacked him in the days when he was but the unimportant founder of the *Société des Amis des Noirs*. The events of July 17 had driven him for a short time to England, but he returned at the opening of the Legislative Assembly, and recommenced his journal with fresh vigour. He was summoned back to work by the members of the club of the Cordeliers, who begged him to draw up a "*Catéchisme Révolutionnaire*," to be taught to every child. The earnestness with which he threw himself into his work as a journalist, and his foresight as a politician, appear particularly on the great question of the war. No account of the journals of 1791 would be complete without an allusion to the *Bouche de Fer*, the recognized organ of the *Cercle Sociale*, the club which had arisen, in the October of 1790, in imitation of a Freemasons' lodge, and which was the creation of Claude Fauchet, the Constitutional Bishop of Calvados. In its columns was to be found the expression of that longing for social equality which so large a portion of the French people had now joined to its desire for political liberty.

Such was the Paris which saw the opening of the Legislative Assembly; and the position of the royal family in the Tuileries, which was attacked alike by Girondins and Jacobins, deserves a passing notice. The king, on the failure of the flight to Varennes, seems to have lost all heart, and it was only through the queen that the opposition of the court to the Revolution was at all encouraged. She could not believe that the princes of Europe, especially her brother the emperor, would allow matters to go further, and earnestly begged him to interfere at once to rescue herself and her husband from the mob of Paris. Leopold had expressed a strong opinion against the project of flight, and had promised if it was post-

poned that he would get the monarchs of Europe to set their armies on foot, and make a general demonstration in favour of the king and queen of France;¹ but, nevertheless, when he saw that the queen was determined, he gave all the assistance in his power to her scheme. When it failed, and the royal family was ignominiously conducted back to Paris, Leopold, after an interview with the Comte d'Artois at Mantua, and encouraged by the assurances of Lord Elgin and Bischoffswerder, the special envoys of England and Prussia, issued a circular letter² to the powers from Padua on July 6, declaring the cause of Louis to be the cause of all kings, and requesting them to present an identical note of protest through their ambassadors at Paris. The letter from Padua was followed up by the conference and declaration of Pilnitz, but Leopold was too wise to really desire war, and under the influence of his old counsellors the Prince von Kaunitz and Marshal Lacy, he took the opportunity to retract the Padua letter on the king's acceptance of the Constitution in September, 1791, and again permitted the French ambassador to appear at his court. With her thoughts set upon armed assistance from her brother, it is little wonder that Marie Antoinette paid but scant attention to the numerous politicians, who secretly advised her and the king, among whom the most notable in their different ways were Barnave, Malouet, Dupont de Nemours, and the astute Swiss publicist, Mallet du Pan.

The king had little more reliance on his ministers than he had on his secret advisers, and indeed they were not worthy of very much notice, for the ministers had become, by the policy of the Constituent Assembly, mere executive officers who were responsible when anything went wrong and who received no praise when everything went right. The only man of any

¹ *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe pendant la Révolution Française*, by François de Bourgoing, vol. i. p. 354. Paris: 1865.

² *Quellen zur Geschichte der deutscher Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs während der französischen Révolutionskriege*, by Alfred, Ritter von Vivenot, vol. i. pp. 185–216, Vienna, 1873; and *Ursprung und Beginn der Revolutionskriege*, by Leopold von Ranke, p. 90. Leipzig: 1875.

distinction or experience who was in office when the Legislative Assembly met was Montmorin, and he had been desirous of leaving the Foreign Office ever since the death of Mirabeau had deprived the court of the one statesman who could really direct the foreign policy of France. He had only retained office at the personal request of the king, but was determined to leave it as soon as his successor could be found. The other ministers, Valdec de Lessart, Duport du Tertre, Duportail, and Tarbé, were men of no weight, and the Legislative Assembly soon showed how small was the respect felt there for the executive power. Rabusson-Lamothe, deputy for the Puy de Dôme, describes the attitude of the Assembly towards the ministers in one of his first letters to his constituents. He writes to them on October 13, "The ministers have appeared in the Assembly three times since the king formally opened it. They have certainly not had to congratulate themselves on the politeness of the legislative body, for they were treated as if they had been criminals placed in the dock to undergo their examination."¹ It was this ferocity of the Assembly towards the ministers, which made Ségur refuse to fill the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mathieu Dumas had good reason to rejoice that he had preferred a seat in the Assembly to the Ministry for War. Before long, however, another attempt was made to strengthen the king's position, through his ministry, by the admission into office, through Madame de Staël's intrigues, of the Comte de Narbonne, when he succeeded Duportail as Minister for War in December, 1791.

The actual debates in the Legislative Assembly were confined almost entirely, during the first three months of its session, to the two great questions of the priests who had not taken the oath, and of the émigrés. It must be remembered that the Constituent Assembly had passed a law that a Convention must be summoned to alter the Constitution, and that therefore no constitutional measure of importance could be

¹ *Lettres sur l'Assemblée Législative (1791-1792) par Rabusson-Lamothe, député du Puy de Dôme, précédées d'une notice biographique, by Francisque Mège, p. 45. Paris : 1870.*

passed by the new Assembly. It was thus obliged to confine its activity to these two administrative questions, but before the debates on them are discussed at length, the opening debate of the Assembly, which treated of questions of ceremony, must be noticed. At its first session on September 30, the oldest deputy present, named Bartauld, took the chair, and, after the verification of powers, Pastoret was elected first president of the Legislative Assembly. As soon as he had taken his seat on October 5, Georges Couthon, who sat among the Jacobins on the extreme left of the Assembly, but who did not play a very great part in the Legislative Assembly, proposed that the royal chair should be brought from its high elevation and placed on a level with that of the president, "For," said the avocat of Clermont-Ferrand, "the king is only the first functionary of the people."¹ The motion was carried with great enthusiasm, and Grangeneuve, who did not wish to be outdone in disrespect for the royal person, moved that all ceremonial titles, such as "Your Majesty" and "Sire," should be dispensed with, which was also carried with enthusiasm. But the next day the Assembly saw that by such motions it merely made itself ridiculous, and the decrees were reversed. It then occupied itself for a few days with the question of San Domingo, and directed the Minister of War, on the motion of Vaublanc, to send three thousand soldiers immediately to the colony. The Girondins and the Jacobins alike sought to discredit the king and his ministers, and thus pave the way for a republic. They occupied themselves at intervals with attacking the ministry, and they had good reason to do so when the news of the massacre at Avignon reached the Assembly. The details of this terrible event deserve a minute description, for they illustrate the incompetence of the ministry and also the disregard of human life which the anarchy of the last two years had fostered in Avignon.

It was noticed that in the month of June, 1791, three commissioners, the Abbé Mulot, M. Lescène-Desmaisons, and

¹ *Correspondance de Georges Couthon*, edited by F. Mège for the *Académie* of Clermont-Ferrand, pp. 28-30. Paris: 1873.

M. de Verninac, had been sent to Avignon to act as mediators between the various parties in that city.¹ These mediators entirely neglected their duty, and made no attempt to call the attention of the government to the critical state of affairs; while M. de Verninac amused himself with a love affair with the daughter of an officer of the National Guard. But their eyes might have been opened and the attention of the ministry attracted by the violent riot which took place in the city on August 21. This riot was the work of Jourdan and his officers, and resulted in the overthrow of the old municipality and the appointment of five administrators chosen from the revolutionary party, under the influence of Jourdan Coupe-tête, who established himself in the richly furnished apartments, hitherto occupied by the vice-legates, in the Palace of the Popes.² When, upon September 17, the news of the union of the city with France³ arrived, there was a great festival, but the new French commissioners to carry out the union did not arrive, and the ministry, instead of following up this measure by sending a powerful force to maintain order, seem to have forgotten all about Avignon, and allowed the extreme party, who were now supreme in the city, and who felt strengthened by the union with France, to go their own way unmolested. Nevertheless the supremacy of the extreme party was due rather to the audacity and ferocity of their leaders, Jourdan Coupe-tête, Sabin Tournal, Rovère, Lescuyer, the Mainvielles and the Duprats, than to their real power, for the great majority of the bourgeois and of the National Guard, though sincerely rejoiced by the union with France, detested the anarchy, which Jourdan and his "Army of the Vaucluse" wished to perpetuate. The Swiss Guard of the Vice-Legate, which had kept order in former times in cases of emergency, had gone to Carpentras with him, so that there was no armed authority to control either the National Guard or the satellites of Jourdan, who were bound to come to blows. An excuse

¹ See vol. i., chap. xvi., p. 513.

² Soullier's *Histoire de la Révolution d'Avignon*, vol. i. p. 259.

³ Decreed on September 13; vol. i., chap. xvi., p. 513.

was afforded on October 16, by the murder of M. Lescuyer, the secretary of the old municipality, and a leader of the extreme party, who was dragged into the church of the Cordeliers, and murdered in front of the high altar. Before this murder the religious feelings of the devout Catholics of the city had been greatly disturbed by hearing that the face of the statue of the Virgin in the church had turned red in a single night¹ and had wept copious tears, and the advanced revolutionists of the city determined to forestall the coming attack on their authority by the Catholic mob. Still the French troops did not arrive, though one of the mediators, the Abbé Mulot, and eighteen hundred French soldiers, under General La Ferrière, were at Sorgues, only six miles distant. All the afternoon of the day of Lescuyer's murder, Jourdan and his satellites marched up and down the city of Avignon, arresting every respectable aristocrat or bourgeois whom they feared for his influence with the Catholic mob or hated from motives of personal revenge. And when the suspects, as he called them, had all been imprisoned, this terrible leader, whose authority remained unchecked, held an informal court, and one after the other the prisoners were brutally murdered during the night, and their bodies thrown into the tower of the Glacière.² Sixty-one of the most respectable persons of the city, including thirteen women, were thus cruelly massacred; and even then, the French troops would not enter the city, but left it at the mercy of Jourdan. At last, under pressure both from the king and the Assembly, General Choisy, who commanded in the district of the Lyonnais, was ordered to march with the two infantry regiments of Boulonnais and La Marek, together with the Lorraine dragoons, the Chamboran hussars, and four companies of artillery; and with them he entered

¹ See the curious report of an expert, M. Plat, dated October 17, 1791, describing the colouring matter which had been used on the statue, in Soullier's *Histoire de la Révolution d'Avignon*, vol. i. pp. 395, 396.

² On the massacres of October 16, see Soullier's *Histoire de la Révolution d'Avignon*, vol. ii. pp. 1-33; and André's *Histoire de la Révolution Avignonnaise*, vol. ii. pp. 1-75.

the unhappy city on November 7. He was followed the next day by the three commissioners appointed by the Assembly to take over the government of Avignon and the Venaissin, Lescène-Desmaisons, Champion de Villeneuve, and the General d'Albignac. The soldiers and the commissioners were received with transports by the peaceful inhabitants; and their wrath against Jourdan Coupe-tête and his satellites was greatly augmented by the discovery on November 9 of the sixty-one mutilated bodies owing to the terrible stench which issued from the tower of the Glacière. The bodies were solemnly interred, and Jourdan was knocked down by the soldiery in the street, and would have been murdered but for the personal intervention of General Choisy. On the same day, the old municipality, which had been overthrown on August 21, was reinstated by the commissioners, who at once ordered that Jourdan and the leading criminals should be arrested. He attempted to escape from the city, but was pursued and brought back in irons by some dragoons. Shortly afterwards, on the demand of the Legislative Assembly, he was sent to Paris for his case to be tried. So valuable a murderer was not likely to be neglected by the extreme Jacobins of Paris, and after being amnestied he was instrumental in the murders of Versailles. He even returned to Avignon, but, strange to say, was denounced and arrested as a moderate Republican in the beginning of 1794, and was guillotined in July, 1794, to the delight of the people of Avignon, by order of the representative on mission, Bernard of Saintes.

The question of the émigrés was one which affected the provinces more than Paris, and was therefore likely to be soon discussed by deputies who really represented the feeling of the provinces. The absence of the noblesse was severely felt in the provincial districts, because they had taken much of the specie of the kingdom out of it, and though this paved the way for speculations in assignats, it played havoc with the small capitalist. But that was not all. The populace were not satisfied with the bargains they had got in the purchase of Church lands, and now wished to purchase those of the

nobility at the same low price ; and there was, besides, a feeling of shame in the Assembly, and indeed all through France, that so many Frenchmen should be in arms on the eastern frontier, breathing nothing but a desire to fight with and destroy their own countrymen. It was this which had induced Barnave to advise the king to send the Chevalier de Coigny to the Comte d'Artois, in the previous August, to try and persuade him to re-enter the country, with the inevitable result of a blank refusal. On October 20, the question of the émigrés was raised, and for more than a fortnight it was discussed by all the leaders of the Assembly in a long series of debates, in which Brissot, Isnard, Condorcet, Pastoret, and Vergniaud especially distinguished themselves. It was Vergniaud who, in an eloquent speech on October 25, which secured his election to the presidency four days afterwards, pointed out that the émigrés could be classed in three categories : simple citizens, whose property could be affected, if their persons could not be seized ; officers, on whom the penalties for desertion could be invoked ; and the princes of the blood. The attitude of Monsieur, he declared, called for immediate legislation, and on October 31 a decree was passed, that if Monsieur did not return within two months he should be held to have forfeited his right to the regency. The general question was referred to the committee of "surveillance," and on the report of Ducastel, a celebrated lawyer of Rouen, and a member of the right of the Assembly, it was decreed on November 9, that all émigrés who had not returned by January 1, 1792, should be declared conspirators, that their property should be confiscated, and that they should be condemned to death. This motion was carried almost unanimously, because even the most Royalist deputies thought it was time that the émigrés should be forced to return, and that the interval allowed them was sufficiently long. But the king, after confirming the decree against Monsieur, vetoed the decree of November 9, and sent Duport du Tertre down to the Assembly, on November 12, to announce his determination. The minister, after stating the king's veto, attempted to give the king's reasons ; but

Vergniaud, who was president, informed him that the deputies were obliged to hear that the king had vetoed the decree, but that they were not obliged to listen to his reasons. Foiled by the king's veto, the Girondins now changed their tactics, and moved, on November 29, that the king be requested to write to the German princes about their harbouring of the émigrés. Louis consented, and on receiving an answer from the emperor alleging his duty to protect any prince of the empire, who appealed to him, he came down to the Assembly on December 14, and defended Leopold's right to make this answer. The Girondin party now began to show that they hoped for an outbreak of war, caused by the question of the émigrés, which would destroy whatever power the king had left; and they therefore devoted all their eloquence to bring about a declaration of war. This was the aim of the motion about the German princes; and the year closed with a decree, on December 27, that the king should tell his brother-in-law and the other German princes that France would declare war if the émigrés were not at once expelled.

What, then, was the situation and the strength of the émigrés, against whom the Legislative Assembly was directing all these decrees? Was there any chance of their forcing their way into France and re-establishing the authority of the king? From the vehemence with which they were attacked, it might have been thought that they formed a powerful army of seasoned soldiers, instead of a mere handful looked upon with suspicion by the petty German princes around them. The Comte d'Artois had quitted the court of his father-in-law at Turin, in 1791, and after an important interview with the Emperor Leopold, which had influenced that monarch in issuing the circular letter of Padua, had taken up his residence at Coblenz, where he was joined by the crowd of high-born lords and ladies, who had been spending their time gaily at Spa, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Brussels, in daily expectation of a speedy return to France. Here, too, he had been joined by Monsieur, after his successful escape in June, 1791; and the two princes were allowed by the Elector-Archbishop of Trèves to dwell in

his palace of Schönburnlust, near Coblenz, where their mistresses, Madame de Balbi, and Madame de Polastron, held their courts, in spite of the presence of Madame.¹ In this crowd of émigrés there were few individuals who did not believe in the rapid success of their cause, but there was a wide difference of opinion as to the manner in which that success could be best achieved. One party, and it was that favoured by the Comte d'Artois, believed that the French monarchy could only be restored by foreign help, and under that impression, Artois had himself been present at Pilnitz, and kept his agents, Comte Valentine Esterhazy, the Prince de Ligne, the Baron de Roll, and the Duc d'Havré, at the courts of St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid. But the more sagacious and patriotic émigrés at Coblenz, as well as the majority of the poorer nobility, who were at Worms with the Prince de Condé, were ashamed at the idea of returning to France with foreign aid, and desired rather to raise a counter-revolution in France itself through the loyal and religious party, and thus restore the king to power. This was not what Artois wanted; he was entirely under the influence of Calonne, and wished to restore the full power of the old French monarchy; and he feared that the result of a civil war would be but a compromise, and that Louis XVI. would be only too glad to be a constitutional king. In his longing for absolutism, he paid no attention to the wishes of the king and queen, and was careless of the danger into which he was thrusting them at Paris; and not satisfied with disobeying the king's openly expressed commands and private entreaties, that he would stop his intrigues, he persisted in his plans, and checked the schemes of the Baron de Breteuil, the king's secret but authorized ambassador at Brussels, and thwarted his agents at Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Madrid, in every possible way. Monsieur looked on at the intrigues of his younger brother and the danger of the king with the utmost tranquillity. He expected no happy result from the intervention of foreign powers, but was content to let things slide, and to wait

¹ *Forneron's Histoire générale des Émigrés*, vol. i. p. 258.

until Fortune should be pleased to turn her wheel in his favour.

It was not from Coblenz, then—from a network of intrigue, where selfishness reigned—that danger threatened France on the part of the émigrés. The headquarters of the more serious minded among them, who had emigrated, not because it was the fashion, or because they had just reason to fear the anger of the people, but because they were sincerely attached to the monarchy and the Catholic religion, was at Worms. There the Prince de Condé, the only Bourbon who had given evidence of military ability, and a veteran of the Seven Years' War, had established himself in the palace of the Elector-Archbishop of Mayence, who was also Prince-Bishop of Worms, with his mistress, the Princess of Monaco, his son, the Duc de Bourbon, and his grandson, the Duc d'Enghien.¹ Here he set to work to organize an army of émigrés, while the princes at Coblenz were intriguing and dancing; and very hard work he found it. Officers he had in plenty, but soldiers were few. The officers of some regiments had led across the frontier the whole, or nearly the whole of their regiments, and the cavalry regiments, Royal Allemand and Dauphin, the hussars of Berchiny, and the infantry regiment of Berwick, which had deserted *en masse*, formed the nucleus of his army. The Cardinal de Rohan, the Prince of Nassau-Siegen, the Comte de Bussy, and the Vicomte de Mirabeau, had raised regiments, or legions, as they were called, in Germany, and the young nobles, who crossed the frontier in numbers throughout the year 1791, were enrolled either in regiments of guards, taking the titles of the old household corps, or in the regiments of noble cavalry and noble infantry. In all, the Prince de Condé had under his command, by the end of 1791, about twenty-three thousand men, including the flower of the French nobility, who did not want for courage, though not very amenable to discipline. It was this army of Condé's which was the real source of danger to France. The cooler spirits in the Assembly knew this well, and while ful-

¹ Forneron's *Histoire générale des Émigrés*, vol. i. p. 250.

minating decrees against the princes at Coblenz, and compelling the king to write letters to the German princes on the Rhine to obtain their expulsion, it was really the army of Condé at which their decrees were aimed, and on which their attention was fixed. The German princes were equally disturbed by the presence of this army, and both disliked it and feared it as much as the French Assembly. The Emperor Leopold highly disapproved of the army, as an obstacle in the way of a peaceful termination of the present state of affairs; and the south German princes, who were all more or less under the influence of the *illuminati*, who, as will appear later, sympathized with the new ideas in France, soon showed their fear and dislike. The Archbishop-Elector of Mayence, though he had not minded lending his palace at Worms to Condé, showed his apprehensions of the presence of his army in every possible way; Charles Eugène, Duke of Wurtemberg, and Charles II., Duke des Deux Ponts, were equally hostile; and Charles Frederick, Margrave of Baden, and Charles Theodore, Elector-Palatine and Duke of Bavaria, went so far as to erect gallows along their frontiers with this inscription: "Émigrés and vagabonds are forbidden to pass this line."¹

In this state of affairs, Condé saw that it was necessary for him to establish himself in France, or else he would be speedily expelled from Germany, and his army would be disbanded; and he also felt the awkwardness of summoning Frenchmen to leave their native land, and believed that if he were once firmly established in France, the whole of the Catholic inhabitants would rally to him, though they hesitated to emigrate. The first city in which he hoped to fix his headquarters, was the great city of Lyons, and an elaborate plot was set on foot to enable him to get there;² but he soon had to recognize that its distance from his present headquarters must prevent a surprise, and that the authorities were too vigilant for him. Then he began to scheme for the possession of Strasbourg, the ideal headquarters for his army, as a strong fortress, and so

¹ *Mémoires* of the Comte de Tilly.

² Balleydier's *Histoire du peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution*.

close to the frontier that he would have no difficulty in receiving succour from Germany. As early as March, 1791, Mercy had written to the queen, "Alsace should be regarded as the central point of the operations, which are to be attempted. In obtaining possession of the city and citadel of Strasbourg, a position will be secured, at once safe and formidable, within reach of the promised assistance, and at the same time with a secure retreat in case of need."¹ Marshal Lückner, who had assumed the command of the city and province, had not more than fifteen thousand men under his command, of whom three-quarters were raw recruits; and it was believed that, as a soldier of fortune, he could be easily won over. The Marquis de Vioménil,² one of the ablest of the émigré chiefs, was sent to Kehl, with an unlimited command of money, and the order of the princes that Strasbourg should be seized in the name of the king; and M. de Thessonet, a young aidê-de-camp, went in and out of the city, at the peril of his life, to make the necessary arrangements. The officers of the garrison, which consisted of the two regiments of Carbineers, the Régiment Royal-Liégois, the German regiment of Salm-Salm, and the Swiss regiments of Vigier and Pallavicini, were quite ready to co-operate. Lückner seemed careless, and all was ready by December 28. From that day, to January 10, Condé waited for the news of a rising, and kept his troops in hand to enter the city. But the news never came. The officers hesitated to commit themselves; Dietrich, the Mayor of Strasbourg, who was informed of the plot by the Chancellor Ochs, of Bâle, his brother-in-law, was on his guard; and in January, the young Prince de Broglie arrived to take up his post, as chief of the staff to Lückner, and his presence was enough by itself to confirm the old marshal's loyalty to his

¹ *Marie Antoinette, Joseph II., und Leopold II. Ihr Briefwechsel herausgegeben*, von Alfred, Ritter von Arneth, pp. 148, 149. Vienna: 1866.

² *Une conspiration royaliste à Strasbourg en 1792*, by Victor de Saint Génis, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, for March 15, 1880; a valuable article, compiled from the papers of Vioménil.

adopted country. Condé's well-laid scheme was thus foiled. Vioménil left Kehl, and in the month of February, the protestations of the Duke of Wurtemberg and the Elector of Mayence were supported by the Emperor Leopold, and Condé's army was ordered to leave Worms, and retire further into Germany. The importance of this plot cannot be overrated; its existence justifies the decrees of the Legislative Assembly against the émigrés, while its failure marked the helplessness of the party which wished to check the progress of the Revolution, but yet did not want to call in foreign aid.

The other burning question was the question of the priests who had not taken the oath. Gensonné and Gallois had been sent by the Constituent to report on the un-constitutional clergy of the western provinces, and they reported to the Legislative that the priests who had taken the oath were not regarded by the peasants as priests at all. It might have been expected that with such knowledge Gensonné would have tried to keep the Assembly from making the mistake of persecuting the clergy who refused to take the oath; but instead of doing so, he assisted, on the advice of Brissot, in the attack made on these unfortunate priests. Hardly had the decree of November 9 been vetoed by the king than the debate on the subject of the priests began, which was known to touch the king yet more nearly, for he himself believed in his heart that the priests who had taken the oath were schismatics. Nevertheless, as if the Girondins had determined to hurt his feelings and make him suspected by the people, they passed the unjust decree of November 29, that if all priests did not take the oath within a week, they should be deprived of their benefices, and expelled by the directories of the different departments. This violent decree was unjust and impolitic in every respect. It was unjust because the Constituent Assembly had taken possession of the Church lands on the distinct grounds that vested interests were to be acknowledged, and that a fair pension should be given to the refractory priests. It was impolitic because, as Gensonné himself admitted, the feeling of the peasants was in favour of

the refractory priests. Nevertheless the motion was carried, and, as was expected, immediately vetoed by the king, on December 19.

As the year closed, it became obvious that the use of the king's veto had had a bad effect upon his popularity, that the people of Paris were more than ever estranged from him, and that he could no longer depend, as formerly, upon the city authorities to defend his person. Lafayette, disgusted at the loss of his popularity, and almost hating the national guards for their expressed distrust of him, resigned his post of commandant in a hurry; and the Assembly, adroitly taking advantage of his resignation, declared that for the future there should be no commandant-general of the National Guard of Paris, but that the six commandants of the legions should each command in chief for a month in turn. Still more important was the change in the mayoralty. Bailly, after more than two years of perpetual worry, resigned his office, and Lafayette had the temerity to propose himself as a candidate for the vacant office. Poor Bailly had done his best, but he had proved utterly incapable as the chief magistrate of a city which demanded above all things a firm ruler in a time of difficulty. Pétion was nominated by the Jacobin Club in opposition to Lafayette, and was elected on November 17 by a triumphant majority. The change was perceptible at once, for while Bailly, with the grace of an old courtier, had gone to the Tuileries on January 1, both in 1790 and in 1791, to offer his congratulations to the king on the new year, Pétion neglected all such formalities, and remained at the Mairie to receive the congratulations of his own friends.

Jérôme Pétion, the successor of Bailly, was the deputy of the extreme left who had shared the popular favour bestowed upon Robespierre at the close of the Constituent Assembly. Yet the character of the two men was utterly different; the one, though possessing faults both of mind and character, was yet from his tenacity of purpose and untiring industry very nearly being a great man, while the other, who was now the

ruler of Paris, was a very ordinary, vain, and incapable statesman. Jérôme Pétion, or as he termed himself Pétion de Villeneuve, was born at Chartres, in 1760, and became an avocat in his native city. He obtained a great reputation there, and, like every ambitious young lawyer, at once wrote for the press, and sent certain articles on the subject of the marriage laws to Brissot's *Bibliothèque de la Législation*. He was elected to the States-General by the tiers état of Chartres, but it was more than eighteen months before his name became known. It was only after the death of Mirabeau that the Radical party gained popularity with the mob, and then it was Pétion rather than Robespierre who was singled out for special admiration. His handsome face and courteous manners won the hearts of the people more than Robespierre's austerity; and while Robespierre was admired, Pétion was adored, until his weakness became manifest. So greatly was he adored, indeed, that in 1792 one Regnault-Warin actually wrote a *Vie de Pétion*, comparing his life and character to that of Christ. A quotation from a contemporary pamphlet will show the opinion held of the Radical leaders in the Constituent Assembly. "Posterity will speak with transport," it says, "of a citizen as incorruptible as Pétion, as inflexible as Robespierre, as loyal as Dubois-Crancé, as philanthropical as Grégoire, as upright as Prieur, as intrepid as Buzot, as firm as Roederer, as ardent a citizen as Salle, as severe as Camus, as honest as Anthoine, as firm as Rewbell, and excellent legislator as them all."

The authorities of the department of the Seine who had been intended to control the commune of Paris had also been changed by the elections of 1791. The directory remained, however, strongly Constitutional, and on December 5 the whole directory, with the exception of Roederer, the new procureur-general-syndic, protested against the decree of November 29. But the council-general of the department held very different opinions to the directory, and declared at their next meeting that they had no knowledge of the protest, and the directors then humbly announced that they had only protested as indi-

viduals, not as a corporation. Nevertheless their humility did not save them; the sections of Paris denounced the directory to the Assembly, and this protest cost very many of the signatories their lives. One member, however, of the administration of the department had not signed the protest. This was Pierre Louis Rœderer, who had been elected procureur-general-syndic of the department on November 11, in the place of Pastoret, who had resigned on being chosen a deputy to the Legislative Assembly. Rœderer was the son of a procureur-general of the Parlement of Metz, and was born at Metz in 1754. He had in 1779 become a counsellor of the Parlement of Metz, and then wrote upon political economy, and became a friend of Dupont de Nemours and the physiocrats. In 1788 he published a pamphlet on the States-General, and in 1789 he had insisted that the city of Metz was swamped by the voters from the country district around, and had procured Metz a deputy for itself. As a reward for his exertions he had been elected the deputy for Metz, and had made some mark in the Constituent Assembly. He had been the reporter of the committee of public contributions, in which capacity he had drawn up the new stamp and patent laws, and had expressed very pronounced opinions on the various questions which came before the Assembly, particularly in the debate on the civil constitution of the clergy. He met his reward now by being elected procureur-general-syndic of the department of the Seine, and the part which he played in the year 1792 has made his name of historical importance in the history of Paris and of the Revolution.

The Jacobin Club, which had been greatly weakened by the secession of so many of its earliest members to the Feuillants, had gained renewed vigour after the meeting of the Legislative Assembly. It exerted itself to the utmost to prepare for the coming struggle, and increased the number of its affiliated societies till there was one, not only in every town of importance, but in very many villages as well. In the Jacobins' a distinct rivalry had arisen between Robespierre and Brissot which had immense importance at a later date.

Brissot often managed to get a majority against the extreme members; but as they laboured in the committee of correspondence, and took far more pains than he and his friends did to increase the power of the club, he was bound to be beaten by them eventually. Robespierre, who had been elected public accuser to the tribunal of the Seine, was the real hero of the Jacobin Club; and though occasionally beaten by Brissot and his friends in the evening debates, his wonderful industry maintained his supremacy in the committees.

It will be seen, then, that the year 1791 closed very gloomily for the court and for the king. The new Assembly was more violently hostile to the monarchy, the nobility, and the Catholic religion than the Constituent Assembly had been, and little mercy was to be expected from it in a struggle. The flight to Varennes had been the starting-point of a new epoch in the history of the Revolution. The shortlived vigour of Lafayette, on July 17, had been without effect, because the provinces were still more advanced in ideas of revolution than Paris itself, and had sent up deputies to the new Assembly who would effectually undo the work of the revision of the Constitution and destroy the effect of the example which Lafayette had made with the full approbation of the Constituent Assembly. It is as the expression of the concentrated opinion of the provinces that the Legislative Assembly must at first be regarded; and the fact that its most powerful members had flocked to the Jacobins must be regarded as the most convincing proof of the extended power of the club. New elements had appeared among the Girondins and Jacobins in the provinces; and if the king and his friends had been unable to outwit or overcome the majority of the Constituent Assembly, which was at heart sincerely attached to the principle of monarchy, how could they expect that, weakened by insult and regarded as a traitor for his flight to Varennes, he could have succeeded against the new Assembly? And more important than the attitude of Assembly was the attitude of Paris, for the advanced revolutionists of the city were now entirely in harmony through the Jacobins with the provinces;

and, in its advance towards a republic, Paris felt itself the representative of France. New men had entered on the scene in the place of the old, and it remained to be seen whether the great orators of the Gironde had more political insight than the great orators of the Constituent Assembly.

CHAPTER II.

THE GIRONDIN MINISTRY.

The attitude of the Girondins and Jacobins towards the idea of a foreign war—New ministry—The Comte de Narbonne—Narbonne's policy with regard to the war—Professor Koch—The Legislative Assembly menaces the Emperor Leopold—His answer and death—The reign of Leopold and his advice to Marie Antoinette—Dismissal of Narbonne and formation of a Girondin ministry—Dumouriez—Roland—The "bonnet rouge"—Robespierre's and Dumouriez' attitude towards it—Fête given to the released Swiss soldiers of Château-Vieux—War declared against Austria.

WHEN the king had dared to express his own will by vetoing the decree against the émigrés on November 9, the Girondin party determined to wound him yet more nearly by opening an attack on what they called the Austrian Committee at the Tuileries, and more particularly on the king's own brother-in-law, the emperor. This manœuvre was entirely the work of Brissot, who had persuaded Guadet and Gensonné that the best mode of establishing a republic in France, and destroying the monarchy, was to have a great war. He also knew very well that he was the only member of the Girondin party who had any knowledge of foreign affairs, and believed that he would, by showing his knowledge in the debates on the subject, gain a complete ascendancy over the Legislative Assembly. The enthusiastic Girondins were not slow to take up a subject on which they could expend so much eloquence, and began loudly to clamour for war. With the thoughtlessness of young men they hardly understood how serious a thing war is, and of course did not recognize that they themselves were not

strong enough men to rule France during the crisis of a European war. Nevertheless they went gaily on, and soon, not only the people of Paris, but a large proportion of the people of France were clamouring for war. The king, at the bidding of the Assembly, had written to the smaller German princes and to his brother-in-law, the emperor, and had courageously defended the answer of the latter on December 14. But there was about him a party which was quite as anxious for war as the Girondins themselves—a party which believed that in a great war the supreme power would revert to the king. Louis himself hardly sympathized with these advisers, but he felt forced into the line of policy they advocated. It is never a very difficult thing to make the French nation wish for war. No reverses have ever tamed the desire for military glory, and the popularity which the Girondins had hoped to obtain was abundantly showered on them. Only one party systematically opposed the war. That was the party of the extreme Jacobins, the very men who, when the war broke out, had to bear the brunt of it, and to prove their greatness. These extreme leaders opposed the war on two grounds. Danton and Robespierre hated war in itself, though they did not fear it, and Marat cried, in his *Ami du Peuple*, “Who is it that suffers in a war? Not the rich, but the poor; not the high-born officer, but the poor peasant.” But the Jacobin leaders had also a more selfish reason for opposing the war. They knew, as well as the Girondins or the king’s friends, that a successful foreign war would strengthen either its advocates or the executive, and they feared that it would cause the Revolution to pass through a more bitter phase than it had yet experienced. It may be true that they expected war would strengthen the king or the Girondins, and thus overthrow their own party, but still more clearly did they perceive that any attempt to overthrow them would cause most terrible bloodshed. The spirit of Mirabeau seemed to have fallen on Danton when he thundered against the evils of a foreign war. The debates in the Jacobin Club on this subject are extremely instructive and interesting.

On November 28 Robespierre first appeared in the club after a visit to his native place, and began a spirited debate by arguing that, though war might be justified, it was not expedient. Danton and Collot d'Herbois followed him, and expressed their detestation of the idea of war yet more forcibly. On December 12 Carra the journalist, and Dubois-Crancé who was to be the founder of the Revolutionary army, earnestly opposed the war, and Robespierre then declared the same opinion which he had put forth in the Constituent Assembly on Le Chapelier's motion of February, 1791, that the case of the émigrés was not one which called for special legislation, and that such special legislation would weaken the power of the law in general. This noble protest for justice to the émigrés, raised when all France was clamouring for their punishment, of itself proves Robespierre's courage. On December 16 Brissot came down to the Jacobins' to defend his favourite measure, but was opposed and completely vanquished in debate by Danton, and on December 19 even Billaud-Varenne, the most severe Jacobin of all, condemned the war. These sentiments of the extreme Jacobins it is most important to notice at once, for it is generally believed and has often been declared that they were the real authors of the great war which was to change the whole face of Europe.

Under the influence of the country's clamour the king felt bound to surrender his longing for peace, and by a complete change of ministry a new departure appeared in the royal policy. Such a ministerial change to mark a new departure had been a favourite scheme of Mirabeau's, and the first resignation among the ministry was that of his old correspondent, the Comte de Montmorin. On November 29 Valdec de Lessart, who had proved his incompetence in the affair of Avignon, and had not been a success at the Ministry of the Interior, was removed to the Foreign Office after the post had been refused by four diplomatists, De Moustier, Ségur, Choiseul-Gouffier, and Barthélemy, and was himself succeeded by a friend of Duport du Tertre's, Cahier de Gerville, who was deputy procureur-syndic to the commune of Paris, and had

been a commissioner to inquire into the affair of Nancy. Count Bertrand de Moleville, an ardent Royalist, became Minister of the Marine. But the most important change was caused by the resignation of Duportail, who had been discredited by the laxity of the War Office with regard to Avignon, and he was succeeded as Minister of War by the Comte de Narbonne, on December 7.

Louis, Comte de Narbonne-Lara, came of the very old Spanish family of Lara, and had been born at Colorno, near Parma, in 1755, and he was therefore a comparatively young man when he entered office. His mother had been lady of honour to Elizabeth, duchess of Parma, aunt of Louis XVI., and his father was first gentleman of the royal chamber. In 1760 he had been brought to Versailles, where he was educated under the eyes of the king's aunts, Mesdames Adelaide and Victoire, and it is even said that the Dauphin, the father of Louis XVI., taught him Greek. Court favour caused his rapid promotion in the army, and he was successively in the gendarmerie and the dragoons, and then colonel in succession of the regiments Angoumois and Royal Piémont, and chevalier d'honneur to Madame Adelaide. He was very ambitious, and after marrying a rich heiress in 1782, took lessons in international law from Professor Koch of Strasbourg, to fit him for political life. In the year 1790 he was thanked by the Constituent Assembly for the good order which had been maintained in the department of the Doubs by his regiment; and in February, 1791, he reported the arrest of the princesses to the Assembly.¹ He afterwards accompanied them safely to Rome, and on his return was promoted *maréchal-de-camp*. His intimacy with Madame de Staël had been remarked ever since 1789, and a clever *pièce de circonstance* called "*Les Intrigues de Madame de Staël*" attributed the arrest of the royal fugitives to information which Narbonne had given to his beloved.² Madame de Staël had set her heart on her

¹ Vol. i., chap. xiv., p. 424.

² *Les intrigues de Madame de Staël à l'occasion de départ de Mesdames de France*, in B.M. —F. 428. (9).

lover's being in the ministry, and in December, 1791, after great difficulty and many intrigues, he was appointed War Minister. Though Spanish by birth, he had more than the usual French vivacity. Handsome, eloquent, and dashing, he was a model leader of the gay young men of Paris who had not emigrated. Without the real ability of Ségur, or the wit of Boufflers, he had yet clear political insight, and, now that he had got his opportunity, he determined to use it to save the monarchy in spite of itself.

His idea was to beat the Girondins on their own ground, and, by assuming an intense enthusiasm for the war, to attract the popularity which the Girondins hoped for, to the king himself. If it were believed that the king was the real head of the party of war, Narbonne thought that neither he nor the queen would be again accused of intrigues with the emperor, and that they would thus repair the injury done to their popularity by the flight to Varennes. But he also hoped that the monarchy would gain power by the war after it had gained popularity. If the war was successful, King Louis XVI. and his great minister Narbonne would be the victorious heroes of France; and then would not both king and minister be firmly established in authority? and if the war went badly for France, would not the people give more power to the chief of the executive in order to remedy disasters? With such sentiments, Narbonne accompanied the king to the Assembly on December 14; and after his Majesty's defence of his brother-in-law's letter, the minister declared that though the king did not want war he wished to be ready for war, and amidst loud applause from the deputies he stated that the king intended to place one hundred and fifty thousand men in readiness on the frontier, in three armies under the command of Lafayette, Rochambeau, and Lückner respectively; and that he himself was going at once to start on a tour of inspection. The announcement was received with transports by the Assembly, and Narbonne started in high spirits for the frontier. His popularity seemed so firmly established and his patriotism so pure, that not only was he defended by Condorcet and

other Jacobins, but even Robespierre declared that Narbonne "appeared worthy of the confidence of the people," though he disapproved of his warlike intentions. The proclamation of war was hurried on by a motion which Gensonné carried on January 1, and which he begged the Assembly to pass as a new year's gift to the nation. He proposed that Monsieur, the Comte d'Artois, the Prince de Condé, Calonne and all the chief advisers of the princes, the Vicomte de Mirabeau, the Marquis de Laqueille and all the noisy Royalists of Coblenz, should be accused of conspiracy against the Constitution. On January 11 Narbonne returned from his tour of inspection, and announced—which was absolutely false—that the departments of the north were in the best state of defence, and that the greatest credit was due to the generals commanding in chief for their exertions. He persuaded the king to create Lückner and Rochambeau marshals of France, but nothing could obtain the same honour for Lafayette. On the same night, at the Jacobins', Robespierre had to defend himself against the charge of being an aristocrat, which Brissot brought against him. His speech had an enormous success, and on January 20, on the proposal of old Dusaulx, the translator of Juvenal, the rivals embraced each other. In spite of this scene, the chief of the politicians, whom Marat called "the little statesmen," was for the future the open enemy of the favourite tribune of the people. The war parties now spent their time in the Assembly in advocating the proposed war. The words of Marat and of the Jacobins were alike disregarded, and the main subject of contention was, who should have the credit of declaring war,—the king and Narbonne, or Brissot and the Girondins. The diplomatic committee, which had been established in imitation of the Constituent Assembly, was divided into two distinct sections, the one led by Gensonné and Brissot and the other by Professor Koch. Gensonné, was no statesman, and had been easily persuaded by Brissot that the declaration of war would hasten the fall of the king. But unfortunately he possessed an eloquent tongue which the wiser professor of international law could not rival.

Christoph Wilhelm von Koch¹ was born at Bouxwiller, in Alsace, in 1737. His father was financial counsellor to the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, and sent his son to the university of Strasbourg, where he eventually became professor of international law. Strasbourg, from its geographical position, was the best place for the education of intending diplomatists, and Schœpflin had raised the reputation of its university for the teaching of history and international law to a very great height. Under Professor Koch were educated most of the statesmen who made their mark in the diplomacy of the end of the revolutionary period; and Metternich, Nesselrode, Oubril, Galitzin, Cobenzl, Ségur, Lord Elgin, Maret, and Narbonne himself were among his pupils. He was an earnest Protestant, and his first appearance in political life was to demand of the Constituent Assembly the preservation of the property of the Protestants of Alsace, which was granted by decree on August 17, 1790. In 1791 he was elected deputy to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Bas-Rhin, and was immediately chosen a member of the diplomatic committee. From his wide learning and his reputation his advice was always listened to with the greatest attention by prudent members of the Assembly; but the Girondins despised him as a pedant, and Brissot conceitedly imagined that he knew far more about foreign politics and international law than the most famous professor in Europe. Koch pointed out, on October 22, his fear that a decree on the question of the émigrés would lead to a breach of treaty obligations, and on November 22 he presented to the Assembly a report on behalf of the diplomatic committee, in which he examined the state of Europe, and showed that if customs of international courtesy were not infringed there was no reason to assume that the monarchs of Europe would declare war against France. During the early months of 1792 he was in a minority in the diplomatic committee, but he gave both the committee and

¹ *Vie de Koch*, by J. G. Schweighoeuser, Strasbourg, 1816, and *Notice biographique sur M. de Koch*, by F. Schoell, prefixed to vol. i. of his edition of Koch's *Histoire abrégée des Traités*. Paris: 1817.

the Assembly no reason to say that they had not been warned of the danger of their proceedings. From the nature of his studies Koch was not an interesting speaker; and though his pupils acknowledged how much they owed him, they were apt to consider themselves far wiser than their teacher.

On January 14 Gensonné, in the name of the committee, moved that the Assembly should request the king to demand from the emperor an explanation of his conduct. Koch pointed out that what the emperor had done was not done from any hostility to France, but from his duty as head of the empire. He had, in fact, informed the elector of Trèves that, if he was attacked by France, he could count on the support of the empire. This behaviour greatly incensed the Girondins, who, though they hoped for the easy conquest of the Rhenish States, felt some hesitation in engaging at once in a war with Prussia and Austria. Narbonne, too, was afraid to have all Europe against him, and persuaded the king to send Ségur, who held the highest reputation as a diplomatist in France, to try to detach the King of Prussia from his alliance with the emperor. Gensonné's motion was followed by one proposed by Guadet, that whoever directly or indirectly proposed to alter the Constitution or to listen to any mediation on behalf of the émigrés should be guilty of "lèse-nation." On January 25 Brissot moved that the king should be invited to state formally to the emperor that, if he did not promise to renounce his attempts against the sovereignty, independence, and unity of the French nation before March 1, his silence would be considered as a declaration of war. In vain did Professor Koch argue that such a declaration was utterly inconsistent with the known principles of international law, or with the rights possessed by the government of any nation; in vain did he say that to insult the emperor was not the best way to secure a strong position for France abroad. Though he was supported with great ability by Mathieu Dumas and Jacques Beugnot, a young Feuillant, who, after failing to be elected to the Constituent Assembly, had been returned for the Aube to the Legislative, the eloquence of Vergniaud and of Hérault de Séchelles secured the adoption of Brissot's motion.

On March 1 the emperor's answer, which had been drawn up by Kaunitz and contained an attack upon the Jacobins,¹ was read by the minister De Lessart to the Legislative Assembly, but hardly was it finished when a rumour arose that the answer had really been drawn up by Barnave and Duport. One deputy then went further, and even accused De Lessart of having himself composed the emperor's answer. The correspondence of Marie Antoinette with her brother shows clearly that in reality she suggested the emperor's answer,² for in his affection for his sister he was ready to do what he could to improve her position, while at the same time he both hated and feared a war with France. Hardly had the excitement caused by his letter grown to its height, when the news suddenly arrived in Paris that the Emperor Leopold had died on that very 1st of March.

The death of the Emperor Leopold was a very serious blow to the cause of monarchy in France. He had become at a very early age Grand Duke of Tuscany, and has already been noticed as one of those benevolent despots whose work was so notable just before the outbreak of the Revolution. He was called the economist king from his physiocratic tendencies, and by his skilful distribution of the weight of taxation had greatly enriched his Italian principality. He had also supported Scipio de Ricci in his Church policy. That bishop had perceived the general disrepute into which the Catholic Church in Tuscany had fallen, and had taken measures to make it more national by decreasing the number of bishoprics and of monks, and by spending a larger proportion of the revenues of the Church on education, hospitals, and charity; and in all his endeavours Leopold had warmly seconded him.³ When, on the death of his brother, the Emperor Joseph, he had succeeded to the imperial throne, he found a difficult task before him.

¹ Vivenot's *Quellen*, vol. ii. pp. 375-379.

² Von Arneth's *Marie Antoinette, Joseph II., und Leopold II. Ihr Briefwechsel*. Vienna: 1866.

³ *Mémoires de Scipion de Ricci, réformateur du Catholicisme*, by De Potter. 2 vols., 1826.

Everywhere the thorough-going reforms of Joseph had distracted the empire. The Netherlands were in open rebellion, and were divided into three distinct parties—those who supported the imperial power, the Vandernootists who wished for the old Constitution of the Netherlands, and the Vonckists who hoped for a revolution after the manner of that in France. Leopold had also to deal with revolts in Hungary and discontent in Bohemia, while the position of the Empire in Germany had been seriously damaged by the aggressive policy of Joseph, and a league had been formed against it, headed by Prussia. During his two years' reign Leopold entirely appeased the internal disturbances in his dominions; conciliated the princes of the empire by his prudent conduct; and turned Prussia from a half-concealed enemy into an ally. With such difficult work to do he had not had much time to bestow on the French Revolution and his sister's position. He knew too well the tendency of the movement to underrate its power, and would rather have forestalled the influence of revolutionary ideas by doing as he had done in Tuscany, and freely giving the people their liberties, instead of trying to fight against those liberties either in France or Germany. The loss of such a prudent counsellor was a heavy one for Marie Antoinette. He had always advised her not to depend on foreign help, and above all things to be sincere and not to be suspected of playing a double part; for, as he hinted, many of the misfortunes which she suffered arose from her own double dealing.

At no time did this unfortunate propensity of the queen appear to greater disadvantage than in the dismissal of Narbonne, on March 9. The young minister had done what no other minister had done since the outbreak of the Revolution. He had made a genuine bid, on the king's behalf, for popular favour, as the head of the fighting part of the French nation, and the bid had been made openly and creditably. That Narbonne was personally a very vain and frivolous young man may be granted; but he had certainly not deserved the abrupt dismissal which he received. As a statesman, he had done nothing but make a false report to the Assembly as

to the efficiency of the French army, which was to have a fatal result ; but as a politician, he had done much.

The exact course of the complicated intrigues which ended in his fall is difficult to be traced, but Narbonne had never had a majority in the Ministry, and had been steadily opposed by De Lessart and Bertrand de Moleville. His dismissal was delivered in the most insulting manner ; but the schemes of his opponents reacted on themselves, for on the very day after his dismissal, De Lessart was not only condemned by the Assembly, but ordered to be impeached, and with him the rest of the Ministers resigned. The Chevalier de Grave, a poetaster¹ and man of no authority, succeeded Narbonne, and on his recommendation, supported by Laporte, the intendant of the Civil List, Dumouriez was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs ;² Roland, the "virtuous Roland," and husband of Madame Roland, was on March 17 appointed Minister of the Interior, by the influence of Brissot, in spite of persistent rumours that the post would be given to Dietrich, the able and patriotic mayor of Strasbourg ;³ and two days afterwards, Duranthon, a man of no weight, but a friend of the Girondins and procureur to the commune of Bordeaux, succeeded Duport du Tertre as Minister of Justice ; Clavière, the assistant of Mirabeau, became Minister of the Finances, and Lacoste Minister of the Marine. This change of ministry was simply throwing the whole power of the kingdom into the hands of the Girondins ; and why the king and queen should have

¹ The following passage from the unpublished memoirs of Comte Thomas d'Espinhal, quoted in Mège's edition of Rabusson-Lamothe's *Lettres sur l'Assemblée Legislative*, p. 131, is worth noting : "The Chevalier de Grave is a little pedant, a little philosopher, a little sentimental poet, and a fanatical little Jacobin, and he will most assuredly be a very little minister. It is odd enough to see a little Knight of Malta, only known at Paris by some little verses and the little romance of the *Folle de Saint Joseph*, becoming a minister. . . . He has already been to pay his homage and return thanks to the Jacobin club, and has appeared there in the *bonnet rouge*."

² Rabusson-Lamothe's *Lettres sur l'Assemblée Legislative*, p. 132.

³ Mège's *Correspondance de Georges Couthon*, p. 106 ; Oscar Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 162.

decided to dismiss Narbonne, and take into office these almost avowed Republicans, has never satisfactorily been explained. Possibly the manœuvre suggested by Mirabeau, in the October of 1790, to form a ministry among the opponents of the king in order to teach them sobriety by giving them responsibility, may have been the motive; but there was a great difference between choosing for office men like Duport and Lameth, who sincerely believed in monarchy, and calling into power these friends of the Girondins. From the moment they were appointed, the slight hope which existed, that the king might have been able to rally warlike France round him, was gone, and it was very soon shown that his new ministers had their own party interests at heart, not his authority. Among the new ministers there were only two, if Clavière be excepted, who ranked above mediocrity; the one by his genuine ability, the other by his perfect self-complacency, Dumouriez and Roland.

Charles François Dupérier, generally known as Dumouriez, who had, after a chequered life, full of adventures, now become Minister for Foreign Affairs, came of a family of *noblesse de la robe*, and was born at Cambrai on January 25, 1739.¹ His father was an officer in the Régiment Royal Piémont, who, after sending his son to the Collège Louis-le-Grand at Paris, obtained his nomination to his own regiment, with which the young man served in Hanover in 1757. He served with the greatest distinction all through the Seven Years' War, and especially at the battle of Klosterkampen, where he lost a finger and was taken prisoner. At the end of the war he was placed on the retired list with the Cross of Saint Louis and a nominal pension, in spite of his twenty-two wounds. He was only twenty-four and had shown himself a brave officer, but as he had no influence his career in the army was closed. He first wandered about Europe on secret missions for the great minister Choiseul, and visited Italy, Spain, and Portugal,

¹ *Das Leben des General Dumouriez*, by A. von Boguslawski. 2 vols, Berlin, 1879; and Dumouriez' own curious but not very trustworthy *Mémoires* in Berville and Barrière's *Collection des Mémoires*.

and was then employed in the campaign in Corsica. But a larger field for his powers of diplomacy soon offered itself, and he became the favourite pupil of Favier, the deep-thinking politician, whose influence appears throughout the foreign policy of the Revolution, who introduced him into that curious network of secret intrigue, which is known as the secret policy of Louis XV.¹ In that policy he played an important part, and in the years 1771 and 1772, in compliance with the secret orders of the king, he organized the resistance of the Poles against the partition of Poland. But however well his work was done, it was not authorized by the French Ministry, and in 1772 he was thrown into the Bastille, where he remained until the accession of Louis XVI. in 1774. After his release he was made a colonel in the army, and eventually became commandant at Cherbourg, where he won great popularity by accepting the post of colonel of the National Guard at the beginning of the Revolution. But his thoughts were fixed on Paris, and his great desire was for political employment. Montmorin knew of his ability and sent him on a secret mission to Belgium, and he afterwards became commandant at Niort, where he made the acquaintance of Gensonné, when on his mission in the departments of the west. He had conciliated so many people that there is no cause for surprise at De Grave's offering him the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had served under Montmorin, was a schoolfellow of De Lessart, and an intimate friend of Laporte, the intendant of the Civil List, so that the king and the courtiers believed him to be a true Royalist, while, owing to his friendship with Gensonné, the Girondins trusted that he was of their opinions. Yet he really cared for neither party. Though enough of a statesman to see the necessity for strengthening the executive, he had no sentiment of attachment to royalty in itself, or to the person of Louis XVI., and he had seen too much of the world to be seduced by the brilliant dreams of the Girondins. His passion was the management of foreign policy. He had served

¹ Broglie's *Le Secret du Roi*, vol. ii. p. 112; *Un Général diplomate au temps de la Révolution*, by Albert Sorel, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

long in subordinate diplomatic positions, and now at last he was to direct the whole foreign policy of France, and the pupil of Favier was to show to the world the truth of his master's conceptions! His great political fault was in underrating the influence of revolutionary feeling in France and entirely neglecting home affairs. This carelessness kept him from being a great statesman, and proved his inferiority to Mirabeau. Yet Dumouriez was by far the ablest man who had taken office since the Revolution began. He had clearly defined ideas about foreign policy, perspicacity, courage, and energy, and, had he possessed a great colleague as Minister of the Interior, must have made for himself an even greater name as a Foreign Minister than the victories of Valmy and Jemmappes made for him as a general. But he had not a great colleague, for it was the "virtuous" Roland who assumed the Ministry of the Interior when Dumouriez went to the Foreign Office.

Jean Marie Roland de la Platiere, the most important colleague of Dumouriez, belonged, as he did, to the *noblesse de la robe*, and was born at Villefranche, near Lyons, in 1752. He entered the civil service in the department of manufactures and commerce at an early age, and by his inquiries into foreign manufactories and his able reports soon obtained a distinguished reputation as an industrious public servant. He held the office of inspector-general of factories at Amiens, when Mademoiselle Cannet introduced him to Manon Jeanne Philipon, and he at once fell in love with her. He loved her far more ardently than she loved him, but she believed that she could be of use to him in his work, and could thus do good to humanity, and so, after a courtship of five years, she married him. In 1786 he was promoted to the inspector-generalship at Lyons, and when the Revolution broke out he took a keen interest in local politics and was a candidate for the post of mayor. Though defeated in this attempt, he was in 1791 deputed by the city of Lyons to represent its condition to the Constituent Assembly, and on his return he founded a branch of the Jacobin Club there. His post at Lyons was soon suppressed, and then he took up his residence at Paris, where his wife's drawing-room

became the meeting-place of the young Girondins. It was through his wife that he became a man of importance, for she was never tired of insisting on his fitness for office, and her friends at last secured his nomination, in March, 1792, to the Ministry of the Interior. Roland was really the virtuous and honest man he prided himself upon being, but he was nothing more. An able and industrious clerk was not likely to become a great minister. He performed the actual duties of his office admirably, drew up his reports laboriously, and was punctual and methodical, but he had no grasp of affairs, and, contented to do his day's work, he did not look ahead. Such a man was not the colleague Dumouriez needed; no statesmanlike ideas were to be expected from him, and the husband of Madame Roland allowed matters at home to drift, while Dumouriez made a vigorous effort to strike out a successful policy abroad.

A curious incident which succeeded Dumouriez' appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs must be remarked, as it not only illustrates his character, and that of Robespierre, but also the change for the worse in popular opinion which had been introduced by the sentiments of the more enthusiastic revolutionists. It also forms an instructive commentary on Dumouriez' famous sarcasm, "Then all is lost," when a horror-struck master of the ceremonies called his attention to the fact that the new Minister of the Interior was wearing ribbons in his shoes instead of buckles. These young enthusiasts had declared that all true patriots should wear on their heads the red cap of liberty. Why this should be done, they themselves could not say. It is most likely that it was an attempt to win the affections of the lowest class of draymen and porters, who were accustomed to work in the streets of Paris with such red caps on their heads. And further, it became fashionable to allude to the lowest classes as the *sans-culottes*. The gentlemen of the eighteenth century, who always appeared in silk stockings and knee-breeches, had conferred this name of contempt on the blouse and trouser-wearing populace; but by 1792 it was the interest of both the Girondins and the Enragé Jacobins in every way to flatter and strive for the favour of

these very sans-culottes; and they not only praised their costume, but themselves adopted it. Dumouriez had been named minister on March 15, and on the 19th he entered the Jacobin Club, placed a red cap on his head, in imitation of De Grave, and swore in everything to obey the will of the nation. He was loudly cheered. And when Robespierre entered the club, and was walking up to the tribune to speak after Dumouriez, with his neat dress and powdered hair, some rough member of the club thrust a red cap on his head. Robespierre threw the cap from him, and trampled on it, and then told Dumouriez, in a stern voice, that as long as he showed himself the defender of the people the associated friends of the Constitution would help him, but that he had better beware that he did not play with them. Robespierre, in refusing to yield to the fancies of the mob, showed himself above them, as Marat had shown himself above them in his violent abuse of the Parisians. The two men had their faults, and both have been frequently accused of the basest cowardice; yet it may be doubted whether there were two other men in Paris who dared thus openly to insult the vanity of the Parisians. All this childish nonsense of wearing a "bonnet rouge," of abolishing powder on the hair, of letting the beard grow, and of adopting trousers instead of breeches, was due to sentimentalism encouraged by the Girondin party. With a bigoted enthusiasm they longed to throw off all trappings of the old régime, and to exalt everywhere the belongings and customs of the lowest classes as badges of their opinions. But in all this they proved themselves sentimentalists, not statesmen. The question so rapidly approaching was how to rule a great people at a great crisis; and the Girondins might be quite sure that the people, both of Paris and the provinces, would not accept red caps and trousers in the place of bread, any more than they had accepted the royal promises.

But some of the extreme Jacobins outdid the Girondins, and not only tried to please the people by adopting their dress, but strove to please their eyes by giving them a great fête; and the Fête de la Liberté, which took place on April 15, in

honour of the Swiss soldiers of the regiment of Château Vieux, which had been cut to pieces by Bouillé at Nancy, was the first exhibition of a kind which afterwards became very popular in Paris. The question whether the forty-one Swiss soldiers who were now serving their time at the galleys at Brest could benefit by the amnesty of September 30 or not was greatly debated in the Legislative Assembly. On November 1 Goupilleau de Fontenay moved that the Swiss soldiers were political prisoners, and should therefore be amnestied. Montmorin opposed the motion, but public interest was at once roused by the Jacobin Club. Collot d'Herbois, on October 31, had offered one half of the six hundred livres, which had been awarded to him as a prize by the Jacobin Club for his *Almanac du Père Gérard*, to the cause, and to him is chiefly due the credit, if it be credit, of securing the release of the Swiss prisoners, after lengthy debates in the Assembly, in which even Pastoret and some of the Feuillants supported the motion. The amnesty was held to cover the Swiss prisoners on December 31, 1791. No effort had been left untried by the Jacobins to excite the Parisians on behalf of these prisoners, and a play called "*Les Suisses du Château Vieux*," with its sequel "*La Marche de Bouillé, ou la suite des Suisses du Château Vieux*," was produced with great success at the Théâtre Molière. As soon as the motion had been carried, the Jacobins determined to have a great fête in honour of the released mutineers, and the two chief members of the committee appointed to arrange this fête were Collot d'Herbois and Tallien. The original proposal of the dramatic author and the young journalist was that two women should represent the city of Paris and the city of Brest, and that the city of Paris should welcome the city of Brest at the barrier, and lead her into Paris, followed by the forty-one soldiers of Château Vieux. But unfortunately Collot and Tallien found it difficult to get leave to hold their fête. The municipality, headed by Pétion, the mayor, were willing to do anything for popularity. But the directors of the department of the Seine set their faces sternly against it. Point by point Pétion

managed to get the better of the directory, and at last the two authors managed to carry out something like their original scheme. On April 11 the released galley-slaves reached Versailles, where they were entertained by the Jacobins of that city in the famous tennis-court. On the next day the Swiss, accompanied by Collot d'Herbois, came to Paris, and presented themselves before the Legislative Assembly. The Comte de Jaucourt, who had been colonel of the Condé dragoons at Metz, under Bouillé, protested against the released galley-slaves being welcomed by the Assembly. But Couthon, deputy for the Puy de Dôme, warmly supported their demand, and they were admitted by 546 to 265—a vote which of itself proves how greatly the voting power of the Feuillants had decreased since the previous October. On April 15 took place the famous fête. On the Champ de Mars was erected a colossal statue of Liberty, and the Swiss soldiers, after being received by the mayor at the Hôtel de Ville, and entertained at the Opera House where the theatre of the Porte Saint Martin now stands, marched solemnly down the Champ de Mars, surrounded by a crowd of Jacobins and by eighty-three sans-culottes, each bearing a banner with the name of a department upon it. To the statue of Liberty a galley, as if to remind the people that the fêted heroes were but galley-slaves, was borne, surrounded by forty virgins headed by young Tallien and followed by the soldiers of Château Vieux, who were escorted by the Gardes Françaises, in their old uniforms, and carrying the keys of the Bastille. When the procession reached the Champ de Mars the declaration of the rights of man and the various flags and emblems were solemnly laid before the statue, and then the people present, including the galley-slaves, burst into the Carmagnole dance.¹ Though the Girondins were not the originators or chief participators in the Fête de la Liberté, it was their party which had set the example of sentimentalizing on the subject of liberty, and the Jacobins had cleverly twisted the weapon to their own use,

¹ See the elaborate account in Mortimer-Ternaux's *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. i., pp. 87-95.

and exaggerated it so as to startle even the Girondins themselves. It must never be forgotten that the Jacobin statesmen took no share in these amusing performances. Both Robespierre and Danton were absent, and Billaud-Varenne did not appear, while Collot d'Herbois exhibited himself rather in his character of dramatic author and fête deviser, than as a serious politician and a statesman.

But while all this child's play was going on, a very serious danger was looming over the people of France. The Girondins had cried out so much for war, that they were half startled when they found themselves on the eve of a more serious war than they had expected. Dumouriez lost no time in telling his friends that the French nation could not be trusted while it ignored all treaty obligations, and the words of Mirabeau must have often recurred to those who saw the terrible complications which were arising. On April 14 Dumouriez announced to the Assembly that the Marquis de Noailles, French ambassador at Vienna, had resigned, and that Louis XVI. was going to send a letter to the youthful nephew of his wife, protesting against the protection given to the émigrés. Francis was not so wise as the Emperor Leopold, and on the 19th the Assembly was informed that the King of Hungary and Bohemia demanded that satisfaction should be given at once to the princes of the empire, whose territories and rights in Alsace had been violated, and also that the Pope should be compensated for the seizure of Avignon and the Venaissin. Such demands were mocked at by the deputies, who knew they had gone too far to recede, and that if any individual or any party dared to propose that such compensation should be given, their political ruin was certain and their lives unsafe. On the morning of the 20th the king appeared, surrounded by his ministers, and listened to a long report from Dumouriez, in which he declared there must be war with Austria. The king said a few words, and then proposed formally that war should be declared against the King of Hungary and Bohemia, for Francis was not yet crowned emperor. On the evening of that memorable day which was to begin a ten-years' war for

France, but one voice was heard in opposition—that of Becquey, deputy for the Haute Marne,¹ and the resolution was carried against a minority of only seven votes. The chief speakers who strengthened their position during this struggle for war and who distinguished themselves in this debate, were Condorcet, Vergniaud, and Merlin of Thionville. And they well illustrate the different types of men who hoped for war. Condorcet wished for it from philosophical motives, believing that as England had fought the American colonies so Europe would fight France, and that it was to the advantage of France to take the initiative. Vergniaud had been inspired by his sentimental feelings; and believing that the establishment of a republic could only be attained by a European war, cried, at the end of his speech, “Vive la liberté, ou la mort!” Merlin of Thionville made a yet more famous remark. He said that war with Austria meant a war against all kings and liberty to all nations. Had it been so, it would have lasted just as long, for nations are not more disposed than kings to be driven into any course of action, and do not care to have to pay with the horrors of war for political liberty. Freedom may be a grand thing, but freedom, when enforced by the sword, greatly resembles tyranny.

¹ *Vie de Becquey*, by Comte Beugnot, pp. 31-36. Paris: 1852.

CHAPTER III.

THE TWENTIETH OF JUNE.

The **Jacobins** oppose the war—**Robespierre** and **Marat**—**Jacobin** journalism—"The Fête de la Loi"—The policy of **Dumouriez**—**Austria**—**England**—**Prussia**—Why it failed?—The state of **Belgium**—Commencement of the war—Murder of **Dillon**—**Servan's** recommendation of a camp of fédérés near **Paris**—The king vetoes the recommendation and a measure against the priests "insermentés"—**Roland's** letter to the king—Dismissal of the **Girondin** ministry—A demonstration plotted for **June 20**—**Santerre**, the brewer of **Saint Antoine**—Conduct of the local authorities—Behaviour of the **National Guard**—The petitioners assemble, and defile before the Assembly—The mob passes the **Tuileries**, enters the **Place du Carrousel**, and finally breaks into the **Tuileries** and insults the king—**Santerre** protects the queen—Feeling in the **Legislative Assembly**—The king's interview with **Pétion**—**Lafayette** in **Paris**—**Vergniaud's** speech of **July 3**—The country declared in danger—Suspension of **Pétion** and **Manuel**—The "Baiser **Lamourette**"—The **Federation**—The enrolment of volunteers—**Prussia** declares war—The **Duke of Brunswick's** manifesto.

JOYFULLY did the leaders of French popular opinion enter upon the war. Not only the Royalist journals, of which the chief was now the *Journal de Paris*, but also the Girondin journals, which were largely subsidized by **Roland** as Minister of the Interior, devoted their pages to proving that it would promote the true glory of France. Mention has been made of the opposition made from the first by the leading Jacobins, not only by **Danton**, **Robespierre**, and **Marat**, but also by men who were afterwards regarded as the most extreme Jacobins of all, such as **Collot d'Herbois** and **Billaud-Varenne**. From

the tribune of the Jacobins' both parties had their say; and though for the time the eloquence of the Girondin orators, and especially of the youthful Isnard, who had won at the Jacobins' the far higher reputation for eloquence than Vergniaud and his friends, had a great effect, the influence of Robespierre was not really diminished by his opposition to the popular feeling.

But the more statesmanlike Jacobin leaders felt it necessary to address their sentiments to a wider audience than that assembled in the Jacobin Club, and they therefore devoted themselves to active journalism. Decidedly the poorest writer among them was Robespierre, yet on April 15 he resigned his post of public accuser to the Tribunal of the Seine, and established a journal called *Le Défenseur de la Constitution*. But real political work, not newspaper writing, was Robespierre's strong point; and though in the long complicated paragraphs which abound in his articles there can be seen the logical consistency which made the journalist a very great man up to a certain point, yet the pages of Camille Desmoulins and of Marat far surpass in interest and in power those of Robespierre. Marat worked himself into a perfect rage on the subject of the war, and regarded it as an infamous conspiracy on the part of the bourgeois Constitutionalists and the Royalists to oppress the poor of the country. The numbers of the *Ami du Peuple* which treat of the question of the war are the most statesmanlike of Marat's writings, and deserve to be analyzed at some length. The effect of his objurgations was that, if it was necessary for the people to suspect all men in power and office in time of peace, still more necessary was it to suspect them in time of war. "Keep your eyes on Lafayette," he once remarked, "for he is more dangerous without than within Paris." Like all men of statesmanlike mind, he clearly perceived the course which events would take. He prophesied that disasters on the part of the French army would be followed by the overthrow of royalty and the destruction of those who hoped for foreign help in Paris. He also declared that an unsuccessful war—and how could it be otherwise than

unsuccessful with an army in a state of disorganization?—would cause disasters, and afterwards the formation of a strong government. He echoed the cry of Mirabeau and of Danton, "Strength is what we want, not a governor." And he proposed that a dictator should be appointed with supreme power for a few days, in which to destroy all traitors at home and vigorously carry on the war abroad. At this bold yet statesmanlike idea the other journalists cried out that Marat wished to make himself, or at other times wished to make one of his friends, Robespierre or Danton, a tyrant or a king. But Marat answered, "Men who are freely given sovereignty are not the men who become tyrants, but the men who seize sovereignty for themselves." If the words of Jean Paul Marat were full of the wisdom of the statesman, Camille Desmoulins in a most witty pamphlet powerfully assailed the war party in the person of their chosen leader. His mind and style were not formed for political dissertations, but he possessed the biting wit which could make itself felt on individuals. In his "*Jean Pierre Brissot demasqué*," Camille Desmoulins is at his best. Everything doubtful in the strange varied life of the innkeeper's son was hinted at in innuendoes which were bound to have their effect on the most unprejudiced mind, while the better actions of his life lost their value by the unworthy motives imputed to them. Seldom has a politician's reputation been entirely destroyed by a single pamphlet, and perhaps the only other instance in modern literary history is the overthrow of the popularity of the first Lord Shaftesbury, in the reign of Charles II., by the publication of Dryden's "*Absalom and Achitophel*."

The effect was immediate. Robespierre and Brissot had many a fierce battle in the Jacobin Club; and after the publication of Camille's pamphlet, the Girondins gradually began to break away from the Jacobin Club. This attack of Camille's the more exasperated the Girondin party because, although they possessed almost a monopoly of eloquence in the Assembly, their journals were distinctly dull. Mirabeau used, with a smile, to remark that Condorcet's articles would

be sufficient to ruin any journal; and truly neither Condorcet's *Chronique de Paris*, Brissot's *Patriote Français*, Mercier's *Annales Patriotiques*, nor Gorsas' *Courrier des Départements* exhibit any of the literary ability which remains to be seen in the *Journal de Paris*, the *Ami du Peuple*, and the *Révolutions de Paris*. Feeling their inability to rival the Jacobins in the press, they carried a decree on May 2, with the help of the Feuillants, that both the *Ami du Roi* of Royou and the *Ami du Peuple* of Marat should be prosecuted. Not satisfied with this attempt to suppress the chief Jacobin writer, the Feuillants decided that they also would have a great fête which should charm the people of Paris, and win their attention and their applause as the Fête de la Liberté had done. At first the theatrical spirit found it difficult to find a hero. But at last they pitched upon one, Simonneau, mayor of Étampes, who had been murdered in that town for refusing to levy a tax upon bread. This was the man whom the opponents of the Jacobins chose as their hero; their fête was called the Fête de la Loi, and it was under the direct superintendence of Quatremère de Quincy, the poet Roucher, and the economist Dupont de Nemours. But these Feuillants were not able to hit the taste of the people as Tallien and Collot d'Herbois, David, and Joseph Chénier had hit it, and the Fête de la Loi on June 1 was a melancholy failure. It was largely attended by officials and moody discontented politicians; but there was no popular enthusiasm, no wild dancing of the Carmagnole, and no hearty applause for the promoters of the festival.¹ This failure might of itself have proved to the Feuillants that they had not the power to win the hearts of the people of Paris.

Meanwhile the war promised better than might have been expected for the French nation. Dumouriez was an able foreign minister, and he formed a great plan by which France might rise triumphant from the dangers which beset her. Unfortunately for the success of his schemes, Dumouriez failed to take into calculation the influence of the revolutionary

¹ Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. i. pp. 108-112.

spirit. To him the Revolution was not the commencement of the regeneration of humanity, but the opening of a career for his personal ambition, and, as M. Sorel says, he played with it as De Retz, at a former period, had played with the revolutionary spirit at the time of the Fronde.¹ In spite of his intriguing spirit, he was a sincere opponent of anarchy and disorder, and an advocate for a strong government. Good government and order could only, he believed, be restored by means of the army. But the army was itself undermined by the spirit of the Revolution, and its efficiency and order could only be restored by a successful war. Against what nation, then, could a successful and a popular war be waged? Against Austria, and against Austria without allies. It is in this last point that the influence of his great teacher Favier could be seen. Dumouriez had brought back from his campaigns in the Seven Years' War a sincere admiration for Frederick the Great and his army, and a thorough detestation for Austria and the Austrian alliance. It was this which had recommended him to Favier and the small group of thinkers and actors, who played a part in the secret policy of Louis XV., and this also which had kept him from power and employment as long as Marie Antoinette, by whose marriage the Austrian alliance was perpetuated, retained her influence. But now at last he was in office, and he determined to carry his ideas into practice and to attack Austria. In doing so he believed he was returning to the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, which had made France a great nation; and it is of the greatest importance to lay weight upon his belief and his policy, for it was universally adopted by the statesmen of the Revolution, and lies at the heart of the transactions, which ended in the treaties of Basle in 1794. But that France should fight Austria successfully, Austria must be isolated, and to isolate her was the first aim which Dumouriez set before himself.

¹ *Un Général diplomate au temps de la Révolution*, by Albert Sorel, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, July 15, 1884, p. 307. This article, which was continued in August 1 and 15, contains the most lucid description of the character and policy of Dumouriez.

To isolate Austria it was practically only necessary to secure the neutrality of two powers, England and Prussia. Dumouriez paid little heed to the attitude of Catherine of Russia. She was too far off to be able to exert any direct influence upon a war between France and Austria, and the French diplomatist, after his experience of eastern European politics, had little doubt but that the Prussian statesmen must see as clearly as he did, that Catherine was only urging the German powers to attack France, in order that she might quietly absorb Poland without interference. Sweden again, which had under Gustavus III. been the most violent of all the nations of Europe against the Revolution, did not trouble the calculations of Dumouriez, for the gallant young Swedish king, who openly declared his intention to rescue Louis XVI. and his queen, was assassinated by Captain Ankerström of the Guards at a masquerade in Stockholm on March 29, and his successor was a boy of thirteen. To Italy also he paid but little attention; Marie Caroline, Queen of Naples and sister of Marie Antoinette, had failed to form an Italian league against France, owing to the opposition of Venice,¹ and Dumouriez expected to obtain the neutrality of the King of Sardinia by promising him the Milanese after France had conquered Austria in exchange for Savoy and Nice. The smaller states of Germany were always afraid of a coalition between Austria and Prussia, and though the war was nominally to be waged on behalf of the rights of the princes of the empire in Alsace, yet Dumouriez knew that these princes would all gladly accept compensation in money, as three of them, the Princes of Lowenstein, Wertheim, and Salm-Salm, had already done. The South German and Rhenish princes were also warmly in favour of the Revolution for its own sake, and had shown that they were so by their treatment of the army of the émigrés under Condé, and they were encouraged in their opinions by the influence of the illuminati, who were all powerful among them, and who believed that

¹ Bourgoing's *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe pendant la Révolution Française*, vol. ii. p. 140.

the French Revolution would be the first step towards the universal acceptance of their ideas, and that it was really the work of members of their own secret societies working through the French freemasons. Holland was sure to obey England and follow its policy, and Spain was bound to France by an identity of interests, which was stronger even than the *Pacte de Famille*. The neutrality, and even the sympathy, of Spain was further secured by the accession to power in the previous February of the old Count d'Aranda, the former minister of the benevolent and reforming Charles III. and the friend of Condorcet, in the place of Count Florida Blanca.

From this sketch it is obvious that the difficulty of Dumouriez' policy for the isolation of Austria was to secure the neutrality of England and Prussia. The attitude of the English people was still distinctly favourable to the Revolution, as it had been from the first, but the eloquent pamphlets of Burke were influencing the landed and wealthy classes, who were beginning to fear that the infection of the new ideas would reach England. The policy of Pitt was one of pure neutrality; he knew his own greatness as a financial minister; England was getting more and more wealthy and prosperous under his wise administration, and the progress of her material prosperity, owing to the introduction of machinery, was unexampled in the history of the world. All this prosperity would be checked by a war, and Pitt therefore strenuously desired to avoid war. Besides, up to the present, the Revolution had been favourable to the trade and commerce of England; France had been too much engaged with its political changes to busy itself in the production of wealth, and the events in the French colonies in the West Indies had ruined their trade in colonial produce and proportionately increased the wealth of the English West Indies. Under these circumstances Dumouriez believed he would have no difficulty in securing the neutrality of England, which meant also the neutrality of Holland and Hanover, and the acquisition in favour of non-interference of the great influence which George III. exercised as Elector of Hanover over the smaller

princes of Germany. Could he even hope for the alliance of England? Talleyrand, the ex-bishop of Autun, believed so,¹ and, as he had just returned from a visit to London, his opinion had some weight. Dumouriez distrusted Talleyrand, as being a self-seeking adventurer like himself, yet he could not deny his ability for diplomacy and intrigue, and when Brissot, to whom Talleyrand had been introduced by Siéyès, urged his nomination for a diplomatic mission to England, Dumouriez felt obliged to accept him. To Talleyrand was joined M. de Chauvelin, an ex-marquis and a vain and empty-headed young man, as nominal minister, Duroveray, the collaborateur of Mirabeau, who knew England well, and Garat, as secretary of the mission. Dumouriez was ready to bid high for an alliance with England. Talleyrand was instructed to promise that France would not annex Belgium, and would not encourage the revolutionary party in Holland; that the commercial treaty between the two countries should be confirmed; and finally that, in return for leave to raise a loan of three or four millions, the island of Tobago, which had been ceded to France to the intense mortification of all Englishman in 1783, should be given back to England.² Earl Gower, the English ambassador in Paris, announces the nomination of the mission to his government in his despatch of March 30, 1792. "I understand it is in contemplation to send immediately to England, with the character of Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. de Chauvelin, one of the *Maitres de la Garde Robe du Roy*, a young man of anti-aristocratical principles and a friend of Mr. de Narbonne, and Mr. de Périgord. The latter is to accompany him, in order that his abilities for negotiating may be employed without infringing the self-denying decree of the late Assembly."³ Yet Dumouriez did not find his English scheme easy to initiate; the members of the mission delayed their departure, and it was not until he had threatened, by Étienne Dumont, the nomination of a fresh mission, that Chauvelin left for London on April 21, the day after the

¹ Sorel, *Un Général diplomate*, p. 314.

² *Ibid.*, p. 318.

³ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 167.

declaration of war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Dumouriez also had his troubles in the Assembly, and Lord Gower writes on April 11: "It is evident that the Ministry here have a most earnest desire to be upon the best possible terms with England, which is a sufficient reason for inclining the *Coté droit* (the deputies of the Right) to be otherwise."¹

Even more important than the attitude of England was the attitude of Prussia. Dumouriez could not believe that the alliance between Austria and Prussia would last; he regarded Prussia as the natural ally of France, and believed that the successor of Frederick the Great would be only too glad to attack Austria while she was at war with France, as his uncle would most certainly have done. He further thought it impossible that any Prussian statesman could be hoodwinked by Russia's pretended ardour for the war against the Revolution, or fail to see that Catherine's policy was to finally absorb Poland while Prussia and Austria were engaged in the west. He knew, too, that there was a strong Prussian party at Berlin, headed by the Duke of Brunswick and Prince Henri, who looked upon Austria with the eyes of Frederick the Great, as the great enemy of the Prussian nationality, and who would regard an alliance with France with favour. But Dumouriez did not take the passions of men into his calculations. He saw which policy it was for the interest of Prussia to adopt, and therefore could not understand her failing to seize the opportunity, and he did not sufficiently consider the character of the king. Frederick William II. was a monarch of a very different type to Frederick the Great; he was completely under the influence of his mistresses. His heart was stronger than his head, and though not wanting in intellectual power, he was governed always by sentimental considerations, and was at this time charmed by the mystic ideas of the theosophists, a secret sect of the nature of the illuminati, though diametrically opposed to the latter in political opinions, whose chief supporter, Bischoffswerder, was his confidential

¹ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 170.

minister. The intrigues of the émigrés had been particularly successful at Berlin, and the favourite mistress, Madame Doenhoff, had been won to their side. As long as the Emperor Leopold lived, the policy of Prussia had been subordinated to that of Austria, but the accession of the youthful Archduke Francis had made Frederick William the leading monarch of the alliance, and Catherine of Russia, who had succeeded to much of Leopold's influence over the mind of the King of Prussia, urged him to immediate war. Dumouriez, then, counting on the interests of Prussia and not upon the disposition of the king, sought to detach Frederick William from his alliance with Austria. In doing so he only followed the example of De Lessart, who had sent Ségur to Berlin in December, 1791, to win over the King of Prussia. Ségur, in spite of his abilities, had failed to accomplish anything, and it was reported in Paris that, in consequence of this failure, he had attempted to commit suicide.¹ When Dumouriez assumed office, Ségur had already left Berlin, and had left as chargé d'affaires there François de Custines, only son of the Comte de Custines, who had sat in the Constituent Assembly as a liberal deputy of the noblesse, a smart young diplomatist and former pupil of Professor Koch. This young man Dumouriez appointed minister plenipotentiary to the court of Prussia, and boldly instructed him not to propose that Prussia should remain neutral, but that she should become the ally of France and help in despoiling Austria.

These were the schemes of Dumouriez, yet, well founded though they were in the old principles of state-craft, they failed because of the new element which the Revolution had brought into existence—the headstrong enthusiasm of a nation, which would not take into consideration the calculations of statesmen. Even without this his schemes might have failed, for not only did the ambassadors of the émigrés oppose his policy, but the secret agents of the imprisoned court at the Tuileries also; for example, on the very same day, March 30, when his courier started with his ultimatum to Vienna, a

¹ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 153.

secret emissary of the queen, the Baron de Goguelat, one of the accomplices in the flight to Varennes, departed with a declaration of the king that he was obliged to yield in appearance to the Revolution.¹ Neither Spain nor Sardinia entered into his plans; Spain received his special ambassador, M. de Bourgoing, coldly, and Victor Amadeus, King of Sardinia, who expected to get the Milanese from Austria without having to sacrifice Savoy and Nice, as the price of his assistance, refused to receive Sémonville, whom Dumouriez had directed to go to Turin, and when he tried to enter the kingdom arrested him at Alessandria on April 19. With the German princes Dumouriez was more successful; the Elector of Saxony and George III. of England, as Elector of Hanover, declared their neutrality, the South German princes openly showed their sympathy, and only William IX., Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, who coveted the title and rank of an elector, expressed his willingness to send his fine little army to the assistance of Austria. In London the agents of Dumouriez had no success; Lord Grenville, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, received Chauvelin very coldly, the king was equally reserved, and only the opposition and its leaders, Fox and Sheridan, were at all cordial. Talleyrand, however, was not to be deceived by the specious talk of the opposition, and he wrote to Dumouriez on May 23 that nothing was to be expected from them.² On May 24, Lord Grenville sent Chauvelin a proclamation, in which he expressed the regret of the English government at the war, its desire to remain at peace, its promise to respect treaties, and its hope that France would respect the allies of England. In this last clause lay the reason for Grenville's coldness. England always kept a jealous eye on the Netherlands. Belgium in the hands of Austria with the Scheldt closed offered no rivalry to English commerce, but it would be otherwise if it were annexed to France, and fiery speakers in the Legislative Assembly and the Jacobin Club

¹ *Le Comte de Fersen et la Cour de France*, par A. von Klinkowström, vol. ii. p. 14.

² Sorel, *Un Général diplomate*, p. 321.

were already declaring that the Vonckists were to be assisted, and that Belgium was to be revolutionized, if not annexed. Still more suspicious was the treatment of the Dutch refugees by the revolutionary leaders in Paris. One of Pitt's greatest strokes of statesmanship had been the overthrow of the Dutch republican party by means of the diplomacy of Lord Malmesbury and the soldiers of Prussia, and the Dutch republicans had always looked to France for countenance and help, while the Stadtholder, the Prince of Orange, had looked to England. The news, therefore, sent by Lord Gower on April 22, that it was in contemplation to raise a corps of Dutch patriots for service on the frontier,¹ with the further intelligence on June 8 that it was to consist of between four and five thousand men,² was quite enough to rouse the jealous suspicions of the English ministry. At Berlin the failure of the schemes of Dumouriez was even more complete. Custines was deserted even by the Duke of Brunswick and Prince Henri, and Bischoffswerder became supreme. Custines reported to Dumouriez that any proposition for an alliance would only irritate the Prussians, and advised that they should be allowed to try just one campaign with the Austrians, after which the coalition of such ill-suited allies would be bound to break up.³ When Custines alluded to the interests of Prussia, Schulemburg, the minister deputed to see him, promptly answered that "if interest ought to be counted, so also ought the honour of crowns;" when the French envoy went on to say that "France did not want to make conquests," he was immediately asked, "How about Avignon?" and Schulemburg concluded, "The King of Prussia does not care about you or your Constitution, but he must repulse your desire to make proselytes."⁴ On April 6 Schulemburg told Custines that the king had no more to say to him than he had had to Ségur, and refused him an audience; and on April 10 the young French diplomatist wrote despairingly from Berlin, "The amnesty granted to the Avignon murderers has lost us all our friends here." On April 29 Frederick

¹ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 175.

² *Ibid.*, p. 190.

³ Sorel, *Un Général diplomate*, p. 423.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

William knew of the declaration of war, and immediately began to make preparations for joining in it, and on May 18 Lord Gower wrote to his government: "The Comte de Goltz (the Prussian ambassador) has received orders to quit this court without taking leave, and he intends to accompany M. de Blumendorf (the Austrian chargé d'affaires left behind by Mercy-Argenteau) out of France in the beginning of the next week."¹ This of itself was almost tantamount to declaring war. With regard to Austria itself, Dumouriez found that the sentiment of the court of Vienna had quite changed since the death of Leopold. The young Archduke Francis, who had succeeded his uncle as King of Hungary and Bohemia, was too much occupied with his approaching election and coronation as emperor to trouble himself much about the war, but he expressed himself warmly in favour of it, and showed his disposition by paying less attention to the prudent counsels of the old Chancellor Kaunitz, and more to those of the Vice-Chancellor Count Philip von Cobenzl, and the Privy Councillor Baron von Thugut. "If France did not attack, Austria would," said Thugut to the Baron de Breteuil, the secret agent of Louis XVI. at Vienna, on April 17; and in these words he spoke the sentiments both of the youthful monarch and of the younger generation of statesmen and soldiers at the court of Vienna.

There was yet a further reason, besides the lessons which Dumouriez had learnt from Favier, why he had determined to wage war against Austria, and against Austria alone, if possible. Austria was the only nation which offered France an easy conquest. It was part of that hereditary policy, in which Dumouriez believed, that the whole of Flanders should belong to France. Louis XIV. had annexed the wealthy province known as French Flanders, and Dumouriez thought it would be equally easy to assimilate the rest. The result of the policy of Joseph II. had shown clearly the disinclination of the Belgians to become an integral part of the Austrian dominions, and though the Vandernootists had been satisfied

¹ Browning's *Despatches of Earl Gower*, p. 184.

with the policy of Leopold, who had restored the old form of government in the Belgian provinces, the Vonckists, who had imagined more radical reforms, and who had risen in rebellion to establish a democratic form of government, were by no means satisfied. Dumouriez had been sent on a secret mission into Belgium by Montmorin in 1790, and he was sure that the doctrines of these insurgents had sunk deep into the hearts of the people, and that at the advance of the French armies the people of Belgium would welcome them as deliverers. When, therefore, he came into office, his first step was to enter into intimate relations with the Vonckist committee which sat at Lille, and to send Maret, the young diplomatist, who had made himself famous by his reports of the debates in the Constituent Assembly, on a secret mission to stir up discontent among the Belgians, and to tell them that the French were coming to their help.¹ It was in this conviction of the readiness of the Belgians to rise that he arranged the plan of the first campaign against Austria. He directed Marshal Lückner to remain quiet in Alsace, with his headquarters at Strasbourg, and to watch events. General Lafayette, with ten thousand picked men of the army of the Centre, was ordered to advance from his camp at Givet upon Namur, and was thence to move upon Brussels or Liège. He was to be supported by three divisions of the army of the North, commanded by the Maréchal de Rochambeau: one under General Biron, the *cidevant* Duc de Biron, ten thousand strong, which was to advance from Valenciennes upon Mons; one under General Theobald Dillon, four thousand strong, which was to march from Lille to make a demonstration against Tournay; and one under General Carle, only fifteen hundred strong, which was to move from Dunkirk upon Furnes. As there were only thirty thousand Austrian soldiers in Belgium, Dumouriez counted upon success. But he had not taken into consideration the utter disorganization of the French army. His plan failed entirely. Dillon's division was suddenly seized with a panic before it had even seen the enemy, and, with cries that

¹ Ernouf's *Le Duc de Bassano*, pp. 48-72.

they were betrayed, all his soldiers rushed back into Lille, and brutally murdered Dillon in the streets on April 29.¹ Biron's division had a slight success at Quièvrain, but on arriving before Mons on April 30 it was charged by a few of the Austrian cavalry, and the whole division immediately fled back to Valenciennes, with the loss of all its baggage. Lafayette suffered no such disaster, but these reverses made it necessary for him to fall back at once and give up the idea of reaching Namur.

The news from the frontier created a great sensation at Paris. Rochambeau resigned his command in disgust at Dumouriez' having directed the employment of his divisions, and was succeeded by Lückner, but Marat confessed himself very pleased, for he said the murder of Dillon showed that the French soldiery would not allow their officers to lead them to Paris. But the Girondins expressed no pleasure. They knew that on the success or failure of the war not only their reputation but their very lives rested, and at the instance of Roland they procured the resignation of De Grave, the incapable "little" war minister, who had in March succeeded Narbonne. In his stead there was appointed to the ministry of war Colonel Servan, a stern, inflexible old officer, descended from an old Jansenist and legal family in Dauphiné, who had learnt in war to defend the stern creed he had been taught in youth.

Like many other Jansenists Servan was a sincere Republican, and he was also an upright and honest man and a very hard worker. He proceeded at once to the reorganization of the army, and soon proposed that the national guards of the departments upon the frontier should be mobilized and placed under the command of the generals of division—a step which at a single blow doubled the French armies in the field of action. Servan was assisted by the military committee of the Legislative Assembly. Here there met on common ground Royalists, Feuillants, and Girondins, moved only by a love of the French army. Its leading members were Mathieu

¹ See *Relation de l'assassinat de M. Th. Dillon, Maréchal de Camp, commis à Lille le 29 Avril, 1792*, in B.M.—F. 833. (2).

Dumas and Daverhoul among the deputies of the right, and Lacuée de Cessac and Carnot of the left. In the Assembly the checks upon the frontier had the effect of strengthening the interest of the deputies in the proposals of the military committee and of Colonel Servan. On May 29 the ardour for military reform, and it is to be feared the desire to leave the king defenceless, urged Basire to move that the King's Constitutional Guard should be at once abolished. This guard consisted of three young men elected from every district of France, and was commanded by the Duc de Brissac who had formerly been colonel of the Cent Suisses. Among the King's Constitutional Guard might be seen the youthful faces of many who were to make themselves a great name in the military history of France. Among them were Joachim Murat and Jean Baptiste Bessières, who had both been elected from the department of the Lot. Both of them had served as privates in the old army, and both had proved themselves such turbulent soldiers that they had been dismissed to their homes. But with their turbulence they possessed a passionate love for their profession, and gladly entered the ranks of the King's Constitutional Guard. Little did Joachim Murat think that after seventeen years he would be King of Naples, and knight of nearly all the orders of chivalry in Europe. Nor did Bessières foresee that, after many a command and many a victory, he would be shot on the eve of a great battle, by mistake, while walking round to inspect the outposts. Basire's motion was supported by Guadet and Vergniaud, and on May 30 the Constitutional Guard was dismissed, and the Duc de Brissac sent to Orleans to be tried by the high court. The king had willingly consented to this dissolution of his guard; but a more insidious proposal was to be made to him. On June 4 Servan came down to the Assembly, and without having given either the king or his fellow-ministers any notice of his intention, proposed that a camp of twenty thousand fédérés from the different departments of France should be formed outside the walls of Paris, as a reserve for the armies on the frontier. The Girondins, who were not over popular in Paris, were

delighted with the proposition, and the camp was ordered on June 8. But neither the king nor the Jacobins at all approved of Servan's camp. The king still hoped that from the armies of the frontier he would gain the power to subdue the recalcitrant capital; while the Jacobins, who knew that the populace of Paris were devoted to them, were loth that such a weapon should be placed in the hands of the Girondins. Whether the king would veto this decree or not, was the question which weighed upon every member of the Assembly; for perhaps he was being pressed too far.

But much as the king disliked the camp of the fédérés, he was still more disgusted with the tyrannical and unjust decree on the subject of the priests who had not taken the oath, which was carried on May 27. It will be remembered that the decree, on November 29, against the priests had been vetoed by the king; but the Girondins and the Jacobins were determined not to be thus foiled. Therefore a yet more unjust decree was proposed by Vergniaud against the unconstitutional priests. François de Neufchâteau, the biographer of Voltaire, had reported to the Assembly that there was no doubt that very great disturbances were being caused in the south and west of France by the presence of the unconstitutional clergy. Vergniaud then had the injustice to move that, on the request of any twenty citizens of a canton, the directory of any department was immediately to exile the unconstitutional priests from their department. It is hardly necessary to point out the injustice of such a measure against men who, though they did not obey the law in one particular respect, were yet French citizens. Torné, bishop of Bourges, well argued the question when he said, "Will you persuade these priests to take the oath by starvation and persecution? Know you not that persecution will only increase their strength, and that their starvation will only discredit you?" The unjust decree, however, was carried, and the king had to consider it as well as that of the camp of fédérés. There was almost a suspension of legislative activity during this period of waiting, and on both sides attempts were made to influence the king's mind.

On the one hand, a petition signed by eight thousand Parisians, known as the "Huit mille," was drawn up to protest against the formation of the camp, and was graciously received by the king. On the other hand, Roland, who considered that Dumouriez took too much on himself, and that he was not paid sufficient respect, consented to send the king a letter which his wife obligingly wrote for him, exhorting and almost ordering him to consent to both decrees at once. Madame Roland was very much disgusted that Madame Veto, or Mes-salina, as she alternately called the queen, had not yet departed out of the way, to make room for the social equality which would leave Madame Roland as the leader of society. She therefore wrote in her husband's name a most impertinent letter—impertinent, politically and personally,—which naturally irritated the king, who had through all his tribulations preserved only the privilege of receiving some little personal respect.

Dumouriez was by the queen's side when Roland's letter was read. "What shall we do with these insolents?" said the queen, with flashing eyes. "Kick them out," said Dumouriez, laconically; and on the same day, June 12, the Minister for Foreign Affairs brought letters of dismissal to his three colleagues, Servan, Clavière, and Roland. Dumouriez received the portfolio of the War Department, and recommended Mourgues, whom he had known at Cherbourg, to be Minister of the Interior, and Naillac to succeed himself at the Foreign Office, and upon Dumouriez poured out the rage of the Girondin party, as the traitor who had actually instigated the king to dismiss the virtuous Roland. But Dumouriez had acted with perfect consistency. He had intended, ever since he had entered the ministry, to become prime minister; and the conceit of Roland and his friends prevented him from assuming the proud position he desired. Personally he cared very little for Louis XVI. or Marie Antoinette, but he intended to obtain power for himself, and would have used that power to repress anarchy. He was not a man who would have sacrificed himself, like Mirabeau, to send advice by notes to the court, day by day, which would

not be followed, but intended that he should be minister in deed as well as in name, and that he should be practically ruler of France. He therefore accepted the War Office, and requested the king to destroy the effect of the dismissal of the ministers by assenting to the two decrees. To his surprise the king would not give in. He positively refused to sanction either decree. Dumouriez failed to understand how any one could object to a camp near Paris because it would cause some rioting, or to a few old priests being hurried to an untimely grave. But he knew very well that, unless he could propitiate the people with some such concessions from the king, he would lose much of his popularity by his recent behaviour; and he therefore haughtily resigned on June 15, and declared that Louis XVI. had broken his word to him. In his perplexity the king once more turned to Lafayette, and decided to admit some of his friends into the ministry, and on June 19 several individuals of very little weight or political importance, but all known as friends of Lafayette, MM. de Chambonas, Lajard, Terrier de Monciel, Beaulieu, and Dejoly, were admitted into the ministry, and on the same day the king's veto on the two decrees was announced to the Assembly. The dismissal of the Girondin ministers had somewhat the same effect upon the populace of Paris as the dismissal of Necker had on July 12, 1789. But there was no enthusiasm for Roland as there had been for Necker. There was something about the virtuous Roland which could not possibly attract the mob; but that their ministers should have been dismissed was discussed in every sectional club in Paris, and it was loudly declared that the capture of the Tuileries would be the sequel to the dismissal of Roland and his friends. But the prophets were not quite right. June 20 was not signalized by the capture of the Tuileries, and in one respect it stands nobly apart from the other great days of the Revolution, for during it not one drop of blood was shed.

The events of June 20 are very significant of the power of the Jacobins, and without the success of June 20 it may be doubted at what particular period the actual capture of the

Tuilleries, which took place on August 10, would have occurred. To distinguish it from the taking of the Bastille, or the events of October 5 and 6, it should be at once remarked that the demonstration of June 20 was premeditated and carefully planned, though matters fell out very differently from what had been anticipated; and something resembling an invasion of the Tuilleries may have passed through the minds of some of the organizers, who assembled at Santerre's house to drink his beer and discuss how the anniversary of the great day of the Tennis Court was to be celebrated. It must also be noticed that, although the movement of June 20 was planned for many days beforehand, neither the Girondin nor the Jacobin leaders had any share in its preparation. Danton and Robespierre alike discouraged any demonstration of the sort. The time was not yet come, they said. Failure would lead to a massacre far more bloody than that of July 17, 1791, while a success which did not seem justified in the eyes of the nation would only ruin Paris in the opinion of the departments. The contrivers of the movement of June 20 were all subaltern actors, who worked in direct opposition to the will of those whom they boasted to be their leaders, and many of them on this day proved themselves fit to be trusted with yet more important matters on a yet greater Revolutionary day, August 10.

Antoine Joseph Santerre was the son of a prosperous brewer of Paris, and was born in 1752. He had a college education, and after leaving college bought a large brewery of M. Acloque, for the sum of sixty-five thousand francs.¹ He had always been very fond of chemistry, and it occurred to him to analyze the popular English beer. He discovered its constituent parts, brewed it himself in Paris, and soon made an enormous fortune. He lived close to his brewery, in the Faubourg Saint Antoine, and his kindness to his numerous workmen and draymen, and even drayhorses, made him quite the most popular man in the poorest faubourg of the capital. Before the Revolution, his chief characteristic, besides his

¹ *Santerre, général de la République*, by A. E. Carro. Paris : 1847.

generosity, had been his love for horses. He was famous as a horseman throughout Paris, and was one of the warmest supporters of the turf, the mysteries of which had been imported into France from England by the Duke of Orleans. He had been an elector in 1789, and had tried to stop the Réveillon riot. He had played an important part in the attack on the Bastille, and was severely wounded when endeavouring to secure respect for a white flag. He was next elected commandant of the national guards of Saint Antoine, and took part with his battalion in the events of October 5 and 6. His influence had considerably increased during the two years of Revolution, and as in his liberality he gave away immense quantities of beer, he possessed all the popularity which might be expected to belong to a charitable brewer. This was the man in whose house the events of June 20 were prepared. The friends whom he assembled round him on this occasion were men of very different ranks in life. Foremost among them was Alexandre, the jeweller, who had been elected commandant of the national guards of the other poor faubourg, the Faubourg Saint Marceau. Besides these officers there was the *ci-devant* Marquis de St. Huruge, the intimate friend of Santerre, who lent him money because of their old acquaintance at the house of the Duke of Orleans and at other places. There was Fournier, called the American, because he had long lived in San Domingo; Lazouski, a Polish gentleman of high birth, who had moved in the best salons of Paris in 1789, and had been there well known and well liked by the English farmer, Arthur Young. With these gentlemen of birth there met, in Santerre's inner room, Rossignol, another jeweller and a very advanced Republican, who was afterwards to be made a general in La Vendée, and the butcher Legendre, a man with violent revolutionary notions and great popular eloquence, who had also the power of attracting sympathy and inspiring it in others. And in the group in Santerre's room neither the *roué* marquis nor the popular exile had one tithe of that seething consuming passion for liberty and equality which of itself made Legendre, though an ignorant, ill-educated man, a

power, not only in Paris, but in after days in the Convention itself.

In Santerre's house it was decided that an attempt should be made to terrify the king into recalling his late ministers. They said, M. Veto has things too much his own way, and ought to see whom the people really love; but since such designs could not be openly avowed, it was decided that leave for a demonstration should be asked of the municipality of Paris, on the ground that the citizens of the Faubourgs Saint Antoine and Saint Marceau wished to present a petition to the Legislative Assembly and to the king on the day of the oath of the Tennis Court; and afterwards to plant a tree of liberty on the Terrace of the Feuillants, in memory of the famous oath. The council-general of the municipality refused their consent and referred the request to the directory of the department and to the government. But the council-general only met once a fortnight, and in the interim Santerre and his friends hoped to obtain the consent which they sought from the mayor and the procureur of the commune, who held power when the council-general was not sitting. Pétion was terribly embarrassed. He feared to lose his popularity by insisting on the refusal which the council-general had given to the citizens of Saint Antoine and Saint Marceau, and at the same time he feared that if the executive got the better of an armed assembly, which he expected would end by a riot, he would be called to a strict account. Therefore, on the advice of Manuel, the procureur of the commune, he determined to summon together the administrators of the police and the commandants of the national guards of the excited faubourgs, in order to throw the responsibility on them. The administrators of police were Panis, the brother-in-law of Santerre, and an indifferent poet; Sergeant, a well-known engraver; Vigner, and Perron; and the four commandants were Santerre, Alexandre, the sergeant Bonneau, who commanded the battalion of Sainte Marguerite, and the actor Saint Prix, who commanded the battalion of Val de Grace. Saint Prix afforded Pétion a means of escape from his embarrassment, and suggested that the national guards of

the disturbed districts should accompany the people to present their petition, in order to maintain the peace; and Pétion acquiesced in this suggestion. This meeting took place at nine o'clock on the evening of June 19, and as those summoned to it returned to their homes they found that all the assemblies of the sections of the revolutionary quarters, and particularly those of the sections of *Quinze-Vingts*, *Popincourt*, and *Gobelins*, were having an all-night sitting, and were working themselves up for the great manifestation of the next day. Pétion was slightly annoyed, and at once sent news of his decision to *Rœderer*, the *procureur-general-syndic* of the department of the *Seine* and an old member of the left in the *Constituent* like himself, and told the administrators of the police to write to the commandant-general for the month, *Ramainvilliers*. *Rœderer* acknowledged his letter, and Pétion went quietly home to bed.

Rœderer at once assembled the directory of the department, who at five o'clock cancelled the mayor's decision of the night before. Pétion then sent off certain administrators of police to announce this both to *Ramainvilliers* and to the commandants of the different battalions of national guards. Naturally both the commandant-general and the commandants of the different battalions were in a state of hopeless confusion on account of the numerous contradictory orders which they had received; and, as was often the case on these great Revolutionary days, the progress of events was left to chance. To analyze the conduct of the several commandants would take too long, but notice may be given to the behaviour of *Bonneau* and *Saint Prix*. *Bonneau* had collected his battalion on June 20, in accordance with Pétion's original order, and had afterwards refused to march with it to join *Santerre* when he received the second order of the mayor cancelling the first; but, soon after, certain men came from the section of *Quinze-Vingts*, and declared that this second order had also been cancelled. *Bonneau* himself wished to dismiss his men, but they forced him to accompany them to *Santerre*, saying that they wished to prevent bloodshed; and he did accompany them,

protesting as they went. Still more violent was the scene in the Faubourg Saint Marceau. When Saint Prix arrived at the headquarters of the battalion of the Val de Grace, he found his men surrounded by a number of workmen who asked the national guards to follow them. Saint Prix ordered his men to fall in, and the gunners to stand to their guns. But the gunners flatly refused to stand to their guns, for the gunners who were attached to the sixty battalions which formed the National Guard of Paris were in nearly every case selected from those old Gardes Françaises who had taken the Bastille, and had then become the Garde Soldée of the National Guard, or else from the mutineers of the artillery regiment of Toul. All these men were violent Revolutionists, and played an important part in every famous riot of the Revolution in Paris. Saint Prix was soon deserted by his gunners and most of his men, and at last consented to accompany his battalion, in order, as he declared, to do his best to prevent them from using violence.

When the news of the excitement in the faubourgs again reached Pétion, he determined once more to disregard the authority of the department, and to legalize the movement which was on foot. He summoned to him his personal friends in the municipality, and they drew up a decree, that the municipality ordered the commandant-general of the National Guard to assemble under his banners all citizens who wished to petition, and that they were to march under the command of officers of the battalions. The municipality then pretended to believe that Paris was saved, because the mob would obey the officers of the National Guard. Meanwhile the directory of the department remained "en permanence," and sent Røederer to report to the Legislative Assembly. Røederer reported that a riot was at hand, and that a very large number of armed citizens were advancing to present a petition to the Assembly. The president, Français of Nantes, replied that the Assembly would consider the matter. Vergniaud then moved that the armed petitioners should be permitted to defile through the hall of the Assembly; and while the motion was being discussed

a letter arrived from Santerre, announcing that the petitioners were already at the doors. The two great streams of men from the Faubourg Saint Antoine and the Faubourg Saint Marceau had moved, the one from the Place de la Salpêtrière and the other from the Place de la Bastille, and had met at the end of the present Rue de Rivoli. The actual petitioners, their battalions of national guards no longer accompanying them, were not more than seven thousand in number at the very outside; but the news of this colossal petition had caused other battalions of the National Guard to fall in, in order to keep the peace, and had also collected a vast number of these who rejoice to see anything new, including, as usual, many women and children. The petitioners, accompanied by this crowd, marched down the Rue Saint Honoré to the Place Vendôme, and there waited while Santerre was admitted to the Assembly in order to request that the petitioners might be heard. A violent debate took place. Ramond and Dunolard on behalf of the right, and Vergniaud and Lasource on behalf of the left, discussed the question at length. For many minutes the Assembly was in utter confusion, and for two hours the debate continued, while Santerre looked calmly on. But meanwhile Santerre's followers were being terribly crushed in the Rue Saint Honoré and the Place Vendôme. Every moment the throng swelled in numbers, until the pressure became intense; and the excitement of the crowd increased. Fortunately the gate of the old Capucin monastery in the Rue Saint Honoré was open, and several thousands of the national guards and of the mob broke into the old convent garden, and planted their tree of liberty among the monks' cabbages, and drank to the oath of the Tennis Court. But, though partly relieved, the crush still continued, and the mass of women and children was nearly forced into the hall of the Assembly, and were so crushed in the narrow passage between the convents of the Feuillants and the Capucins, which formed the only access to the Manège from the Rue Saint Honoré, and which is now replaced by the Rue Castiglione, that three municipal officers came to the king, and requested him to allow the

garden of the Tuileries to be opened, so that the people might get a moment's relief there. The king consented, and the fearful crush which had lasted two hours in the Place Vendôme, the Rue Saint Honoré, and the narrow passage was now over, and the weary and hot petitioners and their friends wandered up and down the beautiful royal gardens. The Assembly at last decided that the petitioners should be heard, and the orator of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, Huguenin, gave utterance to a seditious and feeble speech in the Assembly itself. But the speech was hardly listened to. The important moment was now come, when the women of the markets, and all the petitioners, followed by their friends, were to march through the Assembly. At the foot of the tribune stood Santerre and Saint Huruge, two old friends of Orleans, who directed the petitioners as they marched through the hall. They came along, with arms and without arms, drunk and sober, laughing and weeping; but the only genuine insult which was offered to the Assembly, was when a sans-culotte brought in a calf's heart, with an inscription, "The heart of an aristocrat," upon it, fixed upon his pike. He was promptly induced to leave the hall, and by half-past three the whole of the petitioners and their friends had defiled through the Assembly.

The petitioners, when they had moved through the hall of the Assembly, came down into the court of the riding-school; for it will be remembered that the Legislative Assembly, like the Constituent, sat in the old riding-school of the Tuileries. From the court of the riding-school it was possible for the people to enter the Rue Saint Honoré by turning to the left, up the Rue de Dauphin; but by some chance, probably at the direction of a very officious little architect named Mouchet, who was a municipal officer, the mob turned from the court of the riding-school to the right, and passed along the terrace of the Tuileries, in front of the palace, to the quays opposite the Pont Royal, whence they could move up the quays and disperse on the different sides of the river. The people marched quietly along at first. The national guards on duty stood drawn up along the terrace of the palace, and though the king

might have heard from his windows cries of "*À bas Monsieur et Madame Veto!*" there was no attempt to attack the national guards or to break into the Tuileries. Indeed, any such idea as breaking into the Tuileries did not seem to have occurred to the directors of the popular movement. They were to present their petition to the Assembly, and they were to terrify the king by their numbers, and by the influence for evil they could have exerted; but Santerre, who afterwards saved the queen's life, did not contemplate an invasion of the Tuileries. The crowd had got safely to the quays, but, unfortunately, when the head of the crowd reached the wicket-gate from the Place du Carrousel to the quays, it occurred to certain leaders of the Faubourg Saint Antoine that their shortest way home would be through the Place du Carrousel. A strange and inexplicable order had been left at the wicket of the Place du Carrousel to admit only armed men, but all alike burst merrily into the Place du Carrousel, believing that it would be a very nice way home. Like sheep the crowd had been pressed together in the Rue Saint Honoré and Place Vendôme while the Assembly was debating about them, and now like sheep they followed each other through the gate into the Place du Carrousel, until the square was crammed as tightly as the Rue Saint Honoré had been; but now Santerre and Saint Huruge were no longer with the people to turn them quietly back. Without officers and without directions the crowd soon became overpowering.

In the Place du Carrousel the commandant-general of the National Guard, Romainvilliers, had drawn up five of his battalions, and within the court of the Tuileries itself there were stationed one battalion and a hundred gendarmes on horseback. He had posted ten battalions along the front of the palace in the gardens, two on the river-side, and four in the Place Louis XV.; and with such a force at his disposal Romainvilliers might very easily have prevented the crowd from turning into the Place du Carrousel. But unfortunately the people did get in, and the question was how they were to be got out again. In the midst of the crush certain people

were jammed close up to the entrance of the central court of the Tuileries, known as the Cour Royale, and desired to go in, but not, they declared, to do any harm to the king. The gendarmes forbade them to enter, and when the crowd attempted to force its way in to relieve the terrible pressure the gates were closed. Within this court was posted one battalion of national guards and some gendarmes, as has been said; but nobody to give them any orders. With the gendarmes had assembled some personal friends of the king, and many officers of monarchical ideas had been there ever since the morning, in order to protect his person in case of a riot. One of these officers was Acloque, a son of the Acloque from whom Santerre had bought his brewery; and he persuaded the king to receive twenty of the crowd in the Place du Carrousel, without arms, if they only wished to present a petition: and he then proclaimed at the gate that he would introduce twenty petitioners to his Majesty, who would be well received by him. At this announcement some thirty individuals were admitted into the palace. But now a new and very serious feature appeared in the Place du Carrousel. The gunners of the Faubourg Saint Marceau flatly refused to keep the peace and maintain order, and dragged their guns along the great square, and declared they would blow down the gate which led into the court of the palace. At this threat of the gunners the populace and national guards rushed upon the door; and with a cry, "Don't fire,—it shall be opened," the great gate opened wide. Nobody knew who gave the order to open the gate. There can be no doubt that, if it had not been opened, the events of August 10 would have been anticipated, for the gunners of Saint Marceau would undoubtedly have fired, and however the national guards within the Tuileries might have behaved, the gendarmes would have insisted on fighting.

Through room after room the people thronged in search of "M. Veto," and found him in the hall which was known as the "Œil de Bœuf," with three of his ministers, Beaulieu, Lajard, and Terrier de Monciel, the Maréchal de Mouchy, and a few other personal friends. As the voice of the mob was

heard, Acloque burst into the hall of the *Œil de Bœuf* with a few national guards, and begged them to perish rather than see their monarch insulted. "Do not be afraid, sire," said one of his attendants. "No," replied the king. "Put your hand on my heart; it is calm." There he remained, while the mob rushed into the hall and shouted, "*À bas M. Veto!*" "*Au diable M. Veto!*" Among many speeches it is necessary to note one of the butcher Legendre. He cried out to him, "Ah, monsieur, listen to us,—you are made to hear us; you are a traitor; you have always deceived us; you are deceiving us still. Take care of yourself; your measure is full, and the people are tired of being your plaything!" And in these words Legendre spoke but too truly the belief of those about him. Though they had no mind to murder the king, though they had not intended to force themselves into his presence, yet they believed him to be a traitor, and wished to warn him that the people were tired of treachery. The scene lasted a terribly long time. For nearly two hours the *Œil de Bœuf* was full of a crowd pressed tightly together, and uttering their favourite war-cries. There were incidents enough. Louis, the sacred king, put on the *bonnet rouge*,—the *bonnet rouge* which Robespierre had spurned. The king waved his sword with a cry of "*Vive la Nation!*" The king drank to the health of the people, and stood pressed in the window until his purgatory should be over. At last a disturbance was heard without, and there burst through the crowd some leading deputies of the Legislative Assembly. Side by side rushed on Vergniaud and Isnard, Dauterive and Blanc-Gilly, and all begged the mob to retire in the name of the people and of the Assembly. But the arrival of the deputies could not disperse the crowd, and more and more crowded did the *Place du Carrousel*, the rooms of the *Tuileries*, and the *Cour Royale* become. At length, at six o'clock, Pétion, nicely dressed and in no hurry, ordered his carriage, and drove as far as he could towards the *Tuileries*. He had done nothing since eleven o'clock in the morning, when he had legalized the march of the national guards; but now he declared he had even left

his dinner unfinished in order to go at once to the Tuileries. Welcomed by certain loud cries of "Vive Pétion!" he said, "Sire, I have only just learned what was your situation." "That is very astonishing," said the king, "for it has lasted two hours." Pétion felt rebuked; but when he was told that he should be held responsible for everything that happened, he decided to address the crowd. He begged them in the name of the law to retire; and such was his popularity at that particular epoch, that the crowd did begin to pass through the great interior apartments of the palace just as they had passed through the hall of the Assembly, and Pétion took the place of Santerre, and directed the course of the crowd.

There was one other scene in the palace of the Tuileries that day, which is even more touching than the humiliation of the king. When the queen heard the noise in the Place du Carrousel, she had wished at once to join her husband, but too soon she heard that the crowd was already filling the *Œil de Bœuf*. The minister of foreign affairs, Chambonas, led her, with a few grenadiers, to the council chamber, and she remained there with Madame de Tourzel and Madame de Lamballe, while her little child, the Dauphin, played upon the table. For her, indeed, there was great danger. If the populace wished to terrify the king, they could not terrify the queen, and her life had been endangered by many an article in many a journal. Santerre, who, whatever his faults may have been, was at least a chivalrous man, hurried to the spot where she stood. He took his place by her side, and said that the people would do the queen no harm. There he stood throughout the afternoon, while the terrible crowd filled the council chamber with cries against the queen, till at last, through the influence of Pétion and Santerre, the last of the mob, at half-past eight in the evening, left the palace of the Tuileries. Then husband and wife fell into each other's arms. Those present were deeply moved; but Merlin of Thionville, the young Jacobin deputy, felt that he ought to explain his tears. "I weep, madame," he said, "I weep for the misfortunes of a beautiful and sensitive woman, and for the

sufferings of a mother; I do not weep for the queen. I hate queens and kings; to hate them is my religion."¹

The Legislative Assembly had informally met again at five o'clock, on hearing of the excitement in the Place du Carrousel; Guyton-Morveau, the chemist, as an ex-president, took the chair; and it was decreed that twenty-four members should go to the Tuileries to protect the king. A violent debate commenced; Matheu Dumas and Chabot fiercely attacked each other; and finally, on the motion of Lacroix, a fresh deputation was directed to be sent to the Tuileries every half-hour, in order that the Assembly might be kept informed of the state of affairs. Before this evening session closed, Pétion appeared in the Assembly, and with great emotion made a speech, in which he said that the municipality had done its duty and could never be reproached; that the citizens had done only what was right, and that the citizens would never break the law. The words of the agitated mayor were loudly cheered, and it was obvious that, if it should be attempted to call him to account, the Assembly as well as the people would be on his side.

That the course of events which had so greatly humiliated him, and caused him so many insults, appeared to the king no carefully planned demonstration, but only a series of unpremeditated insults, is shown by the fact that he showed no resentment against the leaders of the rising, but only against Pétion and the municipality for not having prevented it. That the actual invasion of the Tuileries was a consequence of the petition of the faubourgs, there can be no real doubt. It is true that it had been rumoured that the people were going to present their petition for the recall of the dismissed ministers, both to the Assembly and to the king; but had not the gate

¹ By far the best account of the events of June 20, 1792, which has been carefully followed, is that given by Mortimer-Ternaux, in his *Histoire de la Terreur*, Paris, 1862-1881, vol. i. bk. ii. pp. 129-223; with a bibliography, vol. i. p. 392. See also Rœderer's *Chronique de cinquante jours du 20 Juin jusqu'au 10 Août*, 1792, Paris, 1832; and, for Santerre's part, Carro's *Vie de Santerre*, pp. 111, 112

of the Place du Carrousel been opened at the critical moment, there can be no doubt that the people were going quietly home, tired by their long crush in the Rue Saint Honoré, excited by their defiling through the Assembly, and rejoicing at having seen the beautiful gardens of the Tuileries, and at having shouted "A bas M. Veto!" before the palace windows. No hint of a wish to kill the king has been reported; there was no sign of it in the eyes or mouths of these petitioners,—still less in the gay crowd which accompanied the petitioners now, as they accompanied them on July 17, 1791, merely to see or hear some new thing. In truth a movement organized by men of the type of Santerre and Saint Huruge, Alexandre and Lazouski, was not likely to be a very terrible manifestation. At a later date, these conspirators had at their councils men of stronger will, who did not fear to shed blood,—Danton, Marat, Billaud-Varenne, Anthoine, Carra, and Westermann. Just as the flight to Varennes had failed because of a series of accidents, so was the king's humiliation upon June 20 due to a series of accidents. Had there been some one in authority, such as Santerre, at the further side of the Place du Carrousel when the people entered it, in order to take care that there should be free circulation in the crowd, there would have been no cry to enter the royal palace; and when the royal palace was entered, had there been a Santerre by the side of the king, as there was by the side of the queen, the petitioners might have defiled slowly off. The mob showed its good humour and amenability to authority; and though such violent revolutionists as Legendre dared openly to insult the king, yet most of the petitioners liked looking at him, and feeling that they were saying something rude to one who had been considered for so many years to be made of better clay than themselves, without intending to harm him. The king and queen both seem to have felt this, and therefore no arrests are heard of among the petitioners; but the royal anger showed itself in the treatment of Pétion. On the 21st the mayor, accompanied by Panis and Sergent, entered the council chamber. "How is Paris to-day, Mr. Mayor?" said the king. "Sire," said the

mayor, with a smile, "the people have made their representations to you, and are perfectly satisfied." "Acknowledge, sir, that a great scandal took place yesterday, and that the municipality did not do all that could have been done to prevent it." "Sire, the municipality did all it could, and ought to do. Public opinion will judge it; the municipality does not fear the judgment of the whole nation." "In what situation is the capital at this moment?" continued the king. "Sire, it is calm." "That is not true." The mayor began to reply to this insult, "Sire——" "Be silent," said Louis XVI., and turned his back upon Jérôme Pétion.¹ On the 22nd the king issued a proclamation, in which he severely blamed the commune of the city of Paris. That he was greatly pitied is proved by the innumerable congratulations on his escape which came up from the departments,² and perhaps still more by the promptitude with which the directory of the department of the Seine suspended Pétion himself, and Manuel, the procureur of the commune, who had acquiesced in the proceedings of the mayor.

But sympathy could not help the king to regain his authority. There was but one man who could do that, and that man both king and queen would not entirely trust. Lafayette, from his camp, wrote that he was at once coming to Paris to see what he could do about this unfortunate affair of June 20. There is no doubt that if he had succeeded in restoring the king's power he would himself have become a sort of mayor of the palace, for he would never have given his services for nothing; yet in such extremity as they were, the king and queen might well have accepted the general's services, and trusted to fortune to relieve them of his presence afterwards. Even previous to June 20 considerable excitement had been created in the Assembly by the reading of a letter of Lafayette's on June 16, dated from his camp at Maubeuge. In this letter he condemned in no sparing terms the society of the Jacobins, as a corporation distinct within itself, and

¹ Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. ii. pp. 25-36.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. pp. 234, 235.

separated in opinion and feeling from the rest of the country, and he especially denounced Dumouriez and the rest of the Girondin ministers. The letter was impolitic, for it was calculated to arouse irritation, and still more impolitic in that its statements were not correct. The Jacobin Club, instead of forming a corporation distinct from the rest of the country, exactly represented the feeling of the country. That a time came at last when the Jacobin Club did not represent public opinion there can be no doubt; but at present there was no wish for reaction, and the idea of the most energetic men in the country was to press forward. The Jacobin Club could not have obtained its power had it not at one period represented the real, genuine feeling of the country; and when was that period if not now? The letter of Lafayette gave rise to a violent debate, and was finally referred to the committee of twelve—a committee which had been appointed to watch the state of affairs on June 17, and which foreshadowed the great Committee of Public Safety. But the events of June 20 had altered Lafayette's position. It was not that the events of that day had weakened the Jacobins, but they had increased the sympathy of that large mass of the people which goes to no extremes for the king, and which had been fairly won by his brave attitude in a situation of great difficulty. Lafayette perceived this sympathy as clearly as if he had read all the letters from the provinces showing it, and at once determined to go himself to Paris. On June 28 he arrived in the capital, and left his carriage at the house of the president of the directory of the department, the Duc de la Rochefoucauld. He went at once to the Legislative Assembly to offer it "the homage of his respects."¹ He was admitted to the bar, and spoke at length of the letter he had written on the 16th, after which he commented on the events of June 20, and declared that he himself, his officers, and his soldiers formed but one force, with one single thought, that of love for the Constitution and hatred of all factions. He begged the Assembly to pursue and punish the ringleaders of the affair of June 20, and said

¹ Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. i. p. 282.

that he would then report to the army his satisfaction with the deputies. "Monsieur," replied the president, who at that time was Stanislas de Girardin, a ci-devant marquis, and the favourite pupil of Rousseau, "the Legislative Assembly has sworn to maintain the Constitution, and will examine your petition." Great was the effect which the arrival of the former commander of the National Guard caused in the Assembly; and the members of the left felt that, unless in some way his popularity with those who sympathized with the king could be destroyed, their power in the Assembly might be seriously weakened. Guadet, with his usual ability, perceived the weak point of Lafayette's proceedings, and at once attacked him for having left his army without leave. No defence could clear the general of this terrible breach of military discipline; and though, on a vote, Guadet's motion was lost by 234 to 339, his reputation received a severe blow from the eloquence of the Girondins. Flushed with his victory, he left the Assembly and drove to the Tuileries. Round his carriage crowded the national guards, who had been utterly disgusted by the behaviour of Romainvilliers on the previous day, and who, though they had been discontented with Lafayette, and had grumbled at him, yet felt that their position had always been more creditable when under the command of a single general than when the command-in-chief changed from month to month. At the palace the king and queen treated Lafayette politely, but coldly; and to Madame Elisabeth the queen said, "Rather would I perish than be saved by Lafayette and the Constitutionalists." Lafayette felt the coldness of his reception, and deliberately threw away the opportunity which was afforded him. A large proportion of the National Guard of Paris, notably the wealthy bourgeois of the Rue Richelieu and the Rue Vivienne and the reactionary journalists, were desirous of closing the Jacobin Club by force, and they collected outside the palace with cries of "Marchons aux Jacobins!" But Lafayette coldly dismissed them,¹ and though the report

¹ *Dix Années d'Épreuves pendant la Révolution*, by C. Lacretelle, p. 90. Paris: 1842.

was spread the next day among the National Guard that Lafayette would be happy to close the Jacobins, this was not sufficient to bring the men who had crowded round him on the night of the 28th to his side; and on the 30th, after having been in Paris but forty-eight hours, Lafayette returned to his camp. Once more had he had the power of doing something which might have made his name great; once more his own conceit and vanity induced him not to take advantage of the opportunity afforded him. Truly Lafayette might be called the evil spirit of the dynasty of the Bourbons. By his services in America he had established that union between France and America which necessarily tended to decrease the feeling of attachment to the monarchy in France. With the day of the Bastille his name was associated by his nomination as commandant of the national guards of Paris; and the terrible scenes of October 5 and 6 might have been prevented had he determined to prevent them. The flight to Varennes was probably known by him to be in contemplation; yet he made no effort to stop it. And now he appeared during the last struggle that the monarchical idea was to make in France just before its fall, and from wounded vanity failed to strike a blow. Well indeed might the queen feel that he was the cause of all her evils. It is better to have an avowed enemy than a friend who acts in every way for his own glory, and not for the honour or even the safety of those he professes to serve.

Lafayette had not taken effective advantage of the sympathy which had been won for the king by his courageous attitude; and it is now necessary to trace the gradual evaporation of that sympathy during the famous fifty days which elapsed between June 20 and August 10. The history of these fifty days is one of the most interesting in the whole of the Revolution, for in it every current of feeling grew to its height. During those fifty days the greatest loyalty to the king, the truest fidelity to the Constitution, the most enthusiastic love of France, the most uncompromising hatred to the king, and the most determined opposition to his maintenance of power, all appeared at their very highest; and the progress

of public opinion is marked by three or four days of intense excitement.

It was reserved for Vergniaud, the greatest orator of the Revolutionary period, to strike the first great blow at the passing popularity of the king, by recalling to the minds of the deputies of the Assembly, and, through the publication of his speech, to the minds of all Frenchmen, the suspicion that Louis XVI. was in league with the enemies of France. On July 3 Jean Debry opened a debate upon the state of France, and Vergniaud succeeded him at the tribune. His long speech was devoted to an elaborate attack upon the unfortunate monarch, and the following passage will give some idea of his eloquence: "It is in the *name of the king*," he said, "that the French princes have tried to raise all the courts of Europe against France; it is to vindicate the *dignity of the king* that the treaty of Pillnitz was signed, and the monstrous alliance made between the courts of Vienna and Berlin; it is to *defend the king* that the former companies of the Body-Guard have hurried to Germany to serve beneath the standards of rebellion; it is to come to the *help of the king* that the *émigrés* ask for and obtain employment in the Austrian armies, and get ready to tear the bosom of their fatherland; it is to join these gallant defenders of the *royal prerogative* that other gallants, of the most scrupulous honour, are abandoning their posts in the presence of the enemy, are breaking their oaths, are stealing the military chests, are labouring to corrupt their soldiers, and are thus setting their glory in cowardice, perjury, bribery, theft, and assassination; it is against the nation or the National Assembly alone, and for the maintenance of the *splendour of the throne*, that the King of Hungary and Bohemia is making war upon us, and the King of Prussia marching towards our frontiers; it is in the *name of the king* that liberty is being attacked, and if it should be overthrown, the empire would soon be dismembered to indemnify the allied powers for their expenses; for the generosity of kings is well known, as well as the disinterestedness with which they send their armies to desolate a foreign land, and the extent to which it can be

believed that they would exhaust their treasures to sustain a war which should not be profitable to them. In fine, it is the *name of the king* alone which is the pretext or the cause of all the evils which are being heaped upon our heads, and of all which we have to dread.”¹ This is not such an eloquent passage of Vergniaud’s great speech as the one in which he attacks the king personally, as the “man whom the generosity of the French people could not move,” but it shows clearly how the Girondins strove to destroy the effect of the sympathy felt by the nation for the king, by associating him with the idea of treachery, and making him out to be the cause of the war. The result of the debates in which Vergniaud made this great speech, was the declaration on July 11, upon the motion of Hérault de Séchelles, that “the country was in danger,” and the demand for the enrolment of eighty-five thousand volunteers to rush to the frontier.

Though Lafayette had failed to persuade the Assembly to prosecute the ringleaders of the events of June 20, his earnest solicitations to the Duc de la Rochefoucauld had encouraged the directory of the department of the Seine to inquire into the conduct of the mayor and of the procureur of the commune. The question was minutely gone into, and it is from the evidence given before the directory of the department alone that the true history of June 20 can be learned. Unfortunately the directory spent too much time in taking this evidence, and it was not until the evening of July 7, more than a fortnight after the conduct complained of, that the council-general of the department of the Seine announced that it had suspended Pétion and Manuel. At the moment when this news reached the Assembly it had just passed through a peculiar phase which illustrates the tension of men’s minds at this particular crisis of the Revolution. In the midst of a serious debate, Lamourette, the author of Mirabeau’s speeches on the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, who had been elected Constitutional Bishop of Lyons, suddenly proposed that those

¹ *Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention*, by F. A. Aulard, vol. i. pp. 326, 327. Paris: 1886.

"who loathe and hate the idea of a republic, and of two chambers, should rise." "Let us swear," he said, "to have but one spirit and one sentiment; let us form ourselves into one and the same mass of free men, equally terrible to the spirit of anarchy and the spirit of feudalism. The moment in which the foreigner sees that we in this Assembly wish for one thing only, and that we wish it unanimously, will be the moment when liberty will triumph and France will be saved." The young deputies were seized with indescribable enthusiasm. Deputies of the right and of the left rose from their seats; and those who had before opposed each other, now kissed each other with the kiss of Lamourette. Dumas sat by Merlin, Jaucourt by Basire, Albitte by Ramond; Gensonné shook hands with Calvet, Chabot with Genty; while Pastoret and Condorcet, who that very morning had been abusing each other in their respective journals, fell into each other's arms. The king then arrived, and amidst cries of "Vive le Roi!" the Assembly appeared to be seized with a fever of loyalty.¹ After this theatrical performance, arrived the news of the suspension of Pétion and Manuel. It must not be forgotten, whether in looking at the pathetic or the laughable side of this demonstration, that the Assembly consisted chiefly of very young men, and that the strong men of each party did not possess seats there. Certainly it is impossible to imagine Robespierre embracing the Vicomte de Mirabeau, or Danton shaking hands with D'Esprémesnil. But these men of fixed principles were either at Coblenz, cursing the Revolution, or sitting at the Jacobins' and the Soleil d'Or, preparing for the final onslaught on the monarchy. The king declared his determination to maintain the suspension of the mayor of Paris, whom he considered, and rightly, as accountable for the insults he had received on June 20. Thuriot defended Pétion; and during the debate, on July 10, the news arrived that the unfortunate king had been deserted by the friends of Lafayette, and that the ministers in a body had resigned, and only consented to hold office till their successors were appointed. On July 13

¹ Mortimer-Ternaux, vol. ii. p. 34.

the Assembly had the audacity to decree that the suspension of the mayor and the procureur-syndic of Paris was null and void by its own authority, and the king, abandoned by his ministers, actually consented to sign the decree of the Assembly.

On another question the Assembly had practically annulled the veto of the king. He had resolved that the camp of twenty thousand fédérés should not be assembled beneath the walls of Paris; but the Assembly decreed that there should be a Feast of Federation as usual on July 14, in honour of the capture of the Bastille, and the king was obliged to consent. All sides alike felt that the conduct of these fédérés would decide which party would for the present gain the upper hand. The king tried to prevent them from coming up in any number;¹ the Girondins hoped to excite their patriotism; while the Jacobins, who knew men better than the king or the Girondins, made great preparations for entertaining them. On July 14 the Feast of the Federation took place, but it cannot be compared in importance with the great Federation of 1790, for the deputations from Marseilles and the south had not arrived, and not more than three thousand fédérés were present in all. The official ceremony showed the decline of loyalty. The king sat alone and neglected on the left of the president of the Assembly, quiet prevailed, and not a cry of "Vive le Roi!" was to be heard.² The declaration that the country was in danger had not caused much excitement; but on the 22nd and 23rd of July, a week after the assembling of the fédérés, its results were to be seen in Paris. In every square in the city a platform was raised, with a municipal officer seated at the head of a table; and, amidst the sound of artillery and the cheering of the people, young men—aye, and fathers of families—rushed to offer themselves as soldiers, and to swear that they would go to the front. As each volunteer took the oath

¹ See particularly Pollio and Marcel's *Bataillon du 10 Août*, pp. 139 and 159.

² See the account in the *Annales patriotiques* of Carra and Mercier, quoted in an article "*Le 14 Juillet, 1792*," by J. C. Colfavru in the *Révolution Française* for July, 1883.

he moved out to the Champ de Mars, where a large camp was established, which was soon filled with young Parisians. Then men waited. Sympathy with the king was fast disappearing. The Girondins were undecided, and the Jacobins planned openly and without concealment a final blow, involving the capture of the Tuileries, and the deposition of the king.

For the moment everything was quiet. But Paris knew that it was dancing on a volcano. The fédérés were still lounging in the streets, or drinking in the cafés, waiting for the arrival of the Marseillais; the Parisian volunteers in the Champ de Mars were murmuring that they would not leave the capital until they knew that the traitors behind them would not take advantage of their absence. Amidst all this excitement the king had no one on whom he could rely. He could with difficulty find new ministers, and they were men of no weight or importance. But their loyalty was unquestioned, and for that reason their names deserve to be mentioned. They were Bigot de Sainte Croix, Champion de Villeneuve, Leroux de Laville, De Joly, D'Abancourt, and Dubouchage. The directory of the department of the Seine had been discredited by the supersession of the suspension of Pétion. The mayor was not only not trying to check the revolutionary meetings which were taking place, but actually encouraging them; and lastly, the national guards, who should have controlled the revolutionary spirit, were walking about in disconsolate groups, not trusting their monthly commander-in-chief, disgusted with the behaviour of Lafayette, and determined, like the bourgeois they represented, to allow any movement of revolution to go on as long as it threatened only the king or certain individuals, and seemed likely to spare themselves, their wives, their children, and their shops. Upon this waiting Paris, the news of the declaration of war by the King of Prussia on July 25, and the text of the Duke of Brunswick's proclamation, came like a thunderbolt. The war with Prussia was not unexpected, but the severe terms of Brunswick's manifesto caused the greatest indignation. That prince was well known for his enlightened rule of his prin-

ciality and as a favourite of Frederick the Great, and had been supposed to be friendly to France—so much so that the journalist Carra had proposed him, as he afterwards suggested the Duke of York, as a fitting successor to Louis XVI. The manifesto was not, however, the work of Brunswick, and he afterwards declared that the most violent passage in it was added after he had affixed his signature. The youthful Francis had been crowned Emperor at Frankfort on July 14, the very day of the Federation, and after an interview with Mallet du Pan, the accredited envoy of the Tuileries, had joined Frederick William at Mayence four days afterwards to draw up the plan of campaign against France. Mallet du Pan had advised the issue of a proclamation to the French people, and one drawn up by an émigré, named De Limon, a friend of Calonne, was accepted, and, after some revision by the Prussian and Austrian ministers, was issued in the name of the Duke of Brunswick, as general commanding the allied armies. The manifesto was most violent in its terms, threatening any city which resisted with the fullest rigours of war, and declaring that Paris should be totally destroyed if any harm happened to the king or queen. This impolitic manifesto sealed the fate of the royal family, and made the bourgeois and the National Guard of Paris ready to acquiesce in the overthrow of the monarchy, which the Jacobin leaders were busily preparing.

CHAPTER IV.

THE TENTH OF AUGUST, AND THE MASSACRES OF SEPTEMBER.

Preparations for insurrection—The Girondins make overtures to the court—The King rejects plans of escape—The Jacobins win over the fédérés—The directory of insurrection—Arrival of the Marseillais—The song of the “Marseillaise”—Preparations for the insurrection—The petitions of the sections—The sections at the Hôtel de Ville—Final arrangements for the defence of the Tuileries—Mandat murdered at the Hôtel de Ville—Santerre marches on the Tuileries—The king goes to the Assembly—Attack on the Tuileries—Murder of the Swiss Guards—The debate in the Assembly—The king at the convent of the Feuillants—A national convention summoned—Lafayette protests and deserts—Girondins and Jacobins—The state of Paris—The elections in Paris—The massacres in the prisons of Paris—Massacres in the provinces—The massacre at Versailles.

It is impossible to discover on what precise day, during the interval of the fifty days between June 20 and August 10, 1792, the Jacobins decided that an attack should be made on the Tuileries and the royalty finally overthrown, but the first meeting of the “Secret Directory of Insurrection,” in which the measures to be adopted were discussed, did not take place till July 26. What, then, was the king doing, and still more, what was the Assembly doing, during this period? The two chief questions which agitated them were, as has been said, the behaviour of Lafayette and the federation of July; and the sequel of the history of these two subjects will throw much light on the organization of the most important day of the Revolution. Lafayette’s hasty return to his camp had

greatly weakened the power of the National Guard in Paris, and from that time his friends in the Assembly felt that in defending the general they were defending a man who had politically destroyed himself. The question as to what right he had to leave his camp had been referred, on the motion of Guadet, to the committee which was charged to watch over the public safety. This committee had been increased from twelve to eighteen, and finally to twenty-one members, and distinctly foreshadowed the Committee of Public Safety. The majority of the committee, like the majority of the Assembly, was really Feuillant in sentiment; but those members who were perfectly willing to vote with the Feuillants when the voting was secret,¹ were generally induced by fear not to openly oppose the measures of the Jacobins. The report was brought up on July 19 by a Feuillant, Muraire, who was afterwards President of the Court of Appeal under the empire, and completely absolved Lafayette, on the ground that there was no law in the Constitution forbidding a general to leave his camp, and that therefore Lafayette had broken no law. But the left of the Assembly were not likely to be satisfied with this excuse, and on July 21 the general was again attacked by Lasource and Torné, the constitutional bishop of Bourges, and he was afterwards publicly denounced by Guadet, who declared that he had heard Lückner say that Lafayette had wished him to move his troops upon Paris. To this accusation Bureaux de Pusy, the ex-Constituant, and now an aide-de-camp of Lafayette, replied on July 28, and the general on the 30th sent a letter to the Assembly utterly denying the charge. The feeling on the part both of Girondins and Jacobins, which made them attack Lafayette so unsparingly, was that they thought he had sufficient reputation to unite the bourgeois in opposition to the progress of the Revolution; and that they were right in their opinion is shown by the fact that on August 8, after Debry had declared there were grounds for accusing Lafayette, the Assembly refused to condemn him by 406 votes to 224, showing a majority of nearly two to one in

¹ Mathieu Dumas' *Souvenirs*, vol. ii. p. 399.

his favour. Though the majority were thus evidently willing to make every allowance for the general, and to excuse his behaviour, the leaders of the right in the Assembly began to resign their seats and desert their friend. Jaucourt, for instance, the former colonel of the dragoons of Condé, and Daverhoults resigned their seats in the Assembly on July 24 and 26. The leaders of the right, therefore, showed no confidence in their own power or their own cause, and left those deputies who would have supported them to be dragged against their will into consenting to the measures, not only of the Girondins, but of the more extreme Jacobins.

The Girondins felt that it was necessary to make a strenuous effort if power was to fall into their hands; and they tried to strengthen themselves in two distinct directions. On the one side the Girondin leaders hoped to deserve well of France by hurrying on all the preparations for war; and it was on the motion of Vergniaud that, on July 24, volunteers were summoned from all parts of France and directed towards the frontier. These volunteers were not to be subjected to the ordinary rules of martial discipline, and were to elect the whole of their officers; and amongst them were many men who were to win their greatest fame in the military history of the Republic. Moreau was elected commandant of the first battalion of the volunteers of the Ille et Vilaine, Jourdan commandant of the second battalion of the Haute Vienne, Davout commandant of the third battalion of the Yonne, Soult instructor to the first battalion of the Haut-Rhin, Pichegru commandant of the first battalion of the Gard, and Masséna commandant of the second battalion of the Var. But besides trying to increase their popularity by patriotic energy, the leading Girondins bethought them of trying to make their influence felt in the Tuileries itself, and on July 29 a memoir was drawn up and signed by the chief Girondin leaders, Guadet, Gensonné, and Vergniaud, which was sent in to the king by the painter Boze, who was an intimate friend of the king's valet Thierry.

This memoir was drawn up by the great orator Vergniaud,

whose eloquence had done so much to weaken the position of the king, and deserves to be compared, from its perspicuity and its statesmanlike power, to the state papers of Mirabeau. "The king is surrounded," he wrote in the spirit of his speech of July 3, "by persons whose affections are all centred on Coblenz; must it not be believed that he shares their feelings? . . . All the faults of his agents are disastrous to liberty; is it not natural to attribute them to a secret combination with our foreign enemies? Our means of defence are weak; they might be all-powerful; our battalions are numerous but scattered, and with plenty of soldiers we have no army. Who is the natural subject of all fears and murmurs? Surely it is the man in whose name war is being waged against us, and who nevertheless disposes our military forces as he likes best; the man, to whose authority our defeats would be profitable, and who for that very reason is presumed to be more interested in our reverses than our successes. He has been cruelly deceived, if he has been made to believe that all his duty is to obey the laws of the Constitution. Not to violate the Constitution is nothing. His oaths impose upon him also the obligation to defend it; and he would betray it none the less by a system of inaction than by a formal understanding with the allied powers. These would be equal crimes in the eyes of the nation, and would be judged with the same rigour. Perhaps the king thinks there is courage in braving these suspicions, and dignity in shutting himself up in profound silence. When these accusations are the cry of the people, it is neither great nor magnanimous to keep silence; silence is rather an acknowledgment of the faults of which he is accused, or an evidence of most insolent pride towards the supreme accuser. True glory, then, demands that he should justify himself by conspicuous deeds, or solemn proceedings. I would add that it is not only the security and the crown of the king which is my subject here, but the safety of the country, and that the country has the right to exact that Louis XVI. should do for it what a sentiment of false dignity might prevent him from doing for his own sake." Vergniaud then recommends that

the king should declare that he would never separate from the Assembly, that he should select well-known patriots to be his ministers instead of nonentities, and that he should summon some of the best-known of the ex-Constituants, such as Rœderer and Pétion, to his council, though without office. "I do not know," wrote he in conclusion, "if I am deluding myself, but I am persuaded that at the moment in which the king's council should be thus reinforced, the fears of treason would decrease, a hope that the ministry would show some vigour would be developed, the constitutional throne would rise above the cloud of accusations which throw a shade upon its glory, and that the general approval would be the prelude of a sincere agreement between the executive power and the citizens, which alone can, in my opinion, enable us to carry on the war with some success, and save France from perhaps a half-century of calamities. I close my letter; it is only too long, since it will be useless. My heart is oppressed with the deepest sorrow."¹ This letter shows clearly enough the incapacity of the leading Girondins for practical politics; for it was at the hands of Vergniaud, Guadet and Gensonné that the monarchy had received its heaviest blows, and yet Vergniaud, who by his speech of July 3 had destroyed the sympathy felt for the king, now showed a desire to keep him in power. It is hardly necessary to add that the king paid no attention to his advice, and that the Girondin leaders remained helplessly watching the growth of the movement which was to overthrow the constitutional monarchy.

Meanwhile what were the prisoners in the Tuileries doing? The king, discouraged by the failure of the flight to Varennes, was passively waiting for martyrdom, and showing all the virtues of a martyr. Plans innumerable were concocted for his escape, but the queen would accept none of them. Madame de Staël proposed a similar scheme to the flight to Varennes, in which she was to play the chief part, but was coldly refused; and Gouverneur Morris, who succeeded Jefferson as Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America at Paris in

¹ Vattel's *Vergniaud*, pp. 121-125.

May, 1792, received large sums of money¹ from the court to carry out a plan of Terrier de Monciel and Bertrand de Moleville to buy up some of the Jacobin fédérés, and especially the Marseillais, to manage the king's escape. Better devised was the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt's scheme. He was governor of Rouen, and popular there; the city of Rouen was in a prosperous state, and hated the Jacobins, and was but ten hours' journey from Paris; the Swiss regiment of Salis-Samade in garrison there was loyal, and the cavalry regiment of Royal Cravate, when appealed to, was eager to save the king, and shouted "À Paris!"² The king, who was always fond of Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, looked with favour on this scheme, and three hundred of the Swiss Guards were cantoned along the road to Rouen to cover his escape.³ But the queen opposed this scheme, because she hated the duke, and remarked to Bertrand de Moleville that she would never place herself in the hands of the Constitutionalists.⁴ Lafayette hoped also to become once more the saviour of the king, and wished him to escape to Compiègne, where Alexandre de Lameth was in command of two regiments of chasseurs, within easy distance of Lafayette's army. The Marquis de Puységur's answer to Mathieu Dumas, who had made himself very active in this scheme of Lafayette's, gives the keynote to the refusal of the royal family to leave Paris. "Never, never," he said, "shall Lafayette become High Constable, and the royal family and the fate of France be placed in his hands. The queen is obstinately opposed to the scheme, and Madame Elisabeth advises against it from religious motives. The Baron de Vioménil, whose assurance and intrepidity you know well, undertakes, with the Swiss Guards alone, not only to defend the palace, but to drive back to their faubourgs all that canaille in insurrection, which could have been so easily dissipated, if

¹ *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, by Jared Sparks, p. 378. Boston: 1832.

² Lacretelle, *Dix Années d'Épreuves pendant la Révolution*, pp. 95-102.

³ Pfyffer d'Altishofen's *Récit de la conduite des Gardes Suisses*, p. 7.

⁴ Bertrand de Moleville's *Mémoires particulières*, vol. ii. p. 132. Paris: 1816.

it had been once decided to act with vigour.”¹ This is the reason why the plans not only of Vergniaud, but of Rochefoucauld-Liancourt and Lafayette, had been rejected; the queen had determined to fight, and the royalist courtiers about her had convinced her that armed resistance to the populace in Paris might be successful.

The last struggle with royalty was now distinctly decided upon. Jacobins of all sorts, Danton, Marat, and Robespierre, felt that until the king fell the country would be divided and order could not be re-established; and very steadily and determinedly did the leading Jacobins set about their work of organizing a revolt which should terminate in the destruction of royalty. A “Secret Directory of Insurrection” was formed from among the subordinate Jacobins, in which, however, none of the leaders just mentioned sat, though they were cognizant of all the plans. This directory had developed from the central committee of the fédérés then in Paris, who had appointed five of their number to formulate a plan of insurrection, and these five had added to their number ten of the informal committee which had prepared the rising of June 20. Saint Huruge was in prison at Péronne for abusing old Marshal Lückner.² But his place was ably filled. Prominent among the members of the secret directory were Jean Louis Carra, the journalist, Santerre, Alexandre, Antoine, the ex-Constituant, Lazouski, the commandant of the gunners of Saint-Marceau, and Westermann—a man of great personal strength, and an ex-dragoon, who had been a clerk in the courts of Haguenau, and was now a very intimate friend of Danton. Danton himself made no further objection to a great day in Paris for the overthrow of royalty. The excitement of men’s minds, both in Paris and in France, was hindering due attention being paid to what was, according to him, the great question of the Revolution, how to make head against the enemies of France on the frontier. The first attempt at insurrection was in connec-

¹ Mathieu Dumas’ *Souvenirs*, vol. ii. p. 351.

² *Sainte-Huruge*, by Victor Fournel, in *Revue de la Révolution* for December, 1865, p. 423.

tion with a civic banquet which was given on the Place de la Bastille, to the fédérés on July 26. Many citizens of the poorer classes brought their own suppers to the banquet; and, after a big feast, it was proposed that an advance on the Tuileries should be made, and the tocsin was rung. But the time was not yet ripe. The national guards had not yet recognized that, for their own safety, and to maintain a reputation for patriotism, they must not interfere with the progress of the revolt, enthusiasm was not aroused, the Marseillais had not arrived, and therefore the festival concluded without any demonstration.

Far more important was the scheme fixed for July 30. On that day the battalion of Marseillais which had been so long expected entered Paris. This battalion has been described by every historian as a collection of the vagabonds who are always to be found in a great seaport town, and particularly in one like Marseilles, where food was cheap and lodging unnecessary. But their character has lately been vindicated,¹ and it has been shown that these Marseillais were picked men from the national guards of Marseilles, like the other fédérés, and contained the most hardy as well as the most revolutionary men of the city. This battalion had been raised at Marseilles by the voluntary enrolment of national guards, in consequence of a letter received from Charles Barbaroux, asking for the despatch of 500 men, who "knew how to die," to form part of the reserve of 20,000 men proposed by Servan. They left Marseilles 513 strong, with two guns, on July 2, and had been marching slowly across France, singing the immortal war-song to which they gave their name. On their arrival at Charenton on July 29 they were met by Barbaroux, the old secretary-general of the National Guard of Marseilles, who was now a frequenter of the salon of Madame Roland; and under his conduct the battalion marched into Paris on July 30. The very words of their famous song might serve to show the king that the men who were about to fight "the accomplices of

¹ *La Bataillon du 10 Août. Recherches pour servir à l'histoire de la Révolution française*, by Joseph Pollio and Adrien Marcel. Paris: 1981.

Bouillé," as they termed the enemy on the frontier, were equally determined to attack him whom they regarded as the most dangerous accomplice of them all. The day of their entrance had been fixed by the secret directory for the great attempt, but Santerre, who had promised to meet the Marseillais with all the men of Saint-Antoine, and to march at once on the Tuileries, only brought 250 men with him, and the first singing of the "Marseillaise" in Paris was not immediately followed by the overthrow of the king.

The "Marseillaise" had in itself no very radical history. On April 24, 1792, just after the declaration of war, the mayor of Strasbourg, Dietrich, who was himself no advanced republican, but a constitutionalist, remarked at a great banquet that it was very sad that all the national war songs of France could not be sung by her present defenders, because they all treated of loyalty to the king and not to the nation as well. One of the guests was a young captain of engineers, Rouget de Lisle, who had in 1791 composed a successful *Hymne à la Liberté*, and Dietrich appealed to him to compose something suitable. The young man was struck by the notion, and during the night he was suddenly inspired with both words and air, and on the following day he sang over to Dietrich's guests the famous song which was to be the war-song of the French Republic. Madame Dietrich arranged the air for the orchestra; Rouget de Lisle dedicated it to Marshal Lückner, as the *Chant de guerre pour l'armée du Rhin*, and it at once became popular in Strasbourg. Neither Dietrich nor Rouget were advanced republicans. The watchword of the famous song was not "Sauvons la République," but "Sauvons la Patrie." The air was a taking one. From Strasbourg it quickly spread over the south of France, and particularly attracted the patriots of Marseilles.¹

¹ There are many legends on the origin of the "Marseillaise;" the account here followed is that given by Amedée Rouget de Lisle, the author's nephew, in his *La vérité sur la paternité de la Marseillaise*, Paris, 1865, which is confirmed by a letter of Madame Dietrich's, written at the time, and first published in *Souvenirs d'Alsace—Rouget de Lisle à Strasbourg et à Huningue*, by Adolphe Morpain.

Singing this song, then, which of itself breathed no hatred to the king, the Marseillais marched into the city of Paris. After going to the Hôtel de Ville to cheer Pétion, they were conducted by some of the leading Jacobins to the Champs Elysées, where a banquet had been prepared for them. Not far off, some grenadiers and officers of the battalion of the national guards of the Filles Saint Thomas were having a festival, and as both parties left the Champs Elysées a dispute arose between them, and the adjutant of the battalion, named Duhamel, was murdered by the people. The whole battalion instantly pursued their enemies, and there was danger of a violent combat in the streets of Paris, which might have ended in an attack on the Tuileries itself. Fortunately the Marseillais were separated from their opponents; Merlin de Thionville prevented them from hurting two ex-Constituants, Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angely and Moreau de Saint Mery, who had fallen into their hands; Santerre stopped the pursuit; and all that came of the riot were deputations from both parties to the National Assembly, to maintain their own blamelessness. Pétion, at the bidding both of the Assembly and of the directory of the department, hurried to where the Marseillais were standing excited after their dispute, and got them safely away to their barracks in the Chaussée d'Antin, where they finished their banquet under the presidency of Santerre.¹

These riots only proved that, to be effectual, the day which was to overthrow the monarchy must be more carefully organized, and to this effect Camille Desmoulins, Carra, and certain others of the directory of insurrection prepared a plan of revolt on August 4 which should be successful; and Westermann, the friend of Danton, was entrusted with the arrangement of the details of the actual fighting. There was no disguise about the meetings of the directory at the Soleil d'Or, the Cadran Bleu, and in Antoine's lodgings in the Rue Saint Honoré. Every one in Paris, from the king to the poorest street-boy, knew that a great revolt was being planned. To be effectua

¹ Pollio and Marcel's *Bataillon du 10 Août* chap. viii. pp 192-217.

good reasons must be given for the outbreak of the revolt; every attempt must be made to secure the neutrality of the National Guard, and success must be made a certainty. To accomplish this, two chief measures were adopted by the Jacobins. It has been said that it was the duty of the primary assembly of the sections of Paris to break up as soon as their elections were completed; but on July 25, on the motion of Thuriot, leave was given to them to sit *en permanence* to regulate the enrolment of volunteers, and any section might draw up a petition on any subject it pleased. The more Jacobin sections of Paris took advantage of this, and on July 31 the section Mauconseil drew up a petition to the Assembly, praying for the immediate dethronement of the king as a traitor to the country. This was not the first mention of dethronement in the Assembly, for, on the 23rd, Choudieu, a Radical deputy, had read a petition from Angers, dated the 18th, in these few words, "Legislators, Louis XVI. has betrayed the nation, the law, and his oath. The people is sovereign; you are its representatives. Pronounce his dethronement, and France will be saved."¹ Even in the Assembly the same idea was under discussion, and on July 26 Brissot carried a motion that the committee of twenty-one should examine and report what acts should lead to dethronement, and whether the king was not guilty of committing them. The section Mauconseil sent its decree round to the other forty-seven sections of Paris, asking them their opinion. Fourteen of the sections out of the thirty-nine whose records are extant agreed to the petition, while sixteen rejected it. The others made no reply, and it may well be believed that they were willing to watch the course of events, and to be on the side of the majority. If the king's confidence could be augmented by the number of sections which showed a respect for royalty, he must have been undeceived by studying their names, for, without exception, all the most populous districts of Paris agreed to the petition of Mauconseil, and those which adhered to the principle of royalty

¹ Bouglér, *Le Mouvement Révolutionnaire en Anjou*, compiled chiefly from the unpublished memoirs of Choudieu.

were those of the wealthy bourgeois, who were not likely to be able to do much if they tried to stem a popular revolution. Among those who agreed might be noted the sections of Quinze-Vingts and Lombards, both in the Faubourg Saint Antoine, and of Gravilliers, Théâtre Français, Luxembourg, and Gobelins on the other side of the river; while among those nearest the Tuileries itself, the sections of the Louvre and of the Place Vendôme adhered to it. The sections which still maintained the principle of monarchy were those of Central Paris, such as the Isle Saint Louis and Henri IV.; those of the Champs Elysées and the Arsenal, representing the wealthy residents of Paris; and those of the Place Louis XIV. and Montreuil, containing the richest shops. Only one poor district can be noted, that of Popincourt in the Faubourg Saint Antoine, and the conduct of the national guards and inhabitants of this section on August 10 belied their rejection of the decree of Mauconseil. The Jacobins of Paris saw pretty well how far they could expect support. Since the municipality, which had been elected in the previous year, did not show any tendency to fresh progress in revolution, it was determined to extinguish its authority by uniting the commissioners of the different sections at the Hôtel de Ville. Among these commissioners were many of the most advanced Revolutionists of the period, and they were permitted, by the weakness of the municipality and the countenance of Pétion, to sit in the hall of the Hôtel de Ville, close to the chamber in which the municipality itself used to meet. Though none of the chief leaders who afterwards figured in the Revolutionary commune of Paris sat at first among these commissioners, there were enough extreme men to do the work which was set for them. Santerre and the members of the insurrectionary directory had too serious work on their hands to waste their time at the Hôtel de Ville, but they felt sure that it would go well, as Huguenin, the orator of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, was president, and Tallien secretary of the united commissioners. Lhuillier, who was afterwards procureur-general-syndic of the department of the Seine, Bernard, the first priest who married,

Rossignol, the future general, and Leonard Bourdon, an usher in a school, who was afterwards to play a great part in the Convention, met and discussed the state of affairs in the Hôtel de Ville with much fervour; but their time was not yet come; and before they did anything of importance it was necessary for them to be certain of the capture of the Tuileries, and to wait for further orders.

Having provided a meeting-place for the representatives of the twenty-eight sections which were most inclined to violent measures, and which had sent their commissioners to the Hôtel de Ville, the directory of insurrection now turned its attention to the National Guard. The conduct of the National Guard on June 20 encouraged them with the hope that they would not fire on the people; but the behaviour of certain battalions was doubtful. It must be remembered in discussing the conduct of the National Guard on August 10 that, although there had been since 1790 only forty-eight sections in Paris, many of which had adopted strange names, the National Guard was still formed of sixty battalions, which bore the title of their old districts. The sections had often protested against this arrangement, but the Constituent Assembly had maintained it in order that each section should not have an organized battalion at its command. The conduct of the most bourgeois battalions of the National Guard, and especially of those of the Filles Saint Thomas and the Petits Pères, was very doubtful, and the leading Jacobins therefore managed to strengthen those of the populous sections on which they could depend, by a decree passed on August 1 on the motion of Carnot. By this decree it was resolved that, since France was at war, no distinction should be made among those who wished to serve their country, and that all citizens, passive as well as active, might enter the ranks of the National Guard, and that the new members were to be armed with pikes, until arms could be served out to them. The result of this decree was that the battalions in the Faubourgs Saint Antoine and Saint Marceau were largely reinforced by members of the mob, armed with pikes, who made a formidable addition to the strength

of the corps. Having, then, provided for a central power at the Hôtel de Ville, and for the weakening of the National Guard, the secret directory of insurrection set to work on the actual preparations for the outbreak.

First of all it was publicly announced by the sections of Quinze-Vingts and Mauconseil that if on August 9 the Assembly did not agree to the petition of Mauconseil, the tocsin should be rung at midnight, the alarm gun fired, and that on August 10 a new petition would be presented to the Assembly, backed up by the armed force of the sections demanding the dethronement of the king. As upon June 20 the two chief bands of petitioners were to come from the Faubourg Saint Marceau and the Faubourg Saint Antoine, were to meet upon the quays, and march down to the Assembly. To support these columns the Marseillais were moved to the church of the Cordeliers in the Faubourg Saint Marceau on August 4, and some Bretois to the Faubourg Saint Antoine. But they were not only to present the petition, but to overthrow the king; and the commissioners of the Hôtel de Ville were to be ready to take all responsibility on themselves, while Pétion was to be prevented from interfering by a guard of six hundred men. Pétion was quite willing to be prevented, and anxiously looked out on the morning of the 10th for the arrival of his guard. Sergeant and Panis, the commissioners of the police of Paris, then ordered five thousand ball cartridges to be served out to the Marseillais, while they refused the request of Mandat to serve out ball cartridges to the royalist battalions of the National Guard, and all was ready. The Assembly, as was expected, adjourned the question of dethronement, and the last meeting of the secret directory was held at Santerre's on the evening of August 9, at which Danton and Camille Desmoulins assisted, and final arrangements were made, after which beer was served out to the inhabitants of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, who were ordered to illuminate their houses, and who greatly enjoyed themselves with dancing and singing in the streets of the faubourg. At midnight the tocsin was rung; and at eight in the morning, after a visit to the Hôtel de Ville, where

Pétion, to his great delight, was made a prisoner, Westermann prepared to lead the main columns to the Place du Carrousel.

All these measures were perfectly well known¹ to every one in Paris, and the king himself was aware that at midnight on August 9 the tocsin would be rung, and that his palace would be attacked early next morning. He therefore summoned to him his ministers, together with the procureur-general-syndic Rœderer and the other members of the directory of the department of the Seine, Mandat, the commandant-general of the National Guard for the month, and, finally, Pétion the mayor of Paris. With smiling face, Pétion declared that the rising would all end in smoke, and that there was no need for alarm. The king was disgusted at his behaviour, and the mayor was soon glad of an excuse to go down to the gardens of the Tuileries, where he walked up and down with Rœderer and Mandat, discussing the coming events. Rœderer, on the evening of the 9th, entered the Assembly, and reported to the members what they all knew, that since the question of dethronement was adjourned the tocsin was to be rung at midnight, and that a serious riot was expected in Paris. Pétion was then summoned by some friendly deputies, and asked if due preparation had been made to control the coming insurrection. He answered that everything was in most perfect order, and slipped quietly home to the mairie. His escape was only announced to the king and queen when his empty carriage rolled out of the court of the Tuileries. Far more important were the military dispositions which were made by Mandat for the defence of the Tuileries, with the assistance of the Baron de Vioménil and M. d'Hervilly.

Their measures were well and ably taken. They relied chiefly upon the known fidelity of the King's Swiss Guards. These faithful soldiers had been ordered to leave Paris by a decree of the Assembly on July 17, but they had not been sent

¹ For the events of August 10, the account given by Mortimer-Ternaux in his *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. ii. pp. 213-269, has been mainly followed, but corrected in many details by the narrative given in Pollio and Marcel's most valuable *Bataillon du 10 Août*.

further than to their barracks at Rueil and Courbevoie, and on August 8, in expectation of the revolt, the Minister of War, Franqueville d'Abancourt, had ordered the whole of them, to the number of nearly eight hundred,¹ to march to the Tuileries. Round the king also had assembled many of his personal friends, some two hundred in all; and a battalion of national guards was, as usual, on duty in the palace. Mandat's special preparations had been to concentrate in the gardens of the Tuileries twelve of his most faithful battalions, to whom, however, he was unable to serve out more than one round of ball cartridge, and even these picked battalions did not, according to Durler, turn out more than two thousand strong. But his chief attention had been turned to the manœuvre by which the rioters of June 20 had been successful. He determined to separate the two great insurrectionary faubourgs by strongly occupying the bridges; and had, in addition, stationed a reserve of gunners of the National Guard at the Pont Neuf, where the alarm gun was, under the command of Captain Robert, who was given strict orders on no account to leave his guns, or to allow the men of Saint Marceau to cross the river. Mandat had also ordered five battalions of the National Guard to concentrate at the Hôtel de Ville, in order that they might fall upon the rear of the column advancing from the Faubourg Saint Antoine at the same time that the Swiss charged it in front. Mandat had been, previous to the Revolution, a captain in the Gardes Françaises, and now gave proof by these dispositions of distinct military ability. His measures having been well taken, Mandat remained quietly with the king and his ministers and awaited the course of events; while the Assembly met as usual and began discussing indifferent topics, though the minds of the members present were occupied with thoughts of the coming insurrection.

At one o'clock in the dead of night, Danton and Camille

¹ The number of the Swiss at the Tuileries on August 10 has been variously stated, but the MS. *Relation* of Captain de Durler settles the question, and fixes the amount at "à peu près 800 hommes y compris la Garde Ordinaire du Roi."

Desmoulins, who lived in the same house in the Place Théâtre Français, came home. Madame Danton and Lucile Desmoulins had been waiting up for them, and perceived they were quite exhausted. Danton, who had been vigorously haranguing the Marseillais in the neighbouring church of the Cordeliers, at once threw himself upon his bed, while Camille slept on Lucile's shoulder.¹ Everything was now in readiness on both sides; every one knew the struggle was coming, but only one side was confident of success. Danton, in particular, could do no more. He was no soldier, and had left the military arrangements in the hands of Westermann, but he was to be called early in the morning, in order that he might go down to the commissioners of the sections at the Hôtel de Ville, and take the lead with Robespierre in establishing the new authorities which were to succeed the monarchy. Many a time have these chief leaders been accused of cowardice on August 10, but it was not for them to mix in the actual fighting, and they were bound to keep themselves fresh for the discussions of the next day, which would give the direction to the future course of the Revolution.

It is now necessary to turn to the session of the commissioners of the sections at the Hôtel de Ville, for it was their task to destroy the effects of Mandat's arrangements, and to make the conquest of the Tuileries as far as possible an easy achievement. Their first aim was to upset Mandat's scheme for preventing the junction of the rioters of the two faubourgs by the occupation of the bridges. For this purpose, at one o'clock in the morning, Osselin, accompanied by two other members of the municipality, went down to the Pont Neuf with an order from the municipality, which had been extracted by the representatives of the sections, that the guns should be removed from their threatening position. Captain Robert refused to obey, and exhorted his men to stand by their guns. But these gunners were old Gardes Françaises, and at a few words from Osselin they disobeyed their officers and drew their guns to one side, and the alarm gun was then fired. In spite

¹ *Camille et Lucile Desmoulins*, p. 199, by Jules Claretie.

of the certainty of insurrection the king remained quiet till past daybreak in the palace, and at six o'clock, at the instance of Mandat, he went down to the gardens of the Tuileries and addressed the national guards, who shouted "Vive le Roi!" and seemed inclined to be faithful to him. But the gunners even of these faithful battalions cried instead "Vive la Nation!" and there were indications of a violent dispute between them and the infantry, which was only appeased by their being told that the king and the nation were one.¹ The queen and the royal family began to recover some of their equanimity when the night passed and no sign of the insurgents appeared. At half-past six they became so confident in their safety that when an order came from the municipality, signed by Pétion, requesting the immediate presence of Mandat, the king told that officer to do his duty and to go down to the Hôtel de Ville.

When he arrived there, he entered the hall of the council-general, where he was ordered to say why he had placed the guns on the Pont Neuf instead of allowing them to remain with the different sections, and further, why he had taken such measures for the preservation of the peace. After various other useless questions he was dismissed, but as he was going quietly from the Hôtel de Ville, he was seized by two commissioners of the sections and dragged into their midst. His reception by this informal committee was very different. He was asked why he had ordered up the whole of the Swiss Guards, and was then told to sign an order immediately for their removal to barracks, which he nobly refused to do. He was asked how many troops there were in the Tuileries, and alleging his duty as a soldier he refused to say. After similar questions the informal committee suspended him from his functions, and appointed Santerre provisional commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Paris, and he left the Hôtel de Ville a disgraced man. As he came down the steps some one in the crowd shouted, "A bas Mandat! Vive Santerre!" A

¹ Durler's MS. *Relation*; Pfyffer d'Altishofen, in his *Récit*, says that it was Durler himself who appeased this dispute with this remark; but Durler attributes it to "*leurs chefs*."

shot was fired at him, and he was immediately cut down and murdered by a crowd of noisy ruffians who were hanging about on the steps of the Hôtel de Ville. With Mandat's death any slight hope there might have been of the successful defence of the Tuileries disappeared, and this murder was already committed when Santerre arrived at the Hôtel de Ville, at the head of an immense mob of the men of the Faubourg Saint Antoine, among whom were perceived, marching in order, the national guards of Quinze-Vingts, supported by the whole of the national guards of some other districts, and various members of the other battalions, commanded by Westermann, and with three hundred fédérés from Brest in their midst. In accordance with the preconceived arrangements, Santerre sent off six hundred of the National Guard, who were extremely glad to be thus freed from responsibility, to guard Pétion, and, after thanking the commissioners for his appointment, he waited for the men of Saint Marceau. They soon came up, with the Marseillais at their head, and the whole force moved off to attack the Tuileries. Santerre's harangue and other causes prevented his reaching the Place du Carrousel before half-past nine o'clock, and by that time the king had left the palace.

After the departure of Mandat the king and queen became seriously alarmed at the large crowd which began to assemble in the Place du Carrousel; but it must be remembered that this crowd which collected there at half-past seven was in no way the insurrectionary army, which had not yet concentrated at the Hôtel de Ville, but consisted of a rabble of those men who in Paris had been accustomed to hang on the outskirts of every military movement, and who, though they yelled, "À bas M. Veto!" with great noise, were not prepared to back up their yells by action. Then it was that Rœderer, who had never left the king's side, proposed that his Majesty, accompanied by the royal family, should leave the Tuileries, and trust himself to the care of the National Assembly. This idea had been broached on June 20, when Stanislas de Girardin cried out in the Legislative Assembly, "Why does not the king come to us? He will be safe with us!" Rœderer now took

advantage of this suggestion, and begged the king to accompany him. He declared to the queen he would be responsible, on his own life, that the king should be safe and have free passage to the Legislative Assembly; and between eight and nine o'clock, though sadly and as if distrusting his own act, Louis XVI. slowly left the palace he was never again to enter. Rœderer then assembled the ministers, and the royal family, and the members of the directory of the department who were present, in a procession, with the grenadiers of the battalions of the Filles Saint Thomas and Petits Pères and the company of the Swiss Guards on duty, to act as an escort across the garden of the Tuileries. At the head of the procession moved Rœderer; he was followed by the king, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bigot de Sainte Croix, and the queen, with the prince royal, leaning on the arm of Dubouchage, the Minister of Marine. De Joly, Minister of Justice, conducted Madame Elisabeth and Madame Royale. Madame de Lamballe was on the arm of the Minister of War, D'Abancourt; and the Ministers of the Interior and of the Finances, Champion de Villeneuve and Leroux de Laville, closed the procession. Rœderer has reported a few words of the king's, spoken by him in his passage across the garden, which indeed might be taken for an evil omen: "See, there are plenty of leaves," said Louis to his little son, who was kicking them in front of him—"plenty of leaves; they are falling earlier than usual this year." As they passed through the garden, they could see upon the terrace of the Feuillants that a scene of great excitement was being enacted there. Some advanced Royalist prisoners had been taken, with Sureau the witty but dissolute journalist¹ at their head, disguised as national guards, and trying to make their way to the Tuileries. The Assembly had tried to protect them, but the people rushed upon the unfortunate prisoners.

¹ M. Auguste Vitu published in 1854 a curious little book on this old schoolfellow of Camille Desmoulins, who boasted of 16 quarters of *roture*, and who was in turn hussar, avocat, speculator, and royalist journalist, under the title of *Études littéraires sur la Révolution française—François Sureau*.

One of them had a bitter enemy on that terrace. Théroigne de Méricourt, who had played so great a part upon October 5 and 6, was now waiting on that terrace, to see accomplished the overthrow of the monarchy which she hated, and the old régime which had ruined her; and the sight of Suleau, who had abused her in all the most infamous terms which can be applied to a woman—perhaps with justice—excited in her the fury of revenge, and she rushed upon him and cut him down with her sabre in cold blood. The murder might have been seen by the king himself, but he was probably more occupied in wondering what sort of reception he should meet with in the Legislative Assembly. When the deputies heard that the king was approaching they sent out a deputation to receive him, which led the royal family, amidst some excitement, into the hall of the Assembly. After a speech from Louis, the royal family, with a few faithful friends round them, among whom may be noticed the Duc de Choiseul and the Baron de Goguelat, who had so great a share in marring the success of the flight to Varennes, were conducted to a small room, or rather reporters' box, some twelve feet square, behind the president's chair, which was occupied by the reporters of the *Journal Logographique*, which prided itself on giving the most accurate report of the speeches of the Assembly. There they remained forty-eight hours: forty-eight hours which destroyed the monarchy and practically established the Republic.

From their prison—for it was little better—the king and queen heard the sound of shots from the Tuileries, and the king at once wrote an order for his faithful Swiss Guards to lay down their arms and return to their barracks.¹ When the king left the palace, the rest of the Swiss, the national guards, and the noblemen and gentlemen, were at first uncertain what

¹ The chief published authority for the defence of the Tuileries is the *Récit de la Conduite des Gardes Suisses à la journée du 10 Août, 1792*, by Colonel Pfyffer d'Altishofen, Lucerne, 1824; but use has also been made of the MS. *Relation de Monsieur de Durler*, now in the British Museum Add. MSS. 32, 168, which is published in the *English Historical Review* for 1887.

to do, for they had no orders, in spite of the boasting of Vioménil; and the other inhabitants of the palace were equally distressed at seeing the crowd in the Place du Carrousel. The whole garrison consisted of 650 Swiss—for 150 had accompanied the king across the garden—with two hundred gentlemen and about a hundred national guards. The crowd in the Place du Carrousel must have numbered some thousands, and through it Westermann, followed by the Marseillais and the Bretois, and the most determined of his own men forced their way to the gate of the Tuileries. By some mistake the gate was thrown open, and these daring men crossed the court of the Tuileries and entered the palace. Upon the grand staircase he found the Swiss drawn up under Captain Durler and General De Boissieu. Durler's only orders, which had been given him the previous evening by Major Bachman, were not to allow himself to be forced, and the Maréchal De Mailly, who now took command, gave him no others. Westermann, as an Alsatian, could speak German, and he begged the soldiers to leave their officers and come and fraternize with the crowd. Some of them did so, but the Swiss officers quickly brought them back to their duty. General De Boissieu, who was in command of the military division of Paris, spoke to the crowd, but his voice was hardly heard, and he was insulted by the people. At last a shot was heard, but who fired it nobody has ever known. It was probably fired by one of the Swiss who was disgusted, or it might be frightened, by the cries of the mob. It was immediately followed by a volley from the Swiss stationed at the windows of the palace, and by a charge of the Swiss upon the staircase, under the command of Durler, in which they seized two guns belonging to the sections and cleared the court of the Tuileries. The king, on hearing the firing, at once sent M. d'Hervilly to order his Swiss Guards to leave the Chateau; but when d'Hervilly arrived he did not at once deliver his message and the fight was still continued, and lasted nearly three-quarters of an hour. Westermann, whose men had been at first driven back by the onslaught of the Swiss, had again come up to the gates, and was forcing his

way into the court amid the thick smoke which almost prevented those engaged from seeing each other. Hardly any of the Swiss had been killed, but on the other side about a hundred of the assailants, including twenty Marseillais and two Brestois,¹ had been killed and many wounded. Then d'Hervilly delivered his message when he saw further fighting was useless;² the drums were beaten, the Swiss soldiers fell in, and by the king's direct orders retreated slowly across the gardens of the Tuileries. The insurgents continued firing for some minutes after the Swiss had left the palace, and advantage was taken of the favourable moment by the national guards and the king's private friends to escape quietly by the Pavillon de Flore to the quays.

A minute or two afterwards the people rushed into the palace, and, finding no opposition, at once murdered, in the most cowardly manner, a few wounded men who had been left behind when the Swiss retreated. It may well be believed that Westermann and his brave companions did not take part in these murders; but the cowardly crowd, which always accompanies a revolutionary movement, was seized with a fury for killing every one it met. Not only were the hall-porters murdered, but the very cooks in the kitchen were cut to pieces. Yet these servants need not have been murdered had they preserved their equanimity. For instance, as they rushed through the Tuileries the mob came across the old physician of the king, sitting quietly in his room. "Who are you?" they said. "The king's physician." "Are you not afraid?" "Why? I have done no harm. Would anybody do harm to those who do none?" "Come, you are a good fellow, but this is not the place for you. Where do you want to go?" "To the Luxembourg." "Comrades, let this man pass," was the cry. "He is the king's physician, but he is not afraid. He is a good fellow." In a similar manner the ladies of the court, who had collected in one of the queen's rooms, received no violence, and were told that they were pardoned by the

¹ Pollio and Marcel's *Bataillon du 10 Août*, pp. 354, 355.

² Bertrand de Moleville's *Mémoires*, ed. 1797, vol. iii. p. 52.

nation. The mob then proceeded to sack the palace. It is true that many articles of value and interest were brought to the Assembly by those who had seized them, and placed upon its table, but many more were actually stolen, and an immense amount of needless destruction was wrought on doors, tables, mirrors, and other articles of furniture.

The unfortunate Swiss who had obeyed the king's command to retreat marched through the gardens of the Tuileries, under the command of Durler, through a heavy fire. They attempted to force their way into the hall of the Assembly; but the king directed them to retire, and they were afterwards disarmed by order of the Assembly, and the soldiers placed for safety in the neighbouring church of the Feuillants and the officers in the Salle des Inspecteurs. But it was only the force under Durler which had heard the message to retreat, and the numerous Swiss stationed in the corridors and apartments of the palace soon found themselves besieged. They burst through the mob and marched across the gardens, where many fell, including four officers; they found the *pont tournant* or drawbridge was up, and then marched along the Dauphin's garden until they reached the Place Louis XV., where they formed a square under the statue of that king. Here they were charged by the mounted gendarmes, who cut them to pieces; and hardly any of the most faithful defenders of Louis XVI., except those in the church of the Feuillants, escaped upon that fatal day.¹

While the Swiss were being murdered, the Legislative Assembly were informed that a deputation wished to enter. At the head of this deputation appeared Huguenin, who announced that a new municipality for Paris had been formed, and that the old one had resigned. This was, indeed, the fact. On the departure of Santerre the commissioners of the sections had given orders to the legitimate council-general of the municipality to resign, and the council-general, startled by the events which were passing, consented. The commissioners then called themselves the new municipality, and proceeded,

¹ Pfyffer d'Altishofen's *Récit de la Conduite des Gardes Suisses*, p. 17.

as municipal officers, to send a deputation to the Assembly. The deputation almost ordered that the Assembly should immediately declare the king's dethronement, and, in the presence of the unfortunate monarch himself, Vergniaud mounted the tribune, and proposed, on behalf of the Committee of Twenty-one, that the French people should be invited to elect a National Convention to draw up a new Constitution, and that the chief of the executive power, as he called the king, should be provisionally suspended from his functions until the new Convention had pronounced what measures should be adopted to establish a new government and the reign of liberty and equality. The motion was carried, and was countersigned by one of the king's ministers, De Joly; and thus the old monarchy of the Bourbons in France came to an end.

But the Assembly had not yet completed its work. The ministry was dismissed, as not having the confidence of the people, and the Minister of War, d'Abancourt, was ordered to be tried by the court at Orleans for treason, in having brought the Swiss Guards to Paris. The Assembly then prepared to elect new ministers. Roland, Clavière, and Servan were recalled by acclamation to their former posts, but it was necessary to elect new ministers of justice, marine, and foreign affairs. Danton was elected Minister of Justice by 222 votes against 60; Gaspard Monge, the great mathematician, was elected Minister of Marine, on the nomination of Condorcet; and Lebrun-Tondu, a friend of Brissot and Dumouriez, and a former abbé, to the department of Foreign Affairs.

At the bidding of the self-elected municipality of Paris the king had been suspended, and a new ministry inaugurated, and this new municipality, which, it must be remembered, only represented twenty-eight sections of Paris, next proceeded to send its decrees all over France. It was joined on this very day by some of the extreme men who hoped through its means to force a republic on France—notably by Camille Desmoulins and Dubois-Dubais; and on the 11th it was still further reinforced by the presence of Robespierre, Billaud-Varenne, and Marat. The Legislative

Assembly had become a mere instrument in the hands of the Committee of Twenty-one. The majority of the deputies either left Paris, or, if they belonged to the right, hid themselves, while those of the left had to obey every order of their leaders, and left the transaction of temporary business to the Committee of Twenty-one. This committee practically ruled France for forty days, until the meeting of the Convention; the Assembly always accepted its propositions and sent the deputies it nominated on important missions; its only rival was the insurrectionary commune, and the internecine warfare between the Jacobins and the Girondins was foreshadowed in the struggle between this Commune and the Committee of Twenty-one. For, while the extreme Jacobins filled the new Commune of Paris, the Committee of Twenty-one consisted of Girondins and Feuillants; Brissot was its president, Vergniaud its reporter, and Gensonné, Condorcet, Lasource, Guadet, Lacépède, Lacuée, Pastoret, Muraire, Delmas, and Guyton-Morveau were amongst its members.¹ On the evening of August 10 the Assembly decreed that the difference between active and passive citizens should be abolished, and that every Frenchman of the age of twenty-five should have a vote for the Convention.

The day of August 10 ought not to be passed over without remarking the gallant conduct of many who saved lives instead of taking them. No Jacobin was more advanced in his opinions, more in league with the new insurrectionary commune of Paris, or more violent in his republicanism than Basire, and yet it was Basire, at the peril of his own life, who protected the Swiss who had been disarmed, in the church of the Feuillants, and thus undoubtedly saved their lives. It was another deputy of the left, Bruat, who saved the lives of the Swiss officers in the Salle des Inspecteurs, and got them disguises, and eventually sent them off to England,² where they received commissions in Roll's regiment, in which they did gallant service, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, in Egypt. A poor tailor saved the life of

¹ On the work and composition of this committee, see Vatel's *Vergniaud*, pp. 130-141.

² Durler's *Relation* in the *English Historical Review*.

M. de Reding, who, however, was massacred in the following month, and an upholsterer, named Aigremont, saved the lives of four Swiss officers.¹

One very melancholy event of the evening of August 10 ought not to be passed over. Stanislas, duc de Clermont-Tonnerre, had been one of the chief orators of the Constituent Assembly. He had been one of the first deputies of the noblesse to take his place with the Tiers État, and one of the leading members of the original Constitutional Committee. No man had been more popular after the taking of the Bastille, but he had become discredited, with Lally-Tollendal and Mounier, after the rejection of the first scheme of a Constitution. Nevertheless he remained a very active member of the Assembly, and had been a member of the Monarchical Club and at one time its president, and had expressed with both force and truth the doctrines held by the members of the right centre. After the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly he had continued to live in Paris, and was suspected of being one of the secret advisers of the king during the session of the Legislative Assembly. On this evening, as he was walking quietly down the streets, a cry arose that he was an aristocrat and a traitor. The people at once fell upon him. He demanded to be taken to his section to be judged, but was murdered in the gutter before his request could be complied with.

The last sight the king might have seen on the night of August 10 was his palace of the Tuileries in flames, where, for mischief, fire had been set to the stables. It spread from building to building, and the Assembly only took steps to check it when it threatened to spread to the houses of the Rue Saint Honoré. In vain did the firemen attempt to extinguish the fire. The mob would not allow it, and threatened to throw them into the fire if they continued; and it was only when, on the motion of Chabot, Palloy, the well-known contractor for the destruction of the Bastille, was appointed to superintend the putting out of the fire, that the people permitted the water to play. On the day after this terrible night the king

¹ Pfyffer d'Altishofen's *Récit*.

was informed that rooms had been found for him in the Convent of the Feuillants; and to four monastic cells, which had not been inhabited since the dissolution of the monastery two years before, the royal family were led, and round them was placed a strong guard. Yet they were no more prisoners in the Convent of the Feuillants than they had been in the splendid palace of the Tuileries.

The capture of the Tuileries had as its first result the supremacy of the insurrectionary commune of Paris. The king's nominal authority was annihilated; but though the course of events left him a prisoner, it cannot be said that his influence was diminished, for he had none left to diminish. It was to the Girondins, rather than to the king, that the results of August 10 brought unpleasant surprises. Their leaders had been clear-sighted enough to perceive that they might make use of the insurrection, but the mass of the party had by no means encouraged it. Brissot had made no attempt to check it, and the preparations for it were openly discussed at Madame Roland's salon, and the good behaviour of the Marseillais guaranteed there by Barbaroux. No one in France seems to have rejoiced more at the issue of that day than Madame Roland herself, and she believed that it had justified all her hopes when she heard that her husband was once more Minister of the Interior, and found herself again the mistress of his official residence in the Rue Vivienne. But the ministers of the Assembly were not stronger than the ministers of the king had been. The idea that a minister should have power had been destroyed by the policy of the Constituent Assembly; and the Legislative Assembly had shared its distrust of the executive. All business of importance had for a long time been done directly by the Assembly itself, and the ministers had been merely agents; and it will be seen that the ministers of the Convention were looked on as agents just as those of the king had been. The real power had gone to the Commune of Paris, and this was very clearly perceived by Robespierre and by Marat.

The "*Amidu Peuple*" was received with joy by the informal

insurrectionary commune, and he now felt at last that he had the power to do more than write for the cause of the people. The first use he made of this newly acquired power was to beg the Assembly for the use of the royal printing press and type, with which to print his journal. The Assembly passed over this request, but the insurrectionary commune granted it. The new journal which Marat was revolving in his mind, under the name of the *Journal de la République*, was magnificently printed with the royal type, in great contrast to the poor little *Ami du Peuple* which bears on every page traces of haste and poverty, being printed on any scrap of paper that could be found, of many different colours and many varieties. But though Marat was received with the loudest cheers by the insurrectionary commune, Robespierre was the man who really became its leader. He had long expected the shock which had just taken place, and had prepared himself for the crisis. The first requisition was, of course, for a Convention. This had been granted on the very first day. The second demand of the Commune was the safe custody of the king, so that he should not be able to escape to the army. This was conceded by the Assembly on August 12, when they ordered that the king and royal family should be taken to the old tower of the Temple, and there strictly guarded under the superintendence of the insurrectionary commune, which took great care that their prisoner should not escape them. But Robespierre felt that this was not quite enough. There were three quarters from which dangers might come to the new order of affairs if they were not provided against—Lafayette and the army, the provinces headed by some of the popular Feuillants, and, last of all, the wealthy inhabitants of Paris, who feared that matters were going too far.

His fear of the bourgeois of Paris was the first to be expressed, and he himself, as representative of the revolutionary commune, appeared at the bar of the Assembly on August 17, and imperiously demanded a strong police law, by which the municipality might arrest whomsoever they would as a suspect, and the establishment of a new tribunal in Paris, which should

try quickly such prisoners as the municipality should arrest. In this police proposal of Robespierre's, and in the tribunal to try cases promptly which was established at his demand, may be seen the two first steps towards the establishment of the Terror. Thus early had Robespierre recognized that the only mode by which the wealthier classes in France could be kept from open opposition to the course of the Revolution was by establishing a system of terror. He knew as well as anybody else that such a system of terror could only exist as long as it was permitted by the majority, and by the very great majority of the people. If a minority of any size protested against the terror, much more if a majority protested against it, it must fall; and he looked to the frontier for the reason which would make the majority of the law-abiding people of France submit to such lawless law and such cruel tyranny as the establishment of a special court, bound by no restrictions, and exercising unlimited authority. Such a system was quite in accordance with Marat's political ideas, for he, too, knew that if some such system of terror was not established, a reaction would soon take place after August 10, such as appeared after June 20. Next, it was necessary to inform the provinces of the events of August 10, and to take care that France should not rise against Paris. To effect this, the Commune of Paris, acting like a sovereign power, sent off messengers and emissaries to every city and district, to tell the inhabitants that Louis XVI. was overthrown, and that there was no more fear of treachery at home, because the Commune of Paris was watching over the Assembly.

But the greatest fear in the minds of Robespierre and his friends in the Commune was that Lafayette would march on Paris. This was exactly what Lafayette intended to do. He had moved his headquarters to Sédan, where he was grandly entertained by the rich manufacturers, but where the Jacobin Club was hotly opposed to him, and where the old nobility, and especially M. de Vissecq-Latude, an old royalist, who had refused to emigrate, openly insulted him. He heard of the capture of the Tuileries on August 12, and on the 13th

he held a grand review, at which he adjured his soldiers to swear fidelity to the king and the nation. A few of the old regiments obeyed with enthusiasm, but the new regiments of volunteers were more doubtful, and one of the Maine et Loire shouted, "To the nation, fidelity, yes; to the king, no!" This reception disconcerted Lafayette, but nevertheless he caused the municipality of Sedan to arrest three deputies sent on mission to the army, Kersaint, Antonelle, and Peraldi, on August 14, and made the directory of the department of the Ardennes approve his action. Yet he felt the people were not in sympathy with him, in spite of the obedience of the authorities, and he determined to appeal from his own corps d'armée to all the soldiers under his command. To them he published a general order, telling them to rally like good citizens and brave soldiers round the standard they had sworn to defend to the death. To all his generals of division, notably to Arthur Dillon, who commanded at Pont-sur-Sambre, and Dumouriez, who commanded the camp at Maulde, he sent his general order, in the hope that they would join him. This news, as well as the intelligence of the arrest of the deputies at Sedan, soon reached the Assembly, and the municipality of Paris immediately sent a deputation to demand that Lafayette should be arrested; and on August 19, on the motion of Jean Debry, Gilbert Motier de Lafayette, ci-devant general of the army of the north, was formally declared guilty of the crimes of rebellion against the law, conspiracy against liberty, and treason against the nation; and all authorities were ordered to lend their assistance in arresting him, on pain of being considered accomplices in his rebellion. Lafayette found no help on any side when he turned to his soldiers. Dillon issued his order of the day indeed, but Lückner only grumbled, and Dumouriez openly declared his adherence to the new state of things. On August 19 he heard from his staff that his soldiers were themselves at issue, and that many of them openly declared that they would bind him hand and foot and send him off to the Assembly. He knew he was not popular in the army, and therefore, on August 20, accompanied by his staff,

which included the ex-Constituants, Latour-Maubourg, Bureaux de Pusy, and Alexandre de Lameth, he galloped quietly across the frontier into the Netherlands, and was immediately arrested by the Austrian general in command. All except the former members of the Constituent Assembly were released, and ordered to leave the country; but Lafayette and his three friends were imprisoned in the citadel of Antwerp, whence they were transferred by the Austrians to the great prison of Glatz, and finally to Olmütz, where they remained in strict confinement until Napoleon demanded their release in the Treaty of Campo-Formio, in 1797. Daverhoul, the intrepid young orator of the right in the Legislative Assembly, had also tried to escape across into Belgium with General Lafayette, but a league from the frontier he was perceived and pursued by the custom-house officers, and he blew out his brains rather than fall into their power.

Lafayette's sudden flight greatly strengthened the position of the Commune of Paris, and Robespierre in particular felt that the greatest cause of fear for France and the Revolution was gone. The Assembly appointed Dumouriez to the command of Lafayette's army, and nobly did he fulfil his charge. Relieved from the fear of Lafayette's turning against them, both the Girondins in the Legislative Assembly and the Jacobins in the insurrectionary commune turned to the pursuit of their own special plans, and naturally soon came into violent collision. The distinct difference between the leaders of the Girondins and the Jacobins has already been insisted on. The Girondins were, above all things, men of ideas; the Jacobins, above all things, practical men: and of the issue of a struggle between them there could be little doubt, though, at this period the Girondins had the advantage of the best position. On August 15 the final blow was struck at the unfortunate Feuillants, or Constitutionals. The last ministers of the king, as well as Duport du Tertre, Bertrand de Moleville, and Duportail, were all ordered to be arrested, with Barnave and Charles de Lameth. The Assembly followed up this action by establishing the special tribunal of August 17, which held

its first sitting on the same evening at the Hôtel de Ville. Robespierre was elected president, and refused the office; but among the judges was to be seen the name of Coffinhal; and the public accusers were Lhuillier and Réal. But the new tribunal was too slow to satisfy the leaders of the Commune of Paris, for its first prisoner, Laporte, the old intendant of the civil list, was not judged until August 21, and then acquitted. This news made the Commune lose all patience, and they determined to urge the Assembly to more energetic measures. Under the pressure of the Commune the Assembly took vigorous measures indeed. All the lands of the émigrés were sequestered; all ecclesiastics who would not take the oath were to be transported to French Guiana, and it was decreed that the National Guard should enlist every man, whether an active or a passive citizen.

Much of this vigour on the part of the Assembly was due, not only to the pressure of the Commune, but to the rapid advance of the Prussians. On August 25 arrived the news that Longwy had surrendered, and Kersaint, who had been released after the flight of Lafayette on the evening of the 20th, returned from Sedan, with the news that the Prussians would be in Paris in a fortnight. The Assembly, on this, decreed that an army of thirty thousand men should be raised in Paris, and that every man who had a musket issued to him should be punished with death if he did not march at once. On August 27 the funeral of the combatants who had been killed in the Place du Carrousel further excited men's minds; and on August 28, on the motion of Danton, now Minister of Justice, a general search for arms and suspects was ordered. The gates of the city were closed on August 30; every street was ordered to be illuminated; bodies of national guards entered each house and searched it from top to bottom. Barely a thousand muskets were seized, but more than three thousand prisoners were taken and shut up, not only in the prisons, but in all the largest convents of Paris, which were turned into houses of detention. Who should be arrested as a suspect depended entirely on the municipal officer who

happened to examine the house, and these men acted under the orders of a special committee established by the Commune, at the head of which sat Marat. Often, it is to be feared, individuals were arrested for personal reasons, but on the whole it may be said that the prisoners arrested on August 30 were men who, from their position, naturally disliked the progress of the Revolution, and had matters ceased with their arrest, no one would have blamed the Assembly or the Commune for taking such strong measures to secure the peace of the capital. The residents in Paris at the time of the Revolution seem to have been more struck by this house-to-house visitation than by many other events which were far more horrible. The massacres of September were only seen by very few. Even the riots and fighting of June 20 and August 10 were witnessed by a comparatively small proportion of the people of Paris; but the house-to-house visitation spared none of any class or any degree. Many noble deeds of self-devotion were done. Grace Elliot, for instance, an English lady, who had been mistress of the Duke of Orleans, and happened to have a house by the walls, sheltered and assisted the escape of many of her personal friends, and especially of the Comte de Champcenetz, Governor of the Tuileries and brother of the witty Royalist journalist.

On that very day, August 30, the feeling of dissatisfaction which possessed the Assembly at the conduct of the Commune showed itself in open opposition. Girey-Dupré, a young Girondin journalist, had attacked the Commune in the *Patriote Français*, Brissot's old journal, and the Commune promptly summoned him to its bar. The Assembly was indignant at the Commune's attributing to itself such immense powers, and not only cancelled the summons, but called to its own bar the president and secretary of the Commune. Huguenin and Tallien were nothing loth, and in the Assembly itself attacked the leaders of the Girondins. Then the Legislative Assembly, by a large majority, ordered that the insurrectionary Commune should be immediately dissolved, and that a new and legal municipality should be elected. On September 1 the Com-

mune discussed this decree, and Robespierre advised that it should dissolve to avoid open dissension and rupture. He failed in his attempts to secure peace, and nothing was for the time decided. Early in the morning of Sunday, September 2, the electoral assembly of Paris met again in the old hall of the Archbishop's palace—the same hall in which the electoral assembly had met in 1789. The day was spent in verifying the powers of the various electors, and in making preparations for the election of deputies to the Convention. On the same day the council-general of the Commune resolved that, though it would not dissolve itself, it should be increased to the number of 298, and thus partially obey the decree of the Legislative Assembly. In the Assembly itself appeared Danton; and, as he spoke, the tocsin was heard to ring as if another great day of revolt was hanging over Paris. As it rung, he cried, "That tocsin sounds the charge on the enemies of France! Conquer them! Courage, courage, for ever courage, and France is saved!" Amidst loud applause the Assembly decreed that every one who was unable to march to the frontier himself and did not give his weapons to some one who could, should be declared infamous; and then the session closed.

The tocsin which rang while Danton spoke, rang, it has been said, for two purposes—to summon the volunteers to the Champ de Mars to march to the frontier, and to summon murderers to come at their leader's call to murder defenceless prisoners. But the most recent researches have shown that this explanation of the summons is rather an imagination of theatrical writers than real truth. There can be no doubt that the same bell caused both results. The feeling was the same. "Can we go to the war and leave three thousand prisoners behind us in Paris, who may break out and destroy our wives and children?" It is impossible that the brave men who assembled on the Champ de Mars could really have feared this outbreak of prisoners, but they had a vague feeling that, while they were away at the frontier, there would be a reaction behind them at Paris, and that in some way or other they would be betrayed. The French people are always on

the point of crying out, "Nous sommes trahis!" They are always suspicious, and Marat's popularity among them was due to the fact that he was the very genius of suspicion. Marat openly confessed that he suspected every man with money or authority of any sort to be a "contre-révolutionnaire," and very many persons thought the same thing, though they did not express it so clearly. This feeling of suspicion was inborn in them, and it is unnecessary to describe the massacres in the prisons as being the result of an elaborate plot when there were perfectly natural reasons for their taking place. What is indeed surprising is, that all the constituted authorities should not have been able to check the massacres when they had begun; that the Assembly, the ministers, the national guards, and the municipality alike allowed the dreadful deeds to be done by a mere handful of men. The brave volunteers on the Champ de Mars did not actually massacre the prisoners, but they permitted them to be massacred. At the outside, throughout the September massacres, there were not two hundred murderers, the official list says 173; and yet not a single battalion of the National Guard, not a single group of men collected by chance and seeing the terrible scene, interfered to prevent its completion. No soldier, no volunteer, no passer-by, interfered to save the wretched prisoners from their fate. For this reason, Paris, with all its inhabitants, must bear the blame of the massacres; and, at the same time, this apathy on the part of the people of Paris shows clearly enough that the massacres in the prisons were not regarded with disgust by them at the time, but possibly as a convenient means of disposing of a very inconvenient body of prisoners. This said, it becomes unnecessary to minutely examine who ought to have stopped the perpetration of these murders. It was every man's duty, and yet, as often occurs, no man interfered. The first massacre arose by chance, and no one had the courage or the humanity to interfere during the three days of bloodshed.

The massacres¹ began at midday on Sunday, September 2,

¹ The best authorities on the massacres in the prisons are Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. iii.; *Les Massacres de Septembre*, in

When some unfortunate priests were being conveyed from the prison at the Mairie to the Abbaye. On their passage the priests were hooted and yelled at, and, when they began to dismount, from wanton love of murder some of the unfortunate men were slain. Their companions would all have perished had they not rushed for rescue to the room in which the sectional committee was sitting, where two of them found refuge by sitting at the table as though members of the section. A third, the Abbé Sicard, was saved by the courage of a watchmaker, who shouted, "It is the Abbé Sicard, the friend of the deaf and dumb." And, instead of murdering, the populace cheered him. These murderers were soon reinforced by a crowd of others, mostly street ruffians, and rushed to the other end of Paris to the convent of the Carmelites, where were imprisoned more than one hundred and fifty priests who had not taken the oath. At first the unfortunate priests were driven out into the garden, where a volley was fired at them. Then their names were called over, and one hundred and twenty of them were hunted down and slaughtered one by one, beginning with the Archbishop of Arles.¹ This slaughter completed, the murderers went back to the Abbaye. At the Abbaye appeared one of those men whose peculiar function it was, in the history of the Revolution, to attempt to control and organize rebellion on every important day. Stanislas Maillard,² who had never been, as is generally stated, an usher in the law courts, had made his name famous as the chief captain in the taking of the Bastille. He had there shown great courage, and gained great personal popularity. On October 5, when the women were about to hang the unfortunate Abbé Ledoyen, it was Maillard who gave a new direction to their energies, and prevented the riot from becoming a massacre by

Barrière's series of *Mémoires*; Granier de Cassagnac, *Histoire des Massacres de Septembre*; and Buchez and Roux, *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. xviii.

¹ There is a valuable monograph on this massacre: *Le Couvent des Carmes et le Séminaire de Saint-Sulpice pendant la Terreur*, by Alexandre Sorel.

² *Stanislas Maillard, l'homme du 2 Septembre*, by Alexandre Sorel. 1862.

leading the women to Versailles. Now, again, on the terrible September 2, Stanislas Maillard appeared before the murderers of the Abbaye, and knowing well that unless some restraint were put upon them they would murder every one in the prisons, he contrived to get himself appointed judge, and sat at an informal tribunal which indeed caused the death of about one hundred and seventy prisoners, but which saved the lives in that prison alone of more than two hundred. The first victims of Maillard's tribunal were the unfortunate Swiss, fifty-four of whom had been sent to that prison after August 10, all of whom were now massacred. Then came the turn of the forgers of assignats, whom the people regarded as the cause of the depreciation of assignats. After the forgers, were slain the Comte de Montmorin Saint Hérem, the old friend of Mirabeau, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Comte de Wittgenstein, and M. de Laleu, the ex-adjutant-general of the Parisian National Guard, and many another; but, except individuals who had made themselves obnoxious to the Parisians as ministers, as implicated in August 10, or as forgers, none were murdered, and very many who were merely suspected, and who did not carry their royalism in their faces or their actions, in their names or their words, were allowed to return safely home. All through the night the massacre continued, and the committee of the section of Quatre Nations was compelled to send in wine and food to sustain the murderers during their horrible labours.

At the Conciergerie, La Force, and the Châtelet, the massacres did not begin till very late at night, and continued during September 3 without interruption, as has been said, either from constituted authority, or from passers-by; and it was remarked by Jourgniac de Saint Méard, who himself escaped, that the large crowd which surrounded the few actual murderers contained many national guards in uniform, who, though they did not interfere to prevent the murders, yet showed the greatest joy when any prisoner was pardoned by the judges within. Manuel, the procureur-syndic of the city of Paris, and Billaud-Varenne, his substitute, paid a visit to

the murderers on September 2, and on the same day a deputation from the Legislative Assembly, led by the veteran Dusaulx, looked on at the massacre, but did nothing else, and, indeed, their own arms could do little, and one of their number, named Audrein, was nearly slain for wearing his priest's robe. To the Conciergerie, the Châtelet, and La Force, numerous deputations proceeded at different times during September 3, and also did nothing. But it is useless to examine closely the acts of the tribunals of blood which all resembled each other. Some of the victims were notable men in themselves, and many of them rushed upon their fate when they could have been saved by showing some respect to the prejudices of those about them. Among the murdered at La Force were La Chesnaye, the commandant of one of the Parisian legions, who had been with the king throughout August 10, and Rulhières, commandant of the gendarmerie of Paris. But many also were saved there, such as Weber, the foster-brother of Queen Marie Antoinette, and Bertrand de Moleville, brother of the minister. Two individual murders may be noticed, not only because only two women were slain among the thousand who perished during the first two days of the massacres, but also because they well illustrate the disposition of the murderers. The Princesse de Lamballe was imprisoned at La Force, and was led out in her turn before the self-constituted tribunal. She was asked if she would swear devotion to liberty and equality, and hatred to the king and queen and royalty. "I will take the first oath, but not the second. It is not in my heart." And she boldly confronted the president, and he ordered her to the death. She was the only woman of rank who suffered. The Princesse de Tarento, another intimate friend of the queen, Madame de Fausse-Landry, Madame de Tourzel, and every other imprisoned lady of noble birth escaped,¹ and so might Madame de Lamballe, if she would have consented not to brave her judges. The only other woman who lost her life at this time was the mistress and murderess of a Garde Française,

¹ For the romantic escape of Mdle. Pauline de Tourzel, see *Mémoires* of the Duchesse de Tourzel, vol. ii. pp. 293-302.

who had murdered her lover with very great cruelty, and who was lying in the prison of the Conciergerie under sentence to be hung in the following week. Another characteristic murder was that of Vauquelin, who, on September 3, while his trial was proceeding, was dragged out before the faces of the judges of the new tribunal and murdered in the court of their hall of justice.

But some of the most famous escapes from death are even more typical of popular feeling than these murders. The stories of MM. Cazotte and Sombreuil are well known; and the first, which relates that a daughter threw her arms about her father and saved his life, is undoubtedly true; but, unfortunately, modern historical researches have proved the falsity of the legend which attributes the safety of M. de Sombreuil to his daughter's drinking a glassful of blood.¹ The escape of Jourgniac de Saint Méard, who afterwards published his narrative called "My Agony of Forty-eight Hours," is still more typical. This man was a Royalist journalist, and, like Souleau, very obnoxious to the people, and if any one's life might have been considered lost it was his; but he saved it by maintaining his equanimity and using his wit. He first made friends with the Provençal, probably the Marseillais, sentinel who was placed over him, and when led before the tribunal took care to give no offence, but, simulating an admiration for the popular justice, cried, "Vive la liberté et l'égalité!" and it was quite impossible for him to be murdered after that. In fact, it was obvious that any one who was not a priest or a forger was able to save his life if he kept his wits about him. The massacres continued throughout September 3 at the large prisons, and also at the smaller places of confinement, Les Bernardins, Saint Firmin, and the Bicêtre; and on the 4th thirty-five women who were imprisoned in the Salpêtrière were also murdered. The total number of the victims has been variously stated from 850 to 1458 by serious historians, and probably may be fixed at about 1100.²

¹ *Curiosités révolutionnaires*, by Louis Combes. Paris : 1875.

² Granier de Cassagnac fixes the number of the victims at 1458, Mortimer-Ternaux, at 1368; Barthélemy Maurice, 966; Buchez and

All this time the Assembly, the ministers, and the Commune, had done nothing, and no one had interfered with the murderers; but upon the morning of September 4 Roland appeared, with his usual easy smile, at the bar of the Assembly, and remarked, "Yesterday was a day upon the events of which perhaps a veil should be drawn. I know that the people, terrible in its vengeance, has yet made use of a certain justice;" and Robespierre, at the Commune, showed something of the same sentiment when he remarked that "Yesterday no innocent man perished." From his point of view he was undoubtedly right, for he regarded opposition to the Revolution as a crime deserving death; but the verdict of history has not been that of Robespierre. It is quite impossible not strongly to condemn both the people of Paris and the executive bodies, and it is not to palliate the terrible consequences of their apathy that it has been attempted here not to extend to too great a length the description of the agonies of death. The people is terrible in its vengeance, and the people is horribly cruel in its vengeance also. Innocent men perished miserably, but yet the massacre of September was not, from the point of view of a republican statesman, an unmixed evil. It was a defiance to the émigrés and the German armies now crossing the frontier, which was to be echoed, three weeks later, by the guns of Valmy. It was a defiance to the priests and nobles who were planning a counter-revolution in Lyons and Marseilles, in La Vendée and Provence, and who would quite as cruelly and quite as treacherously repay the murders of the Paris prisoners in murdering Revolutionists when their time came. The terrible warning to opposition to the Revolution had not been given in vain, and France, by a gulf of blood, separated its Republic from its Monarchy, and was able to advance on a more noble career. If the apathy of the Parisian National Guard and of the volunteers is contemptible in the beginning of September, their activity in the end of September is equally praiseworthy. If Danton must be

Roux, 906; Prudhomme, 10,035; and the *Mémoires sur les journées de Septembre*, 1079.

blamed for not using his power to check the massacres, he made amends for his neglect by good service in the following month. There can be no apology for the wretched murderers who stained their hands with blood, but there is an apology for those who, like Maillard, tried to systematize the murders, and thus saved some few; and, above all, there is an apology for the great Revolutionary leaders who ought to have interfered, but who yet confidently believed the death of a thousand poor creatures who were foully murdered in the prisons of Paris would pave the way for a stronger and more glorious France.

But the massacres spread beyond Paris at the news of the Prussian advance, and in the provinces too it was believed that traitors at home must be slain ere enemies on the frontier could be fought. Thus seven priests who had refused to take the oath were slain at Meaux by some gendarmes;¹ at Rheims, an officer and six priests;² at Couches, four priests; at Lyons, seven officers and a priest; at Charleville, a lieutenant-colonel of artillery; and at Caen, a magistrate of the name of Bayeux. And one man, more famous than these poor priests, who had played a part in the Constituent Assembly and had been president of the directory of the department of Paris, the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, was murdered at Gisors on September 4, in the presence of his wife and mother. The same fate awaited the charitable Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt if he had not escaped in time to England. The escape of Adrien Duport may also be noticed. He had been arrested at his Château of Bignon near Nemours, and was being brought to Paris to certain death, when Madame Duport let Danton know that his old friend was being led to assassination, and he directed the tribunal of Melun to examine the conduct of Duport, and finally to set him free. The memory of ancient friendship appears in the story of the safety of many others who had ever done a kindness to the leading Revolutionists. Thus

¹ Carro's *Histoire de Meaux et du pays Mellois*, pp. 441-428.

² *L'épisode révolutionnaire à Reims*, by L. Debry; and *Les Massacres à Reims en 1792*, by A. Barbat de Bignicourt. Reims: 1872

Danton saved the life of the Abbé Berardier, the old rector of the Collège Louis le Grand, at which Robespierre and Desmoulins had been educated, and of Charles Lameth; Espinassy, the Girondin deputy, saved Mathieu Dumas; Collot d'Herbois saved Curtius, the modeller in wax and father of Madame Tussaud, by declaring that the Swiss, whose speech had betrayed him, was of French nationality and an Alsatian; Madame de Staël saved her lover, the Comte de Narbonne; and Santerre saved Alexandre Berthier, the future marshal and prince of Wagram, the Comtesse Rantzau, the journalist Doulcet, and many others.

But if many lives were saved by personal friendship, and many lost by individual enmity, notice must now be taken of the last massacre, which was perhaps the most cold-blooded of all. Fournier, called the American,¹ from his residence in that country, had been ordered, upon August 24, to take five or six hundred men with him and to bring up to Paris, to be tried by the new National Tribunal, the prisoners who were now at Orleans waiting their trial for high treason. He, however, waited at Étampes, where he was joined by Lazouski, while Léonard Bourdon went to Orleans to fetch the prisoners. Fournier himself reached Orleans on August 30, and left that city on September 4 to escort the prisoners into Paris, and he took them safely as far as Versailles. There he heard, on September 9, of the massacres in Paris, and determined that he would not be slack in murdering also; and on the same day, as the prisoners alighted from the carriages in which they had come to pass the night at Versailles, every one of them was cruelly massacred, among them being the Duc de Cossé-Brissac, the old colonel of the king's Constitutional Guard; Valdec de Lessart, who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior; d'Abancourt, the late Minister for War; and twenty-five other state prisoners, chiefly officers of various regiments, who had been imprisoned for encouraging their men against the Revolution. These last murders of Fournier,

¹ He was, according to Granier de Cassagnac, a native of Issoire in Auvergne.

at Versailles, were the most cold-blooded of all, and it is certain that no more cruel or cold-blooded murderer ever lived than Fournier, called the American. The murders in the provinces caused as little excitement in Paris as the murders in Paris itself. France was as apathetic on the subject as Paris. The example set by Jourdan Coupe-tête at Avignon had been followed, and the prisons had been cleared in a new and very summary manner. Yet it must not be forgotten that, criminal as this apathy was, it was induced by a fear that France would be betrayed from within if its defenders assembled on the frontiers and left traitors at home, even if shut up in strong prisons. Sad, cruelly sad as the sequel of August 10 proved to be, it is yet not without its bright characteristics. Never was more self-devotion shown, and never was more heroism displayed, than on those memorable days. The tie of friendship was recognized, and those who condemn Danton and his criminal neglect, must yet praise him for his willingness to save any who were recommended to him as being worthy of safety.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONVENTION, AND DECLARATION OF THE REPUBLIC.

Effect of the policy of the Legislative Assembly—The insurrectionary commune of Paris—Gaiety in Paris—The young nobles join the army—Last measures of the Legislative Assembly—The elections to the Convention—Parties in the Convention—Barère—Other deputies of the Marsh—The Girondins—Buzot—Brissotins and Buzotins—The Jacobins—Robespierre—Marat—Danton—The deputies of the Mountain—First measures of the Convention—Declaration of the Republic—Struggle between the Girondins and the Mountain—The Girondin ministers—Monge—Garat—Madame Roland's salon—The Jacobins and their journals—The *Père Duchesne* of Hébert—Social life in Paris—Dumouriez in Paris.

THE terrible massacres in the prisons in September, 1792, and their sequel in the provinces, had thrown a gloom over the last days of the only Legislative Assembly elected according to the Constitution of 1791; and these last days clearly proved how inefficient had been that boasted Constitution. Freed from responsibility, the Legislative Assembly had occupied itself in attacking all constituted authorities, and had weakened the executive by its assumption of administrative power. By insisting on the declaration of war it had ruined the cause of monarchy in France, and not less thoroughly the chance of a bourgeois régime. For in a great war of existence men are valued by their own personal capacity, and not by the money or reputation they may possess. A hundred poor beggars could quickly murder twenty wealthy bourgeois. During the first months after the declaration of war, the bourgeois and

their dreaming leaders the Girondins did not understand that they had thrown away their only chance of power; but the events of August 10 had enlightened them on the subject. The only strength left was in the lower administrative organizations created by the Constituent Assembly—the municipalities which were in the provinces under the influence of the Jacobin clubs, and in Paris under the influence of the Radical sections.

The rise of the insurrectionary commune of Paris has been noticed. It did not represent all the sections of Paris, but by its energy it had assumed the entire rule of the capital, and haughtily dictated terms to the Legislative Assembly itself. Throughout the beginning of the year 1792 the king and ministers had had no power. The Assembly had possessed it all. But when the king fell the Assembly failed to preserve its former influence, and the Commune of Paris usurped it all. It is a strange phenomenon, and can only be accounted for by the fact that either the deputies in the Assembly were themselves too weak to seize upon power, or else felt that they did not represent public opinion. Whatever may be the reason, whether it was from vigour and audacity or from their real courage, the members of the insurrectionary commune of Paris now ruled France. For a moment, in the dispute about Girey-Dupré, the Assembly endeavoured to hold its own against the Commune; but the Committee of Twenty-one was too busy in trying to provide for the needs of the army to interfere, and, deprived of its leaders, the Assembly could effect nothing. Finally, the massacres of September confirmed and strengthened the power of the Commune of Paris.

It has generally been supposed that all Paris felt very gloomy after the news of the massacres. On the contrary, never was life gayer than then. Gloom had only rested on the city during the two days of the domiciliary visits. The news of the massacres was hailed with relief by all classes, and the terrible question as to what to do with the prisoners was removed for ever. The French people felt they had indeed thrown away the scabbard, and determined to congratulate themselves on their own bravery. Very gay were the final

suppers given to the young volunteers on their way to the frontier. Never were more magnificent banquets spread than in these days of September; never were the salons of Madame Roland and Madame Talma more brilliantly lighted up; never were the theatres more thronged or the journals more read. Paris seemed passing through a phase of feverish gaiety and was waiting for the arrival of the Prussians or for the struggle for political power to recommence. Those who had to mourn the death of friends or relatives had to conceal their gloomy faces for fear a like fate might strike themselves, and any who had friends among the advanced Republican party sought their advice as to what it were best to do.

Among those who sought advice, Madame Colbert, widow of the Marquis de Colbert, the descendant of the famous minister of Louis XIV., came to Bertrand Barère, and asked what she should do with her sons, who under the ancient régime would have been the Marquis, the Comte, and the Vicomte de Colbert. The eldest boy was only eighteen and the youngest fourteen. Barère's advice was short, and at once taken. "Send all three to the frontier as volunteers," he said. "Their presence there will protect you at home, marchioness though you be. No one will dare to attack you in Paris with your sons on the frontier, and there they will be safe."¹ The advice was taken, and the ranks of the volunteers on their way to the frontier were filled with young nobles who went to expiate the misfortune of their birth by their bravery on the frontier, and by their courage there protected their relatives at home.

Paris was merely waiting until the Convention should meet, and all France was occupied, as was Paris itself, in completing its elections to the new Assembly. Meanwhile the old dying Assembly concluded its labours by a vote of admiration of the conduct of Beaurepaire, governor of Verdun, and by ordering the use of cartes civiques. The Prussians had rapidly moved on Verdun. The municipality determined to surrender,

¹ *Traditions et souvenirs, ou Mémoires touchant le temps et la vie du Général Auguste Colbert, 1793-1809. 5 vols. Paris: 1863-1873.*

and the commandant had blown his brains out. The Assembly passed a vote in honour of his memory, and declared that if any other town surrendered to the enemy the municipality would be considered to be responsible at the cost of their own lives. The arrangement of the cartes civiques was carried on September 20. Every individual, man or woman, was compelled to carry about a small card issued by his section, containing his name, residence, and daily occupation, and must be ready to show his card to any officer of the police, and indeed to any patriot who asked him for it. Any one who failed to produce his civic card was at once to be taken to his section, and if not recognized to be imprisoned as a suspect. Such was the last measure of suspicion of the Legislative Assembly; and on September 21 the new Convention, which was to rule France either by itself or its creation, the Committee of Public Safety, for just three years, held its first session.

The electoral period had been one of very great excitement. Yet the elections were remarkable for the small number of voters, whether active or passive citizens, who went to the poll.¹ In the provinces, with certain notable exceptions, the candidates proposed by the popular societies were everywhere elected, and a new feature appears when it is remarked that in many departments men unknown to the locality were elected simply because of the reputation they had made at Paris, or from the influence their friends possessed. Thus Louvet, the author of the licentious "*Aventures de Faublas*," was recommended to the department of the Loiret by certain of his Girondin friends as the brave Girondin who had attacked Robespierre in his paper the *Sentinelle*, and was immediately elected, though he had never set foot in the department. Similarly Siéyès was elected, simply because of his reputation in the Constituent Assembly for three departments, the Sarthe, the Orne, and the Gironde, in only one of which he was per-

¹ See the most valuable series of articles, entitled "*La Proclamation de la République*," which have been appearing in the *Revue de la Révolution* since its foundation, in which M. Gustave Bord analyzes, department by department, the elections to the Convention.

sonally known; and Rabaut de Saint Étienne was elected in the Aube, in which there were no Protestants and none who knew him. Again, in certain departments that decree which the Legislative Assembly had passed on August 15, on the petition of Danton, abolishing the distinction between active and passive citizens, was not adopted, and in the Ille-et-Vilaine, in Brittany, Lanjuinais and his colleagues were elected under the old rules of the Constituent Assembly. On the whole, the provincial deputies consisted chiefly of well-known men, who had played a part either in the Constituent or in the Legislative Assembly, or else had made themselves conspicuous in action or in writing during the days of revolution. Very few of them were quite untried men, and so far the complexion of the Convention differed greatly from that of the former Assemblies. Also the proportion of very young men was hardly maintained, though some, like Barbaroux and Louvet, were returned by the influence of the Girondins, and the general average of age was much higher than it had been in the Legislative Assembly. The eyes of all France were fixed, after their own elections were concluded, upon the elections at Paris, just as they had been turned to the elections there to the Constituent Assembly. These were at last concluded, and again Paris returned a large proportion of the leaders of the new Assembly. The elections were being held in the same hall of the archbishop's palace on September 2, when the massacres began, and the first deputy elected for Paris was Robespierre, whose powers of hard work and genuine enthusiasm for establishing a new order of things had been recognized. In regular order there were elected after Robespierre, Danton, Collot d'Herbois, Manuel, Billaud-Varenne, Camille Desmoulins, Marat, Lavicomterie, Legendre the butcher, Raffron du Trouillet, Panis, Sergent, Robert, Dusaulx, Fréron, Beauvais de Préau, Fabre d'Eglantine the dramatist, Osselin, Augustin Robespierre the younger brother of Maximilien, David the great painter, Boucher, Laignelot, Thomas; and, lastly, as twenty-fourth deputy, under circumstances which recalled the election of Siéyès as twenty-fourth deputy

for the tiers état of Paris in 1789, Philippe de Bourbon, who had been Duke of Orleans, and who now called himself Philippe Egalité. Such was the deputation which Paris sent to the Convention on September 21.

The first point which struck observers in Paris when the Convention met was the number of old faces to be recognized there, which seemed to include everybody of any note whatever in France, and the second was that the Girondins seemed to have a very large majority. Quickly did Girondins and Jacobins, who had formed in the Legislative two sections of the left, separate into right and left, for not a man returned to the new Convention dared to say a word for the Constitution of 1791, which had been adopted amid such high hopes. The Girondins took their seats at once on the right of the Assembly, while the leading Jacobins collected on the upper benches of the extreme left—a lofty position which gave them their title of the Mountain party. Few in number were these extreme mountaineers to the great body of Girondins who filled the benches of the right; but greater than in any previous Assembly was the mass of deputies who sat in the centre, or, as it was now called, the Marsh or the Plain. It was these “Frogs of the Marsh,” as they were contemptuously termed by the leaders of either side, who commanded the majority, and they were the men whom the Girondins hoped to lead by eloquence and the Jacobins to terrify by bloodshed; but it must not be supposed that the great mass of the centre, which contained more than six hundred deputies, contained only men of mediocre ability and cowardly minds. Many very able men were there who sincerely did not wish to tie themselves to any party, but who desired to watch the course of events, and give the influence of their votes to the party which was most desirous of the public weal, or which had the ability to serve the country best. The leading member of this centre group, during the first month of the Convention, though he is best remembered for the part he played after he became the spokesman of the Committee of Public Safety, was Bertrand Barère.¹

¹ See vol. i., chap. iv. pp. 99, 100.

Barère had sat in the Constituent Assembly, and had won popularity in his little southern province of the Bigorre, by securing its unity when France was divided into departments, and arranging that the whole province of Bigorre should form one department, called the Hautes Pyrénées. This had given him much reputation at home, and in 1791 he was elected a judge of the tribunal of appeal in his department, and in 1792 had been returned as first deputy to the Convention. He was a ready speaker, and a vivid imagination enabled him to seize upon the strong points of every proposition, and he speedily became the spokesman of the large centre group, which was known as the Marsh. Robespierre knew him well from the days of the Constituent Assembly, and, understanding the impressionable southern nature of the man, caused him in later days to be elected a member of the Committee of Public Safety, and made him its spokesman in the Convention. But if Barère was the representative of the centre group for the first six months, there were behind him many men much abler than he.

Grégoire, the constitutional Bishop of Blois, sat there, a living protest against the atheism and crass materialism which seemed at one time about to seize on the Convention. But he had no sympathy either with Girondins or Jacobins. What he wished was to improve the people; and therefore, while the members of the right and the left were destroying each other, and quarrelling bitterly over points which he did not regard, he remained a member of such committees as the committee of education, and did good work in elaborating such a scheme of national education as had never been seen before. There, too, sat the Abbé Siéyès, another leader of the Constituent Assembly, with several more constitutions ready in his pocket, which he was ready to produce when called upon, and with sage aphorisms which sounded like wisdom ever on his lips, and which gave him the reputation of being a very deep politician, when indeed he was but a shallow theorist. Among other ex-Constituents who sat in the Marsh were Larévellière-Lepaux, Rewbell, Letourneur, and Treilhard, the

future directors; Camus, the former Jansenist and member of the first Constitutional committee; Merlin of Douai, the great jurist; Boissy d'Anglas, the former deputy for Annonay and friend of Rabaut de Saint Étienne; Vernier, Alquier, and Dubois-Crancé, the organizer of the Republican army. Some few members of the Legislative Assembly, which had just sadly closed its session, sat mewed up among the deputies of the centre, watching how events would go. Such were François de Neufchâteau, Guyton-Morveau, Lacépède, Français de Nantes, and Cambon the great financier, who avoided allying himself with either party, and whose financial abilities were required by all. The centre group, too, was largely recruited by men who had sat in neither of the former assemblies, but who learned, under the tuition of the Committee of Public Safety, how to rule when the turn of moderate men should come—such as Cambacérès, the future chancellor of Napoleon; Barras, the future director; Fourcroy, the chemist; Creuzé Latouche, the judge of the high court of Orleans; Lakanal, the reformer of education; and Thibaudeau, the future historian.

But if the real power of the Convention was to rest with these deputies of the Marsh, who at present were only inclined to watch the progress of events, it is more important to examine how the two extreme parties were themselves recruited in the new Assembly. All the leading Girondins of the Legislative Assembly had been returned to the Convention. Guadet and Gensonné, Vergniaud, Grangeneuve, and Ducos again represented the department of the Gironde. Brissot, their leader, though a man of inferior calibre to themselves, was once again elected, while Isnard, Fauchet, Condorcet, and Lasource again sat by their side. But along with the Girondins of the Legislative Assembly sat many others who partook of their opinions and shared their principles. Foremost among these was the ex-Constituant Buzot.

François Nicolas Leonard Buzot was the son of a judge of the parlement of Rouen, and had, when a young man of twenty-eight, been returned to the States-General for the bailliage of Évreux, because he had married a cousin of

Necker's keeper of the seals, Barentin. He had spoken frequently in the Constituent Assembly, and had been grouped with Robespierre and Pétion as one of the leaders of the thirty voices whom Mirabeau had so indignantly rebuked. After the close of the Constituent Assembly he had remained in Paris, and had become an intimate of the salon of Madame Roland. Though stout and awkward in appearance, he was still a young man, possessed of very passionate feelings, and, deserting his own wife, fell violently in love with the enthusiastic wife of Roland. Madame Roland lavished on Buzot all the love her husband longed for, and he had become the king of her salon.¹ Therefore, when returned to the Convention by the department of the Eure, he naturally took his seat on the right among the Girondins. But his advent only served to disunite the Girondin party, which soon split up into the two distinct parties of 1793, the Brissotins and the Buzotins.

Buzot's influence was so great that even the greatest orator of the Girondins, Vergniaud, deserted the standard of Brissot, for he found there was more patriotism and genuine self-sacrifice in the ex-Constituant than in the pamphleteer of the "Amis des Noirs." By Buzot's side, and supporting him in preference to Brissot, sat some other ex-Constituents who have generally been considered members of the Girondin party. Notable among them was Rabaut de Saint Étienne, the Protestant pastor of Nîmes, whose fame had been won before the States-General met, and who there had played an important part. On the conclusion of the Constituent Assembly, Rabaut had lived in Paris, quietly working on the *Moniteur*, but in no way making himself conspicuous or holding any administrative office. To his surprise he was elected to the Convention by the department of Aube, in which he did not know a single person, and where there were no Protestants. He was simply elected because of his great services in the Constituent Assembly to the cause of liberty of conscience. With them also sat the ex-Constituant Pétion, who was very much disgusted that the services of the virtuous mayor of Paris should

¹ *Mémoires de Madame Roland*, edition of C. A. Dauban. Paris : 1864.

have been so completely forgotten by the insurrectionary commune of Paris, and who considered himself very ill used by Robespierre, because his own popularity had hopelessly disappeared, and his weakness and vanity had been made manifest. His support was of very little importance to either side, but such as it was he gave it to the Girondins. One or two other ex-Constituants also threw in their lot with the Girondins, chiefly men, who had played no part of importance in the Constituent Assembly, but who, from the fact that they had sat there, were treated with some respect, such as Couppé, Defermon, Durand-Maillane, Salle, and Lanjuinais, the professor of law at Rennes, who had moved the fatal motion of November 7, 1789, against the admission of ministers to the Constituent Assembly. It has been said that most of the Girondins of the Legislative Assembly were returned to the Convention; but in addition to the names of the leaders already mentioned may be noticed those of Kersaint, Bergœing, Biroteau, Henri Larivière, Masuyer, Dusaulx, and Fauchet, the eloquent constitutional Bishop of Calvados. Of the new men who came to join their party many were personally of very great ability, and most had proved their Girondin principles by their close alliance with the Girondins, either in the salon of Madame Roland or in the Girondin journals, previous to September, 1792. Such were Louvet, whose election has been mentioned; Barbaroux of Marseilles, whom Madame Roland called *Antinöus* by reason of his beauty; Gorsas, the editor of the *Courier*; Mercier, the author of the "*Tableau de Paris*;" Valazé, the young Norman; the *ci-devant* Marquis de Valady; Rebecqui; Carra, the journalist; and Boyer-Fonfrède, a young intimate of Vergniaud, in whose house the great orator lived till his arrest.

On the left of the Assembly sat the Jacobins, and among them all those men who were to make Europe tremble by their reckless audacity in war and their ruthless cruelty at home; the men who were to see France safely through the troubles of a European war, and establish the Republic on a firm footing. The one characteristic of these Jacobins was that they were strong men. Some of them were good men; some of them

were moral men ; some were highly educated statesmen ; some were orators ; but the characteristic which distinguished them all was that of strength. They were men who feared nothing, and cared for no judgment in this world or another, and acted with ruthless power because they felt that strong government was necessary for the welfare of France, and that cruelty and terror were better than a return to the "ancien régime," or than the anarchy which had desolated France during the last three years. These Jacobins may be divided roughly into two broad sections—the men of action, who cared little for whom they worked, or who had the majority in the Convention, so long as they were permitted to see to the efficiency of the armies and the peace of the provinces ; and the men of political theories, who remained in Paris and quarrelled for pre-eminence among themselves, while their colleagues were engaged in restoring order to France. The three chief Jacobins whose names have occurred frequently in the early history of the Revolution, and who now laboured in the Convention to establish their different ideals of government, were Robespierre, Danton, and Marat.

The political position of Robespierre at the close of the Constituent Assembly has been noticed in a previous chapter,¹ but his opinions had distinctly developed during the past year, and he was now able to formulate his ideas with logical consistency in the Convention. Of the three chief leaders, none had a more sincere hatred of anarchy or a more sincere love of liberty than Maximilien Robespierre. The events of the past year had taught him that the Constitution of 1791 was unworkable, and must disappear. He suspected king and ministers, priests and nobles, and openly feared a reaction in their favour ; but he never allowed his fears to overcome his sense of justice. He protested against Le Chapelier's motion against the émigrés in February, 1791,² and still more strongly against Fauchet's motion against the priests who had not taken the oath. He had opposed these motions only from a sense of justice, and not from any liking for émigrés or un-

¹ Vol. i. p. 433.² Vol. i. p. 424.

constitutional priests. His experience in the insurrectionary commune of Paris had convinced him that the bourgeois of France would not be sorry if the progress of the Revolution was now to stop, and matters return in some respects to what they were under the "ancien régime." And he knew that unless these bourgeois could be controlled by being made to distrust their own strength, and could be frightened by a system of terror, they would speedily cause a reaction, which would make the last state of the people worse than the first. A strong and centralized government, with powerful engines for creating such a terror, was what was necessary to control the bourgeois, as well as to put an end to the anarchy all over France. Therefore it was that, highly moral man and opponent of bloodshed as he had proved himself under the old régime, he did not condemn the massacres in the prisons. When he came to sit in the Convention, he saw that he had many enemies about him. Opposite him sat the Girondins, whose leader, Brissot, had been engaged in open battle with him, not only on the question of the war, but on nearly every other topic which was discussed during the session of the Legislative Assembly, and he knew that it was war to the knife between them. Further, besides hating the Girondin leaders as his own enemies, he despised them as half-and-half statesmen. They saw the terrible anarchy they had brought upon France, in addition to the dangers of foreign war and of invasion, and yet they were more interested in dreaming and haggling than in at once establishing a powerful government. They expressed a fear of a strong executive, and became almost hysterical at the notion of a dictator. Such men he regarded as obstacles to the establishment of a powerful government in France, which should terrify her enemies abroad and carry out the ideas of Rousseau at home, and these obstacles must be made to give way. His desire to see fulfilled in France Rousseau's fancy of absolute equality was the weak point of Robespierre's policy. He dreamed of a France where all men should be equal, where all men should start fair on the great race of life, equally equipped with education appropriate to

their physical and mental powers, so that each man should have a fair chance of winning for himself a name in his country, and where there should be no distinction of ranks, and no superiority of the rich over the poor. In this belief in a possible Utopia lay Robespierre's weakness. It was not enough for him that France should be saved from anarchy; France must also be remodelled according to the gospel of Rousseau.

Very like and very unlike Robespierre was Jean Paul Marat. But the Jean Paul Marat who came to sit on the benches of the Convention was a very different man to the Dr. Marat, possessed of a good fortune and a high reputation in scientific circles, the court physician and the friend of great ladies,¹ who had hailed with joy the convocation of the States-General; and in his slovenly dress and diseased frame could hardly be perceived the former sprucely attired ladies' doctor. Only three years had passed since the establishment of the *Ami du Peuple*, yet a mighty change had been wrought in Marat's appearance. He had always been a weak and ailing man; he had believed himself dying when he wrote his "Offrande à la Patrie," in the March of 1789,² and with difficulty he had recovered from his illness. Ever since the establishment of the *Ami du Peuple* he had been persecuted by every party in turn. Lafayette had hunted him from resting-place to resting-place; Talon and Sémonville had tracked him down into the sewers, and into the most secret hiding-places of Paris; when Lafayette's power was gone, the Girondins pursued him with the same deadly hatred, and in May, 1792, ordered that he should be prosecuted;³ and yet after all he had been freely chosen by the electors of Paris to represent them in the Convention. But if the persecution he had undergone had destroyed the strength of his frame, and if his unhealthy life amid the sewers and indefatigable labours had imprinted upon his very face the signs of a fatal disease,

¹ See vol. i. chap. vii. pp. 216-219.

² Jean Paul Marat. *Esprit politique, accompagné de sa vie scientifique, politique, et privée*, by F. Chèvremont, vol. i. p. 77. Paris: 1880.

³ Vol. ii. p. 67.

still more had they affected the bent of his mind. By nature suspicious and gloomy, ever the prophet of evil, he became more and more sombre both in his feelings and in his expressions. To suspicion had been added revenge. He not only suspected those who now seemed likely to possess power, but wished to revenge himself on those who had persecuted him. Robespierre shared in a degree the same feelings of suspicion and revenge, but Robespierre had never been persecuted or hunted from sewer to sewer; and in Marat's mind suspicion now over-shadowed the justice and equity of his natural disposition. If his sufferings made him feel revengeful, they had not affected his statesmanlike insight. More vigorously even than Danton and Robespierre had he condemned the suicidal declaration of war, and more forcibly had he declared that the "little statesmen" of the Gironde deserved capital punishment for causing the deaths of the bravest men of France upon the frontiers. For these little statesmen he shared Robespierre's contempt; and he also shared Robespierre's longing for the overthrow of anarchy, and recognized that it could only be accomplished by a strong executive. But while Robespierre was from the very first day of the Convention busily engaged in compassing the destruction of Brissot and the "little statesmen" of the Gironde, and thus preparing the establishment of the strong executive, Marat allowed his thirst for revenge to overcome his statesmanlike instincts. He therefore worked with as much ardour as Robespierre for the overthrow of the Girondins; but he demanded their deaths, and the deaths of his old persecutors, and not only their removal from the scene of political action. In him revenge now became the guiding principle; but who can wonder at it? Bloodthirsty he was; but had he been treated with mercy? His power rested on the fear that was felt for his unerring sagacity in tracing out the inmost motives of the actions of those who hated him, and his popularity on the feeling of the people that he had suffered in fighting their battle. If the Jacobin Club regarded Robespierre as their hero, the populace of Paris looked upon Marat as a living martyr to the cause of liberty.

Greater in his practical and political wisdom than either Robespierre or Marat, was Georges Jacques Danton.¹ He was born on October 26, 1759, at Arcis-sur-Aube, in Champagne, where his father was a wealthy procureur, and the head of a good bourgeois family. He lost his father when but three years old, and was educated by the Oratorians at Troyes. He came to Paris in 1780, at the age of twenty-one, and purchased the office of procureur to the Parlement there. Though robust in temperament and fond of pleasure, he yet worked hard both at his profession and at history and literature, and thoroughly learned both English and Italian. His character stood so high and he was making such a good income, that in 1787 he married Mademoiselle Gabrielle Charpentier, the daughter of a wealthy bourgeois, and with her dowry, and the money he had saved and inherited, bought, for seventy-eight thousand livres, the office of an "avocat aux conseils du Roi," which conferred on him the privileges both of an avocat and a procureur. He was leading the quiet life of a wealthy and cultivated lawyer in good practice, when the Revolution commenced, and was in particularly happy domestic circumstances adoring and adored by his wife, and rejoicing in the attachment of many friends, including Hérault de Sechelles, the handsome young president of the Parlement of Paris, Fabre d'Églantine, and the young advocate without any practice, Camille Desmoulins, who were all to die with him. In the primary elections of 1789 Danton played an important part in the assembly of the district of the Cordeliers, and had then established the well-known club of the Cordeliers, which became the head-quarters of the extreme revolutionists of the south side of the city of Paris, and eventually of the whole of France. He had very soon been disgusted by the course of events in the Constituent Assembly, and had for a time attached himself to the cause of Orleans, in the belief that a change of dynasty would bring about the establishment of a

¹ For Danton's life, see *Danton ; Mémoire sur sa vie privée*, by Dr. Robinet, Paris, 1865 ; and *Danton ; Documents authentiques pour servir à l'histoire de la Révolution française*, by A. Bougeart. Brussels : 1861.

parliamentary government. Mirabeau declares openly in a letter to La Marek¹ that the triumvirate and Orleanists had intrigued with Danton, and had bribed him with a large sum; but all such stories have been proved to be false by the careful examination of his monetary affairs during the Revolution, which has been published by M. Bougeart. He had sufficient wealth without being bribed, for on the abolition of the "avocats aux conseils," he received 220,000 livres as compensation for the suppression of his office. His mastery of a style of popular eloquence led to his pre-eminence in the club of the Cordeliers. He there assembled round him all the most advanced revolutionists of Paris; for the Jacobin Club, it must be remembered, was at first under the influence of such constitutional deputies as Clermont-Tonnerre, and then under that of Duport and the Lameths, until Robespierre became its hero. With Danton at the Cordeliers sat the witty writer Camille Desmoulins, whose opinions were greatly influenced by those of his powerful friend, Collot d'Herbois the dramatic author, Fabre d'Églantine the young poet, and the butcher Legendre. Danton then offered himself for administrative posts, and he was elected twenty-first out of the thirty-six administrators of the department of the Seine, in February, 1791. He had there shown himself an advanced revolutionist, particularly on the occasion of the flight to Varennes, and would have been prosecuted by his colleagues after the massacre of July 17 if he had not retired to his country seat at Arcis.² At the summons of the Legislative Assembly Danton had returned to Paris, and both in the Cordeliers and the Jacobin clubs had used his influence to throw contempt upon the Girondin statesmen. Brissot seemed to him an objectionable "little" man, who preached about his morality when he had none, and wished to drag France into war that he might show off as Minister for Foreign Affairs; and during the early months of 1792 Danton worked hand in hand with Robespierre and

¹ Dated March 10, 1791. *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marek*, vol. ii. p. 240.

² Vol. i. chap. xv. pp. 456, 461, 464.

Marat in discrediting the Girondins, and inspired his friend Camille's witty pamphlet "Jean Pierre Brissot demasqué." He had been elected substitute to the procureur of the Commune in the November of 1791, and this office gave him an official position in the municipality of Paris, which he used to obtain an entire mastery over the new men who were to play a part in affairs. He had deprecated any movement in the June of 1792, but was the heart and soul of the organization of the insurrection of August 10, and deputed his friend Westermann to act for him at the insurrectionary committee. He had changed his place of abode, and now lived in the same house with Camille Desmoulins, No. 1, Cour de Commerce Saint André-aux-Arcs,¹ where Lucile Desmoulins and Madame Danton, who greatly resembled each other in character, became firm friends. The success of August 10 caused him to be elected Minister of Justice, and on the 11th he had appointed Camille head of his secretaries. In that capacity he had laboured hard on the summons of the volunteers to the frontier, and had made his famous speech, "De l'audace, de l'audace, toujours de l'audace." The greatest blot of his administration was his indifference during the massacres in the prisons, for his power could have stopped them at once. But he regarded these massacres as an advantage to France, and believed that they cleared the way for a new and more energetic government.² He now surrendered his office, and was elected second deputy for Paris to the Convention. He shared with both Robespierre and Marat, but in a far greater degree, their longing to establish a strong executive government, and thus ensure the success of France

¹ *Camille et Lucile Desmoulins*, by Jules Claretie, p. 181. Paris: 1875.

² See particularly on this subject the series of articles, written in the shape of a legal defence, by Dr. Robinet the biographer, entitled *Danton d'après les documents. Réponse aux imputations d'ignorance, d'immoralité, de vénalité, de dilapidations, massacres de Septembre*, in the *Révolution française*, November, December, 1882, January, February, March, April, May, June, and July, 1883; and the articles on *Danton et les massacres de Septembre*, by Antonin Dubost, in the same magazine for August, September, October, November, and December, 1886.

in war, and peace and good order at home. But he was quite free from the idle dreams which weakened the force of the political aims of Robespierre, and from the thirst for vengeance which distinguished Marat. Danton was not as great a man as Mirabeau, or as profound a statesman and political thinker, but he too was above petty feuds, and laughed at the idea of vengeance on his personal enemies. It has been mentioned that when in office he had exerted himself to save the lives of all whose claims were submitted to him at his own personal risk;¹ and it will be seen that throughout his career he always refused to shed the blood of his enemies even when it was in his power, and it would have secured his supremacy. Being, then, no dreamer, and not rabid for vengeance, Danton appears in history a far greater man than Robespierre or Marat. He was ready to do all in a man's power to assure the triumph of France in the war of which he had deprecated the outbreak, and which he despised the Girondins for causing solely to promote their own petty personal supremacy; and he determined to do all that in him lay to undo the work of the Constituent Assembly, and to establish a strong government in France. Free from personal motives, he was also free from impracticable dreams. If France was but happy and at peace he was content, for he knew that the Utopias of dreamers could never be realized, and that attempts to create them did not justify the taking of a single life. This it was which raised Danton high in the scale of statesmanship above the Girondins, above Robespierre, and Saint-Just; for so long as France was happy he cared not what the government might be; and happiness, he knew, depended on peace and order; but that peace must be obtained with honour, and before the great labour of establishing a strong executive in France could be entered upon, the invader must be driven from her borders and France must appear in all her majesty as a free nation.

These three chief Jacobin leaders were men both of action and of thought, but all three confined their labours to Paris and to the Convention, while their friends worked in the

¹ Vol. ii. p. 148.

provinces and at the frontiers. It is impossible to group the deputies of the Mountain as Robespierrists, Maratists, and Dantonists, for they were influenced by different feelings and different men at different times; and it may be truly said of the most important group, the men of action, that they were more attached to France than to any leader in the Convention. These men of action may be divided into those who occupied themselves mainly with the war, and those who established order in the provinces. Prominent among the war deputies were the ex-Constituants Prieur of the Marne, and Rewbell, and Robert Lindet, the brother of the constitutional bishop of the Eure, who, as a curé, had sat in the Constituent Assembly for the bailliage of Évreux.¹ With them worked certain ex-deputies to the Legislature, Carnot, Merlin of Thionville, Dubois-Dubais, Jean Debry, and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, while among the new members there were sent to Paris some of the greatest administrators, such as Jean Bon Saint-André, the protestant pastor of Montauban,² and Philippeaux. And upon the benches of the left, on the Mountain, might also be seen those proconsuls who were to exercise such a terrible power in the provinces of France; who were to ruthlessly beat down all attempts at reaction, and establish order where anarchy reigned by the sheer influence of terror and the exercise of their own fierce wills. Few of these men had had seats in either Assembly; but they were nearly all men who had tried their powers in the provincial Jacobin clubs, which had already established a régime of terror on a small scale in their various districts, and were becoming the chief agents in the restoration of good order, though in many cases their good work was accompanied by deeds of the utmost atrocity. Among them might be seen Carrier, who was to be proconsul at Nantes; Fouché, the tyrant of Lyons and future Duke of Otranto; Tallien; Maignet; Lecarpentier; Javogues; Bernard of Saintes; Albitte; Barras; Cavaignac; Dartigoyte; Lequinis; and Claud Reynaud; with a few whose proconsulates were not to be so terrible, though equally effective in restoring order, such as Roux-Fazillac,

¹ Vol. i. p. 40.² Vol. i. pp. 489, 491.

Gouly, André Dumont, Bô Méaulle, Prost, Siblot, Boisset, and Châteauneuf-Randon. There also appeared in the Convention a group of men who were to make themselves famous or infamous as the enthusiastic supporters of Robespierre, who could easily have been outvoted had Danton cared to take the trouble to form a party. Such men were Anthoine of Metz, the ex-Constituant, and Couthon, who had shown himself an advanced revolutionist in the Legislative Assembly; with some new deputies, including Augustin Bon Robespierre, the younger brother of the republican leader, Le Bas, and Saint-Just, who, in his ardent belief in Rousseau's dreams, outdid Robespierre himself. There were a few men who would have formed a party for Danton, if he had wished it, and who avenged his death, among those who played a great part in the Convention, such as his own personal friends, Hérault de Sechelles, Lacroix, Camille Desmoulins, and Fabre d'Églantine; and his avengers, Fréron, Courtois, and Legendre. Lastly may be noticed a few violent Republicans who grouped themselves under the banner neither of Robespierre nor Danton, but who, though in no way followers of Marat, allowed their desire for vengeance and their fear of reaction to overpower their desire for the re-establishment of peace and order. Such men were naturally from the very first warm supporters of the system of the Terror; and notable among them were Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varenne, who had played so great a part in the events of August 10; Chabot and Basire, who had led the extreme party in the Legislative Assembly; Romme, Soubrany, Bourbotte, Amar, and Vadier, the ex-Constituant.

The Convention met, as has been said, on September 21, in the old Riding School, where the Constituent Assembly had taken up its quarters three years before; and the debates opened with a speech from Couthon, who proposed that every one who did not equally condemn royalty and every attempt to destroy the sovereignty of the people should be guilty of "lèse-nation." Danton, as the true successor of Mirabeau, supplemented this proposal by another—that the Convention should proclaim the eternal maintenance of all territorial and

industrial property. But the Convention did not see the need of giving this pledge to France that the rights of property should be observed, and only decreed that property and personal safety were under the safeguard of the nation. Then arose Collot d'Herbois, who moved that royalty should be abolished in France; and he was followed by Grégoire, with a motion that for the future the government of France should be republican. Of course the motion was carried, and the establishment of the French Republic, one and indivisible, was solemnly proclaimed. The proclamation was received with delight in Paris, and it was followed on the next day by a decree that all the municipal and judicial offices were vacant, and that, the difference between active and passive citizens being abolished, any individual could be elected to hold any administrative post.

Hardly were these first days over when the radical division between the Girondins and the Jacobins appeared, and the struggle between them, which was to last till the final overthrow of the Girondin party, commenced. Roland, the Girondin Minister of the Interior, had been elected a deputy for the department of the Somme; and the Girondins moved that he should not be obliged to resign his seat, and yet retain his office. That the ministers should be members of the Convention was most desirable; but the Jacobins felt that to consent to this motion would be merely to strengthen the hands of the Girondin party; and accordingly, after a violent debate, in which Buzot moved, as an amendment, that provisionally at least Roland might continue to hold his office, the breach was made more decided by Danton's remark, that if Roland was allowed to be a member of the Convention, Madame Roland had better be admitted also. The Girondins, disgusted at their defeat which followed, then moved by the mouth of Kersaint, one of their adherents, that an inquiry should be made as to who were guilty of the massacres of September, and that the authors should be punished; and Buzot followed with a motion, that since the Convention could not be free in such a city of assassins as Paris, a guard should be supplied

to it elected from the eighty-three departments. On this motion the Jacobins declared that the Girondins wished to split France up into a federal republic; and for the first time was heard against them the accusation which was the immediate cause of their overthrow. They attacked Paris, violently; but the opinion of the deputies of the Plain was against them, for, as Danton remarked, if it had not been for Paris the Revolution would not have taken place at all, and the idea of a Constitutionalist or Federalist Guard, or whatever it might be called, was abandoned, and a motion was carried by Robespierre that the Republic should be for ever one and indivisible. After the failure of their attack on Paris, the Girondins next accused the Jacobins of wishing to establish a dictatorship. Robespierre and Danton indignantly denied that they had ever supported anything of the sort, and declared that they did not wish for a dictator, which was perhaps untrue. But Marat openly confessed that he had proposed in his journal the establishment of a dictatorship, and added that Robespierre and Danton had opposed his idea both in speech and writing. Marat concluded by urging that the deputies should not waste precious time in attacking each other, but should agree to discuss the state of the country. His appeal was not heard, and he was violently attacked as the author of the massacres of September; and a decree of accusation would probably have followed, but for a theatrical movement of the "Ami du Peuple," who threatened to blow out his brains in the tribune if it were carried. The Jacobins had their revenge in their own club, which had now changed its title from the "Amis de la Constitution" to that of the "Amis de la Liberté et de l'Égalité," and they expelled Brissot from their body for abusing Robespierre and their other leaders. From the very first days of the Convention an irreparable breach had thus been made between the parties in the assembly, and accusations of dictatorship and federalism had been freely exchanged between the leading deputies, which were to bear their fruit afterwards.

The Girondins were not content with attacking the

Jacobins in the Convention, but also organized all their strength in Paris and the provinces against them. Pétion was re-elected mayor of Paris, but refused to take office in order to retain his seat as deputy. The man who was elected in his stead, Chambon, was an individual of very little weight, who desired to destroy the power of the Commune of Paris, and was ready to be an obedient servant to Roland and the Girondins. In the ministry the Girondins believed that they had permanently established their influence. Roland was their tower of strength, and he freely spent the money of the country in circulating Girondin pamphlets and journals throughout the army and throughout France, under the pretext that he was thus enlightening the minds of the soldiers and the people on what was passing in Paris. Clavière was his intimate friend; Pache, who had succeeded Servan as Minister of War, and who had held many important administrative posts under the "ancien régime," had been brought into office on the express recommendation of Roland himself; and of the other ministers, Lebrun, who now had charge of foreign affairs, was also allied with the Girondin party; while Monge and Garat, who were Ministers of Marine and Justice, studiously kept aloof from all parties alike.

Monge's career had been a strange one, and it was to have a strange end, for he was to die a count of the Empire. Gaspard Monge¹ was the son of a tinker and pedlar, and was born at Beaune, in 1746. His mathematical genius was soon perceived by the Oratorians of the college at Beaune, who educated him, and at the age of sixteen he was appointed professor of physics at the seminary of Lyons. His extraordinary ability procured him powerful patrons, and he was appointed teacher, and, in 1768, professor, of mathematics at the training college for the royal corps of engineers at Mézières. Here he remained for twelve years, and made himself a European reputation by his discovery and development of descriptive geometry, and in 1777 he married a wealthy widow, Madame Herbin de Rocroy. In 1780 a new

¹ *Portraits scientifiques*, by Étienne Arago, vol. i.: 1849.

professorship of hydraulics at the University of Paris was created especially for him, and he was elected to the Academy of Sciences. He then lived in the capital, where he became intimate with all the chief men of science, and especially with Condorcet. In 1790 he was appointed a commissioner for drawing up the decimal system, and he became a constant attendant at the Cordeliers' Club, where, though no great orator, Danton and his friends had a pride in pointing out to the people of Paris what could be done by one of themselves who had been the son of a tinker, and who now, by his works on mathematics and mechanics, had raised himself into European reputation as a learned savant. Like most men of science of the time, Monge was an advanced republican in opinions, and he showed his republicanism in the austerity of his life, which was always very simple and frugal. Through the influence of Danton and Condorcet, he had been elected Minister of Marine on August 10, and he still remained in office when the Convention met. Personally inoffensive, he had no enemies, and all republicans were proud to regard him as a creditable representative of the lower classes of France. As no one disliked him, no attempt was made to turn him out of office; but at the same time he steadily refused all overtures to identify himself with the Girondin party, and occupied himself solely with the work of his office.

More important was the position and character of Garat, who had been elected Minister of Justice by the Convention. Dominique Joseph Garat was the son of a doctor at Bayonne, and was born there in 1749. He became an avocat at Bordeaux, but, having no taste for the law, started for Paris with a tragedy in his pocket, and Panckoucke the publisher introduced him to the literary society of the day. He made the acquaintance of Rousseau, D'Alembert, Diderot, and the other leaders of French literature. He won prizes at the Academy for éloges in 1779, in 1781, and 1784, and wrote in the literary *Journal de Paris*.¹ He was appointed professor of history at the Lycée in 1786, and his lectures soon became

¹ *Mémoires de Garat*, edited by L. H. Carnot. 2 vols. Paris: 1833.

very popular. His eloquence made him the fashionable lecturer of the day, and the Lycée was always crowded on his Tuesdays and Fridays. In 1789 he was elected deputy to the States-General for the tiers-état of the little bailliage of Labour, which was proud of its distinguished representative in Paris society. Garat did little in the Constituent Assembly but vehemently oppose the union of Navarre with France, and its being turned into a department. Yet, though he made no particular mark, he spoke a very great deal, and on the dissolution of the Assembly he continued his popular history lectures. Well known to every one in Paris as an eloquent speaker, and a delightful man who was offensive to no one, but friendly to everybody, he was elected Minister of Justice on September 25, 1792, in the place of Danton. He held in the ministry much the same place that the deputies of the Plain held in the Convention. He allied himself with neither Girondins nor Jacobins, and tried to watch the course of events, and to make himself agreeable to the party in power, whichever it was. His fluent speeches made him an acceptable minister to the Convention, where his kindness of heart prevented him from having any real enemies.

It will be seen, then, that the Girondins were practically supreme in the ministry, and there was good cause for the satire of the Jacobins, who declared that the ministerial measures were hatched in the salon of Madame Roland. Her influence had become very great, and she was as violently attacked by the Jacobins as Marie Antoinette had been. She had none of the proud serenity of the queen, and hated with a deadly hatred the enemies who made sarcastic allusions to her in the Convention, like Danton, or who abused her in the journals, like Hébert. Her drawing-room became a fashionable meeting-place for the Girondin leaders, and there it was that plans were laid for the campaigns against the Jacobins in the Convention and in the provinces. But even in her salon appeared the division between the Girondins which has been mentioned. Brissot was too self-important ever to be a real favourite with her, while Buzot was

her accepted lover. At her house, therefore, met the section of the Girondins who are called Buzotins. Her charm of manner and republican enthusiasm excited such young men as Barbaroux, Louvet, and Boyer-Fonfrède to take up the cudgels in her cause, and back up Buzot with all their might. Occasionally Vergniaud was to be seen there, brought in by his intimate friend Boyer-Fonfrède; but before many days had passed, Brissot, Guadet, and Gensonné became conspicuous by their absence, and the internal schism between the Girondins in the Convention became more marked in Madame Roland's drawing-room. Besides deputies, young journalists and authors were always assiduous at her salon; for did not Roland spend thousands of francs in buying journals and distributing them throughout the provinces and the armies? Here were composed Girondin articles, and attacks upon the Jacobin leaders, especially on Robespierre. The chief journalists of the party all met there, notably Gorsas, the editor of the *Courrier*; Mercier and Carra, the editors of the *Annales Patriotiques*, who themselves were deputies; Louvet, of the *Sentinelle*; and Louchet, who devoted his life to attacks upon Marat. These were the chief Girondin journalists, and it will have to be seen how far Roland might count upon their influence with the army and the provinces when the Girondins made their last despairing appeal against Paris.

There was no such meeting-place as Madame Roland's salon for the Jacobins; their headquarters was the Jacobin Club. Here it was that they attacked the Girondins even more violently than in the Convention, and exhorted the members of the club to watch carefully their future proceedings, to see that they did not turn "contre-révolutionnaires." But they too did not neglect the influence of journalism, and though their greatest writer, Camille Desmoulins, was silent, they had two important papers with immense influence and a large circulation to support their views. These two papers were Marat's *Journal de la République*, and Hébert's *Père Duchesne*. Marat's appropriation of the royal type has been noticed, and with it he established a new journal in the place

of the old *Ami du Peuple*. It preached the same doctrines—suspicion and vengeance—and preached them to great effect both in Paris and the provinces. And however enthusiastically Louvet and his friends might write of freedom and liberty, they never attained the influence over the populace of France which Marat had won from his sufferings.

The *Père Duchesne* was a journal of a different type. Notice has been taken of the obscene and filthy language which the royalists used in their journals in 1790. The *Actes des Apôtres* has been described as the most filthy as well as the most witty of these journals¹; and the royalist writers and pamphleteers upon its staff invented the character of an old man, called by them Father Duchesne, who was supposed to represent the opinion of the Parisian sans-culottes, and to use the language of the gutter and the stable. A member of the Cordeliers club named Jacques René Hébert, who had been money-taker at the Théâtre des Variétés from 1786 to 1788, perceived that the sans-culottes of Paris often bought the *Actes des Apôtres*, and greatly enjoyed the filthy language it contained, though they did not sympathize with its political doctrines; and he bethought him that a journal of the same common type, but professing advanced principles, would be an enormous success. In 1790 he started his *Père Duchesne*, which was not a journal, properly speaking but a series of pamphlets, with such titles as the "Grande Joie du Père Duchesne," or the "Grande Colère du Père Duchesne," at any particular event,² and it soon made him a power in Paris. It has the grossness without the wit of the *Actes des Apôtres*, and Hébert revels in filthy allusions and filthy words whenever he can introduce them. The sans-culottes of Paris greatly enjoyed this language, and men of better education thought they were proving themselves good sans-culottes if they laughed over *Père Duchesne* as much as if they wore loose trousers and a red cap. Filthily abusive as he was in his journal, Hébert was not without

¹ Vol. i. pp. 260, 261.

² *Le Père Duchesne d'Hébert, une Notice historique et bibliographique sur ce journal*, by Charles Brunet. Paris: 1859.

some redeeming qualities. He possessed Marat's quick perception of a traitor, and was as ready to hound down a "contre-révolutionnaire" as Marat himself. Throughout the year 1792 this journal had largely circulated among the sans-culottes of Paris, and Hébert was determined to make use of his popularity to obtain some practical advantage for himself. He therefore offered himself, in the October of 1792, on the re-election of the various municipal officers of Paris, for the office of procureur of the Commune, and though he was beaten by Chaumette, he was elected substitute. What his views then became, and the attitude he assumed in the Commune, will have to be noticed later, as well as his struggle with Robespierre; but at present it is enough to note that with the establishment of the Republic sans-culottism became more and more popular. Certainly Robespierre and Danton and Camille Desmoulins never stooped to lower themselves to the level of the uneducated, but there were many advanced Jacobins who were quite ready to degrade themselves to obtain political importance and popularity. The work of Hébert as a serious politician is not now the question; but there can be no doubt that at this time his obscene paper had great influence in counteracting the influence of the Girondin journals in Paris, and it is a fact that the sale of the *Père Duchesne* exceeded that of all the other journals of Paris in the November of 1792. Notice should also be taken of the continuance of Fréron's paper, the *Orateur du Peuple*, and of Tallien's *Ami des Citoyens*, by means of which they kept themselves before the public, though they did not have a large circulation or very much influence.

In the midst of this violent political strife, Paris remained as gay as ever. As there were no noble ladies left to open salons, this was the time for adventuresses; and as gay company as ever assembled in the salons of the Marquise de Chambonas, or Madame de Broglie, if not as high born, would meet at the houses of Madame de Sainte-Amaranthe and Olympe de Gouges. These two ladies were pure adventuresses. Madame de Sainte-Amaranthe was the widow of a nobleman and officer in the army, and, with her daughters,

had to live in Paris as best she could on a small pension. Even in the early days of the Revolution her house had become celebrated from her own beauty and that of her daughters. But it was necessary that its frequenters should pay for the maintenance of the house by gambling freely at its card-tables.¹ Olympe de Gouges was an uneducated woman, unable either to read or write, who had been left a large fortune by her husband, a rich planter of San Domingo. As she could not write, she used to dictate plays, some of which were acted at the Théâtre de la Nation, and even had a certain success. As she had money enough to entertain well, her house was always full of company, and much gaiety was always to be found there. This gaiety of heart seemed natural to the Frenchmen who were living at this critical period of the Revolution. Never were the gambling-houses of Paris more crowded, or the restaurant-keepers making larger fortunes. Large sums of money were made every day by speculating in assignats; and when money is easily made in large quantities it is as easily and lavishly spent, so that Paris was in a fever of social as well as of political excitement.

Joyfully had every political party, every journal, every social circle, and every knot of tavern-frequenters received the news of Dumouriez' victory at Valmy, and the greater news of the retreat of the Prussians back from France; and amidst the noisy delight of all classes, some men, such as Marat, declared that Dumouriez was getting too popular, and must be watched lest he should now betray the people, while the Girondins readily forgave his desertion of their ministry in the June of 1792, since they now hoped that his victory would bring their political projects success. The minds of all classes in the provinces as well as in Paris were turned to Dumouriez and his army. Would he march on Paris as Lafayette had threatened? Would he attempt to restore the monarchy? Could he? He was the general of a successful army, and popular with his troops; he had freed France from invasion,

¹ See *Les femmes célèbres de 1789 à 1795 et leur influence sur la Révolution*, by S. Lairtullier. 2 vols. Paris: 1840.

and had thus far more power than Lafayette had ever had to enforce his wishes as to the form of government. Dumouriez and the army was the one topic of conversation in the capital in the beginning of October, 1792; and with mingled feelings was the news received on October 12 that the successful general had arrived in Paris. The principal Girondins prepared to crown him with honours, and to persuade him to add the power of his soldiers to the strength of their eloquence. But the army of Dumouriez and its victories deserve a minute examination, for that army more truly represented the opinion of France than all the journalists of Paris put together. To the frontiers had rushed all the brave young men of France: nobles to escape proscription; bourgeois to save their families from ruin; students from love of fighting and love of France; strong men from shame that the soil of France should be trodden by an invader. These were the men who were to save the Republic if the Convention founded and watched over it; and great as is the credit that many of the deputies to the Convention deserve for their labours in Paris and the provinces, still greater should be the honour paid by all France to the brave men who, with but little training and little discipline and inferior weapons, had yet driven the redoubtable Prussian army of Frederick the Great, flushed with its successes in many wars, headlong across the French frontier.

CHAPTER VI.

THE COUNTRY IN DANGER.

Attitude of the sovereigns and princes in Germany—The invasion of France—Dumouriez takes up a position in the defiles of the Argonne—The advance of the Prussians—The cannonade of Valmy and retreat of the Prussians—Negotiations of Dumouriez with the Prussians—The Austrians besiege Lille—The army of the Rhine—Biron—Custine—Custine invades Germany—Occupation of Savoy—Occupation of Nice—Composition of the army—Result of the *levée en masse*—Existence of patriotic not military spirit in the army—Dumouriez in Paris—Dumouriez invades Belgium, and wins the victory of Jemmappes—Opening of the Scheldt—Mistakes and bad policy of the Girondins.

THE history of the Girondin policy which led to the declaration of war on April 20 has been carefully examined,¹ and it is now necessary to see what was the disposition of the German princes against whom that war was levied. Since the year 1791 the little courts of the ecclesiastical electors of Mayence, Trèves, and Cologne had been crowded with French émigrés. They had applied for assistance to every crowned head in Europe, but had only met with a warm reception from these petty German princelings, and from the court of Turin. In England it was a long time before the sympathies of the people could be roused against the French, who were believed to be only working out their own liberty; and this sentiment was shared alike by king, ministers, and people, and the notes of warning sounded by Burke were only listened to at first by the landowners, who thought the contagion of French influence dangerous. Gustavus III., King of Sweden, had,

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 32, 44, 45, 51, 62, 63.

however, with the chivalry which had been inspired into him by his friend Count Fersen, been very desirous of making open war on France, and the Empress Catherine appeared equally zealous, but her zeal was directed by the hope that a European war would give her time to mature her designs against Poland. Both by Austria and Prussia the émigrés had been very badly received. Leopold, as has been said, approved of reform, but he was too true a believer in monarchy to sympathize with the schemes of the French princes who openly declared that Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, should be recognized as regent of France, or else the Comte d'Artois as lieutenant-general of the kingdom. It has been noticed that, after the conference at Pilnitz, the Emperor Leopold and Frederick William, King of Prussia, had decided to watch the progress of affairs in France, and only to act in harmony with each other. But by the beginning of 1792 a great change had come over the situation in Germany. The near approach of war, and the unanimity of the people of France against the émigrés, frightened the German princelings; the Electors of Trèves and Mayence requested their noisy guests to leave their territories, and the Elector of Cologne would have done the same had he had sufficient force to compel the émigrés to abandon their headquarters at Coblenz.

As the ardour of the smaller princes on the Rhine began to diminish, that of the two great German potentates began to increase. Leopold still had no desire for war, but he did not intend to be dictated to by the French Girondin ministry, or to lose the opportunity afforded him of becoming the genuine representative of German feeling. Frederick William had been equally disgusted by the arrogance of the new French ministry, and when war was actually declared on April 20 he announced his intention of helping Francis, the young king of Hungary and Bohemia, and nephew of the late Emperor Leopold, with all his might. Though both sovereigns were ready to act at once, their ministers spent a long time in negotiating on what terms the Prussian and Austrian armies should act altogether. Prussia insisted that she should receive

compensation, either in Poland or in France, for the services of her army; while Austria was very unwilling that Prussia should obtain any additional strength without herself gaining proportionate advantages. When war had once been declared, King Frederick William of Prussia ordered the Duke of Brunswick, who had made his name in war as a general of division under his famous uncle Prince Ferdinand, at Minden and Crefeld, to draw up a plan of campaign, and requested him to take the chief command of the Prussian army. Both monarchs ordered their troops to the French frontier, but made no decisive advance for many months. How Biron unsuccessfully invaded Belgium with the leading division of Rochambeau's army, how Theobald Dillon was murdered and Lafayette forced to retreat, has been noticed,¹ but no attempt was made for some time to drive Biron out of the frontier villages of Belgium which he had occupied. During this state of uncertainty France was making every effort to reorganize her army, and Vergniaud was demanding a "levée en masse."

On July 14, 1792, the city of Frankfort was crowded with princes of Germany, for the coronation of the last of the Holy Roman Emperors. With all the old forms which had come down from the Middle Ages he was solemnly crowned, and the last coronation yielded to none of its predecessors in grandeur and symbolical magnificence. From Frankfort the young Emperor Francis proceeded to join King Frederick William of Prussia at Mayence,² where there were held a series of long and important negotiations, from July 18 to 22. Each monarch was attended by his foreign minister, and the negotiations between Cobenzl, the foreign minister of Austria, and Haugwitz, the foreign minister of Prussia, are of the highest interest. But they could come to no conclusion, and it was decided that the war should be begun without any exact determination being arrived at as to the compensation for Prussia or Austria. One point in the behaviour of the monarchs and their ministers deserves to be noticed, and that

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 77, 78.

² Vol. ii. p. 106.

is the utter contempt they showed for the émigrés. The Empress Catherine had recommended that the war should be waged under the nominal command of Monsieur, but neither the Emperor nor the King of Prussia was likely to take him into their plans; and the intrigues of the French princes were entirely frustrated by the emissary of Louis XVI., the Swiss journalist Mallet du Pan. He argued, on behalf of Louis XVI., against any recognition of the claims of Monsieur or of the Comte d'Artois, and earnestly begged that, since the war was to take place, no mention should be made of the internal state of France, but that it should be waged by the German princes simply on the ground of the frequent breaches of international law which the French Assemblies had committed.

Still more important were the military arrangements made at Mayence. The King of Prussia insisted that the whole Prussian army of 42,000 men should be kept together to invade France by the route of Longwy and Stenay. The Prussian soldiers were to be supported on their left by 20,000 Austrians and 8000 émigrés, who were directed to besiege Metz and Thionville. The bulk of the émigrés under Condé, who were regarded as very useless soldiers, were to invade Montbéliard on their own account, and were then to turn into Burgundy. On the Meuse the Prussians were to be joined by an Austrian corps under General Clerfayt, which was to come down the course of that river from Belgium, and then the two armies together were to march upon Paris. Previous to ordering the advance, the Duke of Brunswick issued the proclamation of which the effects at Paris were to be so terrible. Even then the Prussian army waited yet another fortnight or three weeks before it commenced the invasion, for the Austrians who were to support came up very slowly. At last the frontier was crossed on August 19, not until after the minds of Frenchmen were thoroughly aroused to the peril they were in, and when the chance of making an immediate unopposed advance upon Paris was gone. Longwy fell on August 23, Verdun on September 2, and the advance of the Prussians seemed likely to be entirely successful. But as yet there was

no sign of the corresponding invasion of the Austrians from Belgium, and the Austrian army upon the left was far behind.

What was the position and character of the French army which was to oppose this Prussian invasion? Even before the fall of Longwy, Dumouriez had been appointed commander-in-chief of Lafayette's former army, and had been given power to concentrate troops from other quarters. The Army of the North, in the command of which Lückner had succeeded Rochambeau, was greatly disorganized, so that Dumouriez saw that it was quite impossible to hold the usual lines of defence and resolved at once to fall back behind the Meuse. The Prussian advance was so speedy that he determined to fall back yet further, and to take up his position, with thirteen thousand men, in the defiles of the mountains of the Argonne. Here he had time to summon to him the advanced guard of Lückner's army, consisting of seven thousand men under the command of Arthur Dillon, the ex-Constituant and former Governor of Tobago; while from the Army of the Rhine he ordered up a reinforcement of its best troops under the command of General Kellermann. The defiles of the Argonne were not a tempting position for a general to take up. There were many passes which could be easily forced, and it might have seemed that Dumouriez would have been more wise to hold the line of the Meuse; but he took his decision on true military principles; and though the line of the Argonne was longer and more difficult to hold, his retreat to that position gave him time to wait for the junction of Arthur Dillon and Kellermann, and also to call back his own most advanced division under General Beurnonville. Further, he had time to be joined by an important force under General Duval. This division only consisted of six thousand men, but it was formed entirely of old soldiers who had been drawn from the various garrisons in Brittany and Normandy, and it therefore presented a very different appearance to the volunteers or the national guards, and was better armed, equipped and disciplined. It will be remembered that, on the motion of Vergniaud, thirty thousand national guards were ordered to the frontier,

and also that these men, as well as the fédérés, were to concentrate on the great camp at Maubeuge. Dumouriez changed the place of meeting, and concentrated them at Châlons-sur-Marne, with the crowd of volunteers who had enlisted at the cry of "The country in danger!" It cannot be said that these men were of much fighting value, but their very numbers made them formidable, and Dumouriez reported he was often joined by as many as eighteen hundred in a single day. With all these reinforcements, he was able to calculate that, by the time the Prussians, even if they did not delay to besiege the frontier fortresses, could arrive in front of his position, he would have sixty thousand men to meet their forty-two thousand. There was a further consideration which made Dumouriez prefer the position of the Argonne to defending the line of the Meuse. He certainly would in the latter case have had the great fortresses of Metz, Thionville and Verdun along the Meuse, on which to fall back, whereas there were no fortresses in the Argonne; but there had been so much rain that the defiles, though numerous and not difficult, were almost impassable from mud.

The Prussian army had suffered severely from bad weather.¹ It was wasted with disease, largely caused by eating the unripe grapes of Champagne, and weakened by the detachments which were left to besiege the various fortresses. Further, it had not been joined by the Austrian army, and the Austrians from Belgium gave no sign of motion. The Duke of Brunswick moved forward with a heavy heart, and hardly attempted to force the mountain passes at all. Yet this would have been no difficult matter for a daring general, even in spite of the mud, for wherever the French armies were met with they were immediately routed. The most important engagement of this sort was when General Chazot, the commander of ten thousand men, was driven from his ad-

¹ See Goethe's account of this campaign, at which he was present, and a very rare and valuable little book, *The History of the Campaign of 1792*, by J. Money, Maréchal de Camp in the service of Louis Sixteenth, pp. 90, 104, 150-154. London: 1794.

vanced position by three Prussian cavalry regiments. Dumouriez' own headquarters were close to the little town of Sainte Menehould, which had played so important a part in the flight to Varennes, and there he waited for the arrival of Arthur Dillon and Kellermann. Detached parties of Prussians successfully forced their way through various passes; but Dumouriez was not affected by this, for he knew that, owing to the bad weather, artillery could only be moved along the great high road by Châlons and Rheims. The Duke of Brunswick, after hesitating for several days, and receiving the news of the fall of Verdun, at last attempted to force his way along this road; but Kellermann had by this time advanced from Alsace, and taken up his position at the little village of Valmy, on the left bank of the Aure, with 16,000 men.

The battle of Valmy on September 20 has been more correctly called the cannonade of Valmy, for the whole engagement consisted of an advance of the Prussians in the early morning against the French position, and of a well-sustained fire of the French artillery, which caused the assailants to fall back along the high road. No one except Dumouriez believed for one moment that this repulse would cause the retreat of the whole Prussian army; and any other general but the Duke of Brunswick might have again attempted to force the high road, and would probably have succeeded. But the duke was disgusted with the whole progress of the war. He considered it bad military policy to leave fortresses untaken in his rear. He had been greatly mortified by the non-arrival of the Austrian troops, and particularly hurt by the violence of the reproaches which the King of Prussia daily hurled upon him for not at once seizing Paris. In addition to this he was in bad health, and told the King of Prussia plainly that if the Prussian army was not at once led back, it would soon be entirely annihilated by disease. This was most unwelcome news for the king; but his own eyes convinced him that Brunswick had not exaggerated, when he saw that the one day of the cannonade of Valmy made the whole Prussian army slowly retreat from Champagne. As he retreated the Prussian

general raised the sieges he had formed, of which the most important was that of Thionville, which had been invested by a body of émigrés, one of whom, the young Vicomte de Chateaubriand, carried in his knapsack the manuscript of "Atala."¹ The Duke of Brunswick was allowed to retreat in peace. Dumouriez, who did not entirely trust his soldiers in spite of their being flushed with victory, followed him but slowly, and allowed the Prussian army to recross the frontier to Luxembourg without molestation. Dumouriez was undoubtedly wise to allow his enemy to retreat undisturbed, for his army was as yet by no means disciplined, and the Prussians gathered strength as they retired; but of course his permitting them to do so was at once construed into treachery in the opinion of his enemies in Paris.

The only ostensible ground he had given for such an accusation was by his ordinary military intercourse with the Duke of Brunswick. Arrangements had been made, as they always are made between generals of opposing armies in civilized warfare, for the exchange of prisoners; but this ordinary military courtesy was accompanied by secret negotiations, carried on between Westermann, the friend of Danton, on behalf of Dumouriez, and Lombard and Colonel Manstein for the King of Prussia, which ended in Dumouriez promising not to press the Prussians too hard and to allow them to retreat in safety.² Dumouriez was in this actuated by the favourite idea of the French statesmen who made a study of foreign affairs at this time. As early as the January of 1792, both Feuillants and Girondins had hoped to separate the interest of Prussia from that of Austria, and to make Prussia the ally of France, and for this purpose the Comte de Ségur had been sent to Berlin. This idea Dumouriez had learnt from Favier,³ the great opponent of the Austrian alliance which had been formed

¹ For Chateaubriand's experiences see the *Mémoires d'outre-tombe*, vol. iii.

² See the second article on *Un soldat diplomate de la Révolution*; Dumouriez, by Albert Sorel, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for August 1, 1884.

³ *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, by Albert Sorel. Paris: 1885.

by Madame de Pompadour and strengthened by the marriage of Marie Antoinette, and was the same which was carried into effect in the treaty of Bâle in 1795, when Siéyès and Merlin of Douai succeeded in inducing the Committee of Public Safety to sign a treaty of peace with Prussia. On hearing of the accusations brought against him in the clubs of Paris, though he knew that the council of ministers under Girondin influence approved of his negotiations, Dumouriez, with all the éclat of a victorious general, suddenly returned to Paris, and appeared at the bar of the Convention on October 12—an appearance which reminded some of Lafayette's sudden visit in the month of June, and which was believed by many to foreshadow an attempt at military dictatorship.

Along the frontier the war went in favour of France and the Republic. The junction of Arthur Dillon's division with Dumouriez had nearly destroyed the Army of the North, for the troops of the former divisions of Theobald Dillon and Biron were completely disorganized, and Dumouriez had paid no attention to the northern frontier, for he knew that the critical point was to defeat the Prussians, and he hoped that an unprotected frontier would attract the Austrians to make conquests in French Flanders instead of advancing down the Meuse to join the Duke of Brunswick. In this he judged correctly. Albert of Saxe-Teschen, on some insignificant excuse, proceeded to invest the great city of Lille instead of marching on. But Lille was full of French enthusiasm, and its defence may be looked upon as one of the most interesting as well as the most glorious phases of the first months of the war. The radical tendency of the city had appeared in the disputes between the cavalry and infantry regiments in its garrison in the spring of 1790,¹ when most of the soldiers had fraternized with the people. Lille was then, as now, a great manufacturing city, and, as was the case at Lyons, there had been much distress among the poorer classes. The introduction of assignats had given a seeming aspect of prosperity, but by the autumn of 1792 real distress threatened the inhabitants of

¹ Vol. i. chap. xiii. p. 388.

Lille. At this juncture the municipality behaved with the utmost patriotism. Instead of opposing the ouvriers, as might have been the case in a more inland town, all classes united to prepare for the defence of the city. The bourgeois gave their money, the poor their services. The result of this unanimous enthusiasm was to keep the Austrians at bay; the defence of Lille became famous in republican France, and the city was declared "to have deserved well of the Republic."¹

Before the outbreak of the war, the Comte de Narbonne had announced to the Legislative Assembly that, in addition to the three great armies of Rochambeau, Lückner, and Lafayette, he had established two armies of observation in Franche-Comté and in Provence, under the command of Generals Montesquiou and Anselme, the operations of which were most important, but cannot compare in interest with those of the Army of the Rhine. General Biron, who was believed to have conducted the operations in Belgium in the summer with ability, though without great success, had succeeded Marshal Lückner in the command of this army in July, 1792, and a second in command to him was appointed in the person of General Custine. Generals Biron and Custine were both nobles and officers of the "ancien régime," who had served in America, and had both sat in the Constituent Assembly. Biron was then known by his title of the Duc de Lauzun, and had been famous in his younger days as the intimate friend of the Duke of Orleans. He had followed that prince's admiration of English customs, and had been a great supporter of English horse-racing, and the chief employer of English jockeys. But while enjoying himself as a frivolous man of pleasure and a debauchee, he was nevertheless the friend and boon companion of the Marquis de Sillery, a man of considerable ability. In 1789 he earnestly hoped that events would call the Duke of Orleans, if not to the throne, at least to the lieutenant-generalship of the kingdom, and that he would then obtain an important military command. His

¹ *Les Sept Sièges de Lille*, by Brun-Lavainne and Elie Brun, pp. 457-476, Lille, 1838; Derode's *Histoire de Lille*, vol. iii.

ambition led him to desire military advancement rather than ministerial office. He had shown himself a brave soldier in the American war, and an admirable colonel of his regiment, the famous Hussars of Lauzun, which was considered, before 1789, the finest cavalry regiment in the French service. It had been greatly disorganized by the emigration of its officers, and when in 1791, at the close of the Constituent Assembly, the Duc de Lauzun, now known simply as General Biron, had returned to his regiment, he had disciplined it on a new principle, by promoting as officers many of those whom old prejudice would have kept in the ranks. His well-known sympathy with the new order of things had secured him the command of the first division of Rochambeau's army in the spring of 1792, and now, as has been said, he succeeded Lückner in the command of the Army of the Rhine. But the Revolution had now gone too far for him. Though he accepted the Republic he did not like it, and had no toleration for the rapid promotion of Dumouriez to the command-in-chief. These feelings made him throw obstacles in the way of Kellermann's advance to join Dumouriez, and discouraged his second in command, Custine, from attempting the bold enterprise which he meditated.

General Custine had been known before the abolition of titles as the Marquis de Custine, and had sat with his friend Biron in the Constituent Assembly. He, too, had distinguished himself in the American war, and had been chosen by the Girondin ministry, in May, 1792, for a command in Lückner's army. He was a fierce swaggering man, with a great deal of ambition and a great deal of enterprise, and willingly recognized the Republic when he saw a chance of gaining advancement through it. From the moment he joined the Army of the Rhine he showed a desire to push the war into the enemy's country, and hoped, if successful, to supersede Biron, who had remained quietly in his camp at Wissembourg when the Prussians invaded France, and, to Custine's intense disgust, showed no desire to leave his encampment even to engage the bands of émigrés who were bursting across the Rhine, and pretending to besiege Phalsbourg

Accident made Custine's ideas known, and Servan sent orders to Biron to allow his subordinate to make an advance into Germany with a force to be called the Army of the Vosges.

Custine then selected a division of regular infantry, a division of cavalry, and a battalion of the best volunteers of Alsace; and with them he crossed the Rhine, and drove the war into the enemy's country. The German princelings whose territories he entered were quite unable to make any resistance. The old episcopal city of Spire surrendered on September 23, and the gates of Worms were opened on the following day, by friends in the city. Custine at once announced that the French soldiery came to bring liberty to the inhabitants and freedom from the oppression of their feudal lords, the Bishops of Spire and Worms; and he further showed his disposition by inflicting a fine and war contribution on the cities, of 600,000 and 1,200,000 francs respectively, half of which sums were to be paid by the bishops, and the other half by the municipalities. The Alsatian volunteers whom he had brought with him, and who spoke German, soon made friends with the inhabitants of the towns, and the advance of the French army was followed in both cities by the establishment of a revolutionary municipality, and frequently by the sacking of the houses of the rich bourgeois by the poorer inhabitants and the French volunteers together. When the money Custine had exacted arrived in Paris, nothing but applause for his gallant dash into the enemy's country was heard, both in the Jacobins' and the Convention, but he was not yet made commander-in-chief of the Army of the Rhine in the place of Biron. Custine was not satisfied with these bloodless conquests, and hoped to seize a yet more important place. This was Mayence, one of the strongest fortresses on the Rhine, and the capital of the elector-archbishops. The city had been quite emptied of troops after the congress of the German princes there in the previous July, for it was supposed by them that there was no fear of the French daring to invade Germany, and that, if they did, the strong walls of Mayence and the elector's own troops could

sufficiently defend it. But Custine knew that in Mayence, as in Worms and Spire, he had secret allies.

The progress of the French Revolution had been watched with great interest by the German States along the Rhine, and a keen desire had manifested itself among their populations to gain the liberty which the French had won. This revolutionary movement was skilfully encouraged in all the Rhenish states by means of lodges of freemasons. Freemasonry in Germany had always been connected with political objects, and the German and the French freemasons had both long been dreaming of some such event as the French Revolution. In Germany secret societies have always been popular. They seem to suit the genius of the nation, and they formed a bond of union between the inhabitants of the innumerable little states which then divided Western Germany. These lodges were always under the leadership of men of education, and in Mayence the worshipful master, named Gottlieb, was one of the professors of the university. They had spread abroad in these small states a number of pamphlets, dwelling on the advantages of the French Revolution, and stirring the people up to a similar movement. Most of the princelings had been afraid to take strong measures against this movement, with the notable exception of the Landgrave William of Hesse, who was one of the ablest princes of his day. In the states of the episcopal princes the movement had reached a considerable height, and it was on account of the repeated invitations to General Custine, himself a freemason, from the lodges of Western Germany, that he had made his bold incursion. It has been noticed that the gates of Worms and Spire were opened from within to admit the French troops, and Custine hoped that the same thing would happen at Mayence. He therefore made no hostile demonstration against the fortress, but occupied himself in reducing the little towns round about until the freemasons' lodge had had time to prepare the way; and meanwhile he avoided hurting German feeling, and called himself the liberator of the German people. News came to him in good time that Mayence was ready to be delivered

over to him, and, on October 20, he entered one of the strongest fortresses of Germany without striking a blow. He at once levied a heavy fine on the wealthy bourgeois, and seized all the money in the elector's treasury; and then sent a division to the undefended free city of Frankfort, and levied a further contribution on the wealthy merchants there. His flying division even reached as far as Cassel, which made the Landgrave of Hesse detach his compact and well-disciplined army from the Prussian invaders, and greatly weaken the Duke of Brunswick.¹ So long as no attempt was made to outrage German feelings the French invasion was entirely successful, and it was Custine's success which gave the Convention the idea of their famous decree of November 18, by which the French nation declared it was fighting a war to free all peoples from all kings.

Equally successful were the operations of General Montesquiou and General Anselme. General Montesquiou was the same Marquis de Montesquiou who had been reporter of the financial committee in the Constituent Assembly,² and just as Biron had been urged on by the more advanced opinions and ambition of Custine, so Montesquiou found an inducement to act with vigour from the openly professed desire of Prince Charles of Hesse, who called himself Citizen Hesse, and commanded the forces at Lyons, to supersede himself. Even before August 10 the Prince of Hesse had declared his intention to accuse Montesquiou before the Jacobin Club for neglecting his duty; and under the influence of this threat with some reluctance the general crossed the Italian frontier into Savoy. There again, as had happened in Western Germany, he found that the way had been made easy for him by the revolutionary ideas which had been learned from France, and which had been spread throughout Savoy by a secret association which held its meetings at Chambéry. The Savoyards had

¹ *Mémoires posthumes du général Comte de Custine, rédigés par L. B. Hamburg*: 1794. L. B. was Louis Baraguay d'Hilliers, afterwards one of Napoleon's generals, and chief of Custine's staff.

² See vol. i. chap. xii. pp. 364, 365.

many reasons to dislike being annexed to Piedmont. They spoke a different language, and came of a different race. In every way Savoy was subordinated to Piedmont, and to become a barrister at Chambéry it was necessary to take a law degree at Turin. The feeling of sympathy with the French Revolution manifested itself in the hatred shown by the people towards the émigrés, who flocked to Chambéry; and, for example, they would not allow the curé of Confians to ring the church bells in honour of the arrival of the Archbishop of Paris. Still more serious had been the riot at Thonon, after which several young men were condemned to death as rebels, all of whom escaped to Paris, and laboured there to secure the union of Savoy with France.¹ The country therefore was ready to receive the French army with enthusiasm, and the Piedmontese troops, perceiving that the feeling of the Savoyards was against them, withdrew across the frontier, and established themselves in the mountains.

Montesquiou entered Chambéry on September 25, and called a provincial assembly, which begged for union with France, and at their request four deputies of the Convention, Grégoire, Simond, Jagot, and Hérault de Sechelles, were sent to Chambéry to organize the new department of Mont-Blanc, as the eighty-fourth department of France. Montesquiou was next invited by the partisans of the revolutionary ideas to enter Switzerland. The German cantons were all governed on aristocratic principles, but Montesquiou feared to accept the invitation of the men who opposed cantonal government. Still more pressing was the invitation he received from the revolutionary party in Geneva. The important part which many Genevese exiles, notably Clavière, had played during the French Revolution shows how close was the sympathy between the revolutionary parties in France and in Geneva. But here, again, Montesquiou was afraid to accept the invitation, as it might involve France in yet another war. He therefore made a truce with the Republic of Geneva on October 23,

¹ *Les Savoisians dans les assemblées législatives de la Révolution.* by André Folliet, in *La Révolution française* for March, 1883, vol. vi. p. 799.

on which he was accused of intriguing with the enemies of France, and was recalled from his command.

The last successful invasion to be noticed is that of Nice. Here, again, revolutionary sentiments had been spread across the frontier, and the people, both of the city of Nice and of the country round, were as eager to obtain their separation from Piedmont as the Savoyards. General Anselme found among his troops a battalion of volunteers known as the first battalion of the volunteers of the Var, which had elected for its chef-de-bataillon André Masséna, the future marshal of France. Masséna had served for fourteen years in the regiment Royal-Italien, and had only retired on finding that he could get no promotion above the rank of adjutant sous-officier. It was in 1789 that he left the French service, and returned to his birthplace, Nice, where he set up a shop. But the progress of the French Revolution had excited his admiration, and in 1792 he again left his native city and enlisted among the volunteers of the Var. The volunteers always liked to elect old soldiers to be their officers, and André Masséna was at once elected chef-de-bataillon. He told General Anselme of his thorough knowledge of the country, and his belief that he could lead him into Nice without striking a blow. General Anselme gave him the command of a brigade, with which Masséna entered Nice, after having made a secret arrangement for the opening of the gates of the city with his friends and relatives within, and he soon occupied the whole province. At Masséna's suggestion the general issued a very diplomatic and democratic proclamation at Toulon, calling on the people of Nice to declare themselves republicans, and to be united to France; and they showed every inclination to comply. General Anselme's proclamation was approved of by the Jacobins at Paris, and the services of Masséna were recognized by his rapid promotion, first to the rank of general of brigade, and then, in December, 1792, to that of general of division.

The army which had accomplished such great things, which had not only driven back the Prussian invaders, but occupied the fortress of Mayence, and the provinces of Savoy and of

Nice, consisted of the most varied elements, all of very different degrees of efficiency. The disorganization of the old French army has been commented upon, and the decree of the Assembly for filling up the ranks of the officers, which had been weakened by the emigration, has also been noticed.¹ But the military committee of the Legislative Assembly had not done much more than just confirm the military reforms introduced by the Vicomte de Noailles and Dubois-Crancé. The idea of conscription had been rejected, and the army was still to be a distinct body from the rest of the nation, without an elaborate system of reserves or any territorial organization. The territorial idea had been one of the main points of Dubois-Crancé's scheme of reform. He had argued that regiments ought to be formed from districts, so that every soldier should know who his comrade was. The Constituent Assembly had not only refused to pass the measure, but had destroyed the existing territorial names. Thus not only did the Royal Dragoons become the first regiment of dragoons, and the Hussars of Berchiny become the 1st hussars, but the famous regiments of Auvergne and Berry were to be known for the future as the 47th and 54th regiments of the line.

The plans of the Legislative Assembly for obtaining officers had been fairly successful in bringing able men to the front. Thus, for instance, Murat and Bessières, who had been elected members of the king's Constitutional Guard for the department of the Lot, had been nominated sub-lieutenants of the first and fourteenth chasseurs respectively. But the difficulty was to find men, not officers. The old soldiers had largely deserted and returned to their own homes, where, under the influence of the sale of Church lands and the issue of assignats, work seemed to be plentiful and pay good, and until the outbreak of the war recruits were difficult if not impossible to find. Even the outbreak of the war itself had not fully recruited the ranks of the army, for reasons which will be presently noticed; and the generals of the armies on the frontiers had found it necessary to recognize that most of the regular regiments had not more than half their strength

¹ Vol. i. ch. xiii.

Dumouriez perceived this, and also the great value of the few regiments of old soldiers which he could obtain. With regard to the new soldiers who joined the army in such immense numbers, a great distinction must be drawn between the battalions of national guards sent to the frontier on Vergniaud's motion, the first volunteers, and the *levée en masse*.

The battalions of the National Guard had a very fair idea of military discipline, and, as has been repeatedly noticed, they had generally chosen for their officers old officers of the regular army, who had organized them on military principles. They had found the advantages of discipline in their engagements with the peasants and in maintaining the peace of the country, and having elected their own officers they were ready to trust them and obey them. It must be remembered also that they were drawn chiefly from the bourgeois class. The men owned their arms and uniforms, and did not require a high rate of pay. But as they did not require pay, they did require, like all unpaid soldiers, a great deal of consideration, and Dumouriez and the other generals often found them very difficult to deal with. They claimed not to be subject to martial law, and generally to be treated with much respect. Some of them became enamoured of a military life, and entered the ranks of the regular army, particularly young noblemen and gentlemen, the more since the fact of their being in the army secured not only themselves but their relatives from prosecution and suspicion; but, as a rule, the national guards were not often of great assistance in the military operations.

Far more important were the first battalions of volunteers. These contained many old soldiers, not only men who had left the army during the last two years owing to the disorganization of the regiments, but men who had served for many a long year as non-commissioned officers, such as Masséna and Jourdan, and thoroughly knew their work. These old soldiers were generally elected officers or instructors, and the battalions themselves consisted of young men who showed a far more military spirit than the national guards, and were far more enthusiastic for war and active service. They were armed

and equipped by the municipalities of their districts, and when they arrived at the head-quarters to which they were attached, they were always in good order, and generally fairly well disciplined. This was the material wanted to recruit the regular army, and Dumouriez very wisely brigaded two or three battalions of volunteers with one of the old regiments of the regular army. The effect of this arrangement was to improve the discipline of the army, and largely to increase its fighting efficiency; and a very short time sufficed to turn these volunteers into fine soldiers. There were not many volunteers who entered the regular army, for they regarded themselves as forming part of the regular army, even if they had only volunteered for one or two years; but Dumouriez' system of brigading opened the way for the great reform of Dubois-Crancé in the year 1794, when he abolished the regimental system, and divided the French army into demi-brigades of two thousand four hundred men, each containing four battalions of volunteers and one of regulars.

Last of all must be noticed the result of the *levée en masse*, which had been decreed in the last days of the Legislative Assembly, and still more recently by the Convention. Anything more useless than the material sent to Dumouriez under the *levée en masse* cannot be imagined. Unfortunate peasants armed with scythes and pitchforks were dragged from their fields, where they might have been of some use, and sent to the front, where they had to pillage for a living, and naturally ran away at the sight of an armed enemy. Not much better was the result of the *levée en masse* in Paris and the other great towns. From Paris in particular arrived battalions of the scum of the city, who generally murdered on their way any one they met who had the misfortune to have an aristocratic name or a good appearance, and who employed themselves at the front in spreading what they called patriotic doctrines among the other troops, and exciting them against their officers. Dumouriez bitterly complained of the conduct of this refuse of Paris, and, after his success at Valmy, had the courage to dismiss one battalion and send it back to Paris,

where the men filled the city with their howls. There was just the distinction between the measure of the volunteers and the measure of the levée en masse, which exists between the sound statesmanship of taking advantage of patriotic feeling and statesmanship run mad. Into the ranks of the volunteers had gone all the young men who really had military aspirations and a yearning for a military life; while the levée en masse produced a number of men who went to the front to avoid being called infamous, or otherwise maltreated at home. The volunteers, organized by men from the army of the "ancien régime," saved France at the battle of Valmy, and showed themselves to be true soldiers in the invasions of Custine, Montesquiou, and Anselme, while there is no record of the conduct of the men called out by the levée en masse, except that of Dumouriez' disgust at them and of the murders they committed wherever they went.

The real causes of the victory of Dumouriez and of the successful invasions were the genuine patriotism of officers and troops, and the weakness or complicity of their enemies. The French have ever been a warlike nation, and as the prospect of many enemies rose before their eyes their warlike aspirations increased, and there was no difficulty in finding thousands of soldiers. It was their patriotic rather than their military feeling which made them good soldiers, and the change from the one phase to the other will have to be noticed. Even women were seized with the same fever, and Dumouriez chose among his aides-de-camp two Mesdemoiselles de Fernig, whose father had been murdered on the advance of the Prussians, and who proved themselves fully capable of sustaining the greatest fatigue. It was this patriotic feeling which drove thousands to the frontier; but it could not make them soldiers until the military idea was added,—the idea, that is, of obedience to discipline. The defeat of General Chazot was a notable proof of the lack of genuine military spirit, and it was impossible for a general to count upon implicit obedience in soldiers who thought themselves as much citizens as he was, and at perfect liberty to dispute his commands. For a time

patriotism won the day, but the disasters at the beginning of 1793 prove clearly enough that patriotism without military discipline never makes great armies or wins many victories. After a time military spirit was created by great generals, such as Moreau and Hoche, Pichegru and Bonaparte, and was made effective by the organizing labours of such men as Carnot and Dubois-Crancé. But that patriotic feeling conquers for a month or two does not prove that untaught patriotism can take the place of military discipline. It would not have been as successful as it was at this time had it not been for the faint-heartedness of the Prussian general and the badness of the weather; and in the invasions of Germany, Savoy, and Nice the success of the French arms was due rather to the active assistance of sympathizers from within than to gallant actions in the field. It is by the war of 1793, not by the campaign at the end of 1792, that the armies of the French Republic must at present be judged.

Besides, was Dumouriez the man to inspire military feeling into the army? That he was a very able general and statesman is proved by the position which he took up in the Argonne, the patience with which he awaited the work of disease in the invading army, and his bold advance into Belgium. But he was too much a man of the old régime, who regarded his own fortune as depending on the success or failure of his army, to devote himself to the work of inculcating a military spirit. Great soldiers are often great statesmen, as he proved himself to be, but he failed to be a great man, because he thought more of his own interest than of the state of the army or the country; he showed himself a man to be admired, not to be loved; a man who could inspire confidence, but not arouse enthusiasm. It was this lack of enthusiasm which kept the army of Dumouriez from doing all that it might have done, and the long stay in winter quarters in Belgium, which followed the victory of Jemmappes, was not used to improve the military spirit of the army. Doubtless he had great difficulties to contend with, but a more single-hearted man could have overcome them. The ability

of his statesmanship was manifest, but it did not succeed in raising the general opinion held of the man himself.

The army which had been victorious under him in no way identified itself with its general, and there was little fear that Dumouriez, any more than Lafayette, could have played the part of Cromwell or Monk. The spirit of the army was not so well understood at Paris, and when the victorious general suddenly appeared on October 12, the burst of welcome with which he was received concealed beneath it a vast amount of suspicion. This Dumouriez perceived, and it was his first task to allay suspicion. After receiving the congratulations of the Convention, he complimented the deputies on their troops, and then proceeded to the Jacobin Club, arm in arm with Robespierre. There Robespierre declared his confidence in the general, and Dumouriez firmly believed he was trusted alike by Jacobins and Girondins. But there was one incident which might have enlightened him. On October 16 he was present at a splendid fête, given by Madame Talma at her house in the Rue Chantereine. There was assembled the best literary and artistic society of Paris of all political opinions. Theatrical people predominated where Talma was the host, and with them might be seen his favourite dramatist Marie Joseph Chenier, and his friend the actor Grandmesnil. Art was represented by David, music by Gossec and Méhul, and eloquence by Vergniaud, the genius of eloquence itself. To this brilliant assembly was suddenly ushered the man who combined in himself all that the artistic coteries of Paris detested. But Marat cared for no coterie on earth, and, striding up to Dumouriez, asked him what he meant by cashiering the battalion of Parisian volunteers. It was Dumouriez' purpose to be courteous to every one, and he answered demurely that it had disobeyed military orders. Marat sternly remarked, that the people had their eyes on him, and that he himself would watch him. When he departed, a gloom fell over the whole brilliant fête, and the general himself felt that all his well-deserved popularity could not avail if the genius of suspicion intended to suspect him, as he had

suspected so many others. In spite of these gloomy prognostications, Dumouriez left Paris on the following day, and hurried to his head-quarters.

He had permitted the Prussians to leave France without more fighting, and had merely sent one division to watch them safely out of France, under his friend Beurnonville. He now determined to turn his forces against the Austrians, for he had reason to expect the same welcome in Belgium that Custine had received in Germany. He advanced very rapidly, and detached two powerful corps to the right and left, under the command respectively of Generals Valence and La Bourdonnaye. With the main body of forty thousand men, he raised the siege of Lille, and moved forward into Belgium. He took the same road that Dillon had taken in the month of June, and, like him, approached the important city of Mons. Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschén, who had been joined by Clerfayt, concentrated his forces to protect Mons, and, on the evening of November 5, Dumouriez took up a position parallel to his lines. The key of the Austrian position was the little village of Jemmappes, and early on the morning of November 6 a cannonade began between the two armies. The cannonade had lasted five hours before Dumouriez developed his attack on the Austrian position. The left wing, under General Ferrand, was slow in coming into action, and it was not until he had been superseded by General Thouvenot, that it carried the slight works in its front, while the right wing, under General Beurnonville, failed entirely against the more formidable redoubts at Cuesmes, until Dumouriez came up, and taking the command in person, led his soldiers in a victorious charge, singing the Marseillaise. But the centre column was the one on which Dumouriez' plan chiefly depended. He personally directed the advance, which was led by a division under the command of General Égalité, the eldest son of the Duke of Orleans, who had formerly been known as the Duc de Chartres, and who was to be king of France, as Louis Philippe. His division was the best that Dumouriez had been able to form, and contained a large proportion of regular

soldiers, and after a severe engagement the village of Jemmappes was stormed. The victory was conclusive, the Austrian losses amounting to seven thousand men, while the French losses were barely four thousand, and the Austrians fell back to Luxembourg, where they might be supported by the Prussian army. Mons capitulated the next day without firing a shot, and on November 16 Dumouriez entered Brussels. The army of Valence occupied all the fortresses up to Ostend, which he made his head-quarters, and La Bourdonnaye forced his way as far as Antwerp, which immediately capitulated, and thus the occupation of the whole of Belgium was the result of the battle of Jemmappes.

The victory of Jemmappes was hailed with even more enthusiasm than that of Valmy. The French army had won a real battle, acting in the enemy's country and on the offensive, and the weak behaviour of certain generals was glossed over by the leading Girondins and Jacobins. Dumouriez went into winter quarters on the frontiers of Holland, and awaited further orders from the Convention. And now the great question arose as to whether the statesmen of the Convention would show themselves more skilled in understanding foreign affairs than those of the Legislative Assembly. The victories of France had thrown Prussia and Austria into consternation, and England still sympathized with her. It was in the power of real statesmen to have made a lasting peace; but, instead of that, the Girondins, in spite of Danton and Robespierre, deliberately affronted England, and turned that country also against them by their ridiculous and sentimental policy. England had always been very tenacious of its influence in Holland. In the year 1788 Pitt had, by means of the Prussian army and the management of Lord Malmesbury, defeated the Dutch insurgents who had driven the Prince of Orange out of the country, and that Holland should be under the influence of England was believed to be essential to the maintenance of the English supremacy. Further than this, English merchants had always been very jealous of the Belgian port of Antwerp. Antwerp had been the chief emporium of

commerce, before London, and the destruction of its wealth and power by the Spaniards had served to increase the wealth of London. After the independence of Holland had been recognized, English statesmen had always jealously insisted that the Scheldt should be a closed river, in order that Antwerp might not again rival London. But on these two points, which English statesmen and English merchants believed essential to the political and moral prosperity of England, the Convention went out of its way to affront them. It declared, on November 28, that the Scheldt was a free river, thus ignoring the old treaties which had closed the Scheldt for so many years, and to which the French themselves had assented for more than a century; and it followed up this decree by another on November 30, by which Dumouriez was directed to invade Holland. All Pitt's influence and his desire for peace could not keep the House of Commons and the English people from desiring to attack the nation which had broken all received rules of international law, and to their war with Germany the Convention added the imminent danger of a war with England. Pitt, however, was still anxious to maintain peace, and Dumouriez decided to send a secret agent to England to assure Pitt of his support, and this secret negotiation was one of the chief causes of Dumouriez' fall.

Besides affronting England, the Convention made its war with other nations irreconcilable by declaring its intention to found republican institutions wherever it could, and to create a series of small republics on the frontiers. The famous decree of November 18 declared that the French Republic wished for the liberty of all other nations, and would assist all other nations to gain their liberty. Further, the Convention asserted that France was waging a war for the liberty of all peoples against all kings, but did not intend to seize a single province for itself, or to annex a single fortress. This was plainly inconsistent with the annexation of Savoy and Nice, but the Girondin leaders of the Convention were too full of sentimentality and enthusiasm to recognize the logic of facts. They directed the representatives on mission with the army in

Belgium¹ on December 15 to summon primary assemblies and organize a provisional administration, and were ready to do the same in Holland, as soon as Dumouriez should be in possession of that country. But they had miscalculated the energy of the French people, who could be patriotic enough to free their own country from the invader, but who did not see why they should fight to free other nations from their kings. Here the Girondin leaders made the mistake of being convinced by fine words and fine sentiments, instead of listening to facts. Their war became no longer a war against invaders, but a mere war of aggression, for no one believed in their declaration of non-annexation; and it was more than an ordinary war of aggression, for the Convention openly declared that it intended to revolutionize the whole of Europe. This great and important change in the character of the war marks a new departure in the history of the French Revolution. France was no longer a nation occupied in internal reforms, and demanding only that it should not be interfered with, but claimed on purely sentimental grounds to have the right to interfere with the economy of other nations, and to free them in spite of themselves. The opening of the Scheldt is a typical illustration of this sentimental idea. Of course it was very unjust that one river should be closed to commerce in order that a city on another river should become rich and prosperous; but the arrangement had been consecrated by the treaties of years, and had been assented to by former French governments. Had not the leaders of the Convention enough to do within their own country that they should meddle with the affairs of other peoples? Fatal was the mistake of the Girondins: fatal to themselves; fatal to France, in that it produced a long era of war; and fatal, finally, to the cause of the Revolution itself. And on this tremendous war the Girondins embarked, partly because they were actuated by a real love of liberty for its own sake, but also for their own selfish purposes, because they believed that Dumouriez was in political alliance with them, and that after successes in foreign war they would be able to get the better of their political opponents in Paris.

¹ Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. iv. p. 43.

CHAPTER VII.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GIRONDINS AND THE JACOBINS.

Personal disputes in the Convention—Representatives on mission—Dumouriez and Danton — Dumouriez and Pache — Decrees of December 16 and 18—The question as to the king—The king's trial—Speeches and votes on the trial—Treatment of the king in prison—Execution of the king—Character of Louis XVI.—Murder of Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau—Reorganization of the Committee of General Security—Resignations of Roland and Pache—Efforts for the war—News of defeats on the frontiers—Foundation of the Revolutionary Tribunal—The defeat of Neerwinden—The Committee of General Defence—The desertion of Dumouriez—Establishment of the Committee of Public Safety—Girondins and Jacobins.

THE first appearance of a difference between the Girondin party and those Jacobins who in the Convention sat on the extreme left or Mountain, has been seen to have arisen on the original question of the war, when the Girondins, for their own selfish purpose of obtaining a majority in the Legislative Assembly and in the ministry, voted for its declaration ; while the chief Jacobin politicians, Danton, Robespierre, and Marat, joined in condemning it as a wicked means of attempting to gain influence at home. The contempt with which the Girondins had inspired their more logical and thorough-going opponents on the whole question had increased throughout the summer of 1792, and rose to its height after the establishment of the Republic. The Girondins had indeed, prepared the way for the events of August 10, but it was the extreme Jacobins who had carried through the act of insurrection.

The Girondins were determined to gain the power which had fallen from the hands of the king, and the Jacobins were equally determined they should not have it. The Girondins had been able, after August 10, to compose the ministry almost entirely of their own friends, while the extreme Jacobins centred their hopes in the insurrectionary commune of Paris. The rivalry between the Commune and the Legislative Assembly has been noticed, and it is now necessary to see how the Commune boldly held its own against the great Convention itself. With their usual want of political foresight, the Girondin leaders associated the idea of the Commune with the idea of Paris, and attacked the Parisians with all their might, with the natural result of securing the support of Paris for the extreme Jacobins. For some months the debates on both sides were chiefly directed by the Jacobins against the Girondin ministry, and by the Girondins against the Jacobin Commune. Thus, for instance, a violent attack by Chabot on Roland, on October 30, was followed by Barbaroux's propositions that the Commune should be dissolved, and that the sections of Paris should cease to be permanent. Both motions were equally passed over by proceeding to the order of the day. Of more importance than these attacks was Louvet's elaborate accusation of Robespierre upon October 29. Long and eloquent as it was, the Girondin deputy evidently hoped to destroy the power of Robespierre for ever by flimsy assertions that he wished to become a dictator. But Louvet was only a brilliant writer, known for his friendship with Madame Roland, and had no great reputation for patriotism, so that Robespierre's answer on November 5 was triumphant from the point of view of oratory, and the Convention passed to the order of the day.

Though the Convention was more occupied than previous assemblies in personal attacks and individual abuse, it yet had time to do a great deal of administrative work; and it is in the later months of 1792 that first appeared those commissioners who travelled throughout France, and spread the spirit of Paris and its active republicanism through both the

armies and the provinces. The first commissioners, though their work was not yet defined, and they had no stated position, were sent out after August 10 by the Legislative Assembly, the ministry, and the Commune of Paris. These commissioners were especially directed to announce the news of the suspension of the king to the provinces and the armies, and it has been seen with what feelings their tidings were received. Of these the most important commissioners, from their past career or future notoriety, were Carnot, Prieur of the Côte d'Or, and Gasparin, who were sent by the Legislative Assembly to the armies; Fréron and Momoro, who were sent by the ministry to Metz and the Calvados; and, perhaps most remarkable of all, Billaud-Varenne, sent by the Commune of Paris to the camp at Châlons. The great success of these commissioners, and the universal respect with which they were received, led the Convention to develop the system, and commissioners, generally deputies, were at a later date sent to every part of France. These representatives on mission have an important history of their own, and it is only to be remarked here that their functions were at first very ill-defined. The commissioners sent by the Convention were generally deputies of the Plain. The great orators of the Gironde never seem to have gone on mission at all; and though in later days Couthon and Saint-Just left Robespierre's side, at present the chief deputies of the Mountain remained in their seats in the Convention, and did not go to the provinces. It is, therefore, all the more extraordinary that those deputies of the Marsh, who were contented to hold their tongues and sit mute in the Convention, were yet able to rise to the height of their position in the provinces, and were able, often in the face of great dangers, to leave their mark on the history of the districts which they visited more deeply than either the intendants of the ancien régime or the imperial préfets. It was thus in the month of November that Grégoire, Hérault de Sechelles, Jagot, and Simond were sent to Chambéry to reorganize Savoy, and to establish it as the eighty-fourth department of France, the department of Mont Blanc, and the

direct result of their commission was an appeal from an assembly elected in Savoy for incorporation with France, which was acknowledged by a decree of incorporation on November 7. Far more important even than the mission to Savoy was that which was sent to Belgium after the victory of Jemmappes. It consisted at first of Danton, Lacroix, Camus, and Gossuin, who were afterwards joined by Treillard and Merlin of Douai, and these men had the tasks given them of providing for the sustenance of the army of Dumouriez, of reorganizing the Austrian Netherlands, now called Belgium, and of reporting whether it wished to be united to France or formed into a separate republic.

Danton's ability made this mission a memorable one. He very quickly fathomed Dumouriez. He understood, after a single interview, the utterly selfish nature of the man; but he acknowledged that he was a strong man, though a selfish one, and believed him necessary to France. While Danton had always despised Lafayette, who, indeed, could never entirely gain the affection of his troops, he could not but admire the skill with which Dumouriez had won their confidence, if not affection; and he believed that great use could be made of Dumouriez with skilful management. As a general he thought him invaluable to the Republic, and saw that to secure his faithful services every attention must be paid to his wishes; but at the same time he was to be carefully prevented from interfering in politics. Above all things he must form no political alliance with any party in the Convention. It would be as dangerous for him to be regarded as the general of Danton as the general of the Girondins. He must serve the state exclusively and be regardless of parties. From Danton's point of view the scheme was very well; but Dumouriez had not won the victory of Jemmappes solely to pour treasure into the republican coffers, and to turn Belgium into a little republic, but rather to obtain the power to dictate terms to France, and the question was how soon he should begin to dictate his terms. He had a great idea of marching on Paris and saving the king; but, even when shut up in the

narrow walls of the Temple, Marie Antoinette could not be persuaded to hold any communication with the only man who could save her husband's life and throne. The cool reception of his offers by the queen prevented Dumouriez from declaring in favour of monarchy, and he bent his mind rather to a great invasion of Holland, by which he should at once obtain wealth for himself and his army, weaken the influence of England, and become a yet more powerful factor in the internal politics of France. Therefore, instead of moving on Paris after his victory of Jemmappes, he slowly overran the whole of the Austrian Netherlands, and established his headquarters in the bishop's palace at Liège, while Valence remained at Ostend and Miranda on the Roer, and then waited until the authorization which Danton had promised to obtain came from the Convention for him to invade Holland.

All Danton's efforts could not remove another source of discontent from Dumouriez' mind. Pache, the Minister of War, who succeeded Servan, and was appointed because he was a personal friend of Roland, declined to support the policy of the Girondins. He was a trained administrator, and had held important posts in the naval department;¹ but he looked upon his present office as giving him a means whereby he could strengthen the Jacobin party which he had joined, in Paris, rather than as conferring on him the duty of providing for the armies on the frontiers. Pache was, in fact, a better patriot than he was a minister. He thought that enough had been done in the field, and that Dumouriez must not be made too strong, while, on the other hand, the Jacobin party was very weak in the ministry, and the War Office made a very convenient meeting-place for many youthful members of the club. This method of proceeding filled Dumouriez with wrath. His desire was to make his army as efficient as possible, while Pache determined that he should have but little assistance from the War Minister; and it must be said that the behaviour of Pache was a greater cause of the discontent of Dumouriez with the Convention than the execution of the king or any other circumstance whatsoever.

¹ Avenel's *Lundis révolutionnaires*.

The leading Girondins, perceiving the immediate dangers round them rather than the future difficulties of their party, wasted their efforts in attacking the Commune of Paris instead of organizing their strength in the provinces or the armies. They had at first some success. On November 30 Dr. Chambon, who must not be confounded with the deputy Chambon, was elected mayor of Paris in the place of Pétion. On December 2 the new municipality which had been decreed was installed. But, as has been said, the members of the insurrectionary commune of August 10 persisted in sitting with the members of the new Commune; and with Chaumette as procureur, and Hébert as one of his substitutes, the Girondins had really gained very little by their decree. In vain Roland still spent his time in accusing the Commune of the massacres of September, which were, as Danton once remarked, past history which it was of advantage to no one to recall. Another great success of the Girondin party, which showed their majority in the Convention, was the abolition of the extraordinary tribunal of August 17, which was decreed on November 13 on the motion of Lanjuinais. Hitherto, therefore, the Girondin party maintained their decisive majority whenever they exerted themselves, by means of the sway their eloquence had secured over the deputies of the Plain. But a great question was looming in the near future, which would more closely try the spirit of the Plain, and determine which party should have the final majority in the Convention; and that question was the trial of the king.

But before the debates which led to that memorable trial are analyzed, two famous decrees, the decrees of December 16 and 18, must be noticed. The decree of December 18 had been suggested by the terrible reports of famine which were coming up to the Convention from the provinces. Everywhere food riots were taking place, and it was necessary to do something. Saint-Just first made his name remarkable, and showed his power as an orator upon November 20, when he propounded a very ideal scheme by which food should be sold at a certain fixed price, which would never exceed a fair

proportion of the labourer's wages. In this ideal scheme of Saint-Just's appears the first trace of the fatal law of the maximum; but the Convention was not yet ripe for the new idea, and voted instead, on December 18, that any one exporting grain or food out of the country should be punished with death—a most futile and ridiculous attempt to check famine. The decree of December 16 was of less importance, in that it gave rise to no debate, though it afterwards afforded a pretext for the overthrow and execution of the Girondins. It was that whoever should propose to destroy the Republic should be liable to death. The Girondins never guessed how the decree would eventually effect them, and Buzot, saying that it did not go far enough, proposed the immediate and eternal banishment of all members of the Bourbon family. But even such important subjects as the subsistence of the people and the finances of the country gave way for a time in interest to the great question of the trial of the king.

Barbaroux had, on October 1, proposed the formation of a committee of twenty-four, containing no members of former assemblies or deputies for Paris, to examine the papers which had been seized in the Tuileries on August 10. On November 6 Valazé brought up a report of this committee, accusing the king of treachery to the nation. On the next day Mailhe brought up a report from the Committee of Legislation which opened two questions, whether Louis was indictable, and by whom he could be judged. The debate on these questions continued until December 3, and would have been prolonged had not a motion of Legendre's, that all speeches should be printed and taken as read, been carried. It is hardly necessary to analyze the speakers' arguments; but it is noticeable that Fauchet and Grégoire, both constitutional bishops, declared themselves in favour of trying the king, but against the punishment of death. Great excitement was created during the debate by the discovery of the famous papers in the iron chest, which afforded fresh arguments to the men who were determined to judge the king. The important speech which decided the Convention on December 3 was that of Robes-

pierre. He distinctly stated that it did not very much matter whether Louis was guilty of the specific charges against him or not; if it was for the good of the country that he should die, he must die. His death was a political necessity, not an act of strict justice. In this he struck a key-note which carried the vote of the Plain with it. If every deputy of the Convention was to regard himself as a juror bound on oath to say "guilty" or "not guilty," the tender consciences would have gained the day in favour of a king who was personally guiltless of many of the charges brought against him. But if his death was merely a political question, there was no need to consider the innocence of the man, but only to look to the results to be expected from the measure. On December 6 a committee of twenty-one was appointed to prepare the charges against Louis, and on the 10th Robert Lindet brought up their report. On the 11th Louis appeared at the bar and asked for counsel, who were allowed to him. He chose Target, the chief author of the Constitution of 1791, and president of one of the Paris tribunals, who refused, and the king had to be satisfied with the services of the aged Lamoignon de Malesherbes, who had formerly been one of his ministers, of Tronchet, the ex-Constituant, and of Desèze, the defender of Besenval before the Châtelet in 1789; and ten days were allowed to the king and his counsel to prepare the king's defence, which commenced on December 26.

Desèze opened the defence with a long speech, in which, however, he entirely left out Robespierre's argument, that the king ought to be punished, not as a man guilty of crimes, but as an enemy to his country. It would have been far more logical if the Convention had accepted Robespierre's reasoning, and treated the question of the disposal of the king as a political measure. But the Girondins, with their usual love of display, rejoiced to have the opportunity of making a great show in the Convention, and caused the trial of Louis to be even more impressive than that of Charles I. in England. It could not be expected that the trial should proceed without some interference from foreign powers. All other kings felt

their monarchical position endangered in the person of Louis, and particularly the King of Spain, who was himself a Bourbon. On December 28 the Chevalier Ocaritz, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, formally protested against the king's trial, and his arguments were discussed by Brissot, the reporter of the Diplomatic Committee, on January 2. Just as the Girondins had staked their existence as a party, and their reputation in France, on the foreign war, so even at this time they believed that the war was their one hope of safety, and trusted in the generals whom they allied to their party. Brissot persuaded his party that the trial of the king would embitter the war and throw away all chance of peace, and thus won their support. The very next day, Gasparin, a friend of Boze the painter, disclosed the communications which had passed between the three Girondin leaders, Guadet, Gensonné, and Vergniaud and the king in the previous July,¹ and these revelations brought about a great disunion in the Girondin party. Indeed, throughout the session of the Convention they could never be termed a party, for they were divided into many different sections, and had no consistent principles like the Jacobins of the Mountain.² The two great sections were Brissotins and Buzotins, that is, those followers of Brissot who had sat with him in the Legislative Assembly, and a party consisting of many new members and ex-Constituants who were devoted to Buzot. The Brissotins held in many respects precisely the same opinions as the Jacobins, while the Buzotins had a perfectly different system, which was developed later in the so-called Girondin sketch of a constitution drawn up by Condorcet.³

In the debates on the king's trial, the Brissotins were to a man for his death for political reasons, just as much as the Jacobins of the Mountain; but in that heterogeneous section which has been called the Buzotins, a strong opinion had arisen that the country should judge the king, and not the Convention alone. The chief supporters of this idea were Salle and Lanjuinais, who, though they may in some respects rank with the party of Buzot, were in reality rather opposed

¹ Vol. ii. chap. iv. pp. 109-111.

² Vol. ii. Appendix IV.

³ Vol. ii. Appendix V.

to him. As early as December 28 Salle had proposed that the case of the king should be referred to the primary assemblies, and Lanjuinais strongly supported him. Even if this appeal had taken place, it is very doubtful if it would have resulted in the acquittal of the king; but it would have relieved the deputies of the Convention of a terrible responsibility as judges. After a long debate, it was decided on January 14, on the motion of a young Girondin, Boyer-Fonfrède, that three questions should be put to the Convention, on which every deputy was to give his vote aloud in the tribune as his name was called in alphabetical order of departments. The three questions were: Was Louis guilty of conspiracy against the nation? Shall the judgment be subject to the sanction of the people? and, What shall be the penalty?

On January 15, under the presidency of Vergniaud, the first question was put to the vote. Out of 739 members, 683 simply voted that Louis was guilty; none voted for acquittal; and the minority was composed of fifteen deputies, headed by Lanjuinais, who stated that they voted as legislators, not as judges, of eight deputies, including Fauchet and two other bishops, who refused to act as judges, and of five who would not vote at all. Further, eight deputies were absent from illness, and twenty on mission, including Danton, Lacroix, Grégoire, and Collot d'Herbois. On the same day, January 15, the second vote was taken. Of the 717 members present, 424 voted against the appeal to the people, 283 voted for it, and 10 refused to vote. But it is well worth while to examine how the Girondin party was divided in itself. Instead of giving a solid vote for the appeal to the primary assemblies, which they would have done if they had been an organized political party, it is noticeable that many leading Girondins, such as Boyer-Fonfrède, Condorcet, and Isnard, all voted against the appeal to the people. Such a party as the Girondins, divided against itself, could not hope to win the majority of the votes of the Plain. The most serious vote of all was taken on January 16, and the voting lasted throughout that night and the next day, for every deputy wished to give

his reasons for the vote he was about to give, and every deputy felt that he was determining his career for the future by his vote. The result gave 361 votes for death simply, and 26 deputies, though they voted for death, also supported an amendment of Mailhe, that it would be politically expedient to postpone the punishment. In the minority 334 deputies voted for detention until a general peace, when Louis should be banished, and 28 were either absent from illness or on mission or refused to vote at all.

Again, it is most curious to notice the division in the Girondin party. Much has been said of their desire to save the king's life, but Vergniaud, Guadet, Gensonné, Ducos, Boyer-Fonfrède, Louvet, Brissot, Buzot, Barbaroux, and Pétion, all voted for death simply. Thus deserted by their leaders, it is a wonder that so many Girondins voted against the death-penalty as did; and again that section of the Buzotin party which was led by the ex-Constituants appears distinguished for both courage and consistency. Lanjuinais, Salle, Defermon, Sillery, and Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, the ex-Constituants, all voted for detention till the peace, and then banishment, and with them were to be found such men as Gorsas, Doulcet, Duperret, Grangeneuve, Fauchet, and Kersaint. Of the twenty-four deputies for Paris, twenty-one, including the Duke of Orleans, voted for death, and the other three, Manuel, the former procureur of the Commune, Dusaulx, and Thomas, voted for detention. Fifteen deputies were still absent on mission, of whom the most notable were Camus and Grégoire. But many of them, if they had been in Paris, would undoubtedly have voted for death, as is well proved by the letter which was written from Mayence after an engagement without the walls by the deputies on mission there, Haussmann, Rewbell, and Merlin of Thionville. "We are surrounded by dead and wounded," they wrote, "and we learn that Louis lives still." If the twenty-six votes given for Mailhe's amendment were counted as votes against death, the result of the division would have been 361 for death, and 360 against it; but it must be remembered that Mailhe's amendment distinctly

implied the death-penalty, and only suggested that it might be politically advantageous to put it off.

The Girondin party by their internal divisions had been defeated on each question, but now they thought they might obtain a majority on a further proposal, that the execution should be postponed. This postponement was proposed by Buzot on January 19; and again the disunion of the Girondin party appeared, for its warmest opponent was Barbaroux. The result was that 310 deputies voted for postponement, and 380 against it. The debate of the day was marked by the exciting incident of the resignation of Manuel. He complained that on account of his vote on the death question he had been assaulted in the Convention, abused and not permitted to exercise his full rights as a deputy, and that he therefore resigned his seat in an assembly where the deputies themselves were not free. This courageous protest led to his death at a later period. On January 20 Cambacérès moved that the Convention should allow the king to have a confessor, and also that the French nation should take care of his family.

The news of his condemnation had been communicated to the king by Garat in his prison at the Temple. He had learnt it with firmness, and had only requested to have a confessor, and to have one uninterrupted interview with his family. So many false statements have been made about the imprisonment in the Temple of Louis and Marie Antoinette, that it is worth while to point out some of the exaggerations into which Royalist writers have been led. When the king was taken from the reporters' box of the Legislative Assembly, the custody of his person was given to the Commune of Paris. It was the Commune of Paris which took him to the Temple, and for some time allowed him to live there very comfortably, several rooms being allotted to the royal family. The king was permitted to have two servants to wait upon him, and to walk in the large garden. The royal family were very well fed, as the accounts of the Commune prove. His dinner never consisted of less than five courses, and every allowance was made for Marie Antoinette's love of dress.

So free, indeed, was the royal family within the walls of the Temple, that schemes of escape were eagerly planned. There were many chivalrous Royalists in Paris who had devoted themselves to a sort of worship of Marie Antoinette, and who managed, in spite of every precaution, to have both interviews and secret communications with her. Chief among these chivalrous adherents were the Baron de Batz, an ex-Constituant, and the famous Chevalier de Maisonrouge. The knowledge of these schemes for carrying off the royal family made the council-general of the Commune take stern measures in the month of October, and the king was separated from his wife and children, and not permitted to correspond with them. This was a tyrannical act, but it is the only tyrannical one which is reported on good authority. Of course the vigilance of the Commune was eluded, and the king and queen corresponded by letters pricked with pins. Louis was still treated with every consideration. He was well fed, he was allowed books and cards, and when his trial was determined upon he was allowed to see his counsel in private. This consideration for his personal wants had made him believe that the Convention did not mean to take his life. He was quite in earnest in his defence, and trusted to his personal innocence. To the last he could not believe that he was an enemy of his people, because as he declared he had always observed the Constitution of 1791, and to the last he seemed to expect that in some way his life would be saved. He was therefore somewhat surprised when Garat announced to him that he was to be executed on the following day; and after a painful interview with his family he spent many hours with his chosen confessor, the Abbé Edgeworth de Firmont.

On the morning of January 21, 1793, he was led from his rooms in the Temple by Santerre and Garat, and driven quickly down to the Place de la Révolution, opposite the Tuileries, which had formerly been known as the Place Louis XV., and where, on July 12, 1789, the dragoons of the Prince de Lambesc had charged the people.¹ Throughout his passage to the

¹ Vol. i. p. 133.

scaffold he seemed to expect a rescue, and there is little doubt that many plots were circulating in Paris during the previous night, with the intention of rescuing the king even at the last moment. But there was no effort made, and Louis found it necessary to mount the scaffold, from which he attempted to say a few words to the people. The drums were at once beaten, and while they rolled, Sanson the executioner seized upon the king, and at twenty minutes past ten Louis XVI. was offered up as a sacrifice to the Revolution.

No death throughout the Revolution is so pathetic as that of Louis. He had earnestly longed from the moment he came to the throne to benefit his people. He had willingly consented to be deprived of many of the powers which he had inherited from his ancestors, but every concession which he made lost its effect in the eyes of the people by the ineptitude of his confidential advisers and ministers. Every concession seemed to the people to have been forced from the king against his will, and instead of getting credit for what he had done, he was hated because he had not done it before. Particularly was this so in the spring of 1789. A wiser king than Louis, with a wiser minister than Necker, would at once have made great concessions to the popular wishes at a period when both would have received the fame of having done so, and would thus have secured the co-operation of the people in the future. If the political weakness of his ministers prevented him from ever getting credit for his sincere devotion to the cause of reform, still more did the conduct of the queen prevent his being recognized as a really patriotic king. On many an occasion, when he was willing and desirous to act in harmony with the popular leaders, she prevented him, and Marie Antoinette again and again showed her fatal power of preventing the king from acting according to his better judgment. Personally upright, and desirous of being politically honest, loathing bloodshed and fearing civil war, Louis XVI. had every quality to make him a good constitutional king. His indolence made him the servant of his ministers' wishes, and if Louis had been on the throne of England he would have

been a king after the fashion of George I. or George II. But that very indolence and weakness which would have made him an excellent constitutional monarch, made him a very feeble despot. Ready to yield to all about him, he was apt to give way to those who were hated, not loved, by the people of his country. The unpopularity of his ministers always recoiled on him. The greatest mistake in his conduct during the years of the Revolution was his attempt to leave Paris and escape to the frontier. For by this he proved to his people that he was not in harmony with the Revolution; and that great mistake was more due to the queen than to himself. There can be nothing but pity felt for him on the scaffold, for no one personage of the Revolution was a more single-hearted and honest man than Louis himself; always striving to the best of his ability to do what was right, honest to the last extreme, every fault of his character arose from weakness. The Revolution needed strong men to conduct it, strong men even to play a small part in it; Louis XVI. was unutterably weak, and this weakness of character prevented him from controlling the course of events. Well had his brother defined the character of his mind in the simile of the oiled billiard balls which no one could hold steadily together.¹ Yet it does seem sad that such a worthy, patriotic man, whose position had been forced upon him by fate, and who could not help the weakness of his character, should be sacrificed to the Revolution for political reasons. Louis XVI. was no martyr, he was no hero, he was no saint: he was a good man, with the best intentions, whose character was not equal to the stirring times in which he lived; he lost his life because he was born to a throne at an unpropitious period, and not for any personal offences of his own.

The execution of Louis had been preceded by the murder of one of his judges. On the evening of January 20, an old garde-du-corps named Pâris, who was tired of his life, wandered into the Palais Royal, and seeing Michel Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau seated comfortably in a restaurant there, he rushed

¹ Vol. i. p. 81.

upon him and stabbed him to the heart. He could not have avenged the condemnation of the king on any one who deserved it less. Michel Lepeletier had been a president in the old Parlement of Paris, and had taken his seat on the extreme left of the Constituent Assembly. A learned and wealthy lawyer, his chief intimates had been Merlin of Douai and Robespierre, and his knowledge of law had enabled him to do much quiet good in the Constituent Assembly. He had fallen into the background during the session of the Legislative Assembly, but was elected to the Convention for the department of the Yonne. In every way unassuming, he was one of those hardworking deputies whose labours in committees are apt to be overlooked in studying the history of any assembly. He had held the same position in the Convention as he had in the Constituent Assembly, and had voted for the death of the king from the same sentiments as the rest of the majority. Why he should have been selected as a victim, except by an accident, it is difficult to see, because he had not made himself conspicuous in the trial of Louis; Robespierre and Saint-Just, Barère and Pétion, were far more strenuous opponents of the king than he had ever been.

The execution of the king and the murder of Lepeletier had greatly impressed the minds of all. Danton seized the moment to try and put an end to the perpetual party squabbling in the Convention. "Citizens," said he,¹ "now that the tyrant is no more, let us turn all our energies, all our endeavours, to the war. We must fight Europe; let us now reorganize the Committee of General Security, and remove Roland from the ministry, because he abuses all who do not share his opinions. Let us banish this habit of mutual recrimination, for France will soon not know to whom to accord her confidence. As for me, I am a stranger to the passion of revenge, and I adjure all who know me to say whether I am a drinker of blood. What have I not done to maintain the spirit of

¹ For this speech, which is epitomized and paraphrased, and not literally translated, see *Œuvres de Danton*, ed. Vermorel, pp. 133-135.

peace in the executive council? I have only one desire, and that is to die for my country. I would at the price of my own blood restore to the Fatherland the defender it has lost. I envy his death; you demand for him the honours of the Pantheon; but I tell you this,—the best means of honouring his memory is to swear that we will not separate before having given a constitution to the Republic.” In this manner Danton endeavoured to change the spirit of the Convention, to put an end to the petty squabbles which were tending to make it contemptible, and to raise it to the height of its great mission.

The war was now his main interest. Greatly had he opposed the outbreak of that war; but now that it was begun, it must be ended in glory for France. Danton had been in Belgium, and had seen Dumouriez, and he knew well how weak was the hold of the French army there. He foresaw clearly that enough had not been done to secure the safety of the country, and that before long the successes of Valmy and Jemmappes would be counterbalanced by failures. In order to increase the power of the armies on the frontier, a great effort must be made to concentrate the power of France at home. There must be strong government at home in order to fight well abroad, and Danton, who cared but little for personal aims, believed that at this moment strong government could be best secured by renewing the Committee of General Security. Accordingly, on January 21, the committee was renewed, and then consisted of eleven Jacobins of the Mountain and one Girondin, instead of ten Girondins and two Jacobins. Danton's appeal went unheeded, and the struggle between Jacobins and Girondins increased in bitterness. On January 22, the day after the king's execution, Roland resigned, and his office was temporarily filled by Garat. On the 24th Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, who had been the twenty-first president of the Constituent, was elected president of the Convention by a large majority over Danton himself. On the same day Pache resigned his post of Minister of War, to the great delight of Danton, who knew how distasteful Pache was to

Dumouriez; and Beurnonville, the friend of Dumouriez, and his subordinate in the campaign of Valmy, was elected in his place. But Pache's services could not be dispensed with, and on February 14 he was elected mayor of Paris, in the place of the Girondin Chambon who had resigned.

The resignation of Pache was partly caused by the arrival in Paris of Dumouriez, who at once tried, instead of allying himself with any political party, to obtain permission to invade Holland. He was successful; but the majority of the Convention felt that, under the pressure of a new war, they must make yet fresh efforts. For this reason two great decrees were passed, on February 1 and 15; on the 1st, that new assignats to the amount of 800,000,000 livres should be issued, while on the 15th a levy of 300,000 men was ordered. These 300,000 men were to be levied in a fixed proportion to population, and if sufficient volunteers did not enlist in any district, soldiers were to be drawn by conscription. This decree of February 15 was the immediate cause of the outbreak of war in La Vendée. After making these efforts, the Convention confidently expected favourable reports from the armies on the frontiers, and it was to its great dismay that news arrived of failure after failure, showing that it was necessary to make yet further efforts, not only to carry on the war abroad, but even to defend once again the frontiers of France.

The rash policy of the early months of the Convention was increasing the number of the open enemies of France, and by this time all European nations, except Denmark and Switzerland, had broken off diplomatic relations with the Republic. Of these new enemies, only two were of any real importance—Spain and England; but nations more distant from France itself also showed their hostility in petty ways. Thus, for instance Hugou de Bassville, the Secretary of the French Legation at Naples, who had been sent to Rome to demand the release of two French art students, arrested for revolutionary sentiments, was mortally wounded in the streets of Rome on January 13, 1793,¹ and died on the following day. In Spain, where a

¹ See *Les Diplomates de la Révolution*, by Frédéric Masson, pp. 37-103. Paris: 1882.

Bourbon ruled, feeling was naturally very high against the Republic. The Spaniards, for the sake of Louis XVI., had maintained peace as long as they could, but after his execution they refrained no longer, and on March 7, 1793, they declared war against France, and their general, Don Ricardos de Castillo, easily occupied the province of Roussillon. In England all the early sympathy with the French Revolution had vanished, except among a few radicals; the opening of the Scheldt had disgusted the merchants; the massacres of September had alienated the upper classes; and the execution of the king crowned the feeling of opposition. Pitt, the great peace minister, hesitated for a long time,¹ but he soon saw that there was no chance of maintaining a neutral attitude, and the eloquence of Burke made it impossible for him to check the demand for war. The Republic left him no alternative, for it declared war against England on February 1, 1793. Pitt determined to assist the Austrian army in the Netherlands, and a brigade of Guards, under Major-General Gerard Lake, arrived at Dort on March 5, 1793. It was reinforced by a Dutch and a Hanoverian division; the Duke of York took command, and he marched to join the Austrians, who now had Prince Francis of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld as their general.

At the beginning of March Dumouriez stationed himself at Antwerp, while Valence occupied Aix-la-Chapelle, and Miranda besieged Maestricht. He then entered Holland with his main army, but was soon obliged to fall back by the news that the Prince of Coburg had driven Valence from Aix-la-Chapelle, and had, upon March 4, caused the siege of Maestricht to be raised. Miranda fell back in very great confusion, leaving much of his artillery behind; and when Dumouriez concentrated again at Antwerp, he found that his soldiers had lost the buoyant confidence which had enabled them to overrun Belgium so successfully. Similar bad news came from the army of Custine. On December 14 he had been defeated at Hockheim, and he had been previously driven from Frankfort.

¹ See the able article on this subject by Mr. Oscar Browning in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1883.

A powerful Prussian army now not only formed the siege of Mayence, but even crossed the Rhine, and drove Custine from Frankenthal and Landau to the lines of Wissembourg. But the Convention did not seem to recognize the weakness of Custine's situation, and on March 14 decreed the union of the Palatinate with France, and on the 30th the annexation of eighty cities of Germany, including Mayence. At Chambéry and Nice, Kellermann and Biron, who had succeeded Montesquiou and Anselme respectively, remained quietly in their quarters and waited for further orders to advance into Italy.

The bad news from Belgium caused Danton and Lacroix to be immediately despatched to Dumouriez' head-quarters. There they found him most dissatisfied with the conduct of the Convention in not supporting him, and decidedly inclined to make good his repulse from Holland by a success in Paris itself. Danton and Lacroix hurried back to report to the Convention, and on his arrival, on March 8, Danton made one of his great speeches on the state of the country. "Experience teaches that it is in the midst of dangers," he cried, "that France shows all her energy. The moment has arrived when you must say to France: if you fly not to the assistance of your brethren in Belgium, if Dumouriez is surrounded in Holland, if his army is obliged to capitulate, incalculable evils will follow. . . . Dumouriez unites to the genius of the general the art of encouraging the soldier. We have heard the beaten army call aloud for him. History will judge of his talents, his passions, and his vices; but what is certain is, that he is interested in the splendour of the Republic. Let him only be supported, and he will know how to make our enemies repent their first successes."¹

On the next day the first great effort was made to form what was afterwards to be the chief engine of the Terror, the Revolutionary Tribunal. The creation of a new and powerful tribunal with special powers was proposed by Carrier and strongly opposed by Lanjuinais, who had been successful in the previous November in overthrowing the tribunal of

¹ *Œuvres de Danton*, ed. Vermorel, pp. 139-141.

August 17,¹ and who had a lawyer's dislike for exceptional laws and exceptional tribunals. The object of this tribunal was the summary punishment of "contre-révolutionnaires," and its formation is another proof of the influence which the state of affairs on the frontiers had upon the measures of the Convention. The excitement in Paris at Dumouriez' reverses showed itself in a night riot, when the mob broke the printing presses of Gorsas in the Rue Tiquetonne and of Condorcet in the Rue Serpent, which was put down easily by Beurnonville, the Minister of War, and the Breton deputy Kervelegan.

A committee was appointed to draw up the constitution of the proposed tribunal, but before the report was presented Danton defined his position in a speech which is perhaps the most characteristic of any of his which have been reported. In it his political principles are manifested, and it is worth quoting at some length. "I put on one side," he said, "all passions; they are strangers to my consideration of the public weal. In circumstances more difficult than those in which we now find ourselves, when the enemy was at the gates of Paris, I said to those who were then our rulers, 'Your discussions are contemptible. I know only one enemy; let us beat the foreign foe. You fatigue me with your perpetual quarrels, instead of occupying yourselves with the safety of the Republic. I put you all on the same line, and class you all as traitors to the Republic.' I said to them, 'What matters my reputation? May France be free and my name for ever sullied. I have submitted to be called a drinker of blood. Well, if we must drink blood, let us drink that of the enemies of humanity. Let us fight; let us conquer our liberty.' Expend your energies in every direction. Let the rich listen to my words. Our conquests must pay our debts, or else the rich will have to pay them before long. The situation is a cruel one. Paper money no longer passes at par in circulation. The day's labour of the workman cannot be paid in money. We must break out of this situation by a great effort. Let us conquer Holland. Let us reanimate the republican party

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 138, 139, 212.

in England. Let us make France march forward, and we shall go down glorious to posterity. Fulfil your great destiny. No more debates, no more quarrels, and the country is saved.”¹

After this great peroration Lesage brought up the report of the committee on the organization of the new tribunal. It was to have a paid jury, which, on the motion of Lindet, was to vote openly on the guilt of the accused. There was to be no appeal from its judgments, but the tribunal was to try no prisoner without the authorization of a committee of six chosen in the Convention, and the punishment for every crime against the nation was to be death. Montané, judge of one of the criminal courts of Paris, was elected by the Convention to be president of the new tribunal; Fouquier-Tinville, a bankrupt procureur, who had practised before the old court of the Châtelet, to be director of the jury, or public accuser; and the committee of six was composed of three ex-Constituants Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Larévellière-Lepaux, and Prieur of the Marne, two former members of the Legislative, Garran-Coulon and Delaunay, and Gomaire. The first prisoner brought before the tribunal was Blanchelande, the former governor of San Domingo, who, after a long trial, was condemned to death on April 11, and guillotined on the following day.

A powerful instrument was thus created for securing peace at home by inspiring terror, but far more dear to Danton's heart than the Revolutionary Tribunal was the selection of the ministers from the deputies to the Convention proposed by him on the following day. Like Mirabeau, Danton perceived that there could be no strong government in France unless the executive authority was in the hands of members of the Convention. He declared that he did not wish himself to enter office, that he would never accept any office in his life, if only the Convention would assent to this salutary measure. The strong practical mind of Danton, though he had never left France, came to the same conclusion as the travelled intellect of Mirabeau. He had not studied the working of the constitution in England, but by strong good

¹ *Œuvres de Danton*, ed. Vermorel, pp. 149-151.

sense he saw the ridiculous weakness which must be produced by the separation of the executive from the legislative power. But his arguments were quite in vain. The leaders of the Convention were as much afraid of having the ministers chosen among their own body as the leaders of the Constituent Assembly had been, and after a strong speech in opposition by the ex-Constituant Larévellière-Lepaux, Danton's motion was passed over. Immediately afterwards the ministry was reconstituted in the old fashion. Garat was elected Minister of the Interior, which office he had administered since Roland's resignation, and Gohier became Minister of Justice in the place of Garat.

Difficulties increased and grew up around the Convention. On March 18 Barère brought up a report on the troubles which had broken out in La Vendée as the result of the levy of 300,000 men, and on the 21st arrived the more terrible news of the defeat of Dumouriez at Neerwinden. The general had determined to strike another blow for Belgium, and trusted that the spirit of his troops, which had won him the victory at Jemmappes, would again be successful. But the spirit of the troops was now very different; their discipline had not been improved by their peaceful sojourn in Belgium; and whereas at Jemmappes they had carried the Austrian position by storm, at Neerwinden they were defeated at every point by the Prince of Coburg, and lost four thousand men.

This news of the 21st brought about two important measures. Jean Debry, on behalf of the Diplomatic Committee, proposed that all strangers should be expelled from France within eight days who could not give a good reason for their residence, and on the same evening the Committee of General Defence was reorganized and placed on another footing. This committee had come into existence in January, 1793. It originally consisted of twenty-one members, who were not directly elected by the Convention, but were chosen from the seven most important committees.¹ But now, after the news of Neerwinden, a powerful committee was directly elected. It consisted of twenty-four members, and the first committee

¹ See Appendix VII.

contained nine Girondins, nine deputies of the Plain, and six Jacobins, including every representative man in the Convention, namely, Pétion, Gensonné, Barbaroux, Vergniaud, Buzot, Guadet, Condorcet, Lasource, and Isnard from the Girondins; Siéyès, Cambacérès, Camus, Quinette, Guyton-Morveau, Delmas, Bréard, Jean Debry, and Barère on the part of the Plain; and Danton, Robespierre, Dubois-Crancé, Rühl, Prieur of the Marne, and Camille Desmoulins from the Mountain. The new committee was given the greatest powers, and after first proposing to the Convention that the penalty of death should be decreed against every émigré over fourteen, and to every one who protected an émigré, it proposed that Dumouriez should be summoned to the bar of the Convention.

Dumouriez, after his defeat at Neerwinden, had retreated from Belgium and established his head-quarters at Saint-Amand, between the two camps of Maulde and Breuil. Here he received four members of the Convention, Camus, Quinette, Lamarque, and Bancal des Issards, with the Minister of War, Beurnonville, who informed him of the decree of the Convention. Dumouriez promptly tore it up, and Camus formally suspended the general. Dumouriez, believing his own position secure, at once arrested the four commissioners and sent them off to General Clerfayt, whose head-quarters were at Tournay. He had been for some time—ever since his defeat at Neerwinden—in communication with the Austrians, and had promised to send them as many deputies as he could seize, and to hand over to them the three fortresses of Lille, Valenciennes, and Condé. He arrested the commissioners on April 2, and on the 3rd attempted to occupy the camps and cities, but everywhere he failed. General Miaczinsky was arrested by the deputies on mission who happened to be at Lille on his arrival there to seize the city for Dumouriez. The same fate happened to General Lescuyer at Valenciennes, while General Leveneur, commandant at Maulde, sent off Captain Lazare Hoche to the Convention with the news of Dumouriez' proceedings, and the Adjutant-General Chérin maintained order at Breuil. Dumouriez himself, seeing all his

plans were thus foiled, rode off to Condé. He was stopped by Colonel Davout, a young officer of the old royal army, recently elected colonel of the volunteers of the Yonne, who fired upon his staff and drove him across the frontier. But Dumouriez was not yet disconcerted, and went back into France on April 5, and, collecting some eight hundred men and one hundred and thirty officers, finally rode across the frontier to join the army of Clerfayt. The news of the desertion of Dumouriez, and of the arrest of Camus and his colleagues, which reached the Convention at the same time as the news that Custine had left Mayence and that the city was being besieged by the Prussians, made the Convention decide on yet further measures to strengthen the executive.

Marat, who, like Danton and Robespierre, was statesman enough to perceive the need of strengthening the executive, proposed that enlarged powers should be given to the committees; and Isnard, as the reporter of the Committee of General Defence, proposed the establishment of a smaller committee of nine, with supreme and unlimited executive powers—a proposal which was warmly supported by every statesman in the Convention. On April 4, while still under the influence of the news of the desertion of Dumouriez, three important motions were carried. Barère and Fabre d'Églantine proposed extended powers to the representatives on mission; Lacroix proposed the formation of an army of sans-culottes; and Danton proposed to establish a maximum price of food, which he said would be practically a tax on the rich. Just as the new administration which was presently to be established in France depended on three institutions, all of which were now in existence—the Committee of Public Safety, the Committee of General Security, and the Revolutionary Tribunal—so the chief means by which the authority of that administration was to be exerted, the power of the representatives on mission, the army of the sans-culottes, and the maximum, were now all proposed; and it is noticeable that every measure which strengthened the Terror when it was finally established was decreed while the Girondins could

command a majority in the Convention, and that it was a Girondin, Isnard, who proposed the immense powers of the Committee of Public Safety. Upon April 6 Isnard brought up a decree defining the powers of the new committee. It was to consist of nine deputies; to confer in secret; to have supreme executive power, and authority to spend certain sums of money without accounting for them, and it was to present a weekly report to the Convention. These immense powers were granted under the pressure of news from the frontier, and it was obvious that it would not be long before such a powerful executive could conquer the independence of the Convention. Isnard's proposals were opposed by Buzot, but decreed; and on April 7 the first Committee of Public Safety was elected. It consisted of the following members:—Barère, Delmas, Bréard, Cambon, Danton, Guyton-Morveau, Treilhard, Lacroix, and Robert Lindet.

The very first proposal of the new committee was that it should appoint three representatives with every army from among the deputies of the Convention, with unlimited powers, who were to report to the committee itself. This motion was followed by a very statesmanlike one from Danton. He perceived the folly of the decree of November 18, which declared universal war against all kings. He recognized that if France wanted to become again one of the nations of Europe, and be treated with the courtesy due to a great power, she must not declare herself freed from the recognized stipulations and sanctions of international law. Because France happened to be at war with nearly the whole of Europe, it was no reason that the Convention should practically declare that war perpetual. Men are never born statesmen; they develop from experience their statesmanlike ideas. Danton, some months previously, had been as eager as any one for such a decree as that of November 18, and rejoiced in throwing down the gauntlet to Europe. But his mission to Dumouriez and his practical experience of foreign politics now showed him the folly of such behaviour, and had led him to a more statesmanlike view of the matter; and on his proposition the fatal

decree of November 18 was withdrawn, and it was made possible for France again to enter into the comity of European nations.

It is very obvious that it was the foreign war which had developed the progress of the Revolution with such astonishing rapidity in France. It was Brunswick's manifesto which mainly caused the attack on the Tuileries on August 10; it was the surrender of Verdun which directly caused the massacres of September. It was the battle of Neerwinden which established the Revolutionary Tribunal, and that defeat and the desertion of Dumouriez which brought about the establishment of the Committee of Public Safety. The Girondins were chiefly responsible for the great war, and its first result was to destroy them as a party. The struggle between them and the Jacobins had grown in intensity throughout the first months of the session of the Convention. Their early influence over the deputies of the Plain rested on a belief in their statesmanlike powers, but as time went on that influence steadily diminished. It was in vain for Danton to attempt to make peace in the Convention; bitter words on both sides had left too strong an impression ever to be effaced. The Jacobin leaders despised the Girondins; the Girondins hated the Jacobins for having won away power from them. The Jacobins formed a small but very united body, of which every member knew its own mind; they were determined to carry on the Republic at all costs, and to destroy the Girondins as quickly as they could; while the Girondins, split up into varying sections, driven hither and thither by the speeches of every youthful orator, never attempted to concentrate their power in the Convention, and were bound to fall before their more energetic adversaries. The fact was that the Girondin leaders were orators, not statesmen or even politicians. Their so-called politicians, such as Brissot, were men who had a great belief in themselves, but no strong principles with which to impress others. Just as Camille Desmoulins had in April, 1792, for ever destroyed Brissot's political reputation in his "Jean Pierre Brissot démasqué," so, under the influence of

Danton, he now destroyed the power of the Brissotin section of the Girondins by his "Histoire des Brissotins."

There is a peculiar interest in tracing the history of the struggles of the Girondins for existence against the Jacobins. The roundabout efforts of some of them to save the king would be amusing if they were not pathetic. The story of the king's trial ought to be read in connection with the contest between the Girondins and the Jacobins, not as a separate episode by itself. It proved to France the unity of the Jacobin party. It showed that logical consistency had more power over the deputies of the Plain than oratorical fluency, and proved that the Girondin party was utterly divided against itself and bound to succumb. As if fascinated by the courage of the Jacobin leaders, the Girondins permitted those powerful engines to be established on which the system of Terror was to rest and by which they themselves were to fall. The Girondins did not like the idea of such supreme authority as that given to the Committee of Public Safety and to the new tribunal, and Lanjuinais in particular and his friends protested against them; but yet, fascinated by the boldness of the schemes, the Girondins gave way, and the determination with which the Jacobins forced on their policy broke down all attempts at opposition to the Revolution at home, and their opponents had to acquiesce in their measures. Nothing is more certain than that the engines of the Terror were all established before the fall of the Girondins, and that the Jacobins alone must not get the credit for the new and powerful executive which was now established.

With the death of the king the history of the Revolution deepens in gloom. No longer are casual riots and loss of single lives of enough importance to be mentioned. Men on the frontiers, in Paris and in every provincial city, in the woods of La Vendée and in the workshops of Lyons, now died in hundreds, and owed their fate to the terrible swiftness with which the Revolution progressed. This bitterness in the revolutionary spirit was due to the foreign war. While the country was at peace there might have been riots indeed, but there would have been a quiet development of a new régime.

But the foreign war had introduced a fresh sentiment, and most Frenchmen grew fiercer against royalty and all idea of opposition to the Revolution. They knew that France was hemmed in by countries all glorying in her distress. Any government which would supply her with the means of freeing herself from these enemies and making her terrible to them was sure to receive the full affection and confidence of the French people as long as the crisis lasted. At this moment, when the eloquence of the Girondins was failing to produce its old effect, the Jacobin leaders came to the front with their propositions of a strong centralized administration and of ruling by terror; and men like Moreau did not complain when they heard that their fathers had been guillotined while they themselves were fighting in the armies, because it might have been necessary for the safety of the Republic. It was the foreign war which caused the organization of the system of the Terror, and the Reign of Terror was sanctioned by the silence of the people. But when the pressure of war was passed, the reason for the Terror was gone, and the chief instruments of its supremacy were cast out and punished. The Girondins were too good, too noble, and too moral to invent such a system, or to desire to do anything but oppose it, when they grasped what it involved. But their only idea of making head against it was the old one of Mirabeau, to organize the provinces against Paris. If it were possible to have organized France against Paris and to have caused a civil war in 1790, it was quite impossible that now, with many enemies upon the borders, the patriotic people of France should combine against the capital, and attack the government when it was doing its best to defend the fatherland. The Girondins were chiefly responsible for the foreign war; they fell because of it. And though the details of their fall are interesting and instructive, the main error which caused them to fall was that they did not recognize the whole-heartedness of France. During the Terror the war which they had declared against Europe was to be expiated by their lives on the scaffold and in the open fields, by suicide and by midnight murder.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FALL OF THE GIRONDINS.

The Girondins attack Marat—The Commune of Paris attack the Girondins—Trial and acquittal of Marat—The Committee of Twelve—The 31st of May—François Hanriot—The *coup d'état* of the 2nd of June—The Constitution of 1793—Life in Paris—Murder of Marat by Charlotte Corday—The campaign in French Flanders—Losses of the French—Victories of Hondschooten and Wattignies—The defence of Mayence—The campaigns in the south—Disturbances in the interior—Risings in Brittany and Anjou—Rebellion in La Vendée—Campaigns in La Vendée—Rossignol and Ronsin—Suppression of the rebellion—Insurrection of the great cities—Lyons—Marseilles—Bordeaux—The Girondins in Normandy—Wimpfen—The battle of Pacy—The wanderings of the proscribed Girondins—The death of Buzot and Pétion, and their friends—Character of the Girondins.

THE desertion of Dumouriez had caused strong measures to be taken by the Convention to increase the strength of the Republic at home, and to improve the efficiency of the armies on the frontiers, and all parties had concurred in taking these important steps. Although Danton was really the author of the idea of giving absolute power to the Committee of Public Safety and to the Revolutionary Tribunal, it was Isnard, a Girondin, who actually proposed the new committee, and only the small section of the Girondin party which followed Lanjuinais voted against it. But as soon as these important measures had been taken, which the majority of the Convention believed would enable France once more to free her frontiers from the invaders, the Girondins and Jacobins turned upon each other with redoubled

ardour, and the death-struggle between them recommenced. The Girondins reopened the struggle with an attack upon Marat. Few steps could have been more foolish, for Marat, though in many ways a real statesman, had from the exaggeration of his language never obtained the influence in the Convention to which his abilities entitled him. He was by no means the most redoubtable foe of the Girondins, but his abuse and his loudly expressed contempt for them as "little statesmen" had stung them to the quick, and they attacked him with all their usual fury of eloquence. Marat was no favourite in the Convention, but he remained the idol of the people of Paris, and in attacking him the Girondins exasperated the people of Paris in the person of their beloved journalist.

On April 11 Guadet read a placard in the Convention, which Marat had posted on the walls of Paris, full of his usual libellous abuse of the Girondins. It was referred to the Committee of Legislation with other writings of Marat, and on April 13 Delaunay brought up the report of the committee. The question whether Marat should be sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal or not was voted upon by the *appel nominal*, and lasted all night; yet only 360 deputies were present out of 749. Many were of course absent on mission, but a larger proportion of deputies, including Danton and Barère, avoided attending the Convention that night on purpose. Of the rest, 220 voted that Marat should be sent before the Tribunal, 92 that he should not, 7 supported an adjournment, and 41, though present, refused to vote upon the question. This decree of the Convention was regarded by the Girondins as a very great victory, and it certainly proves the influence of the group which was led by Lanjuinais, and which might at this time be called the principal section of the Girondin party, for Brissot, Guadet, Lasource, Condorcet, Gensonné, and Vergniaud all abstained from voting. But the Jacobins were determined that, as the Girondins had had an opportunity of showing their power in the Convention, they in their turn would show the Girondins how small their influence was in Paris, and on April 15, in the name of thirty-five sections of

Paris, Pache and Hébert demanded the expulsion from the Convention of twenty-two of the leading Girondins as "disturbers of the public peace," including Brissot, Guadet, Vergniaud, Gensonné, Buzot, Barbaroux, Louvet, Pétion, and Lanjuinais.¹ The majority of the Girondin party were indignant at this proposition, but instead of attempting any regular reprisal, they passed to the order of the day, and refused to support a proposal of Lasource on the 16th, that the primary assemblies should be summoned to meet on the 5th of May, in order to ostracize such deputies as they disapproved of. On April 17 the population of Bordeaux sent up a petition, complaining of the Jacobins, and Lhuillier, the procureur-général-syndic of the department of the Seine, demanded that a maximum should be established for the price of food. The opposition of the Commune of Paris and the administrators of the Seine to the Girondins became more and more embittered, and the Jacobin leaders felt that they had a ready instrument with which to overthrow the Girondins, when their plans were fully matured. But it was very important, before the Girondins should be attacked, to make quite certain that the populace of Paris would support the action of its authorities.

On April 22 the trial of Marat took place. He was unanimously acquitted, although most of the judges of the Revolutionary Tribunal sympathized with the Girondins, for it must be remembered that so far there had been no change in the *personnel* of the Tribunal since the first election of its members in March; that the president, Montané, himself was of moderate opinions, and that the jurors included men of high character, and even ex-Constituents. The acquittal of Marat was a fearful blow to the Girondin party; they had in no way discredited the Jacobins, and had only made themselves unpopular in Paris, and given themselves an appearance of want of patriotism by attacking the journalist, who was styled and who styled himself "the martyr of liberty." The Commune of Paris steadily organized the more advanced

¹ For the names of the Girondin deputies accused on this and subsequent occasions, see Appendix IV., "The Girondin Party."

republicans of the city for an open attack upon the Girondins, and on April 28 held a great fête in honour of Lazouski, who had played an important part in the events of August 10, and who had just died of a disgraceful malady, contracted during the past year. This fête increased the popularity of the Commune, and induced Guadet to move, on April 30, that the Convention should remove to Versailles.

Throughout the month of May, preparations for the final struggle went on; it was recognized by both parties that they must appeal to force, and arrangements for appealing to force were made as openly for the *coup d'état* of May 31 as they had been for that of August 10. On the one side, the Commune of Paris steadily concentrated its armed strength and formed its plan of action; on the other, the leading Girondins met daily at the house of Valazé, and prepared to move decrees in the Convention. But the struggle was certain to be a very unequal one for two reasons. First, the Girondins were divided among themselves, and their divisions became more and more accentuated; they had never formed a really homogeneous party, and nearly every deputy had now a different scheme for settling their quarrel with the Jacobins. But to the main difference between the Brissotins and the Buzotins was now added one between the federalist and the anti-federalist deputies. Buzot was at the head of the federalist party, and earnestly advised an appeal to the provinces, but he was not supported by a single member of the original Girondin party. Vergniaud openly disapproved of the scheme as unpatriotic. Guadet, Gensonné, and Brissot thought it a mistake to unsettle France when her difficulties on the frontiers were so great. Buzot found his warmest supporters among the younger deputies, such as Barbaroux, Louvet, Isnard, and Valady, and among such brave spirits as the Bretons, Lanjuinais and Kervelegan; but the party which supported federalist ideas was paralyzed by the refusal of the greatest Girondin orators to act with them. Vergniaud, in particular, refused more and more to go to Madame Roland's salon, and spent a great deal of his time in his own rooms

with Ducos and Boyer-Fonfrede, who also disapproved of the civil war which the federalist scheme would bring upon France, if carried into execution. The second reason why the Girondins were fighting an unequal battle lay in their weakness in Paris. They had no class of Parisians on whom they could rely for assistance. The bourgeois of Paris, who formed the majority of the National Guard, were simply disgusted with the Girondin idea of reducing Paris in importance and holding the Convention elsewhere, which would greatly increase the drain on their impoverished purses, and were certainly not inclined to strike a blow on their behalf. There were no troops in Paris, upon whom the Girondins could depend, and no fédérés from the provinces to help them; and there was no Constitutional Guard. The Convention was quite open to the attacks of the rabble, which the Commune could raise in great numbers; and with full knowledge of this fact, the Girondins awaited the approach of their doom with their courage still unabated.

On May 10 the Convention left the Riding-school, or Manège, in which the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies had sate, and took up its quarters in the private theatre of the palace of the Tuileries, which had been built in 1671, and opened with the first performance of Molière's "Psyche." On the 15th Isnard was elected President of the Convention, and on the 18th Guadet proposed to dissolve the Commune of Paris, and to summon the Convention to meet at Bourges. The influence of the Girondins over the deputies of the Plain might possibly have carried this motion, had not Barère adroitly proposed the appointment instead of a Committee of Twelve, to report upon the safety of the Convention.

On May 20 this committee was elected. It consisted entirely of Girondins and deputies of the Plain, but it only contained five deputies of any distinction—Boyer-Fonfrede, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Kervelegan, Henry Larivière, and Bergœing. On the 24th Viger, a young member of the Committee of Twelve, brought up its report, recommending the establishment of a special guard, elected in the depart-

ments, for the Convention, and directly afterwards the Committee of Twelve declared itself *en permanence*, and issued orders for the arrests of a young radical journalist, named Varlet, and of Hébert, the redoubtable editor of *Père Duchesne*. These measures were promptly met by the Commune. The Council-general of Paris immediately declared itself also *en permanence*, and sent a fiery protest against Hébert's arrest to the Convention. Isnard answered the petition with a haughtiness which finally alienated the people of Paris from the Girondin party, for he declared that "if a finger were laid on the representatives of the nation, Paris would utterly disappear from the face of the earth, and wanderers on the banks of the Seine would soon be searching if such a city had ever existed." The struggle was now reduced to one between the Committee of Twelve and the Commune of Paris. On May 26 the Commune petitioned against the Committee of Twelve, and on the same evening the Committee ordered the arrest of Dobsent, president of the section of the Cité, for protesting against Hébert's arrest. On the 27th Garat, Minister of the Interior, made a report on the state of Paris. He declared that there was no danger whatever, and that the imagination of the members of the Committee of Twelve was so affected, that they really believed they would have to show the greatest courage and die for their country. He concluded by saying, "I report to the Convention that it has no risks to run, and that all the deputies can return in peace to their homes." After Garat's report, Lacroix proposed the dissolution of the Committee of Twelve and the release of Hébert, which was carried late at night, when many of the deputies had left the Convention, and when, according to Girondin writers, many men voted who were not members of the Convention at all. But Lanjuinais would not allow this overthrow of the committee without a protest, and on May 28 he proposed its re-establishment, and after an *appel nominal* it was re-established by 279 to 238; but among the minority of 238 might be noted the names of Condorcet, Carra and Rabaut-Pommier, who, though Girondins, voted against their party.

On receiving this news, the sections of Paris declared themselves *en permanence*, and the *coup d'état* was openly fixed for May 31. The example of August 10 was exactly followed.¹ An insurrectionary municipality, elected in the more revolutionary sections, met in the former palace of the archbishops on May 30, and elected Dobsent its president. It immediately superseded the Council-general of the Commune at the Hôtel de Ville, as the insurrectionary commune of August 9 had previously done; and it elected Hanriot commandant-general of the National Guard, in the place of Santerre, who had been appointed a brigadier-general, and had left for La Vendée on May 10. It even desired so far to follow the example of August 10 as to wish to put Pache under temporary arrest; but Pache had been ordered to the Convention, and was there announcing that everything was peaceful in Paris. At 6 a.m. on the morning of May 31 the tocsin was rung, and the ministers, the administrators of the department of the Seine, and the Mayor of Paris all assembled at the Tuileries in the hall of the Convention. Rabaut de Saint-Étienne opened the debate by proposing the dissolution of the Commune of Paris, and directly afterwards Vergniaud proposed that the sections of Paris deserved well of their country for the zeal with which they had attempted to restore order. By this means he hoped to set at issue the sections and the Commune of Paris, and to induce the sections to overthrow the redoubtable Commune itself; but the plan was too subtle, and Vergniaud's proposition has been generally regarded as an indication of fear on the part of the Girondins. Barère then advanced to the tribune, and on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety proposed the dissolution of the Committee of Twelve, and the grant of extended powers to the Committee

¹ On the events of May 31 and June 2 the chief authority is *La Révolution du 31 Mai et du 2 Juin, et le Fédéralisme en 1793*, by Henri Wallon (Paris, 2 vols. 1885). See also Mortimer-Ternaux' *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. v.; Schmidt's *Tableaux de la Révolution française*, vol. i.; and, among contemporary pamphlets, Gorsas' *Précis rapide des événements qui ont lieu à Paris les 30 et 31 Mai, 1 et 2 Juin, 1793* (Paris: 1793).

of Public Safety, and after this motion was passed, the Convention quietly dispersed without taking further measures.

The leaders of the Commune were much dissatisfied with such a tame termination of their *coup d'état*. They had not only desired to procure the suppression of the Committee of Twelve, but had hoped also that the members of that committee and the designated twenty-two Girondins would have been sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal. However, the Council-general of the Commune of its own accord ordered the arrest of Roland, Clavière, and Lebrun. The two latter, who were still ministers, were not taken to prison, but left under the care of a gendarme in their own houses. The "virtuous" Roland escaped, but Madame Roland was arrested and removed to the Abbaye. On June 1 the tocsin again rang. The day was Saturday, the one day on which the workmen in the public workshops attended at their place of work, because it was pay-day. No great crowd collected in the streets or around the Tuileries. Pache reported to the Committee of Public Safety that the citizens of the sections were fatigued with the calumnies of the Girondins, and he was accompanied on his return to the Hôtel de Ville by Marat. In the Convention Barère at midnight proposed that the Committee of Public Safety should be charged to draw up a report on the conduct of the denounced Girondins.

The Commune had practically failed both on May 31 and June 1. Hanriot in particular felt that one or two more such failures would not only lose him his own position, but give time to the Girondins to concoct means of defence. He was not the disgraced lackey and convicted thief that the Girondin writers have delighted to describe him, but was a manufacturer in a small way in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, and had a workshop in which he employed some thirty workmen, close to that of Réveillon, and in the Réveillon riot in May, 1789,¹ his own house had received some injury. Throughout the early years of the Revolution his career had been that of a bourgeois, who, instead of keeping quiet and thinking only of the interests of

¹ Vol. i. p. 125.

his class, had hoped to make a figure by putting himself at the head of his more ignorant neighbours, and it was thus that he had been elected an officer of the National Guard of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, and he was promoted for his services on August 10 to be commandant of the section of the Buttes des Moulins. From this command he had been chosen, on May 30, by the insurrectionary Commune, to be commandant-general of the National Guard of Paris in the place of Santerre. He had only held this office for two days, and he felt that he must now justify his appointment. He agreed with the insurrectionary commune that the Convention should be blockaded by armed men, and forced to send before the Revolutionary Tribunal the Committee of Twelve, the twenty-two denounced Girondins, and the two ministers, Clavière and Lebrun. It was also decided that until such a decree was passed, no deputy should be allowed to leave the Tuileries. The troops he could best depend upon were the German Legion of Rosenthal, which had been recruited from foreigners living in Paris, and contained most of the Swiss guards who had not perished on August 10, and was now under orders for La Vendée, where it distinguished itself by its fury and debauchery. At the most important points these Swiss and Germans were to be stationed, and for the rest Hanriot collected a large body of *sans-culottes*, who were hired at forty sous a day to form a special force under his orders. There was no particular wish to join him until the forty sous were offered, but, on the other hand, there was no tendency whatever shown by any of the bourgeois in the National Guard to interfere with his proceedings. Madame Roland, however, reports a conversation she had upon this very day with some *sans-culottes*, who openly professed their joy that the calumniators of Paris were at last to be arrested.¹

In the Convention for some hours on June 2 everything went on as usual with reports from the armies and ordinary business, which included the news of the capture of Fontenay-le-Comte by the Vendéans, and of the insurrection

¹ Dauban's edition of Madame Roland's *Mémoires*.

in Lyons, until Lanjuinais could no longer control himself, and, rushing to the tribune, asked why the tocsin was again ringing. A deputation from the Commune of Paris then appeared and demanded the arrest of the members of the Committee of Twelve, of the twenty-two, and of Clavière and Lebrun. Ichon proposed to give way, but was opposed by Larévellière-Lepaux, who argued that such a surrender would tarnish the honour of the Convention. Barère then appeared on behalf of the united Committees of Public Safety and General Security, and proposed that, to save the honour of the Convention, the accused deputies should be invited to suspend themselves from their functions. Isnard, Lanthenas, Fauchet, and Dusaulx at once acquiesced, but Barbaroux and Lanjuinais refused, and Barère perceived that his plan for avoiding the appearance of yielding to the Commune had practically failed. Marat then proposed that the names of Ducos, Lanthenas, and Dusaulx should be struck out of the list, because Ducos was a young chatterer, Lanthenas a foolish fellow, and Dusaulx an old idiot, and that those of Defermon and Valazé should be inserted. Boissy d'Anglas, the ex-Constituant, and friend of Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, who sat in the Plain at the Convention, now entered the hall and declared that the Convention was besieged by the mob. Hérault de Séchelles, who was acting president in consequence of the fatigue of Mallarmé, immediately proceeded to the Place du Carrousel at the head of the deputies to see if the Convention was really surrounded. There is no need to believe in the apocryphal interview between Hérault and Hanriot, but the truth was soon recognized that the deputies were practically prisoners. They then marched round the gardens of the Tuileries and perceived that they would not be allowed to adjourn without acceding to the wishes of the Commune, and, under the guidance of Marat, they returned to their hall and, on the motion of Couthon, it was decreed that the members of the Committee of Twelve, the twenty-two, and the two ministers were to be placed under arrest in their own houses. Marat again obtained the freedom of Ducos, Lanthenas, and

Dusaulx, and Legendre that of Boyer-Fonfrede and of a deputy named Saint-Martin Valogne, who had not signed the decree of arrest against Dobsent. In all thirty-one individuals were ordered to be kept under surveillance in their own houses by one gendarme. These thirty-one included twenty out of the twenty-two who had been accused by the Commune, namely, Gensonné, Guadet, Grangeneuve, Vergniaud, and Lasource, who had been leaders of the Girondin party in the Legislative Assembly; Brissot, the "politician," who had been instrumental in drawing France into war; Buzot, Salle, Lanjuinais, and Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, who had all sate in the Constituent Assembly; Pétion, the former Mayor of Paris; Louvet of the *Sentinelle*; Barbaroux, the journalist of Marseilles; Gorsas, the editor of the *Courrier des Départements*; Birotteau, the future leader of the insurrection at Lyons; and Valazé, the leader of the Norman Girondins, with the less-known Chambon, Lidon, Lehardi, and Lesage. With these twenty were ordered to be arrested Clavière and Lebrun, the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs, and nine of the Committee of Twelve, excluding Boyer-Fonfrede and Saint-Martin Valogne, who had been saved by Legendre, and Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, who has been mentioned in the former list. These nine included, with Kervelegan, Larivière, and Bergceing, the comparatively unknown deputies Gardien, Boileau, Bertrand, Viger, Mollevaut, and Gomaire. The day's work of proscription was finally ended by an order to Isnard and Fauchet not to leave Paris, and the long sitting of the Convention was concluded at 11 p.m.

The Commune of Paris had been completely successful, and it was by its means that the Jacobins had been able to overthrow their opponents. The *coup d'état* of June 2 left the members of the Mountain predominant in the Convention. The deputies of the Marsh or Plain were now docile to the voice of the Jacobin leaders, and ready to assent to any projects which might be submitted to them. But the Jacobin leaders had also to deal with the Commune, which had gained them their victory, and the contest for power was no longer

between the Jacobins and the Girondins in the Convention, but between the Jacobins of the Convention and the members of the Commune of Paris. For many months they acted in harmony, and turned their attention to more important matters, but the struggle was bound to come at last. They occupied themselves at first with making a bold front against both enemies on the frontiers and enemies in France, for dangers had everywhere to be faced. During the summer months of June and July, 1793, Condé and Valenciennes were taken by the allies; the English blockaded Dunkirk; Mayence surrendered to the Prussians, and the Spaniards occupied nearly the whole of Roussillon. Everywhere the foreign enemies were successful, and in France itself the Vendéans had with fresh courage invaded the province of Lower Poitou. Saumur was in their power, and their leaders were confident of occupying the important city of Nantes. At Lyons, under the inspiration of Birotteau, the citizens declared themselves independent of the Convention. Marseilles arrested two deputies on mission, and was preparing to send troops against Paris. Bordeaux despatched deputies all over the south of France to organize a revolt, and expelled two deputies on mission; while at Caen seventeen Girondin deputies collected, who endeavoured to combine the departments of Brittany and Normandy in their favour, and were supported by General Wimpfen, commanding the army of the coasts of Cherbourg.

The events of June 2 were not regarded with favour by the non-combatant members of the Convention, and though the deputies of the Plain never openly condemned the *coup d'état*, several protesting Girondins were still left in their seats, two of whom, Doulcet and Boyer-Fonfrede, used bold language against the leaders of the Mountain. Besides this, they drew up a protest against the arrest of their colleagues, signed by seventy-four or seventy-five deputies, which is generally known as the protest of the seventy-three.¹ It was kept secret, but was discovered among the papers of Lauze-Deperret, deputy for Marseilles and a friend of Barbaroux,

¹ See Appendix IV. : "The Girondin Party."

which were examined after the arrest of Charlotte Corday. To have signed this protest was a cause for proscription in later months, and four deputies who signed it were executed on that account some months later. That the protest was kept secret shows that the remaining Girondins and the deputies of the Plain felt that they were defeated, and as bad news kept arriving from every quarter, the Jacobins determined for a time at least to put an end to the internal disputes in the Convention, and to complete and proclaim an elaborate republican constitution, as the best means of quieting France. To draw up this constitution, five deputies, Ramel, Hérault de Séchelles, Mathieu, Couthon, and Saint-Just, were specially added to the Committee of Public Safety, and by working night and day the new constitution was ready by June 24,¹ when deputies were sent all over France to obtain its ratification by the primary assemblies of the departments. In honour of its completion, a great fête of federation was held in Paris on June 24, under the direction of David the painter, himself a deputy for the capital.

The continuous series of defeats, both in the provinces and on the frontiers, proved that still further exertions were necessary, but the means for creating a really strong execution were now ready. The Committee of Public Safety was every day becoming more important, and as soon as the majority of the Convention recognized clearly that they formed too unwieldy a body to superintend every detail of administration, a very little pressure from the Commune of Paris and a few more disasters ensured to the Committee the unlimited power which enabled it to carry France triumphantly through the terrible winter of 1793, and which only had to be surrendered when the need for the system of Terror, which it vigorously supported, was gone. It cannot

¹ See Appendix V., "The Republican Constitution of 1793." As this constitution never came into practical working, owing to the Revolutionary Government, a description of it has been relegated to an appendix, where it is compared with the scheme drawn up by the first Constitutional Committee, under the influence of Condorcet.

be too strongly insisted upon that the whole of that system of Terror was due to the perils in the provinces and on the frontiers. Extraordinary were those difficulties, and equally extraordinary means of government were necessary to meet them. Such means were found in the immense powers given to the Committees of Public Safety and of General Security, and to the Revolutionary Tribunal. The system of Terror was only reluctantly acquiesced in as a necessity; it was never popular, and when it had reached its height and seemed no longer justified by the condition of affairs, it was overthrown and declared infamous by the very men who had patiently undergone its yoke, when its extreme powers were necessary for the safety of the country.

Meanwhile, how did the citizens of Paris look on these great events which were passing before their very eyes? With their usual gaiety of heart. No summer witnessed more brilliant fêtes than the summer of 1793, the forerunner of that terrible winter. The theatres were always full; restaurateurs made great fortunes, for not only deputies to the Convention, but innumerable people in authority were perpetually being summoned to Paris to render an account of their services, who liked good dinners and could afford to pay for them accordingly. While leading Parisians of every class willingly bowed down to the Commune and the Committees in order to obtain lucrative appointments, whether as commissioners to the armies or as clerks in the over-filled public offices of the city, the ouvriers, though not rich, did not yet feel the pinch of poverty, which was to make them riotous once more in the succeeding winter. The few sous they received were enough to sustain existence, and for their pleasure the theatres were often ordered to play gratis, and there were great fêtes on many occasions, notably on August 10, in commemoration of the capture of the Tuileries. The fever of the Revolution had attacked every mind, and money, since it was quickly made, was quickly squandered. The republican costume now began to come into fashion. Since breeches were unpatriotic and the loose trousers of the sans-culottes un-

picturesque, the dandies who could afford it wore a compromise between breeches and trousers in the long tight leggings, whose popularity spread to distant countries. For Paris remained the mistress of the fashions of Europe. Every extravagance of patriotism and republicanism was introduced in those exciting days; the very playing-cards were no longer made with kings, queens, and knaves, but with liberties, equalities, and fraternities of the different suits. The gaiety of the times is attested in the numerous reports, which have been published,¹ of the staff of spies established in Paris by Garat as Minister of the Interior. These men were present at every meeting, café, and restaurant, and at all the dances and fêtes, and heard what there was in the mouths of men, and it is most astonishing to see how small a space political matters fill in their reports. With regard to individuals, many an argument was heard; fights are reported in the Palais-Royal, now called the Palais-Égalité, between the young men who declared Miranda was a traitor to the country, and those who defended him. Immense excitement is reported on the questions whether the Vendéans had really crossed the Loire, and whether the Normans were advancing on Paris; but little seems to have been said about the Convention or its leaders, and it may well be imagined that the gay and lively Parisians thought it better not to adopt such subjects for conversation, but were contented to let matters go on as they would, as long as their own pleasures were not interfered with. The probable behaviour of the departments was much canvassed in the Committee of Public Safety and in the Commune, in the cafés, and in the streets, for it was a serious question for the Jacobin leaders and for Paris whether the departments would declare against them or not. Everything seemed to indicate that the supremacy of Paris would be of short duration; Lyons, Bordeaux, Marseilles, Montpellier, Toulon, Nîmes, and Grenoble in the south, all declared against the Convention; in the north Caen and Évreux were enthusiastic on behalf of the Girondin deputies, who had fled to their midst, while it was feared that

¹ Schmidt's *Tableaux de la Révolution française*, vol. ii. pp. 1-99.

the rebels of the north and south would combine with the rebels in La Vendée and the Vivarais for the capture of Paris. The news which created most interest related to the arrest of Brissot on June 10 at Moulins, and the daring escapes of Pétion, Lanjuinais, Louvet, and Guadet, and, on the motion of Charles, the rest of the Girondin prisoners, including Vergniaud, who could have escaped and would not take the opportunity,¹ were ordered to the Abbaye on July 24, and imprisoned in the Luxembourg on July 26. But all the excitement about the Girondin deputies was thrown into the shade by the rumour which rang through Paris with terrible significance, that Marat had been murdered by a young girl, the supposed emissary of the escaped Girondins.

The Ami du Peuple had been confined to his house in the Rue des Cordeliers by a severe skin-disease, and had not been able to attend the sittings of the Convention since June 8. His health was so very bad that, in spite of the loving care of Simonne Évrard, whom he had married, to quote his own words, "before Heaven," he was gradually sinking, and could only find relief by sitting in a hot bath. He had been unable to publish his journal with his usual punctuality, and had received the condolences of a deputation of the Jacobin Club on his state of health. His last public act in the Convention had been to try to save the lives of Ducos, Lanthenas, and Dusaulx, and he knew as a medical man that his end was fast approaching. The fact of his dying condition, however, was not known in the departments, and he was believed to be the leader of the Mountain. As has been said, his influence had never been great in the Convention, and his bad state of health made it slighter than ever. Yet his bitter taunts in former days had exasperated the Girondins more than the serious attacks of their more determined enemies, and they hated him with a bitter hatred. This hatred exhaled in the conversation of the escaped Girondin deputies at Caen, and a young girl was excited by it to a desire to murder their enemy. Marie Anne Charlotte

¹ Vatol's *Vergniaud*, vol. ii.

de Corday d'Armont, a descendant of the great dramatist Corneille, was born in 1768, and was therefore twenty-five when she met these escaped Girondins at Caen. She had been brought up in much the same manner as Madame Roland, whom she resembled in many ways, and had made Plutarch her favourite author. Many lovers have been attributed to her, from the Comte de Belzunce, murdered at Caen in a riot in 1789,¹ to Barbaroux, the Girondin leader; but the latest investigator of the subject has successfully disproved all these legends, and has shown nearly with certainty that she was in love with Charles Henry Bougon-Longrais, an avocat and native of Caen, who had been elected procureur-général-syndic of the Calvados in 1792,² and was a federalist. She was at Caen when the Girondin deputies took up their abode there, and thought it would be a noble deed to murder the man whom she heard them abuse the most. She decided to go to Paris without informing any one of her purpose, and obtained a letter of introduction from Barbaroux to his friend and compatriot, the deputy Lauze-Deperret. On arriving in Paris she went to see both Lauze-Deperret and Fauchet, and got them to take her to the Convention, where, however, she failed to see the object of her hatred. She then obtained his address, and purchased a knife in the Palais-Égalité, with which to slay her victim. She wrote a letter to Marat, stating she had important news about the escaped deputies to give him, to which she received no answer, and when she called at his house on that and the following day, Simonne Évrard refused to admit her. She then wrote to him a second time on July 13: "Citizen, I wrote to you yesterday and presented myself at your door this morning. Did you receive my letter? If you have received it, I hope that you will not refuse to see me. I repeat to you that I have important secrets to reveal to you, and can put you in the way to serve the Republic. Further, it is enough for me to inform you that I am unhappy, in order to hope that your

¹ Vol. i. chap. vi. p. 186.

² *L'Amour sous la Terreur*, by E. de Lescure. Paris: 1832.

kind heart will not be insensible, and to have a right to your justice." This touching letter had its effect. When Charlotte Corday called in the evening, Marat, sitting in his bath, as he was as usual, ordered her to be admitted, and while he was writing down the names of the deputies at Caen, she stabbed him in the throat without speaking a word, and after one cry to Simonne Évrard for assistance, he died.

This is the true story of the murder of Marat. Charlotte Corday has been treated as a martyr; she was really guilty of a most cold-blooded murder, which was productive of good to no one. Her conduct shows to what a pitch of exaltation the words of the Girondins could excite individuals; if not guilty of murder themselves, they certainly were the cause of this assassination. It was absolutely useless; Marat's importance belonged to the years 1789, 1790, 1791, and 1792, during which his opinions and actions have been studied; in 1793 his influence had diminished, and in July, 1793, he was dying. He, like his murderess, had had his mind affected by the Revolution. The excitement of the times and the persecution he had suffered had affected him with what may be called revolutionary madness, and it must have required a strong mind not to be affected in those days of crisis. She was tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal, found guilty, and executed, on July 17, 1793, and was three months later followed to the guillotine by Adam Lux, a young deputy for Mayence, who openly declared his admiration for her deed. With such events happening around them, it is not to be wondered at that the Parisians did not listen with so much interest as the members of the Committee of Public Safety to the news from the frontiers, serious as it was.

Auguste de Dampierre, a ci-devant marquis, who had served in the royal army, succeeded Dumouriez after his desertion, as senior general of division, in the command-in-chief of the armies of the North and of the Ardennes. He attempted to resist the advance of the Austrians, under the Prince of Coburg, and of the English, under the Duke of York, who had united their armies and formed the blockade

of Condé. Dampierre was killed in a skirmish on May 8, and before Custine, who had been appointed to succeed him, could arrive at the head-quarters of his army, the English had stormed the French entrenched camp at Famars, and the allies had laid siege to Valenciennes. Condé capitulated on July 10, but Valenciennes,¹ under General Ferrand, resisted forty-three days of bombardment, and did not surrender until July 28. Kilmaine, a cadet of a noble Irish family, who had served through the American War of Independence in the Hussars of Lauzun, succeeded Custine in the command-in-chief, when that general was arrested. He was unable to meet the invaders in the field, and it was only a serious dispute between the Prince of Coburg and the Duke of York which prevented the allied army from marching directly upon Paris. After the capture of Valenciennes, the Duke of York wished that the allied army should turn towards Dunkirk, which the English ministry desired to hold in order to have some good port at which to land troops and munitions of war. The Prince of Coburg refused, and the two armies separated, the Austrians to besiege Le Quesnoy, and the Duke of York to besiege Dunkirk with his mixed force of English, Dutch, and Hanoverians. Dunkirk was very ably defended by Souham, who had Hoche under him, and Berlier and Trullard as deputies on mission, and by cutting the dykes they prevented the enemy from getting near the city. The Duke of York divided his troops into three distinct bodies: the besieging army under himself, a covering army under General Freytag, and the Dutch troops encamped at Menin under the Prince of Orange.

The siege was formed on August 24, and at that moment Carnot had just entered the Committee of Public Safety. He at once superseded Kilmaine by General Houchard from the army of the Moselle, and ordered him to collect all his available soldiers in front of Dunkirk. Carnot then requisi-

¹ See *Le Siège de Valenciennes*, by J. N. Bécays-Ferrand (Paris: 1805): an interesting MS. criticizing this work, by an officer of the garrison, in the author's possession; and a brochure, *Siège de Valenciennes en 1793*, published at Valenciennes, 1883.

tioned every horse that could be found, and, mounting on them the best troops of the armies of the Ardennes and the Moselle, concentrated a very large force against the English army. On September 6 Houchard led an attack against the position of General Freytag at the little village of Hondschooten. The French fought well, for in Carnot they knew that they had a minister who could perceive military merit at a glance, and had power to reward it on the spot. Freytag was driven from Hondschooten, and Delbrel and Levasseur, the deputies on mission, publicly degraded two adjutants, and promoted many young officers on their own responsibility. With such vigorous organizers of victory at his side, Houchard stormed the camp of Furnes on September 8, and that of Menin on September 13, and after these defeats the Duke of York was obliged to raise the siege of Dunkirk, and to retreat rapidly towards the Prince of Coburg. But before he joined Coburg a very similar series of operations to those of Houchard had taken place under the direction of General Jourdan. Carnot had been dissatisfied with Houchard for not following up his victories, and had perceived the merits of Jourdan; and on September 22 he gave the latter, a veteran soldier of the American war, the command-in-chief. Exactly the same plan was followed. Carnot brought up by forced requisitions all the troops that could be mustered from the victorious army, against the Austrians who were besieging Maubeuge; and under his inspiration in his presence Jourdan defeated Clerfayt at Wattignies, on October 15, after which the Prince of Coburg retired across the frontier, and eventually joined the Duke of York in Belgium.

The operations of the other armies have not as much importance as those upon the north-eastern frontier, where it will be perceived that the French were from June to August experiencing a long series of repulses and defeats, which they revenged in the months of September and October. On the Rhine the great event was the siege of Mayence.¹ When

¹ See particularly a series of articles by Félix Bouvier on the siege of Mayence in *La Révolution française*, September, 1882, to February, 1883.

Custine retired from Germany he left 22,000 men to garrison that city under the command of various generals, of whom the most famous were Aubert-Dubayet, Doyré, Kléber, and Meusnier de la Place, with two deputies on mission, Merlin of Thionville and Rewbell; but he had left insufficient provisions, and the Prussians confidently expected a short siege and an easy conquest. However, the courage of the two deputies on mission inspired the raw young volunteers who formed the bulk of the garrison, and the defence of Mayence is famous in the history of sieges. For a month the soldiers were kept on half rations, but they expected speedy relief either from General Alexandre de Beauharnais, the ex-Constituant, who had succeeded Custine in the command of the army of the Rhine, or from General Houchard and the army of the Moselle. They waited in vain; and after every animal in the city, down to the very rats, had been eaten, and after the gallantry of the French republicans had impressed the Prussians so much that the Prussian generals and the French deputies mutually respected each other, Mayence surrendered on July 23. The first feeling of the Convention was one of indignation against the garrison; but the glowing accounts which Merlin of Thionville and Rewbell gave of its behaviour made the Convention declare that the defenders had deserved well of the country, and at the same time order the arrest of Custine and Beauharnais, for not having better provisioned or relieved the city. Since the garrison had surrendered on condition that the soldiers should not serve in foreign wars for one year, the gallant defenders of Mayence, who, though reduced from 22,000 to 8000 men, were now warlike and experienced troops, were ordered to La Vendée. After the capture of Mayence the Prussians made no further efforts. But the Austrian marshal, Wurmser, after forcing his way into Alsace, carried the famous lines of Wissembourg on October 13; after which defeat Saint-Just and Le Bas, the deputies on mission, selected Pichegru for the command of the army of the Rhine.

The armies of the Alps and of Italy did nothing against the foreign enemies during 1793. Kellermann, who was in

command of the army of the Alps, covered the siege of Lyons and kept the Sardinians in check, while Brunet, who succeeded Biron in the command of the army of Italy in May, 1793, is chiefly known for his quarrel with the deputy on mission, Fréron. It so happened that Fréron had been sent to the south-east of France for recruiting purposes only, and Brunet therefore refused to recognize him as a representative of the people with his army, with the result that he was himself quite independent, since, owing to the arrest of Pierre Baille and Beauvais at Toulon and the absence of Despinassy, only one deputy, Paul Barras, remained accredited to the army, and the Convention had decreed that the authority of two was necessary to control the generals-in-chief. The struggle ended by the supersession and arrest of Brunet on August 8, and the appointment of Dumerbion in his place.

In Spain the army of the Pyrenees, which had been under the command of the former Girondin minister, Servan, since the month of October, 1792, was divided into two armies in April, 1793—those of the Eastern and the Western Pyrenees. That of the Eastern Pyrenees was extremely weak in men, and was also weakened by perpetual changes of generals; so that during the summer of 1793 the Spanish general, Don Ricardos de Castillo, assisted by a Portuguese army under General João Forbes-Skelater,¹ had occupied the whole of Roussillon, except the capital, Perpignan. Here again, chiefly owing to the influence of the deputies on mission, Generals Barbantane, Dagobert, and D'Aoust began to recover the province in the beginning of October, and to expel the invaders. The army of the Western Pyrenees did not see so much fighting as that of the Eastern Pyrenees. Servan, as a Girondin, was recalled in July, and his successors were none of them able to carry out any military operations of importance, while the Spaniards were too much occupied in the Eastern Pyrenees to pay much attention to the army in the west.

¹ For the services of this army, and the general effect of the Revolution in Portugal, see Simão José da Luz Soriano's *Historia da Guerra civil et do estabelecimento do governo parlamentar em Portugal*, vol. i.

Thus it will be seen that events on the frontiers in the summer of 1793 were everywhere disastrous to France; while, on the other hand, in the autumn months of September and October the balance was restored. It is impossible not to attribute this improvement in the state of affairs to the great changes which had taken place in Paris. The spring and summer of 1793 were occupied by the quarrels between the Girondins and the Jacobins, which naturally weakened the executive; and it will be shown later that these very disasters on the frontiers, as in so many other instances, had a great influence on the administrative reforms in Paris, and were the chief cause of the immense powers which were given to the Committee of Public Safety. The first results of these extreme powers being granted were the victories of Hondschooten and Wattignies, owing to the presence of Carnot with the army of the North, and the appointment in rapid succession to important commands of such great generals as Jourdan, Pichegru, Hoche, Masséna, Dagobert, and Dugommier.

But it was not only the events on the frontiers which caused the grant of unlimited power to the Great Committee, for appearances in the interior of France were quite as threatening, and the most experienced judges might well have assumed that a great civil war was imminent. From two main sources was civil war approaching—from the Vendéan rebellion, and the insurrection of the cities. The two movements had very different origins and very different results. The Vendéan movement was the spontaneous rebellion of a whole agricultural district; peasants, villagers, gamekeepers, priests, and gentlemen all alike took arms, and a gallant fight they made against overwhelming odds. Very different indeed was the insurrection of the cities, which became manifest after the events of June 2. It was essentially a city movement. Lyons, to mention the city which opposed the greatest resistance to the Convention, was quite unable to obtain any assistance from the districts round it. The peasants of the Lyonnais, nay, even the peasants of Dauphiné and Auvergne, remembered the remorseless cruelty with which the National

Guard of Lyons, under the leadership of the Muscadins, had marched out from the city walls, and hung and shot them when they were burning their masters' châteaux in the summer of 1789.¹ The feud between the peasants and the citizens prevented the federalist movement, which originated in the opposition of several provincial towns to the *coup d'état* of June 2, from obtaining any large amount of support; and the weakness of the rising of isolated cities clearly appears, when the success of the Vendéan movement and the failure of the insurrection of the cities are contrasted.

The movement which is known as the Vendéan rebellion,² and which has been attributed to the highest motives of religion and loyalty, was really by no means so romantic as it has generally been represented. The excitement in the departments formed out of the old provinces of Brittany, Anjou, and Poitou caused by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was not greater than it had been in other districts of France; but the clergy in these provinces were far more unanimous in refusing to take the oath, and therefore it was less possible for the constitutional bishops of these departments to find substitutes for the former clergy. Very much also has often been said of the affection felt by the peasants of these provinces for their lords, and the way in which they followed them during this rebellion against the Convention; but careful examination of the history of the rebellion shows that it was not until the populace had gained some success by themselves, under their own leaders, that the gentry of Poitou came to the front to lead the peasants. It may safely be affirmed that religious and political reasons had very little to do with the

¹ Vol. i. p. 182.

² There is a vast literature on the subject of the rebellion in La Vendée, and it is impossible here to refer to all the valuable works published in recent years on this subject; but special reference may be made for their historical value to Lallié's *Le District de Machecoul* (Paris: 1869); *Les Guerres de La Vendée*, by A. Duchâtellier (Paris: 1876); Lescure's *Mémoires sur La Vendée* (Paris: 1884); and the numerous valuable works of MM. Quernau de Lamerie, Desbrunfaut, and Gustave Bord.

Vendéan rebellion. Brittany, Anjou, and Poitou had heard the news of the events of August 10 in Paris without dissatisfaction, and the peasants would probably have allowed matters to go on in their regular course, but for the decree of February 24, by which 300,000 men were to be raised for the wars on the frontiers, and by which also, if sufficient volunteers did not present themselves in every village, conscription was to be resorted to. Sunday, March 10, was the day fixed for the drawing of these new conscripts, and on that very day the peasants in many villages rose against the republican commissioners who were sent to superintend the drawing of the lots. In some places murder was committed by the peasants, notably at the little town of Machecoul, on the borders of Anjou, where an ex-Constituant, named Maupassant, was killed by the inhabitants.¹ The attempt to enforce the conscription on March 10 was followed by a general rising among the peasants of the five departments of Brittany, and the three northern departments of Anjou and Poitou. In the beginning the movement resembled that of 1789, for castles were again stormed and archives burnt. The same men who had led the risings of 1789 again led the risings of 1793, and the peasants were no more moved by religious motives in 1793 than in 1789. When the outbreak took place, six deputies were on mission in the disturbed districts. Billaud-Varenne and Sevestre were at Rennes, Fouché and Villers at Nantes, Choudieu and Richard at Angers. Under their influence Brittany was rapidly pacified. General Canclaux, an officer of the *ancien régime* who was in command at Brest, speedily quieted Lower Brittany. General Beysser marched out from Rennes and occupied the little town of Roche-Bernard, where a municipal officer, named Sauveur, had been cruelly murdered by the inhabitants, and established order in his district. But the most extraordinary expedition of all was one made by the National Guard of Vannes, which of its own accord marched through all the troubled villages in its vicinity, and even took and garrisoned the town of Rochefort. By April 1 the

¹ *Le District de Machecoul*, by A. Lallié.

deputies on mission were able to assert that the five departments of Brittany had been pacified, and that the rebellion was now confined to the three departments of the Loire-Inférieure, Deux-Sèvres, and La Vendée. The speed with which the spirit of revolt in Brittany had been quieted made the deputies confident that equal success would attend their efforts in Anjou. General Beysser was ordered to Nantes, and collected together there a large force of regulars, national guards, and volunteers, with which to settle the country. The most disturbed district he found to be that of the Pays de Retz, of which the capital was the little town of Machecoul. Here the rebel peasants had been completely successful, and in the town of Machecoul a villain of the stamp of Jourdan Coupe-tête had established himself as ringleader. This man, René François Souchu, had been a lawyer, and now occupied himself in murdering the various republican officers and commissioners who were brought into Machecoul by the peasants. All were executed; and one massacre on April 3 deserves special mention, in which fifty-eight unhappy prisoners were shot down, and many buried alive without the walls.¹ Three days after this massacre, General Beysser occupied Machecoul, and Souchu and many others were executed.

It will be seen, then, that the first phase of the Vendéan disturbances lasted but a very short time, and that they were everywhere easily put down. But the cold-blooded murders of Souchu, and the severe retaliation of Beysser, had imparted a feeling of bitterness to the struggle in the north of La Vendée, and the peasants were not unwilling to rebel once more. Accordingly, after the Easter festivities, armed bands of peasants in search of plunder and murder were again in arms under their self-elected leaders, Cathelineau the postilion, Stofflet the gamekeeper, and Godin the barber; and for the first time some gentlemen of the district also appeared amongst them, such as MM. D'Elbée, Bonchamps, and Lescure. The noblemen and gentlemen of La Vendée had always been particularly loyal to Church and king, for they were, as a rule,

See *Le District de Machecoul*, by A. Lallié, pp. 375, 376. Paris: 1869.

too poor to live much at Paris, and therefore formed an exaggerated idea of the sanctity of royalty and religion. Living much at their country châteaux, they became personally well known to their dependants, and, if not always popular landlords, they were well known by character and appearance to their tenants. For some time they merely shared the leadership with the self-elected captains of the peasants, and, after taking the field at the end of April, though defeated by General Beysser, they obtained a real success over General Quétineau at Thouars. It was during the latter engagement that the most popular hero of the Vendéan rebellion, Henri de la Rochejacquelein,¹ a lad of eighteen, first made himself conspicuous. The victory of Thouars convinced the statesmen at Paris that the Vendéan rebellion of the end of April was more important than the different risings which had occurred during the month of March, and accordingly, when Cambon proposed the establishment of the eleven armies of the Republic, two of them, those of the coasts of La Rochelle and of the coasts of Brest, were intended to be directed against the Vendéan peasants.

The former army was placed under the command of General Biron, who was removed from the army of Italy, and the latter under General Canclaux, who had already shown his capacity in Brittany. Under these generals-in-chief brigadier-generals were appointed, who afterwards distinguished themselves, notably Menou the ex-Constituant, Santerre the brewer of Paris, and Alexandre Berthier, who had belonged to the head-quarter staff of the old royal army, and was to be Napoleon's most trusted military adviser. In June by a strenuous effort a special levy of Parisian volunteers and the German legion which had served on June 2, was despatched to La Vendée under the command of Danton's friend Westermann, who had commanded at the capture of the Tuileries on August 10. Meanwhile the Vendéans continued to be victorious, and La Rochejacquelein took the important town of Saumur by storm on June 10. Cathelineau was now

¹ See *Mémoires de la Rochejacquelein*, ed. 1865.

formally elected their commander-in-chief, and proclaimed Louis XVII., the little prisoner of the Temple, as king of France, and in conjunction with Charette, who commanded in Lower Poitou, he advanced on June 29 to Nantes, which was actually taken and in the possession of the insurgents, when Cathelineau, kneeling down in the chief square to return thanks, was shot dead from an attic, and his men fled in a panic. The repulse from Nantes disheartened the Vendéans, and the arrival of Westermann brought about a new era in the war. He drove the peasants headlong before him at first, and took Châtillon, from which place he was soon expelled with severe loss on July 5. Terrible cruelties had been committed by the revolted peasants ever since the execution of Souchu. No quarter was given to the republican troops, or "Blues," as they were called; and, on the other side, Westermann's Germans and Swiss behaved with equal ferocity against the "Whites." Westermann was suspended by Bourdon of the Oise and Goupilleau de Fontenay, the representatives on mission, for his defeat at Châtillon and his ruthless conduct to his opponents, and ordered to the bar of the Convention; but Barère, on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety, in a long report declared that cruelty must be met by cruelty, and recommended that terror should be the order of the day in the insurgent districts.

The Committee of Public Safety then altered its military system for the worse. It was afraid to employ *ci-devant* nobles and former royal officers in this civil war, and began to suspect the old and tried soldiers who were at present at the head of the republican armies in La Vendée. On July 11 it superseded Biron and appointed to his command a Paris goldsmith named Rossignol, who had been one of the secret Insurrectionary Committee which prepared the rising of June 20,¹ 1792, and a prominent leader under Hanriot on June 2, 1793. Rossignol formed his staff of some leading Paris radicals, including the printer Momoro and the low comedian Grammont; and with a staff composed of such unwarlike

¹ Vol. ii. p. 84.

individuals, he arrived in camp the day after General Tuncq had won a victory over the Vendéans at Luçon. The deputies on mission, Bourdon of the Oise and Goupilleau de Fontenay, at once suspended the new general, and Bourbotte, one of their colleagues, went further and forbade the troops to obey his orders. The wrath of the Commune of Paris at the news that their favoured goldsmith was not recognized as a general exhaled both in the council-general of the Commune and in the Convention; and after a long debate on August 22, Rossignol was sent back with flying colours to do all the mischief he could to the republican army. He was accompanied on this occasion by an equally incompetent general named Ronsin, who, after serving for four years as private in the Regiment of Aunis, had made his living as a playwright in Paris, and during the Revolution his fortune as a commissary with the army of Dumouriez.

Such generals were not likely to overcome the rebellion in La Vendée with the material at their command; and it was almost with joy that the Convention heard that the garrison of Mayence, when that city surrendered, had sworn not to serve for two years against a foreign foe, and could therefore be directed towards La Vendée. The defenders of Mayence, under their famous generals, Aubert-Dubayet, Marceau, and Kléber, and their equally famous deputies, Merlin of Thionville and Rewbell, marched slowly across France to the seat of war. But a quarrel arose immediately between the generals of the armies of Brest and Rochelle, as to which should have the privilege of incorporating the warlike Mayençais among their forces. There could be little doubt among those who knew anything of war that the troops would be more valuable under Canclaux than under Rossignol, and, after a council of war at Saumur, they were ordered to join the army of Brest. But the arrival of the Mayençais did not bring about immediate success, for from September 18 to 23 the republicans lost no less than five important battles. Santerre was beaten at Coron and at Baulieu, Kléber at Torfou, Beysser at Montaigu, and Canclaux at Saint-

Fulgent, and after this series of defeats, Canclaux retreated to Nantes. He was immediately suspended, and both Ronsin and Rossignol were recalled to Paris. After recruiting at Nantes, the army of the coasts of Brest again advanced, and, under the temporary command of Kléber, the Mayençais defeated the Vendéans at Saint-Symphorien, and finally at the great battle of Cholet on October 17. In this battle the two ablest Vendéan leaders, D'Elbée and Bonchamps, were mortally wounded, when the whole rebellion fell to pieces. The remaining insurgents under La Rochejacquelein, accompanied by their wives and children, seized what booty they could, and crossed the Loire into Brittany; but in Brittany they found no help. Far from their own homes, losing men at every step, they reached the shore of the English Channel and attacked the little port of Granville, where they expected that an English fleet might come to rescue them. But their hopes were vain. They were repulsed from Granville by Lecarpentier, the representative on mission there; the Mayençais kept close behind them, and when, a month later, the survivors of the Vendéan peasants, after numerous defeats, recrossed the Loire into their own country, they were but a fragment of their former strength, and their spirit as well as their strength was utterly broken. This great republican success was due mainly to the warlike prowess of the Mayençais, to their splendid generals, and to the energy of the deputies on mission. Just as Rewbell and Merlin of Thionville had been the two leaders in the defence of Mayence, so were they the two chief conquerors of La Vendée in 1793. With them might be mentioned many another deputy, who took his share in the fighting as well as in the organization and provisioning of the armies—Choudieu, Richard, and Bourbotte in particular; and it is noticeable that these gallant deputies were not the men who, by ruthless executions, again drove La Vendée into insurrection in the following year. That task was left to such men as Carrier, the tyrant of Nantes.

Of a very different character to the Vendéan war was the movement of the cities against the Convention, which followed

the news of the *coup d'état* of June 2. It was partly caused by jealousy of Paris, and partly by the influence of escaped Girondin deputies; but in each city the movement was distinct and individual. All attempts at harmonious action between them failed as thoroughly as the attempts to raise the whole country against Paris. The four principal cities in which the federalist movement developed, though under different circumstances and in different ways, were Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Caen.

At Lyons¹ the progress of the Revolution had been watched during the last year with most intense interest. The local Jacobin club, under the guidance of a very upright man, but very advanced democrat, named Chalier, by its energy had become all-powerful in the city, and Chalier was elected mayor of Lyons in January, 1792. But his influence was abhorred by the bourgeois and the capitalists of the city, who resented being governed by a group of previously unknown men, and felt that because of their wealth and numbers they ought to rule instead of the members of the Jacobin Club. The massacres of September in Paris had their counterpart in the massacres in the prisons at Lyons, when, under the direct countenance of Prince Charles Louis of Hesse, who called himself Citizen Hesse and was in command of the troops, the populace were permitted to murder some royalist officers in the château of Pierre Scize.² The dangers of the foreign war seem to have put an end to the internal strife in the city for a time, and all remained quiet during the winter of 1792. The three first deputies on mission to Lyons, Rovère, Basire, and Legendre, were men of remarkable energy, and

¹ On the revolt of Lyons there is a considerable literature. See especially Balleydier's *Histoire du peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution*, vol. ii.; *Lyon sous la Révolution*, by Baron Raverat (Lyons: 1883); *Mémoires* of the Abbé Guillon in Berville and Barrière's series of *Mémoires*; Morin's *Histoire de Lyon depuis la Révolution de 1789*, vol. ii.; and the interesting series of articles by A. Duvand, called *L'Insurrection et le Siège de Lyon*, published in the *Révolution Française*, April, 1885, to February, 1886.

² Vol. ii. p. 148; and Raverat's *Lyon sous la Révolution*, pp. 53-81.

while occupying themselves in obtaining recruits and provisions for the army of the Alps, then under the command of Kellermann, they also took care to support the influence of the local Jacobin Club in the city itself. These three deputies were succeeded on May 10, 1793, by Dubois-Crancé, Gautier, Nioche, and Albitte, who had been appointed representatives on mission with the army of the Alps, and who, on arriving at Lyons, summoned the authorities, and ordered them to raise 6400 men, of whom 1600 were to go to La Vendée, and the rest to remain for garrison purposes at Lyons. They also demanded that six millions of francs should be raised in twenty-four hours by the capitalists and shopkeepers of the city, and that a local committee of public safety should be established. They then forbade the distribution of Girondin journals, burnt all the copies that could be found in the city, and begged the Convention to establish a special Revolutionary Tribunal there. After thus exasperating the bourgeois of Lyons, the deputies left the city for the army. On May 29 the National Guard of the city, under the command of a manufacturer named Madinier, stormed the Hôtel de Ville, and imprisoned Chalier, the mayor, and other Jacobin municipal officers. Madinier and his friends felt that they had thrown away the scabbard, and when Robert Lindet arrived with the news of the *coup d'état* of June 2, he was not permitted to enter the city. The month of June was spent in organizing resistance against the Convention. An army was speedily raised of 10,000 men from the National Guard. An old officer of the regular army, named Perrin-Précý, a declared royalist, and formerly lieutenant-colonel of the Constitutional Guard of 1791, was elected commander-in-chief, with the Comte de Virieu, at one time president of the Constituent Assembly, as his assistant, and a very able young engineer officer, named Agnel de Chenelette, increased the strength of the fortifications of the city. In the middle of June arrived Birotteau and Chasset, two escaped Girondins, who at once took the lead in the movement, and headed an expedition to Saint-Étienne, where the deputy on mission, Lesterpt-Beauvais, gave

up 10,000 muskets from the government factory there to the insurgents. The Convention was not going to allow matters to continue thus, and on July 3 directed the army of the Alps to advance against Lyons, and declared Birotteau and his friends traitors to the country. The declaration of the Convention was met by the establishment of a local tribunal, which condemned Châlier to death, and he was accordingly guillotined on July 17. Dubois-Crancé and Gautier, who were with Kellermann's army, at once borrowed from him 4800 men, with some cavalry and twelve guns, and, ordering him to cover their operations, they advanced to besiege the city. In the month of August, they resolved to change the blockade into a bombardment, and their resolution brought about a great change in the motives of the defenders of Lyons. Instead of remaining entirely under the influence of Birotteau and Chasset, and the federalist republicans, the policy of Perrin-Précý, Virieu, and the many other royalists, who had fled to Lyons for safety,¹ prevailed, and secret negotiations were entered into with the Piedmontese generals, who promised to advance to their assistance. On August 22 the bombardment began, and on the 24th the great arsenal of Lyons was blown up by a Jacobin woman, who was immediately murdered. Then arrived the troops which had defended Valenciennes against the English and Austrians in July, and these trained soldiers brought about the same results at Lyons as the Mayençais did in La Vendée. The two deputies were also joined by Couthon, Maignet, and Châteauneuf-Randon. Couthon, in his native province of Auvergne, took advantage of the hatred which the peasants felt for the proud city of Lyons, and he brought up more than 30,000 peasants to the siege, who, though of little use as soldiers, helped to complete the blockade, and left more valuable troops free for other employment. On October 9 Perrin-Précý tried to break out of Lyons with his best troops, and the women and children in their midst. His forces were entirely cut to pieces, though he him-

¹ As, for instance, M. des Écherolles; see the *Souvenirs d'une Famille noble sous la Terreur*, by Alexandrine des Écherolles. Paris: 1879.

self escaped; and in the same evening the republican army entered Lyons. The Convention determined that an example should be made of the wealthy city which called itself the second city of France, and on October 12 it decreed that Lyons was to be destroyed, and its name changed to Commune-Affranchie. On returning from their mission, Dubois-Crancé and Gautier were arrested, but released in a few days, while Couthon and Maignet were succeeded by Collot d'Herbois Fouché and La Porte, who were to inflict a terrible punishment on the unhappy city.

The resistance of Marseilles¹ was not so long or so intrepid as that of Lyons, because the Jacobin element was originally larger and stronger there; it was purely federalist, due solely to the influence of the Girondins, and in no way covered royalist designs. At the end of May the people of Marseilles, influenced by their National Guard,² and still more by their favourite Rebecqui, who was the intimate friend of Barbaroux, and had resigned his seat in the Convention on April 9, expelled Moyse Bayle and Boisset, the deputies on mission, from the city. On hearing the news of the *coup d'état* of June 2, and the arrest of the Girondins, the Marseillais, under Rebecqui's influence, elected a central committee and formed a battalion of volunteers, who were to march to Bourges, and, when joined by battalions from other cities, to advance on Paris. The central committee then seized Bô and Antiboul, two deputies on their way to fulfil a special mission in Corsica, and imprisoned them. The Convention was no more inclined to negotiate with Marseilles than with Lyons; Carteaux was detached with a force from the army of the Alps, and ordered to use the greatest exertions to prevent the insurgents of Marseilles from joining those of Lyons. Fortunately for the Convention, Carteaux was an able general, and was accompanied by a most energetic representative on mission, Antoine Louis Albilte, while the Marseillais leaders talked too much to

¹ Fabre's *Histoire de Marseille*, vol. ii. pp. 489-519; Boudin's *Histoire de Marseille*, pp. 510-520.

² On the character of the National Guard of Marseilles, see vol. i. p. 485.

act with vigour. He quickly drove the Marseillais volunteers out of Avignon and the little town of Pont-Saint-Esprit, defeated them at Cadenet, where their general, the Chevalier of Villeneuve-Tourette, was killed, and then advanced in force towards the city. Among the troops Carteaux collected on his way to the south was a regiment of artillery, formerly the Regiment of La Fère, in which an officer of most determined Jacobin proclivities was serving, a young Corsican named Napoleon Buonaparte, who had played a leading part in the troubles in Corsica in 1789,¹ and had been an unsuccessful candidate in the previous year for the office of commandant of the National Guard of Ajaccio. On August 19 Carteaux drove the Marseillais volunteers out of Salon, and on the 23rd he appeared before Marseilles itself. The Jacobins, who were very numerous, now determined to treat with the general of the Convention, and the bourgeois felt no desire to have their shops destroyed by a bombardment, such as was destroying Lyons. So that when the regular troops in the city crossed over, with banners flying and drums beating, to General Carteaux, the National Guard of Marseilles refused to fight, and Carteaux entered the city without resistance, accompanied by four deputies on mission, Albitte, Gasparin, Saliceti, and Escudier, whose first proceedings were to make numerous arrests and to establish a Revolutionary Commission to punish those who had opposed the Convention.

At Bordeaux,² as might have been expected, great indignation was felt at the news of the events of June 2. The inhabitants of the department of the Gironde, and especially the Bordelais, were very proud of their eloquent deputies, who had given their name to a political party, and were indignant at hearing that nearly the entire deputation from their department was imprisoned at a single blow. Their indignation showed itself in quietly conducting the two deputies on mission, Ichon and Dartigoyte, without the walls,

¹ Vol. i. p. 475.

² O'Reilly's *Histoire de Bordeaux*, part ii. vol. i. pp. 260-377; Vivié's *Histoire de la Terreur à Bordeaux*, vol. i. pp. 214-288.

and establishing a Committee of Public Safety to sit *en permanence*. This committee sent representatives all over France, complaining of the *coup d'état* of June 2, and requesting that every city which disapproved of it would raise a battalion of volunteers and send it to Bourges, whence a regular advance should be made upon Paris. Many cities, such as Marseilles and Limoges, consented, but few of them took any steps to raise their volunteers, much less to send them to Bourges. The Bordelais proudly imagined they were leading a great popular movement; but they themselves did not despatch a single volunteer from their city. The Convention were, after the events of June 2, inclined to appease the natural resentment of the citizens of Bordeaux, and sent Mathieu and Treilhard to try and conciliate the city. These two deputies were able to reach Périgueux, but not allowed to go any farther. The news of the battle of Pacy, and the absence of their favourite leaders, Vergniaud, Guadet, and Gensonné seemed to paralyze the federalists of Bordeaux, and the local committee quietly dissolved itself on August 2. The Convention was now triumphant, and no longer desired to temporize, and on August 6 it declared the committee and all connected with it outlaws. On the 19th two deputies on mission, Baudot and Ysabeau, entered Bordeaux, and were immediately hooted out of the city, which the Convention then determined to blockade. When it was too late to make an effective defence, five escaped Girondin deputies, Duchastel, Meillan, Bergœing, Salle, and Cussy, arrived at Bordeaux; and almost on the same day General Brune encamped in front of the city. As at Marseilles, the Jacobins now became noisy, and the bourgeois, in fear for their property, decided to make no resistance, so that Tallien, Ysabeau, Baudot, and Chaudron-Roussau entered the city quietly on October 16, and at once ordered the establishment of a Revolutionary Commission, and changed the name of the Gironde to Bec-d'Ambès.

The federalist risings at Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux were paralyzed by the want of harmony with each other, and by the absence of men of real influence as leaders. To no

such lack of leaders could the failure of the movement at Caen be attributed, for no less than seventeen escaped Girondins were assembled there before the end of July.¹ They had been attracted to Caen by the attitude of the administrators of the departments of the Calvados and the Eure during the month of May, for, as early as May 2, the authorities of the department of the Calvados had begun to raise volunteers, and had sent circulars to every department, inviting their rulers to make levies also, in order to form an army to protect free debate in the Convention. On the news of the *coup d'état* of June 2, the administrators of the department of the Eure declared that they would at once raise 4000 men, and the administrators of Calvados arrested the two deputies on mission with the embryo army of the coasts of Cherbourg, Romme and Prieur of the Côte d'Or. The first Girondin deputies to arrive in Normandy were Buzot and Barbaroux. Évreux was the capital of the bailliage and department by which Buzot had been elected to the Constituent Assembly, and again to the Convention, and he naturally attempted to first teach his federalist ideas to his native city and department. He met with every success, and retired cheerfully to Caen, to raise an army which should act against the Convention. During the month many of the other Girondin deputies also escaped from Paris, and joined Buzot and Barbaroux at Caen, of whom the most notable were Salle, Bergœing, Gorsas, Louvet, Pétion, Kervelegan, Valady, and Guadet, who were all given free quarters in the former residence of the intendants of Caen. Here they had a very good reception; they published pamphlets, went to parties, and wrote songs; and it was at this time that Charlotte Corday received her letter of introduction to Lauze-Deperret from Charles Barbaroux himself. Why they did nothing but write songs and go to parties is difficult to understand; but once more their conduct at this period proves that the leading

¹ See, on the episode of the Norman insurrection, *Souvenirs de l'Insurrection Normande, dite du Fédéralisme, en 1793*, by F. Vaultier. Caen: 1858; and Wallon's *La Révolution du 31 Mai*.

Girondins were not men of sufficient practical energy to conduct the affairs of a nation. It has been asserted that they wasted time because Madame Roland from her prison begged them to do nothing. Her arguments may have influenced her lover, Buzot; but surely they ought not to have destroyed the energies of the sixteen other deputies, among whom were one or two, notably Kervelegan and Valady, who were men of tried courage. Perhaps the best explanation is that even the Girondin leaders themselves did not feel the confidence they professed in their cause, and noticed a lack of genuine popular enthusiasm.

They had no difficulty in finding an experienced general. Félix de Wimpfen, on whose services they relied, was born in 1744, and had risen to the rank of *maréchal-de-camp* in the old royal army, after fighting throughout the Seven Years' War in Germany, at the capture of Port Mahon, and in the siege of Gibraltar. He had sat as deputy for the noblesse of his native bailliage in the Constituent Assembly, and had been a member of the Military Committee.¹ At the outbreak of the war, he had been appointed commandant of Thionville, and had made himself famous by his defence of that fortress in 1792 against the army of the *émigrés*, assisted by some Prussians.² On the formation of the eleven armies in April, he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the coasts of Cherbourg, which was at present only an army on paper, but was intended to resist any attempt made by the English to land in Normandy. In the Constituent Assembly Wimpfen had made the acquaintance of Buzot, and he now consented to act as commander-in-chief of the Norman and Breton forces destined to act against Paris. On June 22 he practically declared war against the Convention in a letter which he wrote to the Minister of War, Bouchotte, in answer to a summons to Paris, and in which he declared he would only go to Paris at the head of 60,000 men. Unfortunately for him, instead of 60,000 men, the whole influence of the Girondin deputies could not collect more than 4000 men,

¹ Vol. i. p. 383.

² Vol. ii. p. 188.

including three volunteer battalions from the Breton departments of Ille-et-Vilaine, Finistère, and Morbihan, and 600 volunteers from the Calvados and the Eure respectively. Even these volunteers were collected with great difficulty, and the artillerymen were recruited from the very dregs of the city of Caen for a few francs apiece. This was disappointing both to Wimpfen and the Girondin deputies, for they saw clearly that only three departments of Brittany and two of Normandy, out of the ten, would support them. Of the other departments of Normandy, the authorities of the Orne and the Seine-Inférieure did nothing, while those of the Manche entirely refused to arrest Prieur of the Marne and Lecointre, the deputies on mission in their midst. Even when they saw how few volunteers came to their assistance, the Girondin deputies took no trouble to inspire those few with enthusiasm, and allowed them to march out of Caen under the command of a declared royalist, Comte Joseph de Puisaye, whose appointment gave a pretext for the Convention to declare that the Girondins were but royalists in disguise. Wimpfen made one last effort at a great review of the National Guard of Caen on July 7, when he called for volunteers, but hardly any men then offered themselves.

Considering the weakness of the actual force raised by the Girondins, it is surprising with what fear their advance was expected in Paris, and with what intense interest it was watched by the rest of France. To oppose Wimpfen's army the Commune of Paris ordered eighteen thousand men to be raised, but at the beginning of July the authorities were only able to despatch two battalions of volunteers raised in Paris, and one in the department of the Seine-et-Oise, with a few regulars and gendarmes, amounting in all to about four thousand men. This force was placed under the command of General Sepher, who had been an old soldier, but whose name does not occur again in the history of the Revolution. But the adjutant-general and second in command was an artist named Brune, a friend of Danton and Camille Desmoulins, who, after holding many conspicuous commands, especially in Switzerland

and Italy, became a marshal of France under the Empire, and was cruelly murdered in the reaction against Napoleon in 1815. This small force was accompanied by Robert Lindet, himself a deputy for the Eure, and by Duroy, as representatives on mission. On July 13 the two armies came into collision at the little village of Pacy, near Vernon; and though the gendarmes ran away first, the gunners of Puisaye did the same, and as the Normans ran away quickest, the Parisians claimed a great victory, and entered Évreux on the same day without having lost a single man. Robert Lindet used his victory with his natural moderation. Instead of calling the inhabitants of Évreux to account, he satisfied himself with obeying an absurd decree of the Convention, that Buzot's house should be pulled down and the site sown with salt, and in marrying six virtuous young men to six virtuous young women. This moderate conduct, even more than the engagement of Pacy, caused the federalist army to melt away. The Breton volunteers marched off to their own homes. Wimpfen, after having, according to Louvet,¹ suggested that the defeated federalists should negotiate for help from England, a suggestion which was indignantly rejected, hid himself in Bayeux, where he remained concealed throughout the Terror. The authorities of the department of the Calvados made preparations for arresting the Girondin deputies, and at once released Prieur of the Côte d'Or and Romme. The primary assemblies were summoned throughout Normandy, and enthusiastically accepted the Republican Constitution of 1793, devised by the Convention. Not a single execution took place, and Robert Lindet might well boast that he had quieted the most serious movement inaugurated by the Girondins without shedding one drop of blood.

Robert Lindet, though he was wise enough not to punish their followers and dupes, yet vigorously pursued the Girondin deputies. Whither to escape they knew not. They were outlawed by a decree of July 28, and in every quarter the Convention was triumphant. Lanjuinais, who had only

¹ Louvet, *Mémoires*, ed. Barrière, p. 272.

stopped at Caen a few hours, Gorsas, Delahaye, Duval, Guadet, Valady, Larivière, Duchastel, Kervelegan, and Mollevaut fled separately, and the remaining ten, Pétion, Barbaroux, Buzot, Louvet, Salle, Meillan, Cussy, Lesage, Bergœing, and Giroust, with Girey-Dupré, a young Norman named Riouffe, Buzot's servant Joseph, who would not leave his master, and six Breton volunteers, put on republican uniforms, and, pretending to be nineteen recruits bound for the army of the coasts of Brest, tramped wearily into Brittany.¹ They were more than once nearly captured, and the story of their adventures is full of the elements of an exciting romance. Duchastel, Bergœing, Meillan, Salle, and Cussy, soon left Brittany for Bordeaux, where they arrived too late to stir up the spirits of the federalists of the Gironde. A month later, Pétion, Buzot, Barbaroux, Louvet, Valady, and Guadet, also sailed for the south, and met some of their former colleagues, who had preceded them, wandering about in search of an asylum. Guadet promised to protect them, and, since his father's house at Saint-Émilion was watched day and night, he applied to his sister-in-law, Madame Bouquey, to receive them. Though she knew they were outlaws, she consented, and hid eight of the proscribed deputies—the six last mentioned, Salle and Meillan—in the subterranean remains of an old Roman quarry in her garden at Saint-Émilion, to which access was only to be had by going down a deep well. Here they remained safe for some weeks, but in November they were forced to leave their unhealthy but safe hiding-place. Meillan climbed over the hills and hid himself in his native mountains of the Pyrenees. Louvet, hot lover as he always was, would not be kept away longer from Paris and his Lodoiska, and, after incurring terrible dangers, he got safely back to the capital.² His devotion met its reward; Lodoiska concealed him in a cellar in Paris for two months, and afterwards contrived his escape

¹ For the wanderings of the proscribed Girondins, see Vatel's *Charlotte Corday et les Girondins*. Paris: 3 vols. 1864-72. Meillan, *Mémoires*, and Louvet, *Mémoires*.

² See *Mémoires* of Louvet in the Collection of Berville and Barrière.

to the mountains of the Jura, where he remained until the Terror was over. Valady was recognized at Périgueux on December 4, and executed as an outlaw, without trial, on the following day. Three of the refugees from Normandy to the Gironde had not joined the party at Saint-Émilion. Of them, Bergœing was hidden in a grotto at Sainte-Présentine, near Réole, where a servant-maid brought him food and drink;¹ while Duchastel and Cussy were captured in trying to escape from Bordeaux, and sent to Paris, where the former was guillotined on October 31, with Vergniaud and the Girondins who had refused to leave Paris, and the latter on November 15. The saddest fate of all was that of the five who remained at Saint-Émilion. When forced to leave the subterranean grotto, Guadet and Salle were received into the house of Guadet's father, where they lived in a garret under the roof, without any light except what came between the tiles, and which was so low that they could not stand upright, while Madame Bouquey secured an asylum for Pétion, Barbaroux, and Buzot in the little house of a poor hairdresser of Saint-Émilion, named Troquart. In these retreats they occupied themselves in writing. Pétion, Barbaroux, and Buzot wrote their memoirs,² and Salle occupied himself in writing a tragedy on the subject of Charlotte Corday,³ and a poem, *L'Entrée de Danton aux Enfers*.⁴ Under these roofs the five proscribed deputies remained in safety during the greater part of the Terror. It was commonly reported that they were hidden in the little town, but no effort was successful in discovering their hiding-places until 29 Prairial, Year II. (June 17, 1794). On that day certain emissaries of Jullien, the acting proconsul at Bordeaux, perceived that there was room for a little garret in the roof of the house of Guadet's father. They searched the house afresh, and discovered the two Girondins in their tiny attic. It was in the height of the

¹ Vatel, *Charlotte Corday et les Girondins*, vol. ii. p. 658.

² See the edition published by M. Dauban in 1866.

³ Vatel's *Charlotte Corday et les Girondins*, vol. ii. pp. 1-93.

⁴ *Danton aux enfers* was first published by G. Moreau-Chaslou in 1865.

Terror, when long trials were out of fashion. The two friends were brought before the revolutionary committee of Bordeaux and questioned, and on 1 Messidor, Year II. (June 19, 1794), their identity was proved to the satisfaction of the Military Commission sitting there, and they were at once guillotined as outlaws. On 30 Prairial (June 18), Buzot, Barbaroux, and Pétion heard of the arrest of their colleagues, and they at once decided to leave the house of the friendly hairdresser of Saint-Émilion. They moved towards the Spanish frontier, but near Castillon they were seen, and Barbaroux then attempted to commit suicide by shooting himself through the head. He was removed first to Castillon, where his wounds were dressed, and then to Bordeaux, where he was identified, and guillotined on 7 Messidor, Year II. (June 25). Pétion and Buzot escaped the captors of Barbaroux by hiding in a pine forest; but their spirit was broken by their long sufferings and the death of their comrade, and, in despair, the once-adored Mayor of Paris,¹ and the lover of Madame Roland, blew out their brains. The noise of the dogs fighting over the corpses drew attention to their remains; the dead bodies of the two chiefs of the federalist Girondins were identified, and buried in the field in which they were discovered.²

Thus one by one the majority of the men of genius who had exerted so great an influence on the history of France during the past two years gradually perished, and thus their brilliant fellowship failed, because they were not, what no men ever can be, born statesmen. Statesmanship is an art founded on experience and education; and a group of young lawyers did not, because they possessed great powers of eloquence and keen sympathies, necessarily become statesmen. The grand qualities which achieve genuine and lasting success in politics are moderation and a power of

¹ Vol. ii. p. 40.

² This description of the last days of the outlaws of Saint-Émilion is derived from the account and the documents published in M. Vatel's *Charlotte Corday et les Girondins*, vol. ii. pp. 128-214, and vol. iii. pp. 639-744.

seeing how far any measure or idea is practicable. Now, the Girondins were slaves to ideas of abstract justice, and Brissot on one occasion cried out, when the subject of slavery was discussed before him: "Perish our colonies sooner than that an act of injustice be done!" Great countries cannot be governed by sentimental considerations; for the essence of good government is compromise, and sentimentalists and fanatics never compromise. The greatest mistake which was made by the Girondins as a party was the declaration of war in April, 1792. Their imaginations were inflamed with the idea of carrying liberty to Europe, and, with their sentimental vanity and narrow considerations, they deemed it more glorious to free a world which had not asked to be freed, than to spare the lives of many thousands of their fellow-citizens, who had no enthusiasm for the cause for which they were sacrificing themselves. And further, as is generally the case with sentimentalists, no Girondin was a man of action. They could all think, talk, and write, but none of them did anything great. When the Prussians were in the heart of France, and Verdun had fallen, and Paris was within their reach, Danton cried out for volunteers and more volunteers, while the Girondins occupied themselves with petty squabbles. Again, when, after the victory of Jemmappes, Dumouriez felt his weakness, and was on the point of being driven back through Belgium by the Austrians and the English, Danton at once went to the frontier to see what could be done, but no Girondin accompanied him. It is needless to quote further the instances of Carnot in French Flanders, Merlin of Thionville and Rewbell at Mayence and in La Vendée, Couthon and Dubois-Crancé at Lyons, Robert Lindet in Normandy, or Saint-Just at Strasbourg. It is enough to say that at no critical moment did any leader of the Girondins do any great deed. They made another fatal mistake, which destroyed any chance of their succeeding. Sentimental and unpractical as ever, they disliked Paris, because she had been stained by the massacres of September and would not dance to the music of their words, and their hatred for Paris led them at

last even to encourage civil war at the moment when France needed all her strength to meet the foreign foes, whom they had raised up. Here was their last fatal mistake, their lack of patriotism. The people of the provinces of France would not have sat idly by, and let their great speakers be proscribed and executed, had they not felt that there was something wanting. They had no confidence in their strength, and they had no confidence in their patriotism. Yet the fall of the Girondins has something very pathetic about it. They died unstained by the cruelty and the vices which distinguished the men who were stronger than they, and the enthusiasm which they threw into their speeches and their writings creates a sympathy with their fate, which has moved the poets and men of imagination of the present age, and has made their names immortal.

CHAPTER IX.

THE GREAT COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

The need for a strong executive—The history of the Committee—It establishes the Reign of Terror—The instruments of the Terror—The origins and careers of its members—Robespierre—His early life—His rôle in the Constituent Assembly and in the Convention—Never had a majority in the Committee—Couthon—Saint-Just—The working members of the Great Committee—Carnot—Priour of the Côte-d'Or—Jean Bon Saint-André—Priour of the Marne—Robert Lindet—Billaud-Varenne—Collot d'Herbois—Hérault de Séchelles—Barère, the reporter—The value of biographies of revolutionary leaders—The mode of government of the Committee and the division of labour among its members—The ministers—What was the Reign of Terror, which it established?

THE attempts of the escaped Girondins to raise the provinces and the disasters on the frontiers during the summer of 1793 had brought about, what Mirabeau and Danton had so earnestly advocated, the establishment of a strong executive. They had both urged that this executive should be chosen from the assembly which really ruled France, whether it were the Constituent Assembly or the Convention, and declared that otherwise there would be dissension between the supreme executive and legislative authorities or else weakness of administration. Neither the deputies to the Constituent Assembly nor those to the Convention recognized this great political truth, and it was not until France had suffered nearly four years of anarchy that the Convention consented to confer absolute and supreme powers in matters of administration to its Committee of Public Safety, and then only under the

pressure of foreign and civil war. The delay in appointing this strong executive had increased the need for its absolute supremacy, and it obtained a despotic authority, which made it more powerful than any tyranny that ever existed, with absolute dominion over the lives and property of all Frenchmen. It did not attain this authority at once, but as months passed by the advantage of its strength became more obvious, and when, on October 10, the Convention, on the motion of Saint-Just, decreed that the constitution of 1793, which it had promulgated in the summer, was suspended, and proclaimed the existence of revolutionary government until a general peace, it practically confirmed the despotism of the Committee of Public Safety.

The election of a committee of nine deputies, who were to exercise supreme executive authority, meet in secret, and report weekly to the Convention, had been proposed by Isnard on behalf of the cumbrous Committee of General Defence, and the proposition had been warmly supported by Danton, and carried in spite of the opposition of Buzot.¹ It was elected on April 7, and consisted of Barère, Delmas, Bréard, Cambon, Danton, Guyton-Morveau, Treilhard, Lacroix, and Robert Lindet, and on the same day it made its first step towards power by carrying a motion that the representatives on mission should report to it instead of to the Convention. A few weeks' experience was enough to prove its utility, and on May 30, when it was decided to promulgate a republican constitution at once, the task was confided to the Committee of Public Safety, which was reinforced by the election of five deputies for this special purpose, Hérault de Séchelles, Mathieu, Ramel, Couthon, and Saint-Just. During the month of June three changes were made by the election of Berlier in the place of Bréard, who retired from illness, and of Gasparin and Jean Bon Saint-André in the place of Treilhard and Mathieu, sent on mission to Bordeaux.² The services of the new committee did not at first meet with the recognition due to its vigour in acting against the federalist insurrections,

¹ Vol. ii. p. 232.

² Vol. ii. p. 271.

and, after a violent attack upon it by Camille Desmoulins on July 10, it was decided that its numbers should be reduced to nine, and that there should be a fresh election of the members composing it.¹ The nine elected were Jean Bon Saint-André, Barère, Gasparin, Couthon, Hérault de Séchelles, Thuriot, Prieur of the Marne, Saint-Just, and Robert Lindet, and it is most notable that Danton, who had served ever since April, was not re-elected. On July 27 Robespierre was proposed by the members of the committee to take the place of Gasparin, who was ill, and on August 1 Danton proposed that the ministry should be abolished as an executive council, and that the ministers should become the agents of the committee. The Convention, however, declined to take such a decisive step, but granted the committee a credit of fifty millions of francs, which it might spend, without rendering any account, for the good of the republic. On the same day the Convention denounced to the world, in the name of humanity, what it was pleased to call the perfidy and cowardice of the English Government, and decreed the confiscation of all goods belonging to outlaws, the trial of Marie Antoinette before the Revolutionary Tribunal, the destruction of the monuments of the former kings of France at Saint Denis, the arrest of all foreigners not domiciled in France, the closing of the barriers of Paris, and the condemnation to twenty years' imprisonment of every one convicted of refusing to take assignats in payment for goods or debts at their face value. It also decreed that the garrison of Mayence should be sent against the rebels of La Vendée, that the woods should be burnt, the harvests destroyed, and the cattle seized throughout that unfortunate district, and that the children and old men should be deported from it to the interior. The execution of all these measures was entrusted to the Committee of Public Safety, in which the majority of the Convention suddenly seemed to feel a blind confidence, and the whole Convention felt the relief of abandoning its executive powers to a small group of men. Many of the deputies doubtless felt less

¹ Appendix VII., The Committees of Public Safety.

hesitation in passing such cruel and sanguinary decrees, when they knew that they could throw the responsibility upon the shoulders of the few individuals who were ordered to execute these measures. The vigour of the new committee was shown at once in every direction, and armies were directed to march upon the rebellious cities of Lyons and Marseilles. The next step was to hand over to the committee the complete direction of the foreign war, and for this new service two officers of the corps of engineers, both noted for their vigour in the Military Committees of the Legislative Assembly and the Convention, Lazare Nicolas Marguerite Carnot and Claude Antoine Prieur-Duvernois, commonly known as Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, were added to it on August 14. Exactly one week afterwards, on the demand of the committee, the permanent requisition of all Frenchmen between eighteen and twenty-five to serve in the army, without power of obtaining a substitute, was decreed by the Convention.

On September 5 the power of the Committee of Public Safety was finally consolidated, and, on the motion of Barère, "Terror was decreed to be the order of the day." This declaration, by which the system of Terror was officially recognized by the Convention as the temporary mode of government for France, like Saint-Just's decree establishing revolutionary government in the following month, practically made the Committee of Public Safety supreme over life and property, without restraint from law or custom. The deputies of the committee became absolute despots, entrusted with the task of ruling France by terrifying it into silent obedience to their will. The instruments of the Terror were quickly forged. On that same September 5, the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris was, on the motion of Merlin de Douai, the reporter of the Committee of Legislation, divided into four sections, so as to be able to try more prisoners at a time; a revolutionary army of five thousand men and twelve hundred gunners, all known *sans-culottes*, was decreed; and the revolutionary committees of the sections of Paris were ordered to be "*épurées*," which meant that only men well known for their

republican sentiments were to be retained, and every member of them was in future to be paid three livres a day raised by a special tax upon the rich. On the following day, as if to mark more strongly the commencement of the Reign of Terror, Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois were elected, on the recommendation of the committee itself, to be members, in order to take particular charge of the measures of the Terror, just as in the previous month Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or had been elected to undertake the direction of the foreign war. On September 11 the Committee of General Security was renewed,¹ but its composition did not give satisfaction to the new rulers, and on the 14th it was again renewed, when deputies in the confidence of the members of the Great Committee of Public Safety were elected to serve upon it; and as it was entrusted with the administration of the police of Paris and of France, it at once became the principal instrument for organizing and executing the system of the Terror. On September 17 the law of the *suspects* was passed, and on the 20th Thuriot, the same Thuriot who had played such a conspicuous part in the capture of the Bastille on July 14, 1789,² resigned his seat on the committee, which was thus reduced to the twelve members who formed the Great Committee, and who, with the exception of Hérault de Séchelles, executed in the following April, ruled France despotically until the end of July, 1794. These twelve men were, in order of seniority on the committee, Jean Bon Saint-André, Barère, Couthon, Hérault de Séchelles, Prieur of the Marne, Saint-Just, Robert Lindet, Robespierre, Carnot, Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, Collot d'Herbois, and Billaud-Varenne.

It is only by examining the history of the lives of these twelve men, who had thus become the twelve rulers of France, that the true history of the government of the Great Committee of Public Safety can be rightly understood. All of them were men of education and good scholars; five at least, Collot d'Herbois, Billaud-Varenne, Barère, Couthon, and Saint-Just, were educated in various colleges of the Oratorians; Robespierre

¹ Appendix VIII.

² Vol. i. p. 141.

was educated at the Collège Louis-le-Grand at Paris, Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or at the military school of Mézières, Jean Bon Saint-André at the Jesuit College at Montauban, Hérault de Séchelles at the Collège de France, and it may be safely asserted, though no facts are known about their early life, that both Robert Lindet and Prieur of the Marne were not uneducated men. All of them were men in the prime of life, the eldest, Robert Lindet, being fifty and the youngest, Saint-Just, just twenty-five, and their average age was only thirty-seven. Of the twelve, three came of families of new noblesse, and the remainder of the ten, whose parentage is known, of good bourgeois families. Hérault de Séchelles was the son of a colonel in the army and grandson of a minister of police; Saint-Just, of a captain and a knight of Saint Louis; Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, of a receiver-general of the finances at Auxonne; Robespierre, Barère, Carnot, and Billaud-Varenne, of provincial *avocats*; Couthon, of a provincial notary; and Collot d'Herbois and Jean Bon Saint-André, of wealthy bourgeois. None of them in 1789 had any idea of the great future before them, or that in four years they would be the rulers of France. At that time no less than seven of them were *avocats*—Billaud-Varenne at Paris, Robespierre at Arras, Couthon at Clermont-Ferrand, Barère at Toulouse, Prieur of the Marne at Châlons-sur-Marne, Robert Lindet at the little town of Bernay in Normandy, and Hérault de Séchelles, who was *avocat-général* to the Parlement of Paris; while Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or were officers in the corps of royal engineers in garrison, Jean Bon Saint-André was a Protestant pastor at Montauban, Collot d'Herbois was a well-known actor and dramatist, living in retirement at Chaillot near Paris, and Saint-Just, having just finished his education, was a law student at Rheims. It will be noticed from this that the very great majority of the members of the Great Committee were men of provincial origin and local reputation, and it is still more remarkable that none of them, except possibly Prieur of the Marne and Robert Lindet, of whose early life nothing is known, were sons of peasants,

farmers, or even country gentlemen. Of the twelve, only Hérault de Séchelles and Collot d'Herbois can be called Parisians; Barère and Jean Bon Saint-André came from the southern provinces of Gascony and Guienne respectively, Couthon from Auvergne, Prieur of the Côte-d'Or and Carnot from Burgundy, Prieur of the Marne from Champagne, Saint-Just from Picardy, Robespierre from Artois, Robert Lindet from Normandy, and Billaud-Varenne from La Rochelle, the capital of the little province of Aunis. With regard to their seats in the Convention, Robespierre, Billaud-Varenne, and Collot d'Herbois represented Paris, Carnot the Pas-de-Calais, Robert Lindet the Eure, Saint-Just the Aisne, Pierre Louis Prieur the Marne, Prieur-Duvernois the Côte-d'Or, Hérault de Séchelles the Seine-et-Oise, Couthon the Puy-de-Dôme, Jean Bon Saint-André the Lot, and Barère the Hautes-Pyrénées. It is also important to see what training for political life the members of the Great Committee of Public Safety had received. Three of them, Robespierre, Barère, and Prieur of the Marne, had been members of the Constituent Assembly, and had been conspicuous on the extreme left towards the end of its session,¹ and had afterwards been elected to legal offices, Prieur as vice-president and Robespierre as public prosecutor of the criminal tribunal of the Seine, and Barère as president of the court of appeal of his department, the Hautes-Pyrénées. Five of them, Hérault de Séchelles, Couthon, Robert Lindet, Carnot, and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, had been members of the Legislative Assembly, of whom the three civilians had previously held local office under the new constitution as judge of the district tribunal of Clermont-Ferrand, procureur-syndic of the district of Bernay, and agent of the court of appeal at Paris respectively. The other four members had sat in neither of the former representative assemblies, but had all played a part in politics before their election to the Convention. Jean Bon Saint-André had been a conspicuous member of the popular society of Montauban, and had played a prominent part in the disturbances there;² Saint-Just had made himself

¹ Vol. i. p. 438; vol. ii. p. 40.

² Vol. i. p. 489-492.

known in his department of the Aisne by defending the claim of Soissons to be capital of the department instead of Laon,¹ and would have been elected to the Legislative Assembly had he not been under twenty-five years of age; while Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois had both been members of the insurrectionary Commune of Paris, and the former had succeeded Danton as substitute to the procureur of the Commune on August 10. It will now be advisable to give sketches of the lives of each of these twelve men, who as the Great Committee were to rule France despotically, for it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that their government marks the crisis in the history of the Revolution, and it is necessary to consider them individually before examining their acts and their mode of government by means of the Terror as a committee.

Maximilien Marie Isidore de Robespierre,² who is undoubtedly the great central figure in the history of the Great Committee of Public Safety, although he could never command a majority in it, and fell because he believed he could use its power to serve his own political ends, was born in a little house in the Rue des Rapporteurs at Arras, on May 6, 1758. His family is believed to have been of Irish descent, and to have left Ireland for religion's sake at the time of the Reformation, and his ancestors had been notaries at the little village of Carvin, near Arras, since the beginning of the seventeenth century. His grandfather was the first member of the family to show more ambition, and had practised as an avocat at Arras, the capital of Artois, and his father followed the same profession and married Mademoiselle Josephine Carraut, daughter of a wealthy brewer in the same city, in 1757.

¹ Vol. i. p. 503.

² The great authority for the life of Robespierre is the *Histoire de Robespierre*, by Ernest Hamel (Paris: 1865-1867), which is one of the most important books written upon the Revolution. It is impossible to agree with M. Hamel in all his views, for he is too enthusiastic an admirer of his hero, but his facts are generally correct. See also *La Jeunesse de Robespierre*, by A. J. Paris (Arras: 1870). The *Mémoires de Robespierre*, published at Paris in 1830, and the *Mémoires de Charlotte Robespierre*, are both worthless.

Maximilien was the eldest of four children, and when, on the death of his mother in 1767, his father left Arras to wander about Europe till his own death in 1769, the children were adopted by their maternal grandfather and aunts. Maximilien de Robespierre, as the family name was then styled, was sent for his early education to the college at Arras, and showed such promise there, that, in 1770, Mgr. de Conzié, Bishop of Arras, gave him a bursarship or scholarship at the famous college of Louis-le-Grand at Paris. There he very greatly distinguished himself, and became a favourite pupil, and, in consideration of his brilliant career, his bursarship, when his own education was completed, was given to his younger brother, Augustin Bon Joseph de Robespierre. Maximilien had then to choose a profession, and naturally selected that of his father and grandfather, and after studying law at the University of Paris, he was admitted an avocat at Arras in 1781, and received a gratuity of six hundred livres from the authorities of his college as a reward for his industry. He was at first so poor that he could not hire an office, and had to establish himself in a room in his uncle's house; but the news of his brilliant career at school and college had preceded him to Arras, and in March, 1782, his former patron, Mgr. de Conzié, in order to show his appreciation of the ability and industry of his protégé, appointed him criminal judge of the diocese of Arras. This office he soon resigned, rather than pronounce a sentence of death; but in the following year he established his local reputation by his famous argument on the legality of lightning conductors, which had just been invented by Franklin. This argument, which he published in 1783 under the title of *Plaidoyer pour le Sieur Vissery*, received a great deal of attention all over Europe, and was favourably noticed in the *Journal des Savants* for March, 1784. Its success brought him a good practice at the bar, and he was able to indulge in the pleasures of society, and was elected a member both of the Academy of Arras and of the little society of the Rosati in that city, which included all the wits and beaux esprits of the provincial capital, and used to meet every

week to read little epigrams and *vers de société* and to pass a convivial evening. Not satisfied with this local reputation, Robespierre, like all young *avocats*, began to compete for the numerous prizes offered by the various provincial academies. He was not, however, very successful, and only obtained a medal from the Academy of Metz for his essay on the question whether the relatives of a condemned criminal should be punished, and an honourable mention from the Academy of Amiens for an *Éloge* on Gresset, the author of *Vert Vert* and *Le Méchant*. Hitherto he had been contented with his profession and with his social successes in the salons of Arras and the society of the Rosati, and had never dreamt of a political career; but when, in 1787, the news reached Arras that a States-General was to be summoned, Robespierre, like other young provincial *avocats*, threw his whole soul into the great political questions of the day.

The question of the elections was the first to attract his attention, and in 1788 he published an *Adresse à la nation artésienne*,¹ in which he argued that it would be quite ridiculous to allow the Estates of Artois to elect the deputies for that province to the States-General. When the *règlement* for Artois was issued, he made himself even more conspicuous. According to it, the city of Arras was to elect twenty-four electors of the tiers état to the assembly of the bailliage, and the burning question was as to the extent of influence the corporation was to exercise. Robespierre headed the opposition to the corporation, and drew up the cahier of the cobblers of the city² in that spirit, and was so successful that he was himself elected the fourteenth elector for the city of Arras. He then gave a marked proof of political foresight which secured his election to the States-General. He saw that, under the terms of the *règlement*, the rural electors were bound to outnumber the electors of the city of Arras in the assembly of the bailliage, and he therefore set to work to conciliate them, and made himself their champion in his *Avis*

¹ Vol. i. p. 16.

² Vol. i. p. 22; and Paris, *La Jeunesse de Robespierre*.

aux habitants de campagne, published at Arras in March, 1789. This manœuvre was successful, and it may be assumed that it was by means of the votes of the country electors that Maximilien de Robespierre, who had only been chosen fourteenth elector for the city of Arras, was elected tenth elector for the bailliage of Arras, and eventually fifth deputy to the States-General for the whole tiers état of Artois.¹ Maximilien de Robespierre was not quite thirty-one years of age when he took his seat in the States-General. He was by no means a remarkable personage to look at; short, pale, fair-haired, blue-eyed, and slightly marked from small-pox, with a nervous manner and only a local reputation to back him, he struck no one as a deputy with a career before him. His timidity and nervousness were so marked that every contemporary who has described him has dwelt upon the subject,² yet his convictions were so earnest that his evident efforts to conquer this very timidity lent weight to his remarks. He began to speak from the first in the Constituent Assembly, but was only very shortly reported as "un député," from the fact that his name was quite unknown to the journalists of Paris. He spoke, however, no less than thirty times in the Assembly during 1789, and far more frequently in the Jacobin Club, where he had not to fear the annoying interruptions of the deputies of the Right. From his persistency, and perhaps in a greater degree from the numerous allusions which his school friend, Camille Desmoulins, made to his patriotism and learning in his journal, his name became well known during 1790, and after Mirabeau's death he became a very important personage in the Assembly and the recognized leader of the Jacobin Club.³ During the summer of 1791, he came more and more into notice, and on the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly

¹ *Arras sous la Révolution*, by E. Lecesne, preliminary chapter, vol. i. pp. 1-62, in which the part Robespierre played during the electoral period is carefully analyzed; see also vol. i. 42.

² See the descriptions of his personal appearance, quoted in Aulard's *Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention*, ii. 421; and in Lecesne's *Arras sous la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 16, note.

³ Vol. i. p. 433.

he was crowned, with Pétion,¹ by the people of Paris. Of his career during the session of the Legislative Assembly,² his attitude at the meeting of the Convention,³ and the part he played in the king's trial⁴ and the struggle with the Girondins, much has already been said; but he was now placed in an entirely new position. As a member of the Committee of Public Safety, he was one of the twelve men on whose shoulders the Convention had thrown the whole duty and responsibility of governing France, and it is necessary to see what effect this new position had upon him.

The attitude of men towards events, whether in private or public life, necessarily changes year by year, and nearly day by day, and it is ridiculous to regard individuals as governing events when circumstances really govern them. The Robespierre of 1789, 1791, and 1792, differed greatly from the Robespierre of 1793. The enthusiastic worshipper of Rousseau, who had been used to regard the necessity of the establishment of order and good government in France as the first step only towards realizing the dreams of his master, looked upon his membership of the Committee of Public Safety as a temporary position. He trusted to mould his colleagues on the committee to his views, as he had moulded the Jacobin Club and a group of admirers in the Convention. He believed sincerely that he was the greatest man among them, and that by industry and persuasiveness he would gain a preponderating influence over them. He knew well that his was the only name of the members of the committee which conveyed a meaning beyond the walls of the Convention and the Jacobin Club, and that on him rested the chief responsibility for the action of the committee. His colleagues knew this also. They humoured his fancy; they allowed him to think that he was the chief man amongst them, and was the director of their policy; but in reality he was their tool, and his great reputation for virtue and incorruptibility strengthened their power at the time, while it covered their responsibility afterwards. They made

¹ Vol. i. p. 468.² Vol. ii. pp. 46, 59, 65, 135, 136.³ Vol. ii. pp. 161-163.⁴ Vol. ii. p. 214.

use of his name and fame while engaged in their double task of ruling France and maintaining their absolute supremacy, but when he went further, and thought he could do without them and establish a government after his own fashion, they easily overthrew him. It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the Great Committee, and not Robespierre, ruled France from September, 1793, to July, 1794, and that in the committee itself Robespierre had no more power than Prieur of the Marne or Robert Lindet, and that he never commanded a majority. To the outer world and to posterity he has seemed the ruling power of the Great Committee, but in fact he earned neither all the praise nor all the blame which has been cast upon it and upon him. What, then, were the views and political ideas which he hoped to develop by means of his position on the Great Committee? His attitude had altered greatly since the days when the Convention first met, in which he had hoped that the overthrow of the king would leave the way clear for the establishment of a republic framed from the ideal of Rousseau. The struggle with the Girondins had shown him that men existed with different ideas to his, who would not be persuaded or coerced into believing in Rousseau. Further, his contest with the Girondins, and still more his experience in practical government as time went on, showed him that Rousseau's dreams were not all suitable to be put into practice, and in proportion as his confidence in the practicability of Rousseau's political ideas diminished, his personal ambition to retain power increased. There is a wide gap between the young avocat of twenty-four, who resigned a judgeship sooner than condemn a fellow-creature to death, and the statesman of thirty-five, who did his best to establish the system of the Terror. This is not the place to examine Robespierre's constructive schemes and the influence which his study of Rousseau had upon them; it is enough here to state that he spent the first months of his membership of the Great Committee in endeavouring to establish, first, the omnipotence of the committee over France, and next that of himself over the committee. In the first effort his colleagues were with

him, and a despotism was created; in the second he was not successful. He had only two faithful adherents among the twelve, two men whom he had charmed into believing in him; two men—one a cripple, the other little more than a boy—who were ready to die with him,—Couthon and Saint-Just.

Georges Auguste Couthon¹ was the elder of the two colleagues of Robespierre in the Great Committee who obeyed him in all things, and formed the minority with him. In career and character he was strangely like and yet unlike his friend, to whom he acted as a sort of high priest. He was born at Orcet, near Clermont-Ferrand in Auvergne, on December 22, 1755, and was therefore between two and three years older than Robespierre. His father was a country notary, and as Couthon's elder brother was destined to succeed to the family business, he, as second son, was educated for the bar. In 1783 he became an avocat at Clermont-Ferrand, and soon had a large practice there; so large, indeed, that, in 1787, he was selected by the Provincial Assembly of Auvergne as one of its three judicial assessors. In the following year he was stricken with paralysis, and entirely lost the use of his legs; but his misfortune, instead of overwhelming him, seemed to quicken his faculties. He became a leading freemason, and the Duc de Clermont-Tonnerre, who was colonel of the regiment in garrison at Clermont-Ferrand, inspired him first, it is said,² with political ambition. Pity for his affliction won him support in his native city, as it did later in Paris, and during the session of the Constituent Assembly he played an important part in local politics. He took the lead in the affiliated Jacobin Club, which Bancal des Issards founded at Clermont-Ferrand in 1790, and in 1791 he was elected eighth

¹ The authorities on Couthon's life are *Correspondance de Georges Couthon, député du Puy de Dome à l'Assemblée Législative et la Convention, suivie de l'Aristocrate converti, comédie en deux actes par Couthon*, edited by F. Mège for the Académie of Clermont-Ferrand, 1872; *Les Conventionnels d'Auvergne*; Dulaure, by Marcellin Boudet (Clermont-Ferrand: 1874), Appendix I. pp. 399-403; and Aulard's *Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention* (Paris: 1886), ii. 425-443.

² *Correspondance de Couthon*, pp. 7, 8.

deputy to the Legislative Assembly for the department of the Puy-de-Dôme. Couthon was at this time no violent partisan of the Revolution; in the play which he wrote in 1791, under the title of the *Aristocrate converti*, he makes his principal character a pronounced aristocrat, who is converted by long arguments to believe in the changes brought about during the past two years, but he preaches no startling republican doctrines. On coming up to Paris to take his seat in the Legislative Assembly, he took lodgings with one of his fellow-members, the ci-devant Marquis de Soubrany, at 343, Rue Saint-Honoré, not far from the house of Duplay, in which Robespierre lodged, and on the opening of the Assembly he made his famous speech about the king and his precedence.¹ He was not at this time a very ardent politician; his letters to the municipality of Clermont-Ferrand contain at least as much about his health and the treatment of the Paris doctors of his complaint, as about politics. But nevertheless he had made his mark. His affliction, and the consequent necessity for him to speak from his seat or be carried to the tribune, at once gave him an individuality, and his words were always listened to with respectful sympathy. He was at this period no Girondin, as has been sometimes pretended, though he voted for the war, but was a sincere believer in Rousseau, as a remark in one of his letters to the municipality of his native city à propos of some sugar riots in January, 1792, "Are the rich then to be allowed to employ their fortune in increasing the necessities of the poor?"² plainly shows. During the year he became a thorough deputy of the Mountain, for on September 4, 1792, he writes of the massacres, "The Bicêtre has been taken and the people have there also judicially exercised their sovereignty."³ He was re-elected to the Convention as first deputy for the Puy-de-Dôme, and at once allied himself there with Robespierre, to whom he was attached by sympathy of tastes, education, and manners. Both country avocats, they were neither of them men of action. They were

¹ Vol. ii. p. 28.

² *Correspondance du Couthon*, p. 73.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

talkers and thinkers; both knew their Rousseau well, and hoped to put some at least of his ideas into practice, and both felt a repulsion for the Girondins, on account of the belief of the latter in Montesquieu, while they were united further by their hatred and loathing for atheism and atheists. Couthon's affliction made him a valuable helper to Robespierre in the Convention; the sufferer was always referring to his sufferings, and was always listened to with sympathy, and thus being sure of an attentive audience, he could often make Robespierre's sentiments more clearly understood than Robespierre himself. His beautiful face and singularly sweet voice were points in his favour in the Convention; but they had no effect upon the men of action who formed the majority of the Great Committee of Public Safety, where Robespierre could depend only on his vote on the rare occasions when the state of his health permitted him to be present. In spite of his crippled condition, Couthon twice went on mission; on the first occasion in March, 1793, to unite to the French Republic and organize the little independent principality of Upper Salm,¹ at the request of the inhabitants, and with the full consent of the Prince of Salm-Kyrbourg, who had taken the side of the Revolution, and was commandant of the National Guard of the Faubourg Saint-Germain; and on the second to rouse the peasants of his native Auvergne against Lyons.

Louis Antoine Léon Florelle de Saint-Just,² the younger of Robespierre's two supporters in the Great Committee, was of better birth than his two friends, being the only son of a retired captain of cavalry and a knight of Saint Louis, belonging to a family long seated at Blérancourt, near Coucy-le-Château. He was born at Decize in the Nivernais on August 25, 1767, and on his father's death ten years later the boy

¹ *Les Vosges pendant la Révolution*, by Félix Bouvier, pp. 191-196.

² On Saint-Just, see *Histoire de Saint-Just*, by Ernest Hamel (Paris : 1859), and *Saint-Just et la Terreur*, by S. Fleury (Paris : 1851), of which the former is full of unmitigated praise, the latter of abuse, but both of useful facts; and Aulard's *Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention*, vol. ii. pp. 443-476.

was left entirely to his mother's care. He was educated by the Oratorians in their college of Saint-Nicolas at Soisson, where he showed himself a most brilliant and distinguished scholar, and had commenced to study law at Rheims, when he suddenly broke off his education and returned to his mother's house at Blérancourt. It was now that occurred the best known event of his early life, which royalist writers never wearied of repeating—his theft from his mother, and consequent imprisonment. The true story is very simple. The young man of nineteen, either to avoid taking orders, as M. Aulard suggests,¹ or for mere indulgence in a fancy for seeing the capital, went off one morning from Blérancourt to Paris in September, 1786, with some of his mother's plate and other valuables. These things he sold. He was promptly arrested, and, at his mother's request, he was imprisoned for six months in Paris. Before the magistrate he frankly avowed what he had done, and seemed to argue that he had as much right to the plate as his mother.² On terminating his imprisonment, Saint-Just returned to his home at Blérancourt, where he seems to have given up his law studies, and thought of a literary career. It was at this period, or else during his imprisonment, that Saint-Just wrote his poem *L'Organt*, a mere imitation of Voltaire's *Pucelle* and absolutely without any merit whatever,³ which was published in 1789. The Revolution gave to this young man a career; he was not old enough to have seen through the fallacy of Rousseau's conceptions, and yet sufficiently sobered by his six months' imprisonment not to be solely impelled by personal ambition. He warmly espoused the cause of reform, and was in 1790 elected commandant of the National Guard of Blérancourt and representative of that little bourg to the assembly summoned to meet at Chauny in May, 1790, to decide what town

¹ *Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention*, vol. ii. p. 446.

² Vatel's *Charlotte Corday et les Girondins*, vol. i. pp. 141-154, where all the documents concerning this escapade and its punishment are printed for the first time.

³ This poem is reprinted in Hamel's *Histoire de Saint-Just*.

should be the capital of the newly formed department of the Aisne. Saint-Just met with great success in this assembly; his youth, beauty, and eloquence all attracted attention, but he did not succeed in obtaining a majority, for Soissons, in which city he had been educated, and whose cause he warmly espoused, was rejected in favour of Laon by 411 votes to 37.¹ His burning interest in this local question induced him to write both to Camille Desmoulins and to Robespierre for their support, and it was thus that he made their acquaintance. In 1791 he published a thoughtful essay, entitled "*L'Esprit de la Révolution et de la Constitution de France*," which was greatly praised by Camille Desmoulins, and he would undoubtedly have been elected to the Legislative Assembly had not attention been called to his youth, when, as not being twenty-five years of age, he was struck off the list of the active citizens of the Aisne. In 1792 this failure was more than repaired by his election to the Convention as fifth deputy for his department. He immediately allied himself with Robespierre, made his mark by a proposal to regulate the price of food on November 20, 1792,² and was, on May 30, 1793, added to the Committee of Public Safety as one of the five assistants whose special duty it was to draw up the republican Constitution of 1793. He was the reporter on and practical author of the new Constitution, and in this capacity so increased his reputation that he was re-elected to the committee on July 10. Saint-Just, like Robespierre and Couthon, was a believer in the theories of Rousseau, and he was naturally their ally in the Committee of Public Safety; but in one thing he was greater than they were, for he was also a man of action. A man of action only, however, not a man of business, capable of great deeds of energy and devotion, but not of prolonged labour. He was, without doubt, the greatest man of the three friends; his behaviour on his missions to the armies on the frontiers is enough to prove that; but he

¹ Vol. i. p. 503; Desmases' *Histoire de la Révolution dans le département de l'Aisne*, pp. 112, 113.

² Vol. ii. p. 212, 213.

was, in spite of his many brilliant qualities, too much a man of ideas to be a great administrator. His youth and singular beauty served him, as Couthon's infirmity or Robespierre's incorruptibility served them, by attracting popular attention, and his moral character, which has recently been entirely cleared of the greatest stain which has ever rested upon it,¹ was as high as that of his two allies.

These were the three men who are the most famous members of the Great Committee of Public Safety; they were the only three who looked upon their position as obliging them to plan out a fresh system of government for France, the only three who, instead of doing merely the work which came to their hand, looked forward to the future. Yet at this period they did not allow their constructive ideas to come to the front; they were occupied with their colleagues in consolidating their power, and in doing the work for which the Great Committee had been entrusted with absolute authority, namely, strengthening and simplifying the internal administration of the Republic, and opposing her foes both at home and on the frontiers.

Of the nine remaining members of the Great Committee, seven were essentially administrators, and not orators or men of abstract ideas. They formed the majority, and really governed France during the period between September, 1793, and July, 1794. Their names are quite overshadowed by those of the triumvirate in the eyes of posterity. They are not such interesting men as Robespierre and his friends; they were not men who were full of great political ideas; but they were what France needed far more than men of ideas, practical administrators and hard-headed men of business. It is well to study the careers and characters of these seven men, for they are types of the men to whom any country, racked by revolution or disaster, is bound to have recourse—men of steady, practical business habits, utterly devoid of romantic ideas, and yielding only to the calm logic of facts. Of the seven, two, Prieur of the Marne and Robert Lindet, had, as their special

¹ *Saint-Just et Madame Thorin*, by E. Patoux. Saint Quentin : 1878.

department, the "subsistances" of the country—that is, sole charge and management of its economic resources; two, Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois, looked after the development of the revolutionary government in the interior; the fifth, Jean Bon Saint-André, had charge of the navy; and the other two, Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, superintended the military department and the conduct of the war upon the frontiers.

Of these seven men, Carnot "the organizer of victory," is the best known, but he deserves neither more credit nor less blame than his colleagues. He fully shares the responsibility of the measures of the government by Terror, and also the glory of organizing the successful resistance to foreign enemies. Lazare Nicolas Marguerite Carnot¹ was born at Nolay, in Burgundy, on March 15, 1753, and was therefore forty years of age when he entered the Great Committee. His father was a country avocat, who gave his son a good education at the college of Autun, and then at a military tutor's in Paris where he showed such proficiency in mathematics, and especially in geometry, that he had no difficulty in obtaining admission into the Royal Engineer College at Mézières in 1771. In 1773 he passed out of the college as first lieutenant in the Royal Engineers, and was ordered to Calais. He spent his military career entirely on the north-eastern frontier, and was in garrison at different times at Calais, Arras, and Saint-Omer, and was promoted captain in 1784. But Carnot was not satisfied with merely performing his military duties. He determined to achieve distinction in science and literature. He first published a *Mémoire sur les Ballons*, then won the prize of the Academy of Dijon for an *Éloge* on Vauban in 1783, and in 1784 published his *Essai sur les Machines en général*. He by no means neglected light literature, and when at Arras became a member of the dilettante society known as the Rosati, among whom he was one of the most successful poetasters. He

¹ On Carnot there is considerable literature. See especially *Mémoire de Carnot* (Paris; 1832); *Mémoires sur Carnot*, by his son, Hippolyte Carnot; and the essay on him in Mignet's *Éloges et Portraits*.

seems to have shown no particular taste for politics, but in 1791 he married the daughter of M. Dupont, a wealthy inhabitant of Saint-Omer, and in the September of that year, partly owing to his father-in-law's influence, and partly to that of his younger brother, who acted as secretary to the electors, he was chosen ninth deputy of the Pas-de-Calais to the Legislative Assembly.¹ In that assembly he served on the Military Committee, and was reporter on the murder of Théobald Dillon,² and a commissioner to inquire into the military insubordination at the camp of Soissons owing to the report that the bread was poisoned. He was re-elected to the Convention by the Pas-de-Calais, and it is no small tribute to the sagacity of the deputies that, among the many eloquent speakers of all parties, this hard-working officer should have been selected for many important missions. Some instinct must have taught the Convention that he was a man of organizing abilities, for as a speaker he was beneath contempt; yet on August 14, 1793, he was one of the two officers recommended by the Committee of Public Safety to be added to their number, in order to take the direction of the foreign war. It will be shown later that Carnot does not perhaps deserve all the praise which has been lavished upon him, and that he had a peculiarly able band of assistants under him; but in this place it must be recognized that he was one of the strong, silent workers in the committee, who, as long as he was left undisturbed in his department, supported the other members in their ideas in their own departments, and that he never failed to acknowledge the solidarity of the committee, and that he too was responsible for the measures which they carried.

Claude Antoine Prieur-Duvernois, commonly known as Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, was the other officer of Royal Engineers who was added to the Great Committee of Public Safety in August, 1793, for the special purpose of conducting the war, and became Carnot's principal assistant. He was

¹ Lecesne's *Arras sous la Révolution*, vol. i. pp. 178, 179.

² Vol. ii. pp. 77, 78.

the only son of a receiver-general of the taxes at Auxonne, where he was born on December 22, 1763, and he was therefore not quite thirty, and Carnot's junior by ten years, when he was elected a member of the Great Committee. He was educated at the Military College at Mézières, from which he entered the Royal Engineers in 1784, and he may have made Carnot's acquaintance during his period of military service. He was a man of great aptitude for scientific inquiry and well versed in chemistry, and he first made his name known by publishing, in 1790, a *Mémoire sur la nécessité et les moyens de rendre uniformes dans le Royaume toutes les mesures d'étendue et de profondeur*, which was mentioned with praise by the Marquis de Bonnay in the tribune of the Constituent Assembly. This memoir, his reputation as a man of science, and his father's wealth, caused his election to the Legislative Assembly by the department of the Côte-d'Or in 1791. In that assembly he spoke seldom, but proved a hard-working member in the Military Committee, and he consistently voted with the extreme left, following in all things the counsels of his great friend, the chemist Guyton-Morveau. He was elected to the Convention by his department as third deputy, next to Basire and Guyton-Morveau, and filled much the same position that he did in the Legislative, and enjoyed the same sort of reputation. His arrest in Normandy,¹ when on mission there during the brief period of the ascendancy of the escaped Girondins, brought his name prominently forward, and he was in August requested by the other members to join the Committee of Public Safety. There is a story extant, which seems to rest on good foundation, that Prieur of the Côte-d'Or was offered the sole superintendence of military affairs in the Great Committee, and that it was he who, feeling himself unequal to such a work, suggested Carnot as his colleague.² Anyhow he was the most efficient coadjutor Carnot could have had, for he interfered but little with the actual management of the

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 272, 275.

² See the article on Prieur-Duvernois in the *Biographie Rabbe* (Paris: 1836), evidently written by an acquaintance.

campaigns, and devoted himself rather to the task of providing arms and ammunition, to the superintendence of the hospitals, and to what is called in France the administration of the army.

The absolute power which Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or exercised with respect to the army and the war on the frontiers was entrusted by the Committee of Public Safety, with regard to the navy and the naval war and defences, to Jean Bon Saint-André. This remarkable man came of a wealthy Protestant family of Montauban,¹ and was born in that stronghold of Protestantism in 1749. He was nevertheless educated by the Jesuits, and not in the religion of his family, and feeling a strong love for the sea, he entered the merchant service, and soon qualified himself as a merchant captain. However, in one of his voyages he was wrecked off the coast of San Domingo, and the shock made him turn to thoughts of religion, and he threw up his first profession and became an ardent Protestant. He went to Lausanne and studied theology, and acted in succession as Protestant pastor at Castres and in his native city of Montauban. Like all Protestants, he was naturally a warm adherent of the Revolution from the very first, and became the most conspicuous member of the popular club at Montauban, and one of the leading men of the advanced party during the religious troubles there in 1791.² He nevertheless failed in his candidature for the Legislative Assembly, but was elected for the department of the Lot to the Convention. He took his seat amongst the Girondins owing to his friendship for Lasource, who also had been a Protestant pastor, and was a deputy for the Tarn, but during the king's trial he was filled with disgust at the vacillations of the Girondin party, and joined the deputies of the Mountain. He was soon recognized as an authority on naval matters, and was elected, first, on June 22, 1793, member of the first Committee of Public Safety in the place of Mathieu, and then, on July 10, senior member of the new, or, as it came to be, the Great Committee.

¹ See *Jean Bon Saint-André, sa vie et ses écrits*, by Michel Nicolas. Paris : 1848.

² Vol. i. pp. 489-492.

Jean Bon Saint-André was a hard-worker and a poor speaker, like Carnot; he was constantly employed in difficult missions, and had to work almost single-handed, and the importance of his attempts to reorganize the French navy will form the subject of a later chapter.

Similar in character, and equally men of practical and administrative ability and not thinkers or orators, were the two members of the Great Committee who took charge of what was vaguely called "subsistances," Prieur of the Marne and Robert Lindet. Of Pierre Louis Prieur,¹ commonly called Prieur of the Marne, there is hardly anything known, except that he was born at Sommesous on April 1, 1756, and was practising as an avocat at Châlons-sur-Marne in 1789, when he was elected a deputy to the States-General. This absence of information is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as he was a man who filled an important place in the eyes of his contemporaries, and was a leading deputy both of the Constituent Assembly and of the Convention, as well as being a member of the Great Committee. In the Constituent Assembly he sat on the extreme left, and was next to Robespierre and Pétion, the most conspicuous member of the thirty, whom Mirabeau attacked.² He was in his language the most violent of all the radical speakers in the Constituent Assembly, and was the deputy who proposed the destruction of the monument which "despotism has erected to itself on the Place des Victoires" and the first to propose penal measures against the émigrés. At the close of the Constituent Assembly Prieur was elected vice-president of the criminal tribunal of the Seine, and was in September, 1792, chosen by the department of the Marne to the Convention. As an ex-Constituant, Prieur of the Marne was from the first listened to with attention; he was a member of the Committee of General Defence, and entrusted with many important missions;³ and eventually on July 10, 1793,

¹ It is difficult to get any information on Prieur of the Marne. Louis Barbat's *Histoire de Châlons-sur-Marne*, 1855, and Lhote's *Biographie Chalonnaise*, 1870, say nothing whatever about him.

² Vol. i. p. 438; vol. ii. p. 40.

³ Vol. ii. p. 274.

he was elected a member of the Great Committee, when, as has been said, he took charge of the department of subsistances, which included all financial arrangements, with Lindet.

Jean Baptiste Robert Lindet,¹ who was the special colleague of Prieur of the Marne, was another administrator whose ability was for practical hard work, not for successes in the tribune, from which he hardly ever spoke, owing to the weakness of his voice. He was born at Bernay in Normandy in 1743, and was therefore fifty years of age when he was elected to the Great Committee of Public Safety, and the oldest of its members. He was in practice as an avocat in his little native town, where his brother, Robert Thomas Lindet, was curé of the parish of Sainte-Croix, up to the year 1789, when the States-General was summoned. The two brothers both took an interest in politics, and one of the incidents in the revolt of the curés was the election of Thomas Lindet as deputy for the clergy of the bailliage of Évreux to the States-General.² He was one of the first deputies of the clergy to join the tiers état, and one of the few to take the oath to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and he met with his reward in being elected constitutional bishop of the department of the Eure. His success helped his brother Robert Lindet, who was elected procureur-syndic of the district of Bernay, and in September, 1791, deputy for the Eure to the Legislative Assembly. There his weak voice prevented him from speaking, but he proved a most efficient member of the Financial Committee, and always handed his notes to Cambon for use in the tribune. He was re-elected to the Convention, and the quiet man of business was generally esteemed there as an admirable worker in committees. He brought up the report on the "crimes" of Louis XVI.³ in December, 1792, and on the constitution of the Revolutionary Tribunal in March, 1793, was elected to the first Committee of Public Safety in April, 1793, put down the Norman insurrection in the summer,⁴ and

¹ *Les Conventionnels de l'Eure*, by J. N. Davy. Paris : 1878.

² Vol. i. p. 40.

³ Vol. ii. p. 214.

⁴ Vol. ii. p. 275.

was elected to the Great Committee in July, 1793, where he became the habitual colleague of Prieur of the Marne.

Equally great as administrators, were the two members of the Great Committee of Public Safety who were specially added to it on September 6, in order to carry out the administration of the interior of France, or the home government, as it might be called, in the same absolute fashion as Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or managed the army and Jean Bon Saint-André the navy. These two men, Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois, were the real rulers of France under the Terror; they did not invent the system, but they developed it, and ruled by means of it. Jean Nicolas Billaud-Varenne, the abler and more clear-sighted of these two friends, and the man who was at once the logical exponent of the system of the Terror and its most relentless advocate, was the son of an avocat at La Rochelle, and was born in that old Huguenot capital on April 23, 1756. He intended at first to follow his father's profession, and studied law; but he changed his mind and joined the teaching staff of the Oratorian college at Juilly, where he had been educated, as an usher, and afterwards became "prefect of studies." He had there as one of his colleagues the notorious Fouché, and managed to make himself particularly popular with the boys, by whom he was termed the "bon père Billaud."¹ In 1785 he left Juilly, it is said, on account of his writing a comedy, *Une femme comme il n'y en a peu*, and came to Paris, where he married a natural daughter of a farmer-general, M. Verdun, and inscribed himself as an avocat. He did not get much practice, and, like many other poor lawyers, devoted himself to literature. His first work, which must have cost him years of reading, was published before the States-General met, in 1789, under the title of *Le Despotisme des Ministres de France*, in three large volumes, which seem to have made no particular impression. The meeting of the States-General and the interest excited in political affairs gave him his opportunity as a political

¹ *Histoire de l'Abbaye et du Collège de Juilly*, by Charles Hamel, pp. 334-336 (Paris: 1868); Arnault, *Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire*.

pamphleteer, and he published in quick succession *Le Peintre Politique* in 1789, *Plus de Ministres* in 1790, and in 1791, after the flight to Varennes, *Acéphaloceratie*, which bears as its sub-title, "Federal government, shown to be the best of all for a great empire by the principles of politics and the facts of history." That the chief organizer of the most centralized government which ever existed should have written in favour of federalism, is of itself a matter of strange interest, and deserves remark. None of these pamphlets, however, made much mark,¹ and Billaud-Varenne was chiefly known as a regular attendant at the Jacobin and Cordelier Clubs, when he made the acquaintance of Danton. The great Cordelier could have had no great personal sympathy with the pamphleteer, but he understood his character instantly, and recognized at once his main qualities of seeing things as they really were, and having courage to confess the conclusions he had arrived at. It was doubtless through Danton's influence that Billaud-Varenne was elected to the insurrectionary commune by the section of the Théâtre Français on August 9, and to succeed himself as substitute to the procureur of Paris, and his firm conduct during the critical month which followed, and during the September massacres, secured his election to the Convention as fifth deputy for Paris. In the Convention Billaud-Varenne spoke very little, but what he said was always to the point, and his administrative ability was so thoroughly believed in, although he had had few opportunities of displaying it when on mission, that he was specially co-opted to the Great Committee of Public Safety on September 6, 1793, on the nomination of the other members. It was Billaud-Varenne who really systematized the Terror; he was the one man who reduced the idea to its logical conclusions, and was its most courageous defender. What the system of the Terror was will be developed in the ensuing chapters; it

¹ There is a letter in Mr. Morrison's collection, dated August 10, 1791, from Billaud-Varenne to Dulaure, stating that he had to hide from the police owing to his *Acéphaloceratie* (see Thibeaudeau's *Catalogue of Mr. Morrison's Autograph Letters*, vol. i. p. 79).

is here enough to point out that Billaud-Varenne was one of the working members of the Great Committee, having charge with Collot d'Herbois of what may be called the department of the Interior, and in that capacity organizing and superintending the system of the Terror.

Jean Marie Collot d'Herbois, who was the particular colleague of Billaud-Varenne in the Great Committee, is somewhat vaguely said to have been born at Paris in 1750, and to have been the son of a bourgeois there. He is also said to have been educated by the Oratorians, though there is no very trustworthy evidence on this point; but wherever he was educated, his wide knowledge did credit to his teachers. The first certain fact in his career is that he devoted himself to the theatre, and became in turn an actor, manager, and dramatic author. As an actor little is known of him, except the story of his having been hissed at Lyons, which is certainly false,¹ and indeed he seems to have been rather an author and manager than an actor. He was certainly director of a theatrical company at Geneva, at Lyons, and at the Hague, and it was in the latter city that a collected edition of his dramatic works was published in 1784. The known plays of Collot d'Herbois, before the commencement of the Revolution, are nine in number and were originally printed in different provincial towns of France, where presumably he was at the time with travelling companies. They mostly treat of provincial life and manners, except two, which deserve a special notice, *Les Français à la Grenade*, a *pièce de circonstance* published at Lille in 1779, when all France was rejoicing over Bouille's victories in the West Indies, and *L'Amant loup-garou, ou M. Rodomont*, a comedy in four acts and in prose, published at Douai in 1780, the incidents of which are founded upon Shakspeare's *Merry Wives of Windsor*. His career must have been fairly prosperous, for in 1789 he was established comfortably at Chaillot, near Paris. The Revolution furnished him with a great opportunity as a dramatist, and it was as a

¹ *Lyon et la Révolution*, by the Abbé Guillon, vol. ii. p. 332; Morin's *Histoire de Lyon sous la Révolution*, vol. iii. p. 404.

dramatist, not as a politician, that he first made his mark. He became known as the patriot dramatist, and between 1789 and 1791 he produced no less than eight successful plays at different Paris theatres, of which *Le Famille Patriote, ou la Fédération*, is the most famous.¹ The titles of the others are worth mentioning, if only to show Collot's skill in taking advantage of the subjects which most attracted the Parisian populace at the time they were produced; they are *L'Inconnu, ou le Préjugé nouvellement vaincu*; *Adrienne, ou le Secret de la Famille*; *L'Ainé et le Cadet*; *La Journée de Louis XII.*; *Isabelle et Don Louis*; *Les Portefeuilles*; and *Le Procès de Socrate, ou le Régime des anciens temps*. His reputation was further confirmed by his winning the prize of the Jacobin Club for a national almanack with his *Almanach du Père Gérard pour 1792*, which was translated into English, German, and Dutch, and went through innumerable editions.² This almanack, which made Collot's political fortune, was by no means republican, but evidently the work of a constitutional royalist, and it is curious to note here the names of the judges who awarded him the prize on behalf of the Jacobin Club. They were Condorcet, Grégoire, Polverel, Lanthenas, Clavière, and Dusaulx. Collot d'Herbois devoted half his prize to the cause of the Swiss soldiers of the Regiment of Château Vieux, and he it was who, remembering his old days of theatrical management, organized the great fête in honour of the released mutineers in March, 1792.³ He was now so well known that, when the electors for Paris assembled to choose deputies to the Convention, he was elected their president, and on the following day third deputy to the Convention, next to Robespierre and Danton. He soon made his mark by his real, if somewhat theatrical eloquence, and after showing his ability on mission, notably at Nice in January and at Orleans in April,⁴ 1793, he was, on September 6, 1793, chosen with

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 22.

² *Les Almanachs de la Révolution*, by Henri Welschinger, pp. 21-23. Paris: 1884.

³ Vol. ii. pp. 60-62.

⁴ *Collot d'Herbois à Orléans*, by Jules Doinel, in the *République Française*, April 14 and 15, 1885.

Billaud-Varenne to organize the system of the Terror as a member of the Great Committee of Public Safety.

Carnot, the two Prieurs, Robert Lindet, Jean Bon Saint-André, Billaud-Varenne, and Collot d'Herbois were the seven working deputies of the Great Committee of Public Safety who really administered the government of France from September, 1793, to July, 1794, just as Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just were the three Rousseauists who looked upon their position in the Great Committee as a step towards establishing a new *régime*, and it is easy to see which party had the majority and was really responsible for the government of France during that terrible year. Nothing need be said of Thuriot, who was elected to the Great Committee on July 10, and resigned on September 20; but some notice must be taken of Hérault de Séchelles, the Dantonist colleague of these great men, and of Barère, the habitual reporter of the committee.

Marie Jean Hérault de Séchelles¹ differed entirely from the rest of his colleagues in birth, bearing, and opinions, and this elegant courtier of former days must at times have felt himself strangely out of place among the earnest men with whom he was supposed to work. He was the descendant of an ancient Norman family; his grandfather, René Hérault, was lieutenant-general of police from 1725 to 1739, his uncle was the Maréchal de Contades, and his father was a colonel in the army, and was killed at the head of his regiment at the battle of Minden. He was born at Paris in 1760, in the year of his father's death, and received a good education, by which he profited to become an excellent Greek scholar, and in 1779, though only nineteen years old, he published an *Éloge de Suger*, which excited some attention. He was introduced at court by his cousin, Madame de Polignac, and the queen at once took a fancy to the handsome youth, who was known both at court and in city circles as "le beau Séchelles." He became an

¹ On Hérault de Séchelles see *Les Dantonistes*, by Jules Claretie (Paris: 1868), pp. 317-332; and Aulard's *Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention*, vol. ii. pp. 265-291.

avocat at the Châtelet in 1780, and from his reputation as an orator and his court influence, he was promoted to be avocat-général to the Parlement of Paris at the unprecedented age of twenty-five in 1785. His birth, surprising success in life, and court influence did not, however, imbue him with aristocratic ideas, for he adopted a sort of laughing philosophy, imitated from Buffon and Diderot. Free alike from the earnestness of enthusiastic disciples of Rousseau and the iconoclasm of followers of Voltaire, he lived an epicurean life, and devoted himself to pleasure, but pleasure of an elegant sort, devoid of vulgar debauchery. It might from this have been expected that he would have thrown in his lot with the aristocratic wits, like Mirabeau-Tonneau and Champfort; but, whether from philosophy or from dislike of the courtiers and members of the Parlement of Paris, he at once took the side of the popular party, and was one of the most vigorous assailants of the Bastille, and one of the first to mount the ramparts of that fortress.¹ This action brought down on him the hatred of the courtiers to a redoubled degree, as a traitor to his class, and he was thus thrown more and more with the popular party, and by their means was elected a judge for one of the arrondissements of Paris in 1790, and appointed in March, 1791, "*commissaire du Roi*" at the Tribunal of Appeal. In September, 1791, he was elected a deputy for the department of the Seine to the Legislative Assembly, and first spoke on October 6 in favour of repealing the motions made by Couthon and Chabot and against removing the ceremonial titles and precedence of the king. He was hissed as an aristocrat, and in December, 1791, he changed his tactics, and became a member of the Left and a violent partisan of the war. His handsome face and real, if somewhat academic and stilted, eloquence was bound to make its mark; he became a leading member of the assembly, and in July he was chosen by his colleagues in the Diplomatic Committee to draw up the famous report on "the country in danger."² He was now thoroughly engaged with the democratic party, though prudence forbade him to become

¹ Vol. i. p. 143.² Vol. ii. p. 102.

a candidate for the mayoralty of Paris, and on August 26, 1792, he drew up the famous proclamation on the capture of Longwy, which did so much to cause the massacres of September. He was elected to the Convention by the department of the Seine-et-Oise, and in November was sent on mission, with Grégoire, Jagot, and Simond, to organize the conquered province of Savoy as a department of France. When on this mission he did little of the real work, but contented himself with picturesque excursions and falling in love,¹ and owing to it he was absent from the king's trial, and only sent in his condemnation of his former patron by letter, though without stating to what penalty. On his return to Paris he allied himself closely with Danton, whose broad tolerant spirit suited him well, and on May 30 he was added to the first Committee of Public Safety, as one of the five additional members appointed to draw up the republican Constitution of 1793. In one capacity Hérault de Séchelles was pre-eminently conspicuous—namely, as the president of an assembly. He had acted in this capacity during the last month of the Legislative Assembly, throughout the stormy days of the Prussian advance and of the September massacres; and was elected fourth president of the Convention on November 1, 1792. As an ex-president, he presided over the Convention during the night of May 31, 1793, and again on June 2, when the Girondins were finally overthrown, and he was elected president of the Convention for a second time on August 8, in order that he might be the official representative of that assembly in the grand fête held on the first anniversary of the capture of the Tuileries. There can be no doubt that Robespierre was decidedly jealous of the influence which this handsome nobleman possessed over the deputies of the Convention, and that he felt a great dislike for his loose manner of life, as unbefitting a ruler of the Republic. For Hérault de Séchelles differed entirely in character from the earnest workers and thinkers who were his colleagues on the Great Committee; he

¹ *Les Savoyiens dans les Assemblées Législatives de la Révolution*, by André Folliet, in the *Révolution Française* for March, 1883, pp. 804, 805.

shone in society, and his love-affairs, especially with Madame de Morency and Madame de Sainte-Amaranthe, were notorious; he paid but comparatively slight attention to business and affected a knowledge of foreign affairs, which brought him into communication with such adventurers as Espagnac, Proly, and Pereira. His character made him obnoxious to the strict Rousseauists, who were ready to believe any evil of a man of loose morals, while other deputies of the Convention could not forget his noble birth and former court influence, and it can therefore be readily believed that he was out of place in the Great Committee, in which he exercised only the slightest influence.

If Héault de Séchelles was the least influential member of the Great Committee, Barère was in some respects the most important of them all. It was Barère who was elected at the head of the list on the first Committee of Public Safety on April 7, and second on the Great Committee on July 10; he it was who suggested, in the name of his colleagues, the addition of Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or to its numbers on August 14, and of Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois on September 6; he was a constant attendant at the committee, never going on mission, and taking general charge of such miscellaneous subjects as the regulation of the theatres, and above all he was the regular reporter of the committee. His famous reports ought to be collected and published to form a worthy monument of the labours of the Great Committee of Public Safety; and it is little wonder that the Convention always received Barère with cheers as the representative of the government of France. Something has already been said of Bertrand Barère as a journalist and deputy to the States-General for Bigorre in 1789,¹ and as a representative member of the "Marsh," or Centre, during the early months of the session of the Convention;² it now remains to examine his conduct in his most important capacity, as reporter of the Great Committee of Public Safety. Macaulay has devoted one of his essays to elaborate abuse of Barère, an essay which contains

¹ Vol. i. pp. 99, 100.

² Vol. ii. p. 157.

much that is true, though obscured by exaggerations. His criticism on many acts in Barère's career is perfectly justified by facts, but he entirely failed to understand the man. Barère was a typical Gascon, with a keen imagination and a fund of fluent eloquence, easily influenced by those about him, and quick in assimilating the ideas of the majority. He was a man who, if he never had much weight in forming public opinion, was yet excellent in representing it. In the early days of the Convention he was a typical "Frog of the Marsh," with such influence over the deputies of the Centre that all parties courted him alike. He was naturally elected on every important committee, from the Committee of General Defence to the Great Committee of Public Safety, and from his fluent eloquence was generally chosen as reporter. He showed a disposition to join the Girondins in the early months of 1793, but when he perceived that the deputies of the Mountain were the strongest, he turned round and joined that party. This faculty of always being on the stronger side was not peculiar to Barère; many men, indeed most conscientious men, have changed their opinions often, but very few men, even in the time of the Revolution, became the spokesmen of so many different parties. Yet it is hardly fair to rail against Barère as a double-dyed traitor; he was no more a traitor than the vast majority of the Convention, or indeed of all Frenchmen, but his peculiar power of assimilating ideas and his faculty of eloquence made him conspicuous in the tribune, and therefore in French history, as a man who often changed his opinions. There is no need to defend Barère, but it is necessary to understand him; his changes of opinion indicated the wavering of the majority of the Convention until he became reporter of the Great Committee, when he fell under the influence of the majority of the working members among his colleagues. He it was who explained from the tribune the victories which Carnot had organized, the financial expedients of Robert Lindet, the naval battles of Jean Bon Saint-André, and the events of internal history under the Terror as regarded by Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois, and, as the spokesman

of the majority, he was extremely obnoxious to the Rousseauist minority on the committee. Robespierre could not conceal his jealousy of Barère's popularity, and tried on various occasions to supplant him as reporter by Couthon and Saint-Just; but such attempts were vain. Couthon and Saint-Just may have been far greater men than Barère, but they could not catch the attention and tickle the ears of the deputies of the Convention like the orator of the south, with his handsome face and glowing periods.

If there is any justification for inserting biographies in the course of a history, it is in the instance of the members of the Great Committee of Public Safety. Critics may object that such biographical work is unnecessary, and that it stops the consecutive flow of the narrative; but it is of paramount importance to grasp various facts in connection with these particular men, which cannot be understood without regarding each man individually. First, it is necessary to understand that these twelve men were not exceptionally gifted, specially trained administrators. There were most probably hundreds of other men equally qualified to put an end to anarchy and to reorganize France, both in the Convention and in the remains of the military and civil services, but circumstances thrust these twelve men to the front. Mankind is too apt to believe that because certain men have filled certain conspicuous positions and done certain great deeds, they are therefore exceptional men. It is not so; it cannot be proved, indeed, that other men would have acted in precisely the same manner, as they cannot be put into precisely analogous positions, but it can be shown that none of these twelve men, who formed the Great Committee of Public Safety, were in any way especially prepared for the great functions they undertook. It has been pointed out that they were all well-educated men, belonging, with the exception of Hérault de Séchelles, to middle-class families, who had, before 1789, no idea of the great power which they would one day possess. It has been shown that ten out of the twelve were not Parisians, and that the only two of the future colleagues who

were acquainted with each other before 1789 were Robespierre and Carnot, who had both been members of the Rosati at Arras. It is important and interesting also to observe how thoroughly these twelve men were new to administrative functions, in order to learn that administrative experience is not indispensable to prepare men to hold supreme power, for these twelve men were called suddenly to the head of affairs, and yet were more efficient than any one could have expected. It is important also to notice what manner of men they were, and to distinguish between the workers and the talkers. None of the seven working members of the committee were orators. If they had anything to say, they let it be said by Barère, whose main function was to act as their spokesman, and they themselves were contented to work quietly, receiving neither money nor glory. Carnot is the only one of them whose personality is at all known to posterity; the names of some of the hardest workers among them, such as the two Prieurs, are so ignored that it is almost impossible to collect any biographical details about them, and their portraits are not to be procured. When once the existence of these seven workers and their reporter is brought into clear relief, as well as the indolent character of Hérault de Séchelles and his attitude towards the committee, the weakness of Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just, as a minority, becomes clear, and the utter absurdity of considering the government of the Great Committee as the government of Robespierre and his friends becomes manifest. The part played by this triumvirate, their ideas and attempt to draw the power of the committee into their own hands, will be examined later; it is at present enough to lay weight once more on the fact that they were only a minority. Apart from all these facts, there is a real interest in knowing something of the details of the lives of these men, who ruled France with such unflinching sternness, especially in the case of those whose names are now forgotten by the world.

In studying the government of the Great Committee it is necessary to analyze the decree "on the provisional revolutionary government," carried on the proposition of Billaud-

Varenne on the 14th Frimaire, year II. (December 4, 1793), which was the natural sequel to the decree carried by Saint-Just on 9 Vendémiaire (October 10), declaring the Constitution of 1793 suspended and the continuance of revolutionary government till a general peace. By Billaud's decree all constituted authorities and public functionaries were placed under the authority of the Committee of Public Safety, and were to obey its orders, while all police duties and the supervision of the conduct of private individuals were handed over to the Committee of General Security; the posts of procureur-général-syndics of departments and of procureur-syndics of districts were abolished, and "national agents," chosen either by the Committee of Public Safety or by the representatives on mission, were appointed in their place to correspond with the two committees; the representatives on mission, appointed by the Convention on the nomination of the Committee of Public Safety, were to report to the committee every ten days, and the ministers also, and the committee was itself to report to the Convention every month. The simplicity of this organization is obvious, and its advantages over the elaborate system devised by the Constitution of 1791. Through the ministers, the departments of the public service; through the representatives on mission and the "national agents," the provinces of France, were entirely subordinated to the Great Committee. The committee was only responsible to the Convention, but, as has been said already, the Convention deliberately abandoned its executive and administrative powers to the committee, and consented to all its propositions, while jealously guarding its real duty of legislation. The committee met every night in private at the Pavillon de l'Égalité in the Tuileries, and transacted business until the meeting of the Convention in the morning. Two-thirds of the signatures of the members of the committee were necessary to the validity of their acts, but the members so thoroughly recognized their solidarity, that they lent their signatures to their colleagues, who even, in cases of emergency, did not hesitate to forge them. It need hardly be said that there was not time for every member to

read every document emanating from the Great Committee, and that they took what was placed before them on trust, and just as Carnot would sign a document relating to the internal government of France placed before him by Billaud-Varenne, so Billaud would in his turn sign any document relating to the army placed before him by Carnot. It is here worth while to recapitulate the division of labour amongst the members of the committee. Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varenne corresponded with the national agents and received the reports of the representatives on mission in the interior; Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or took charge of the army and the war on the frontiers, as Jean Bon Saint-André did of the navy; Robert Lindet and Prieur of the Marne had all economic questions to arrange, and provided clothing and subsistence for the armies; Barère was reporter, and supervised all miscellaneous matters and such correspondence with foreign countries as was left, in which latter task he was assisted by Robespierre, and in a fitful manner by Hérault de Séchelles; Saint-Just was supposed to be responsible for constitutional legislation, but really was generally on mission, and acting as Robespierre's special emissary; Robespierre was supposed to have charge of public instruction and education, and of what he called "esprit public," which often brought him into collision with the Committee of General Security; while Couthon, owing to his infirmities, seldom came, and had no special department allotted to him.

It has been said that the ministers were to report to the Great Committee every ten days, but from August, 1793, the ministers of the Republic were to all intents and purposes what they were officially made in April, 1794, when the ministries were abolished—chief clerks who managed their departments under the direction of the members of the Great Committee; though in this subordinate position their names are worth mentioning, for they all proved efficient and hard-working subordinates to the committee. They were, in order of seniority, Gohier, a Breton lawyer and former deputy for the Ille-et-Villaine to the Legislative Assembly, Minister of

Justice; Dalbarade, a celebrated privateer captain during the American War of Independence, and afterwards a Knight of Saint Louis and a captain in the Royal Navy,¹ Minister of the Marine; Bouchotte, a colonel in the army, and formerly captain in the Esterhazy Hussars, Minister of War; Destournelles, a Norman Protestant, who had been employed by the farmers-general before 1789, Minister of Finance; Deforgues, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Paré, a former clerk of Danton's when the great statesman was a lawyer in Paris, Minister of the Interior. It is worth noting, as showing the new spirit which had come over the executive, that all these men remained in office until the ministries were abolished in April, 1794, a remarkable change after the chopping and changing which had been the rule since 1789. The dates when they came into office may also be noted. Gohier succeeded Garat in March, 1793; Dalbarade and Bouchotte became ministers in April, on the retirement of Monge and the arrest of Beurnonville by Dumouriez;² Destournelles and Deforgues took the places of Clavière and Lebrun, when the latter were included in the proscription of the Girondins;³ and Paré was appointed Minister of the Interior instead of Garat on August 15, 1793, when the latter was suspected of Girondin sympathies. But these ministers were not the only assistants whom the members of the Great Committee had to aid them in their arduous labours; many of the great administrators, on whom Napoleon afterwards depended, served their apprenticeship and learnt their work in the bureaux of the Great Committee. Among these future administrators might be noted Otto, Colchen, Reinhard, and Miot de Melito in the department of Foreign Affairs; Benezech, Pille, and Xavier Andouin in the War Office, where General d'Arçon, Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the ci-devant Comte de Montalembert, the two most scientific soldiers in France, also assisted; Gaudin and Mollien, the future financiers; Fain in the Ministry of

¹ *Histoire Maritime de la France*, by Léon Guérin, ed. 1863, vol. v. pp. 415, 416.

² Vol. ii. p. 230.

³ Vol. ii. p. 246.

the Interior; Admiral Grivel, Adet, and Pléville-le-Peley at the Ministry of Marine; while Monge, Berthollet, Fourcroy, Guyton-Morveau, and Lagrange, famous men of science, gave their help in inventing improved guns and ammunition, and Guibert de Pixérécourt, the collector of curiosities, assisted Barère in his regulation of the Paris theatres.

But enough has been said of the Great Committee itself: it now remains to examine its government of France. That government was the Reign of Terror. The system of the Terror was simplicity itself; it depended mainly on two institutions—the Committee of General Security, sitting at Paris, and the representatives on mission scattered through the provinces. These authorities developed the Terror by means of the Revolutionary Tribunal at Paris, and its imitations established in the departments by the representatives on mission. In the next two chapters the system of the Terror will be examined in Paris and in the provinces. That it was made necessary by the anarchy of the previous years of the Revolution and the danger from foreign foes has already been demonstrated; it now remains to examine the system in cool blood, without being excited to wrath by the enormities which stained it, or looking upon it as a great creation of human genius. It was neither so monstrous nor so admirable as it has been painted; great evils demand strong remedies; and the Terror was the only remedy the members of the Great Committee could find for France, when torn by internal dissensions and harassed by foreign war. It was a drastic remedy indeed, but a very necessary one, and France became once more a mighty nation, able, owing to internal peace and a strong administration, to drive back all her enemies from her borders.

CHAPTER X.

THE TERROR IN PARIS.

The Reign of Terror—The revolutionary or sans-culotte army—The revolutionary committees—"Cartes de sûreté" and the system of denunciation—The Committee of General Security—Its history—Its members—Amar, Vadier, Rühl, Guffroy, etc.—The weakness of Robespierre's influence over this committee—The Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris—Its history—Judges and jurors—Fouquier-Tinville—The procedure of the tribunal—Early trials and acquittals—The trials and executions of Marie Antoinette and of the Girondin deputies—Other executions—General acquiescence in the Reign of Terror—Gaiety in Paris—Life in the prisons—The necessity for amusing the Parisians—The stage during the Terror—The Comédie Française—The Opera—The *pièces de circonstance*—Art in Paris and the art students of David—The Republican fêtes—The economical condition—The law of the maximum—The restaurants and cafés during the Terror—The women of the Terror—Olympe de Gouges—The "tricoteuses"—Republican affectations and extravagances—Conclusion.

THE period of the Reign of Terror marks the crisis of the Revolution; it is the period which distinguishes it from all other revolutions, and a mention of the French Revolution in 1793 brings at once before the mind a picture of crowded prisons, of carts on their way with victims to execution, and of the guillotine. The time has now arrived when the memory of these horrors should no longer cloud the knowledge of this famous epoch, and when it should be possible to examine calmly the events of this famous year, and see why the people of France submitted without resistance to this *régime* of blood. There is no need to palliate the atrocities of the Reign of Terror, but there is every reason why this Terror should be

investigated and tested by the magic criteria of facts and figures. Partisan writers in France, and even sober historians, have given rein to their imaginations when treating of this period, and one of the most eminent writers on the history of the Revolution, M. Mortimer-Ternaux, has commenced his *Histoire de la Terreur* with the year 1791. Yet the Reign of Terror did not really begin until after the establishment of the Great Committee of Public Safety, when Barère declared in the Convention that Terror was the "order of the day." Up to September, 1793, the history of the Revolution had been stained by many horrors; there had been riots innumerable, terrible massacres, like those in the prisons of September, 1792, and civil wars; the Revolutionary Tribunal had been at work for some months, and many persons, guilty only of political opposition to the progress of the Revolution, or of want of success in military operations, had been sent by it to the guillotine. But a certain number of executions per day or week, in order to intimidate those who were not contented with the existing state of affairs, did not become the rule until after September, 1793. It is no doubt a regrettable circumstance that lives of political opponents should be taken by the party in power in any country, but such executions cannot be called evidences of a Reign of Terror; they are the inevitable and regrettable consequences of civil disturbances, of all revolutions, and even of all reformatations and forcible changes of government. The Reign of Terror under the Great Committee was a very different thing; lives were then taken not so much in revenge for political opposition or military insubordination, as for the purpose of making examples and terrifying away any thought of opposition.

When the Great Committee firmly seized the reins of power, with the full consent of the majority of the Convention, which was wearied by the troubles of executive government, it found all its instruments ready to its hand—the Committee of General Security, the Revolutionary Tribunal, and the representatives on mission. To the representatives on mission it entrusted the establishment and organization of the Reign

of Terror in the provinces, which will be examined in the next chapter, and these men took their cue from Paris, where the system of Terror was first fully developed. To overawe and subdue the capital special measures were needed, of which the most important, the organization of the revolutionary committees and of the sans-culotte army, have been already alluded to. The sans-culotte army was under the orders of the Commune of Paris and of the revolutionary committees, and to gain their daily pay its members, who cannot be called soldiers, were ready to yield implicit obedience to their superiors. It may be wondered at that these eighteen thousand men, mostly drawn from the very lowest classes, could overawe the educated citizens of Paris; but far more powerful than the revolutionary army to subdue the spirits of the national guards and of the bourgeois class in general was the daily spectacle of the guillotine at work. Two distinct feelings may be observed, which counselled the bourgeois to submit and to surrender the advantages which they had obtained during the early years of the Revolution by the Constitution of 1791—the one, the fear of losing their lives or having their property damaged in street riots; the other, patriotism in the belief that this disagreeable and rigorous means of government was the only way to secure peace at home and victories abroad. It must be remembered also that the class which felt it had reason to fear was comparatively small, only consisting of those whose wealth was sufficiently great to make them objects of suspicion, or who were known to have aided and abetted any anti-revolutionary schemes in the past. The bulk of the bourgeois of Paris felt quite safe as long as they kept a close seal on their lips and gave no utterance to anti-revolutionary sentiments.

The revolutionary committees which had been established in every section took the place of the old sectional assemblies. They no longer, however, consisted of all the electors of the different sections of Paris, but of a few self-nominated or co-opted sans-culottes of the section, who were carefully watched by the Jacobin Club and the Committee of General

Security, and from time to time *epurés*, or purified, as the phrase went, of all but the most tried democrats. As a rule the power of these revolutionary committees really rested in most sections in the hands of one or two men, who, holding the titles of president and secretary, were in the confidence of the higher authorities, and regularly attended at the offices. These revolutionary committees had three chief means of maintaining the Terror in their sections—*cartes de sûreté*, denunciations, and the law of the suspects. *Cartes de sûreté*, or guarantee cards, were issued by the revolutionary committees, and contained a full history of each individual to whom they were issued, and especially of his or her life since 1789. Some of these *cartes*, in cases where the individual had moved about much, and resided in different towns or sections of Paris, are perfectly covered with signatures of various authorities. Every citizen, whether man or woman, had to carry a *carte de sûreté* about with him or her, and had to produce it at any moment to any one who might ask to see it, under pain of being instantly taken to the nearest revolutionary committee. In spite of all precautions, *cartes de sûreté* were frequently issued by various revolutionary committees to persons who had no real claim to them, but who had managed to get up plausible stories, supported by two or more respectable witnesses.¹ In such cases, however, the system of denunciation came to the help of the organizers of the Terror. Any one who heard a citizen make an anti-revolutionary remark, or who noticed anything suspicious about him, could forward a denunciation to a revolutionary committee, which had immediately to investigate the case, and which generally committed the denounced person to prison, and marked on the denouncer's *carte de sûreté* that he was a good citizen, thus making it to the advantage of any one to denounce as many people as possible. Finally the vast net of the law of the suspects, which was carefully framed by the

¹ See, for instance, Lacretelle's account of his manœuvres to get a *carte de sûreté* in *Dix Années d'Épreuves pendant la Révolution*, by Charles Lacretelle, pp. 148-153. Paris: 1842.

great jurist Merlin of Douai, was pretty sure to catch any dangerous individual, even if he had managed to obtain a *carte de sûreté* and had escaped being denounced. Under this law, any one who had been of noble birth or had held any office before 1789; any one who had any connection, whether of relationship or of service, to an émigré; any one who could not show he had made some sacrifice for the cause of the Revolution; and, in short, any one who for any reason whatever might be thought to have any reason to be discontented with the existing *régime* was liable, at a moment's notice, to be brought before a revolutionary committee and sent to prison.

At the head of this elaborate system for keeping the people in check stood the Committee of General Security. This important committee of the Convention was placed in command of the police of the whole country, and had power to order the arrest of any individual, even in the most distant department of France, and to have him brought to Paris. It had also entire management of the prisons of Paris, and every arrest made by the revolutionary committees had to be immediately reported to it. It was responsible for the peace of Paris, and was in constant correspondence alike with the Commune of Paris and the Committee of Public Safety. It had further the duty assigned to it of selecting the prisoners who were to go for trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal, and of superintending the execution of those condemned to death. A Committee of General Security had existed ever since the meeting of the Convention,¹ but it did not possess these defined and extended powers until the organization of the government of the Terror in September, 1793. The committee chosen on June 16, 1793,² after the expulsion of the Girondins, was not satisfactory to the members of the Great Committee of Public Safety, so on their motion it was quashed on September 11, and a new committee of nine, with five *suppléants*, chosen in its stead. This new committee also failed

¹ See Appendix VI., "The Committees of the Convention," and vol. ii. p. 223.

² See Appendix VIII., "The Committee of General Security."

to meet with the approval of the new rulers of France, mainly owing to the presence on it of Chabot and Basire, the former deputies to the Legislative Assembly, who were not likely to care to remain subordinate to the Committee of Public Safety. So, three days later, on September 14, this new committee was dissolved, and twelve deputies were chosen, who, with three alterations, remained in office until the execution of Robespierre, and acted in cordial co-operation with the majority of the Great Committee of Public Safety.

The men who formed the permanent Committee of General Security, and the principal implement of the Great Committee of Public Safety in carrying out the Reign of Terror, were, in order of election—Vadier, Panis, David, Guffroy, Lavicomterie, Amar, Rühl, Voulland, Moyse Bayle, Louis of the Bas-Rhin (in succession to Boucher Saint-Sauveur, November, 1793), Barbeau du Barran (in succession to Le Bas, December, 1793), and Jagot (in succession to Le Bon, February, 1794). Of these men, who exercised the police of France and carried out, though they did not originate, the Reign of Terror, a few words must be said. The most important among them were Amar, the reporter, and Vadier, who was generally believed to be the most influential and relentless member of the committee. Jean Pierre André Amar, known in the history of the Revolution as the "*farouche*" Amar, whose reports were simply lists of proscription, was the son of wealthy parents at Grenoble, where he was born in 1750. He became an avocat in his native city, and purchased the position of treasurer of France, which conferred nobility upon him, and, after showing himself a moderate in the early years of the Revolution, and acting as a member of the directory of the district of Grenoble, he was elected to the Convention by the department of the Isère as an advanced republican. He proved himself to be a politician of the type of Billaud-Varenne, but, though he manifested the same hearty belief in the system of the Terror, he did not show the same statesmanlike qualities, perhaps because he did not have the same opportunities. Marc Guillaume Alexis Vadier, who surpassed Amar in his ferocity, and invented

the idea of the conspiracies in the prisons as a pretext for furnishing victims to the guillotine, was one of the oldest members of either of the committees, having been born in 1736, and being therefore nearly sixty years of age. He was the son of a servant of a Bishop of Pamiers,¹ and after receiving a good education, served for some time in the army, under the name of De Montfort, as a lieutenant in the Régiment Royal-Piédmont. On leaving the army he became a counsellor at the court of Pamiers, where, however, he was looked down upon, even by the bourgeois, as a lackey's son; yet he was eventually elected to the States-General as a deputy for the tiers état of the county of Foix. In the Constituent Assembly he sat upon the extreme left,² with Robespierre and Pétion, and on its dissolution he was elected president of the tribunal of Pamiers, and in September, 1792, first deputy for the department of the Ariège to the Convention. Jacques Louis David, the famous painter and friend of Robespierre; Louis Charles de Lavicomterie, an industrious pamphleteer who had made his reputation with three violent works, *Les Crimes des Rois de France*, *Les Crimes des Papes*, and *Les Crimes des Empereurs d'Allemagne*; and Étienne Jean Panis, the brother-in-law of Santerre, and former colleague of Sergent as administrator of police during the risings of June 20 and August 10, and the September massacres,³ were all three deputies for Paris and advanced republicans. Philippe Jacques Rühl deserves a rather longer notice from the peculiarities of his early career. He was the son of a Lutheran minister at Strasbourg, and, after a good education, was himself ordained to the ministry. But he did not keep long to his first profession, and abandoned it for the law. He wrote some learned legal memoirs in Latin, German, and French, on questions relating to the laws of succession in German principalities, and eventually became an Aulic counsellor and practical ruler of the little state of Leiningen-

¹ On Vadier's early life see *La Révolution dans le Pays de Foix*, by Paul Casteras, p. 106.

² Vol. i. chap. xv. p. 438.

³ Vol. ii. pp. 85, 120.

Dachsberg as minister for the duke, whose chief adviser he became. At the commencement of the Revolution in France, however, he abandoned his prospects in Germany, and returned to Strasbourg full of enthusiasm for the new ideas. He was elected in succession an administrator of the department of the Bas-Rhin in 1790, and a deputy to the Legislative Assembly and to the Convention for the same department in 1791 and 1792. In the Legislative Assembly he distinguished himself in the Diplomatic Committee by his intimate knowledge of the history and attitude of the states of Germany and of Alsace, and in the Convention by his report on the papers found in the iron chest, and in both assemblies had shown such thorough republican spirit, that he was thought worthy of a seat on the Committee of General Security. Armand Benoît Joseph Guffroy is the only other member of the committee of much importance. He was a compatriot of Robespierre, being born of a respectable family near Arras in 1740, and was an avocat in good practice in that city in 1789.¹ He made strenuous efforts to secure a seat in the States-General for his native county, but was unsuccessful, and that Robespierre, his junior by eighteen years, and his rival at the bar, should have defeated him, added bitterness to the sting of rejection. He had shown himself very active in local politics, and was procureur-syndic for the district of Arras in 1792, when he was elected to the Convention by the department of the Pas-de-Calais. When Guffroy came to Paris he started a journal, which he called the *Rouguff*—an anagram of his own name—or *La France en vedette*, in which he used language resembling, if not quite so coarse as, that used by Hébert in the *Père Duchesne*. The violence of his language hid a good deal of kindness in his disposition, and his attitude on the Committee of General Security is of interest rather from his sworn enmity to Robespierre than from any great qualities of his own. Of the other members, Grégoire Marie Jagot was deputy for the Ain in both the Legislative Assembly and the Conven-

¹ On Guffroy see Lecesne, *Arras sous la Révolution*, vol. i. pp. 116, 117, and *passim*.

tion, and was a personal friend of Amar, and Jean Antoine Louis, of the Bas-Rhin, was the *alter ego* of Rühl; while the three others were all from the southern departments. Jean Henri Voulland, a Protestant and ex-Constituant for the bailliage of Nîmes,¹ now represented the department of the Gard; Moyse Bayle, who had been mayor of Marseilles from 1791 to 1792, was deputy for the Bouches-du-Rhône; and Joseph Nicolas Barbeau du Barran sat for the Gers.

These were the men who, under the general direction of the Great Committee of Public Safety, carried out the system of the Terror, who signed the numerous decrees of arrest and selected the food for the guillotine, and who spent their nights in examining denunciations, while the members of the Committee of Public Safety considered great measures of state in the adjoining room. In times of peril, and when especially important police measures were in contemplation, the two committees united and deliberated together, and on those days Robespierre found himself in even a more complete minority than in the Great Committee alone. He had but one real friend in the Committee of General Security, David the painter, after the resignation of Saint-Just's young colleague, Philippe Le Bas, and at least one open and declared enemy, Guffroy. Meanwhile the working members of the Great Committee, and especially Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois, found men of their own stamp, such as Amar, Vadier, Rühl, and Lavicomterie, ready to aid them in all their efforts to establish and systematize the Terror. This opposition to Robespierre and his friends in the Committee of General Security will be seen to be one of the causes of his overthrow, and his contest with this police committee was one of the indications of his weakness. Of the twelve men themselves it is noticeable that three of them came from Paris, five from the southern, three from the eastern, and one from the north-eastern departments, and none from the northern, western, or midland districts of France. Two of them, Vadier and Voulland, were ex-Constituants, and two, Rühl and Jagot, had been members

¹ Vol. i. chap. xvi. pp. 487, 488.

of the Legislative Assembly, and none of them have any claim to be remembered in French history, except David, whose greatness, however, was as a painter and not as a politician. They were, on the whole, much older men than the members of the Great Committee, Moyse Bayle, the youngest, being thirty-three, while Vadier was fifty-seven and Lavicomterie sixty-one, and their average age was forty-six; and, considering their difficult and horrible functions, it cannot be wondered at that Dusaulx should say that "the members of the Committee of General Security had something the appearance of the old lieutenants of police, and those of the Committee of Public Safety some resemblance to the ancient ministers of state."¹ In one thing, however, all twenty-four men deserve the greatest honour. After holding absolute power, all who survived that *annus mirabilis* retired poor; none profited by their position to make money; and none, except David, whose position was exceptional, Jean Bon Saint-André, who became a baron and *préfet* of Mayence, Carnot, who accepted a command in 1815, and Barère, bowed the knee to Napoleon.

The machinery of the revolutionary committees, which filled the prisons of Paris, with the assistance and under the superintendence of the Committee of General Security, has been described; the famous Revolutionary Tribunal, which partially emptied those prisons and maintained the influence of the Terror, has now to be examined.² It is with no idea of palliating the flagrant injustice done by this tribunal that a comparison must be drawn between its procedure and the massacres in the prisons in September, 1792. Those massacres were caused by the overcrowding of the prisons and the belief of the republicans that the prisoners were numerous enough to break out and murder their wives and children, and it must be admitted that judicial murders are preferable to wholesale

¹ Quoted in Aulard's *Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention*, vol. ii. p. 478.

² The authorities on the Revolutionary Tribunal are *Le Tribunal Révolutionnaire*, by E. Campardon (2 vols. Paris: 1868), and *L'Histoire du Tribunal Révolutionnaire*, by H. Wallon (6 vols. Paris: 1884).

massacres. It was not likely, however, that such an outbreak as that of September, 1792, would occur again, and the operations of the Revolutionary Tribunal were intended by the organizers of the Terror to frighten the people of Paris and of France into acquiescence in the rule of the Great Committee, by showing them that the result of being suspected or denounced would be not merely a detention in a prison, but very possibly rapid judgment and summary execution. The first organization of this redoubtable tribunal, and the report of Lesage, which laid down the rules to govern its powers and procedure, have been already alluded to;¹ its further development is now to be examined. Directly after the overthrow of the Girondins, the superintending committee of six deputies of the Convention was abolished and a new jury elected; on July 2 it was decreed that the jurors should be paid eighteen livres a day; on July 24 the number of judges was increased to seven, and on July 30 to ten; on which day also it was decided that the jurors should be increased to thirty, and the court divided into two sections with equal powers. Montané was on the same day removed from the post of president as a moderate and a friend of the Girondins; and during the month of August, Dobsent and Coffinhal were elected among the new judges, and Herman as president of one of the sections. On September 5, when the Great Committee of Public Safety was firmly fixed in power, Merlin of Douai brought up the decree, which regulated the Tribunal until the law of 22 Prairial. By it the Tribunal was divided into four sections, and was to consist of sixteen judges and sixty jurors, assisted by a public accuser and five substitutes.

On September 28, 1793, the new officials were elected. It is not necessary to name them all, but a few of the most famous ought not to be passed over. Martial Joseph Armand Herman,² who was elected President of the Tribunal, was, like so many men conspicuous in the Revolution, a native of

¹ Vol. ii. chap. vii. p. 228.

² Lecesne, *Arras sous la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 92; and *Histoire de Joseph Le Bon*, by A. J. Paris. 1864.

Artois. He was practising as an *avocat* at Saint-Omer in 1789, and did not make himself at all conspicuous until after the proclamation of the Republic, when he showed himself an ardent politician. He had, however, obtained no post higher than that of president of the local criminal court in his native town, when he came up to Paris and called on his compatriots there. He pleased them, and through the influence of either Robespierre or Guffroy (strange to say, accounts differ as to which of these enemies was his patron), he was elected president of a section of the Revolutionary Tribunal on August 28, 1793 and of the whole Tribunal on September 28. Of the sixteen judges, the most notable, either from their conduct on the bench or their political opinions, were René François Dumas, who had been a Cistercian monk; Antoine Dobsent, the former judge in Paris, whose arrest by the Committee of Twelve in May had caused so much excitement;¹ Jacques Antoine Coffinhal, the intrepid friend of Robespierre; and Étienne Foucault. Of the sixty jurors, fifty were chosen in Paris; and among them might be noted the artist Topino-Lebrun, whose notes are an authority of the highest importance for the history of the Tribunal, and Jacques Duplay, in whose house Robespierre lodged. Far more important were the functions of Fouquier-Tinville, the public accuser.

Antoine Quentin Fouquier-Tinville was the son of a small farmer at Hérouelle in Artois, and after finishing his education at Saint-Quentin, established himself at Paris as a *procureur* at the Châtelet. He soon became a bankrupt, and is then said, with or without foundation, to have become a police spy. Chance seems to have pointed him out, in April, 1793, to the deputies of the Convention, and he was nominated first director of the jury and then public accuser to the new Revolutionary Tribunal. For the purpose of carrying out the system of the Terror, no better instrument could have been found than Fouquier-Tinville. He is one of the few men in the whole history of the Revolution for whose cold-blooded atrocity no palliating circumstance can be found. Many evil

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 241, 242.

deeds were done during the Reign of Terror, much blood was wantonly shed, yet for the organizers of the system excuses can be made. They honestly believed that the steady succession of executions was necessary to maintain peace and good order in France, and that, to save much bloodshed from anarchy and civil war, it was necessary that some lives should be solemnly taken with judicial forms. This may not be a valid excuse to strict moralists, but it is an intelligible attitude to adopt. However, no such excuse can be pleaded for Fouquier-Tinville. When on his trial, he urged that he was merely the agent of the committees, who demanded so many lives a day; but that can be no excuse for his own brutality, no excuse for his harsh words to his victims, or for such atrocities as the execution of the Maréchale de Mouchy. The names of his five substitutes ought to be mentioned, as they occur frequently in the history of the Terror: they were Fleuriot-Lescot, afterwards Mayor of Paris, Gribcauval, Royer, Naulin, and Lieudin.

The procedure of the Tribunal was very simple. Before each section was brought for trial every day certain prisoners, whose names had been decided on in a nightly conference between the Committee of General Security and Fouquier-Tinville, and who had then been removed from their respective prisons to the Conciergerie, which was close by the Palais de Justice, where the Tribunal held its sittings. The selection of victims was at first a serious matter, prisoners only being chosen for trial who had shown themselves in some way markedly opposed to the Revolution, either as politicians or journalists. But as the Terror became more organized into a system less care was shown, and names were selected at random from the first that came to hand, the important point being to have a certain number of condemned for the guillotine. This random selection was so well known that it became a regular expedient for friends of prisoners to bribe the clerks of the Committee of General Security to keep the names of the individuals in whom they were interested at the bottom of the files of prisoners' papers, so that they should not strike the

eye of Fouquier. The unfortunate victims selected were summoned the next evening to leave their respective prisons for the Conciergerie, and on the following day they were brought up for trial. The prisoners at the bar were first asked if they were guilty or not guilty, after the indictment had been read over to them. They were then asked if they would have a counsel, and one was generally assigned to them. These official defenders, of whom the most famous were Chauveau-Lagarde and Tronson Ducoudray, were allowed free intercourse with their clients, and it is to the credit of the Terrorists that they were never punished for their pleadings in court; the ægis of his protection, which Marat had thrown over Malesherbes for defending the king, seems likewise to have protected those who followed the example of the former minister. When the counsel had been appointed, Fouquier-Tinville, or his substitute, opened the pleadings and called his witnesses, whom the prisoners' counsel was allowed to cross-examine. So far the trial seems to have been perfectly fair; but as the Reign of Terror went on, the judges, jury, and public accuser had got into such perfect harmony that at a hint from the presiding judge, the jury would declare itself convinced, and immediately return a verdict of guilty. The judge would then, in most abusive terms if he were Herman or Dumas, condemn the prisoner or prisoners to death, and the execution would take place immediately in the Place de la Révolution.

It must not be imagined that this expeditious manner of proceeding was developed at once. In the early days of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and especially between the months of April and September, 1793, the trials of the prisoners were conducted fairly, although they generally ended in a verdict of guilty. This can be demonstrated by the fact that from the institution of the tribunal to the end of August only thirty-eight individuals were condemned to death for treason against the nation. Of the generals arrested as accomplices of Dumouriez, Lanoue was acquitted on May 10, Miranda on May 16, and Stengel on May 28, while Lescuyer, Miaczinski, and Devaux were condemned and executed. The most

eminent of the other victims during these months were Charlotte Corday, executed for the murder of Marat on July 17, 1793,¹ and Custine, the ex-Constituant and conqueror of Spires, Worms, Mayence, and Frankfort, who was condemned to death for not having properly provisioned Mayence, or done his best to relieve that city, after a patient trial lasting thirteen days, on August 27. Even after the reorganization of the Tribunal by the resolution of September 5, the atrocity of condemnations of large batches of prisoners did not at once commence, and the executions between September, 1793, and March, 1794, were comparatively few to those between March and July, 1794.² The Reign of Terror, though in full operation and action, did not reach its height until the law of 22 Prairial, Year II. (June 10, 1794), took away from the prisoners their last chance of a fair trial.

Two trials during this second period, from September 5, 1793, to the end of February, 1794, must be noted, which differed from the rest, owing to the previous history of the prisoners. Marie Antoinette had been left at peace in the Temple after the execution of her husband, and, though separated from her children, had been seemingly forgotten by the Convention during the furious contest between the Girondins and the Mountain. But when that struggle was over, and the republicans were enraged by the successes of the foreign armies on the frontiers, attention was again directed towards "the Widow Capet," as the unfortunate queen was called, and on August 1 she was removed to the Conciergerie. The daring attempts of the Baron de Batz and the Chevalier de Maison Rouge to open communications with her and contrive an escape attracted the notice of the Committee of General Security, and on August 25 Fouquier-Tinville was ordered to make preparations for her trial. It must not be believed that she was treated in prison with the extreme barbarity described in royalist pamphlets. The expenses of her maintenance have

¹ Vol. ii. p. 253.

² See Appendix IX., where the actual figures of the numbers condemned month by month by the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris are given and analyzed.

been published,¹ from which it appears that fifteen livres a day were spent on her meals—not much perhaps for a woman who had been Queen of France, but yet more than most of her subjects were able to spend on themselves in those hard times—and three livres a day on food for her maid, while among other items appear fourteen livres for two new caps, twenty-two livres for laundry expenses, and sixteen for the hire of books for her to read. This was not luxury, but yet it cannot be called barbarity. Though she had been removed to the Conciergerie on August 1, it was not until October 12 that her trial² commenced at the Palais de Justice before Herman, President of the Revolutionary Tribunal, Foucault, Donzé-Verteuil, and Lane, judges. Fouquier-Tinville prosecuted in person, and Tronson-Ducoudray and Chauveau-Lagarde defended the prisoner. The trial lasted from the 12th to the 16th of October, and no less than forty witnesses were examined. Her condemnation was determined upon and she knew it, yet the former queen defended herself ably on lines best explained by her final words, in answer to the question, Have you anything more to say in your defence? “Yesterday I did not know who the witnesses were to be; I did not know what evidence they were going to give. No one has brought any positive fact against me. Let me remark in conclusion that I was merely the wife of Louis XVI., and that it was necessary for me to bend to his wishes.”³ This line of defence was skilful, but her influence over the king was and is too notorious for such a pretext to have any weight either in the eyes of the jury or of posterity. It is hardly necessary to go into the evidence produced against her.⁴ Of course Marie Antoinette

¹ *Marie Antoinette à la Conciergerie: Pièces originales, conservées aux Archives de l'Empire, suivies de notes historiques et du procès imprimé de la Reine*, by Emile Campardon, p. 58. Paris: 1863.

² The best account of the trial is *Le Procès de Marie Antoinette*, by Charles Ostyn, published in the *Révolution Française* from 1882 to 1884; but see also Wallon's *Histoire du Tribunal Révolutionnaire de Paris*, vol. i. pp. 296–352.

³ *La Révolution Française* for May, 1884, p. 1031.

⁴ On the horrible accusation brought against Marie Antoinette with

had naturally opposed the progress of the Revolution; she could not have denied that, though she might and did deny some of the special allegations made against her, and as one of the defeated side, she could not have expected mercy. Had she conquered, would she have been merciful? Herman summed up against her in violent terms; the jury after one hour's deliberation found her guilty; Fouquier-Tinville demanded the extreme penalty of the law, and Herman accordingly passed sentence of death upon her. On the afternoon of the same day, October 16, the daughter of Maria Theresa and widow of a king of France, strangely altered from her former self, if the pen and ink sketch of her on her way to the guillotine, made on the spot by David,¹ may be trusted, underwent the penalty of death on the Place de la Révolution. Before the story of agony written on that haggard, withered face, criticism is forced to be silent. Marie Antoinette had many faults, and committed many political mistakes; she was her husband's evil genius, and for that reason the evil genius of France also; but she expiated her errors by months and years of terrible suffering, and however necessary it may have been to point out her faults and mistakes in the course of this history, before the spectacle of her death no feelings but those of pity can be experienced.

The other exceptional trial was that of the Girondins, which lasted from October 24 to 30. Mention has already been made of the fate of those Girondin leaders who escaped from Paris; those who remained lost their lives earlier, but did not suffer so much. It will be remembered that some of the greatest Girondin orators and thinkers, notably Vergniaud and Gensonné, had refused to leave Paris and join the insurgents in Normandy, because they disapproved of the civil

regard to her son, which is purposely passed over in the text, it will be sufficient to refer to the evidence of Princess Elizabeth in Charles Ostry's *Le Procès de Marie Antoinette* in the *Révolution Française* for March, 1884, p. 859.

¹ This sketch is reproduced as a frontispiece to the second volume of Campardon's *Tribunal Révolutionnaire*.

war which their friends were trying to raise. Of the original twenty-nine deputies ordered by the Convention on June 2¹ to place themselves under arrest, twenty-one escaped, and met with various fates, and of the other eight, Bertrand was allowed to resign his seat in the Convention, while Vergniaud, Gensonné, Valazé, Lehardi, Gardien, Boileau, and Viger, confident in their own innocence of any crime against the Republic, refused to leave Paris. Vergniaud, who acted as the mouth-piece of this group, wrote to the President of the Convention on June 5, protesting his innocence, and in the body of that assembly Ducos and Boyer-Fonfrede, who had been spared on June 2, never wearied of pleading the cause of their friends. But the Norman insurrection, and still more the murder of Marat, exasperated the deputies of the Mountain against them, and on July 26, for fear of escape, they were removed from their own houses and confined in the Luxembourg Palace, which was first turned into a prison to receive them. Even there the Committee of General Security thought it unwise to leave them together, and on July 31 they were distributed among the different prisons of Paris. From his prison at La Force, Vergniaud wrote on August 12 demanding a trial, but the Convention was too busy, organizing the new revolutionary government, of which the Great Committee of Public Safety had not yet got complete control, to pay any attention to his demand. However, when the month of September was past and the new government was in working order, Amar, as reporter of the Committee of General Security, rose in the Convention on October 3, and requested that the doors of the hall should be closed. He then read what was really a long accusation against the whole Girondin party, and demanded the trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal, or the outlawry, of forty-three Girondins, while maintaining the sentence against the twenty-one outlawed on July 28, and the detention as suspects of the rest of those who had signed the petition of the seventy-three.² Twenty-one were selected for immediate trial, namely, the seven, who have already been men-

¹ See vol. ii. p. 246. ² Biré, *La Légende des Girondins*, pp. 384, 385.

tioned as refusing to leave Paris; Brissot¹ and Duchastel,² who had escaped, but had been recaptured; Carra, the journalist and deputy for Paris; Sillery, the ex-Constituant, husband of Madame de Genlis, and intimate friend of the Duke of Orleans; Ducos and Boyer-Fonfrède, the friends of Vergniaud; Fauchet, the constitutional bishop of Calvados; Lauze-Deperret, from whom Charlotte Corday had received her letter of introduction; Lesterpt-Beauvais³ and Antiboul,⁴ who had shown Girondin tendencies when on mission to Saint-Étienne and Marseilles; Duprat and Mainvielle, deputies for the Bouches-du-Rhône, and friends of Barbaroux; Lacaze, a deputy for the Gironde; and Lasource, the former Protestant pastor, who represented the Tarn. These deputies were removed to the Conciergerie on October 6, and on October 24 they were brought in a body to take their trial before four judges, presided over by Herman.⁵ They seemed still to believe in the power of words, for Vergniaud is reported to have said hopefully on leaving the Conciergerie, "If we are allowed to speak, we shall return; if not, adieu for ever."⁶ They were allowed to speak; Vergniaud had prepared an elaborate plan of defence,⁷ and Brissot was admitted on all sides to have surpassed himself; yet so slight was the power of their eloquence, that they were all unanimously convicted, after six days' trial, and condemned to death on October 30. On hearing the sentence, Dufriche-Valazé stabbed himself, and his dead body was taken back to the Conciergerie with the living prisoners. A talented French author has written a fanciful sketch, entitled the "Last Supper of the Girondins,"⁸ and it may well be believed that even the recollection of the death of Valazé did not quench the wit and eloquence of his friends. On the following day, October 31, the twenty condemned Girondin deputies were guillotined, and the Great Committee

¹ Vol. ii. p. 251.

² Vol. ii. p. 277.

³ Vol. ii. pp. 267, 268.

⁴ Vol. ii. pp. 269, 378.

⁵ On this trial see Wallon, *Histoire du Tribunal Révolutionnaire de Paris*, vol. i. pp. 373-428; and Biré, *La Légende des Girondins*, pp. 398-421.

⁶ Vatel's *Vergniaud*, p. 235.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 253-267.

⁸ Charles Nodier, in his *Souvenirs de la Révolution et de l'Empire*.

of Public Safety felt that by this stroke and by the detention of the rest of the signatories of the protest against the *coup d'état* of June 2, it had established a Reign of Terror over the Convention, as well as in Paris and the provinces of France. As to the executed Girondins themselves, their fate was happier to die swiftly on the guillotine, instead of enduring the agonies of Condorcet, wandering in a half-starved condition in the forest of Fontainebleau, and eventually committing suicide when arrested at Bourg-la-Reine, or of Pétion, Buzot, and Barbaroux in the cavern at Saint Émilion.

Before leaving the Revolutionary Tribunal, it is as well to notice the names of the other victims condemned by it during the winter of 1793, who had played a conspicuous part in the early history of the Revolution. On October 7 Antoine Joseph Gorsas, the former schoolmaster at Versailles, and subsequently a successful journalist, who had been a leading member of the Girondin party in the Convention, was ordered to the guillotine as *hors de la loi*, on his identity being proved. He had been one of the deputies who had directed the Norman rising,¹ and had escaped into Brittany before his colleagues; but he would not remain there, and insisted on returning to Paris to see his mistress—a proceeding which cost him his life, as he was at once recognized and arrested. In November many illustrious victims mounted the steps of the guillotine. On the 2nd Olympe de Gonges, the dramatist, who did not know how to write,² died for her courageous attempt to defend Louis XVI.; on the 4th it was the turn of Adam Lux, the deputy for Mayence, who had declared aloud his admiration for the deed of Charlotte Corday;³ and on the 6th they were followed by one, less worthy than either of them, Philippe Égalité, formerly known as the Duke of Orleans, whose pusillanimous vote for the death of the king did not suffice to save his own life. On the 8th Madame Roland, the soul of the Girondin party, followed the queen, whom she had so bitterly attacked, to the guillotine; and on hearing the news of his wife's death, the "virtuous"

¹ Vol. ii. p. 272.

² Vol. ii. pp. 357, 358.

³ Vol. ii. p. 253.

Roland, who had hitherto been safely concealed by some friends at Rouen, left his asylum and committed suicide on the high-road. On the 10th Bailly, the first mayor of Paris, paid the penalty for having ordered the National Guard to fire upon the people on July 17, 1791;¹ and he was kept waiting for death while the guillotine was being set up in the *Champs de Mars*, where he had read the proclamation directing the people to disperse upon that fatal day. Upon the 14th Pierre Manuel, the former procureur of the Commune of Paris, who had resigned his seat in the Convention after the condemnation of the king,² and General Brunet, who had dared, when in command of the army of the Alps, to dispute the authority of the deputies on mission,³ were both executed; and on the 15th the same fate awaited Gabriel Cussy, the Girondin deputy, who had been caught escaping from Bordeaux,⁴ and General Houchard, the victor of Hondschooten,⁵ who had failed nevertheless to give full satisfaction to Carnot. On the 21st Girey-Dupré, the successor of Brissot in the editorship of the *Patriote Français*, who had shared the perils of the proscribed Girondin deputies in Normandy and Brittany,⁶ and had been arrested at Bordeaux, was condemned to death; and on the 28th the former Keeper of the Seals and Minister of Justice, Duport du Tertre,⁷ and Barnave, the famous orator of the Constituent Assembly, who had been discredited ever since his communications with the Court of the Tuileries after the flight to Varennes,⁸ met the same fate. There were not so many well-known victims to the Reign of Terror in December. On the 4th Kersaint, the gallant naval officer, who, after his election to the Convention, had thrown in his lot with the Girondin party,⁹ shared their fate, as did Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, upon the 5th, who surrendered himself to certain death, being *hors de la loi*, sooner than involve the kindly friends who had

¹ Vol. i. pp. 463, 464.² Vol. ii. p. 218.³ Vol. ii. p. 257.⁴ Vol. ii. p. 277.⁵ Vol. ii. p. 255.⁶ Vol. ii. p. 276.⁷ Vol. i. p. 334.⁸ Vol. i. pp. 454, 459, 464, 468.⁹ Vol. i. pp. 404-406.

hitherto sheltered him in Paris. These two high-minded and able men were followed to the guillotine on the 8th by Madame Du Barry, the former mistress of Louis XV., who was condemned as a returned emigrée, because she had gone to London in search of her jewels, which had been stolen.¹ On the 8th also perished Jean Baptiste Noël, the Girondin deputy for the Vosges, who had signed the protest of the 73;² on the 13th the Duc du Châtelet, the former colonel of the Gardes Françaises;³ and on the 27th Lebrun-Tondu, the Girondin Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁴ whose colleague in proscription,⁵ Clavière, only escaped the same fate by committing suicide in his prison at the Luxembourg.⁶ The list of distinguished victims for December is closed by the Baron Dietrich, the first mayor of Strasbourg,⁷ who had saved that great frontier city from the emigrés in 1791,⁸ and in whose house the Marseillaise was first played,⁹ and by General Biron, the leader of the fashion of "Anglomania," and the friend of the Duke of Orleans, as Duc de Lauzun, in days before the Revolution, the liberal deputy to the Constituent Assembly, and the general-in-chief in turn of the armies of the Rhine, of Italy, and of La Vendée.¹⁰ In January, 1794, the only notable persons who perished on the guillotine were the younger Custine, whose mission at Berlin in 1792¹¹ had been one of the key-stones of Dumouriez's foreign policy, on the 3rd; old Marshal Lückner on the 4th; and Jean Lamourette, the collaborator of Mirabeau in his speeches on the civil constitution of the clergy,¹² and subsequently constitutional Bishop of the Rhône-et-Loire, who is best remembered by the incident of the "Baiser Lamourette,"¹³

¹ On the trial and condemnation of Madame Du Barry, see Wallon, vol. ii. pp. 221-238; Campardon, vol. i. pp. 453-457; Dauban, pp. 588-638.

² Vol. ii. p. 247.

³ Vol. i. pp. 126, 373.

⁴ Vol. ii. p. 131.

⁵ Vol. ii. p. 246.

⁶ *Letters containing a Sketch of the Politics of France from May 31, 1793, to July 28, 1794*, by Helena Maria Williams, ed. 1795, vol. i. pp. 222, 223.

⁷ Vol. i. pp. 188, 189.

⁸ Vol. ii. p. 37.

⁹ Vol. ii. p. 115.

¹⁰ Vol. ii. pp. 190, 191, 257, 262.

¹¹ Vol. ii. pp. 73, 75.

¹² Vol. i. pp. 328, 329.

¹³ Vol. ii. pp. 102, 103.

on the 11th; while in February, 1794, there were no victims whose names would bear any significance if recorded. During the five months from September, 1793, to February, 1794, three hundred and forty persons were condemned to death by the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris, and perished on the guillotine—a large number, indeed, but few compared to those executed in the summer of 1794.

By the end of October, 1793, the Committee of General Security had mastered Paris, and established the Reign of Terror there by means of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and could answer to the Great Committee of Public Safety for the tranquillity of the capital. There were no more riots; men were afraid even to express their opinions, much less to quarrel about them; the system of denunciation made Paris into a hive of unpaid spies, and ordinary crimes, pocket-picking and the like, vanished as if by magic. Yet it must not be supposed that Paris was gloomy or dull; on the contrary, the vast majority of citizens seemed glad to have an excuse to avoid politics, of which they had had a surfeit during the last four years, and to turn their thoughts to the literary side of their favourite journals, to the theatres, and to art. They felt delighted to get rid of the necessity for making up their minds about political questions, and to be able for a time to cast all political cares on to the shoulders of others, and they were disposed to be thankful to the Committees for not allowing them to express their opinions. After all, it is only a very small portion of mankind which really troubles itself about politics; times of revolution are not so unlike other times, that men should care to postpone their business or their pleasure to examine the conduct of their governors for the time being. The dull places of Paris were the Revolutionary Committees, the Jacobin Club, the Convention, the Hôtel de Brienne, where the Committee of General Security sat, and the Pavillon de l'Égalité, formerly the Pavillon de Flore, in the Tuileries, where the Great Committee of Public Safety laboured; for in these places earnest men were gathered together, carrying on the government of France, and face to

face with gigantic and appalling political problems, economic difficulties, and foreign armies. Elsewhere men were light hearted and gay, following their usual avocations, and busy in their pursuit of pleasure or of gain. It is most essential to grasp the fact that there was no particular difference, for the vast majority of the population, in living in Paris during the Reign of Terror and at other times. The imagination of posterity, steeped in tales of the tumbrils bearing their burden to the guillotine, and of similar stories of horror, has conceived a ghastly picture of life at that extraordinary period, and it is only after living for months amongst the journals, memoirs, and letters of the time that one can realize the fact that to the average Parisian the necessity of getting his dinner or his evening's amusement remained the paramount thought of his daily life. It is so at all times of crisis; men and women who have lived through a terrible siege always say that in a day or two they became quite accustomed to the noise of artillery and the bursting of shells; and so it was that the Parisians lived their usual life, with the exceptions that they had more rules and regulations to obey, and that they had to avoid discussing political questions more carefully than they had done during the preceding years. For this they were not sorry, for, strange as it may seem to posterity, the majority of the men of that time seem to have got thoroughly bored with politics, and had had so much disturbance and discussion between 1789 and 1793, that they were quite ready to accept any form of government which did not require them to interfere, whether it were the government of the Committee of Public Safety, of the Directory, or of Napoleon.

Freed, then, from the necessity of being politicians, men devoted themselves more and more to pleasure, and, strange to say, nowhere was life more happy and gay than in the prisons of Paris, where the inmates lived in the constant expectation that the haphazard chance of being brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal and condemned to death might befall them at any moment. The ordinary prisons had long been overcrowded, and the Committee of General Security then converted

all the chief convents of Paris, as well as the palace of the Luxembourg, into *maisons d'arrêt*. These latter were the pleasantest places in which to be detained, for the prisoners were allowed to mix together, and, provided they had enough money to purchase what they wanted, they could enjoy life without any thought for the future. In the Luxembourg, for instance, there were always from eight hundred to a thousand prisoners, who used to meet, in the words of Beaulieu, "in three divisions, at eleven, twelve, and one o'clock, to partake of a dinner, supplied by a restaurateur at fifty sous a head, of soup, two courses, one of meat and one of vegetables, and a half-bottle of wine."¹ This comparative freedom within the prison allowed room for plenty of social intercourse, and the Marchioness d'Harcourt, the acknowledged queen of the prison, had good reason to say that the polished gaiety of the Paris salons was renewed there, after being intermitted for two years. There were receptions and parties, with social amusements, such as *bouts-rimés* and dancing, and, of course, there was love-making and intriguing, which did not always end in the most reputable manner, and gave rise to plenty of gossip and social scandal.² Even the horrors of the guillotine and of the Revolutionary Tribunal were made into a source of amusement, and the Countess de Böhm, the sister of Stanislas de Girardin, tells a story, how, when she was shown into her sleeping-room, with five other ladies, at the old Carmelite convent in the Rue de Carnaval, she found that the evening amusement of her companions was to draw lots who was to play prisoner, and then enact the whole tragedy of the Revolutionary Tribunal, ending with a mock execution with a pillow on the foot of a bedstead.³ But because many of the light-hearted suspects enjoyed their prison life, it does not follow that there were no agonizing troubles suffered there also. The greatest of these was the

¹ *Mémoires sur les Prisons*. Paris : 1823.

² *L'Amour sous la Terreur*, by E. de Lescure, chapter iv., *Les Amours des Prisons*. Paris : 1882.

³ *Les Prisons en 1793*, by Madame la Comtesse de Böhm, née de Girardin. Paris : 1830.

difficulty of communicating with friends still at liberty. Yet even this difficulty could be sometimes surmounted, and the heroic Sophie de Condorcet, for instance, used to get leave to enter the prisons in order to take portraits of the prisoners for their friends outside, and she never feared to convey letters to and fro. This separation was one of the most painful experiences of the prisoners, and its bitterness appears very pathetically in the touching letters of the poet Roucher to his wife.¹ The older prisons, however, which had served as criminal prisons in former days, and which were now known as "prisons jacobines," as contrasted with the Luxembourg and other "prisons muscadines," were not so pleasant, for in them existed close, dark cells, and the whole paraphernalia of gaolers' appliances, and it can well be imagined that in the Conciergerie, the stepping-stone to the Revolutionary Tribunal and the guillotine, there was not much gaiety and liveliness of heart. A most interesting literature exists on the prison life in Paris during the Terror, and though of course many incidents may be exaggerated, and many anecdotes touched up in order to emphasize the liveliness and courage under misfortune, of which Frenchmen and Frenchwomen are justly proud, there can be little doubt that the course of life in the prisons was not so sombre as might have been expected.² This is the more natural, since the prisoners had now no fear of a repetition of the massacres of September, and each hoped that among the thousands of his companions in misfortune he might escape. A more sombre tinge was, however, given to prison life between the months of April and July, 1794,

¹ Reprinted in Lescure's *Mémoires sur les Comités et les Prisons*. Paris: 1881.

² Besides the works already quoted, see *Les Prisons de Paris sous la Révolution*, by C. A. Dauban (Paris: 1870); *Mémoires d'un détenu pour servir à l'histoire de la tyrannie de Robespierre*, by H. G. Riouffe, reprinted in Berville and Barrière's series of *Mémoires*; *Tableau des prisons de Paris sous le règne de Robespierre*, two series (Paris: year III.); *Almanach des prisons, ou Anecdotes sur la Conciergerie, le Luxembourg, etc.*; and *Les Souvenirs d'un jeune prisonnier, ou Mémoires sur les prisons de la Force et du Plessis* (Paris: year III.).

when the Reign of Terror had reached its height, and after the horrible invention of the "conspiracies in the prisons" made each captive think that his neighbour might be a spy.

But it must not be considered that the prisoners had a monopoly of French light-heartedness. The Parisians at liberty enjoyed life as much as ever, and the restaurants, cafés, and theatres were always full, and did remunerative business. On this subject it is worth while quoting an extract from one of the police "observers" or spies, whom Garat freely employed when Minister of the Interior, whose report is dated June 1, 1793—the very day before the *coup d'état*, which was to overthrow the Girondins. "The places of amusement which I have visited," he writes,¹ "present a picture at once detestable to a true patriot, and comforting to a magistrate. It is impossible not to observe without *chagrin* the spirit of selfishness pushed to such a point, that people can give themselves up quietly to frivolous amusements, when the fatherland is in danger. But, on the other hand, this very tranquillity decisively contradicts the idea of a plan of counter-revolution, which is attributed to people who are wealthy or comfortably off. As long as they are allowed their old amusements, and not deprived of the pleasure of travelling in the interior of the kingdom, and not forced to go to the war, they may be taxed most heavily without making the slightest movement; no one will even know of their existence, and the most important question they will raise, when they will take the trouble to reason, will be this—*Does a man get as much amusement under the republican government, as under the old régime?*"

Of all French amusements the stage is the chief, and it is therefore no wonder that the history of the theatre in Paris under the Reign of Terror has been the subject of a good deal of investigation.² Never before had so many theatres been

¹ Schmidt's *Tableaux de la Révolution Française*, vol. i. p. 378.

² On the Revolutionary stage see *Histoire du Théâtre Français depuis le commencement de la Révolution*, by C. G. Étienne and A. Martainville, 2 vols., 1802-06; *L'Histoire par le Théâtre*, vol. i., by Théodore Muret, 1865; *La Théâtre de la Révolution*, by Louis Moland, 1877; and *Le Théâtre de la Révolution*, by H. Welschinger, 1881.

open at once, and never were they so crowded, while the Convention continued the royal subvention to the Opera-house, and even increased its amount. Yet during this period not a single great play was produced; not a single happy dramatic character was put on the stage, such as the inimitable Madame Angot, the great invention of the period of the Directory; and no famous opera was composed. This was entirely due to the action of the Commune of Paris and of Barère, who superintended theatrical business in the Committee of Public Safety. The authorities were afraid to allow themselves, their principles, or their peculiarities to be laughed at, and therefore insisted that not only should all new plays be "patriotic" and quite agreeable to their views, but also that all the plays in the répertoires of the theatres, even those of Molière and Racine, should be *sans-culottisés*, and all words or passages referring to royalty or nobility should be expunged or altered. The result of these restrictions was the production of a host of *pièces de circonstance*, dealing with current events, and of no intrinsic value whatever. But before glancing at these pieces, something must be said of the history of the Comédie Française and of the Grand Opera during the Terror. The breaking-up of the company of the Comédie Française in 1791 owing to the retirement of Talma and Dugazon, who had set up a new theatre, called the Théâtre Français de la Rue Richelieu, has been already alluded to,¹ and it need hardly be said that the actors and actresses who remained and represented the most famous dramatic company in the world, under the title of the Théâtre de la Nation, were closely watched and greatly suspected by the sans-culottes and the leaders of the Commune of Paris. These actors, under the management of Larive, thought they could defy the Mountain, and on January 2, 1793, they produced the *Ami des Lois*, or *Friend of the Laws*, a play in five acts and in verse, by Jean Louis Laya, a young author of Spanish descent, who had made his reputation by his tragedy of *Jean Calas*, produced in 1789. The play abounded in most bitter and biting sarcasm on the Jacobins,

¹ Vol. ii. p. 23.

and, played with enthusiasm by such famous actors as Vanhove, Fleury, Saint-Prix, and Dazincourt, it naturally caused the greatest excitement. The debates on the king's trial were in progress, and the Commune of Paris promptly interdicted the play. The author and actors appealed to the Convention, which, being then under the influence of the Girondins, quashed the prohibition of the Commune. The play ran for a few nights, but caused such uproar that the Commune ordered Santerre to stop it by force, and the piece was withdrawn two days before the execution of the king.¹ For the next few months the Théâtre de la Nation managed to keep out of danger; but on August 13, 1793, it produced *Pamela, ou la Vertu récompensée*, a play founded on Richardson's famous novel, by François de Neufchâteau, who had been an influential member of the Legislative Assembly. In this piece, in which Fleury played Bonfil, and Mademoiselle Lange, Pamela, the heroine is represented as a servant, who turns out to be the daughter of a Scotch earl—a title which so offended the ears of the sans-culottes, that the play was interdicted on August 29, and the author ordered to alter it. This he did, but not so as to please the authorities, and on September 3, 1793, Barère asked the Convention to sanction a decree ordering the arrest of the whole company of the Théâtre de la Nation, as well as of the author, which was agreed to. The actors and actresses were sent to the prison of Les Madelonnettes, and they would undoubtedly have been brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal, had not Charles de la Bussière, a former actor, who was employed in the office of the Committee of Public Safety, destroyed all the papers relating to their case. The history of the Grand Opera house was very different, mainly owing to the republican opinions of Lais, the great bass singer. This famous singer had been well educated, and was intended at first for the Church, and then for the legal profession, when his success as an amateur caused him to come to Paris to try singing as a profession. He made his first success in Glück's *Iphigenia in Tauris*, in 1779, and from

¹ Welschinger's *Théâtre de la Révolution*, pp. 380-409.

that time he maintained his position as an opera-singer of the first class. He was a most advanced republican, and when, on September 16, 1793, the Commune of Paris determined to arrest the managers of the Opera house, it was decided that the singers should manage the performances themselves, and divide the receipts. The Opera house was devoted to patriotic spectacles, such as *L'Apothéose de Beurepaire* and *Le Siège de Thionville*, or to classical spectacles, such as *Horatius Cocles* and *Miltiade à Marathon*, and when operas were produced, great composers like Grétry had to waste their talents on such blasphemous rubbish as Sylvain Maréchal's *Fête de la Raison*.¹

An instance of the endeavours of the authorities to control the tastes of the theatre-going public of Paris is to be found in the decree of August 2, 1793, that "tragedies, such as *Brutus*, *William Tell*, and *Caius Gracchus*, and dramatic pieces describing the glorious events of the Revolution, and the virtues of the defenders of liberty, should be played three times a week upon the Paris stage." Of the former class, Marie Joseph Chenier's *Caius Gracchus*, Christian's *Manlius Torquatus*, and Luce de Lancival's *Mucius Scævola* are the best examples, and of the latter a complete list will be found in Étienne and Martainville's comprehensive history. An instance or two of this type will be sufficient. They can be divided into satirical plays, attacking the opponents of the new government, or killing again the defunct abuses of the *ancien régime*, or patriotic plays, praising the heroes of the *sans-culottes*. Of the first class may be mentioned *Buzot, roi de Calvados*, produced in August, 1793, in which Buzot, who has a court consisting of Guadet as premier, Gorsas as chancellor, and Pétion as finance minister, is just about to marry the heiress of the last King of Yvetot, when he is overthrown by his own cook, who throws about copies of the new constitution. Equally absurd is Lebrun-Tossa's *La Folie de Georges, ou l'Ouverture du Parlement d'Angleterre*, in which George III. is represented as going mad in the midst of Parliament on receiving the news of the capture of Toulon, when Grey and Sheridan put on the

¹ Welschinger's *Théâtre de la Révolution*, p. 271.

red cap of liberty, the Tower of London is stormed like the Bastille, and Fox declares, as the curtain falls, "If the king recovers his reason, I will be the first to demand his death." Of the patriotic class, perhaps the best specimens are Lesur's *La Veuve du Républicain*, Léger's *L'Apothéose du jeune Barra*, Georges Duval's *La Prise de Toulon par les Français*, Gassier Saint-Amand's *L'Ami du Peuple, ou la Mort de Marat*, Philipon and Jadin's *Agricol Viola, ou le Jeune Héros de la Durance*, and Boullault's *Les Brigands de la Vendée*, of which the titles sufficiently denote the subjects.

The tendency towards the grandiose and the spectacular, which was obvious on the stage, also had its effects on painting during the Reign of Terror in Paris. In the chapter devoted to art during the Revolution, the story of the abolition of the Academy of Painting, and of David's attempts to reform the public exhibitions, as well as the influence of the Revolution on art in general, will be discussed; but it is necessary here to notice how the new artistic principles assisted the organizers of the Terror. The Salon of 1789 has already been mentioned as exhibiting a new departure in French art,¹ and the Salon of 1791 was not less remarkable from this point of view, inasmuch as it contained two of David's masterpieces, the "Oath of the Tennis Court," and the "Brutus." But the great painter was unable, during this year of terror, to devote much time to art, for he was a member of the Convention, and had much to do as a member of the Committees of General Security and of Public Instruction. Yet, though he was not painting, his influence, combined with that of the Revolution itself, had already made Paris a school of art and a centre for art students. The imprisonment of two French art students, Rater and Chinard, followed by the murder of Hugou de Bassville,² and the general war with Europe, caused the abolition of the French Academy at Rome, and aspiring French art students were obliged, therefore, to study their profession in Paris. There they formed a numerous group, devoted to David and the classical principles

¹ Vol. i. p. 256.

² Vol. ii. p. 224.

in art, with their head-quarters in his atelier in the Louvre, and they were a faithful body of adherents, on whom David could depend for assistance in organizing his famous fêtes. They carried their devotion to Greece and Rome and the classics to such an extent that they went about Paris clad in togas and buskins, and made up grandiose schemes for vast historical paintings, and gigantic statues, and allegorical groups, to celebrate the Revolution and its progress. But if the Revolution inspired them with a longing to abandon the old academical style of painting with the costume of the eighteenth century, they in their turn exercised a curious influence on the Reign of Terror in Paris. The Revolution was a grand time for enthusiastic young men, and the Parisian populace delighted in the eccentricity of these art-students, and assisted them in imagining and organizing popular pageants and fêtes.

The Roman emperors found that the way to rule the Roman populace was to give them *panem et circenses*, bread and spectacular entertainments, and the Great Committee of Public Safety understood their principles thoroughly. The food question will be noticed presently; it is now the place to deal with the entertainments. At the instigation of the Great Committee, and under the direction of David and his young disciples, an unparalleled series of magnificent fêtes was given by the Convention to the people of Paris, concluding with the famous Fête of the Supreme Being. The taste for popular fêtes and pageants had been inaugurated with the Fête of Federation on July 14, 1790,¹ and the fête in honour of the released soldiers of Château-Vieux in March, 1792,² and the government of the Terror was preceded by the first fête directed by David, which was held on the anniversary of the capture of the Tuileries, on August 10, 1793. Upon the Place de la Bastille, the colossal figure of a woman had been erected, with hands pressed against her breasts, from which sprang two jets of water, and around it gathered the members of the primary assemblies of Paris, the conquerors of the Bastille, and the

¹ Vol. i. p. 336.

² Vol. ii. pp. 59-61.

heroines of the march to Versailles in October, 1789, with crowds of Parisians of all classes. Through the crowd the deputies of the Convention were marshalled, carrying fruit and flowers in their hands, and when they reached their places, the president, Hérault de Séchelles, addressed the statue with the words, "O Nature, receive the expression of the eternal attachment of all Frenchmen to thy laws." He then poured a libation, in the ancient Greek fashion, upon the ground, and a choir of chosen voices sang a hymn to Nature, of which the words were by Sylvain Maréchal, and the music by Gossec. This is not the place to describe the Fêtes of Reason, which were not the work of David or of the Convention; but similar fêtes to the one described were held on 2 Pluviôse, Year II. (January 21, 1794), in commemoration of the execution of Louis XVI.; on 23 Messidor, Year II. (July 11, 1794), in honour of Barra and Viala, the youthful martyrs of the Republic; and, after the fall of Robespierre, on the occasion of the transference of the dust of Rousseau to the Pantheon. These fêtes, by which the Terrorists tickled the eyes and ears of the Parisians, culminated in the famous Fête of the Supreme Being, by which Robespierre believed he had laid the keystone to the supremacy of himself and his ideas.

It was not enough, however, to provide amusement for the Parisians; they must also be provided with food; and the measures taken for this purpose by the Commune of Paris, under the supervision of the Committee of Public Safety, were entirely successful. The two chief links in the machinery which fed Paris during the months from September, 1793, to July, 1794, were likewise two of the chief links which bound the power of the government of Terror upon the capital—the revolutionary army and the law of the maximum. By means of the paid revolutionary army, the dangerous class of workmen out of work, which had been the instrument of so many riots and revolutionary movements, was permanently bridled. A good sans-culotte had only to be enrolled in this army to be sure of his three livres a day, which gave him a safe income, and the crowd of women and children of the poorer

faubourgs, who at other periods starved, had a right, according to the theories of the members of the Commune of Paris, to claim and obtain enough to live upon from the authorities. Certain employment and wages being therefore within the reach of every one, the difficulty was to make those wages of sufficient purchasing power to procure means of subsistence. This was attempted to be secured by the law of the maximum, which fixed authoritatively the price to be paid for articles of prime necessity. Any one charging more than the price laid down by the authorities was liable to instant arrest and prosecution, and the punishment was death. This drastic measure was, of course, utterly opposed to all economical principles, and destroyed all trade; but it was logically carried to its extreme, and the farmers and market-gardeners were obliged to sell to the shopkeepers at the government price. In this manner the price of food was kept down throughout the Reign of Terror, but it is doubtful whether the result could have been achieved had not the harvest of 1793 been extremely abundant, and the farmers able to meet the requirements of the government. Nevertheless, they were not always willing to bring their crops, meat, or vegetables into Paris to dispose of them at the low price fixed by the law of the maximum; and so, to ensure a sufficient supply, it became necessary for the Commune of Paris to send out its revolutionary army, which ravaged to more than fifty miles round Paris, seeking out the farmers' hidden stores, and compelling them to send everything which was not necessary for their own existence into the capital to be sold at the statutable price. These measures were certainly effective, and the Commune strengthened them by their orders that no one should be allowed to buy more than a fixed quantum per head of bread and other necessities of life. The price of luxuries was left untouched by the law of the maximum, and therefore it was possible for a wealthy man to give a dinner abounding in every delicacy, and yet to be obliged to ask his guests to bring their own bread.

For rich men still existed in Paris, men who had made

money by depreciating assignats or by speculations in ecclesiastical property, and these men did not grudge spending their money freely on their pleasures. It was possible to get a luxurious dinner in Paris at many restaurants, especially in the Palais Royal and its neighbourhood, but the supremely expensive and fashionable restaurant of the Terror, as Brébant's and the Café Riche were at later periods, was Méot's, at the corner of the Rue des Bons-Enfants. Hither came Danton, who was a man who loved a good dinner, Barère, Hérault de Séchelles, Dumas, the judge of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and every one in Paris who liked a luxurious dinner, served in beautifully decorated rooms;¹ and here it was possible to purchase every luxury of the table, including the rarest wines. One novelty of the kitchen may be noted as becoming popular at this period—the tomato. An absurd theory that tomatoes were poisonous was prevalent in Paris until the arrival of the Marseillais, on the eve of the capture of the Tuileries, on August 10, 1792. They went into every restaurant, asking for their favourite vegetable, the “apple of love,” and certain acute restaurateurs made quite a fortune by importing them into Paris, and serving them to all comers as the “republican vegetable.”²

Only wealthy bourgeois and successful politicians and speculators, however, could afford to patronize Méot's and other fashionable restaurants; but the cafés were not so exclusive, and every one could find a few sous to spend an evening in one of them. As in the early years of the Revolution, the Palais Royal,³ now called the Palais Égalité, remained the chosen site of all the more famous cafés of the Reign of Terror.⁴ The Café de Foy, the Café de Valois, and

¹ Goncourt, *La Société française pendant la Révolution*, pp. 285, 286; Mercier's *Le Nouveau Paris*, ed. 1799, vol. iv. p. 227.

² Pollio and Marcel's *Le Bataillon du Dix-Août*, p. 242.

³ Vol. i. p. 113; vol. ii. pp. 20–22.

⁴ Goncourt, *La Société française pendant la Révolution*, pp. 187–202; Schmidt's *Paris pendant la Révolution*, translated by Paul Viollet, vol. i. pp. 116–159.

the Café du Caveau were still full of customers; but with the decline of the bourgeois as an important political factor in the government of Paris, and the practical renunciation of power by the National Guard, these cafés, though as crowded as ever, possessed but little political importance. It was far otherwise with the Café Corazza, in the Rue Vivienne, and the famous old Café Procope, now Zoppi's, in the Faubourg Saint-Germain. In the former of these cafés assembled the adventurers of every land, who hoped to make the Revolution a stepping-stone to fortune—Varlet, Gusman the Spaniard, Proly, the natural son of the Austrian minister, the Prince von Kaünitz, and Desfieux; it was there that they had prepared for the risings of May 31 and June 2; and there they still met during the early months of the Reign of Terror, chafing against the restraints set by the Great Committee of Public Safety and the Commune of Paris against the continuance of anarchy, and indulging in dark intrigues, which were to lead them to the guillotine. The habitués of Zoppi's were mostly members of the club of the Cordeliers, and friends of Hébert, the editor of *Père Duchesne*, and the Hébertists discussed their future policy in the halls, which, when the place was the Café Procope, had been the meeting-place of the dramatic critics and the court-room of Diderot. The chief cafés resorted to by the worshippers of Marat were the Café de l'Échelle-du-Temple, the Café du Pont-Saint-Michel, and the Café Hottot, also known as the Café des Tuileries and the Café Payen; and by the ardent supporters of Robespierre, the Café de la Convention, in the Rue du Petit Lion, and the Café de Choiseul, close to the Théâtre Italien, which was kept by Chrétien, one of the jurors at the Revolutionary Tribunal. Others which deserve mention were the Café Conti, by the Pont-Neuf, which was the meeting-place for speculators, and those who followed the dangerous but lucrative calling of dealing in assignats, and the Café de Chartres, or Café des Cannoniers, where avowed opponents of the Terror assembled, and which was to be the head-quarters of the *jeunesse dorée* after the fall of Robespierre.

These restaurants and cafés were, however, the meetings places of men; it remains to be seen what part women played in Paris during the Reign of Terror.¹ The days of political salons had gone by with the fall of Madame Roland. Although the Girondins were not displeased to be led by a woman, the new rulers of France declined to be under their influence in politics. Most of them were men of pure life, either happy in their marriages, like Billaud-Varenne and Robert Lindet, or looking forward to the happiness of a chaste married life, like Robespierre and Saint-Just. The same may be said of their great opponents. Hébert's marriage with a released nun had been a most happy one; Danton was affectionate to the verge of uxoriousness; and the happiness of Camille and Lucile Desmoulins forms one of the sweet but pathetic romances of the history of the Revolution. Of the members of the Great Committee, Barère and Hérault de Séchelles could alone be called libertines, and the latter's liaison with Madame de Sainte Amaranthe was fatal to them both. The space which separated the position of Madame Roland and Madame de Sainte Amaranthe, the Egeria of a political party and the beautiful woman whose beauty, with that of her daughter, was chiefly used to attract men of wealth to her house to gamble, shows of itself the gap which lies between the women of the educated classes before and after the fall of the Girondins. Most of the accomplished ladies of the salons were either in exile or in prison, showing in all their trials the exquisite grace of French womanhood of the highest class; and the women of the next social grade, as represented by Lucile Desmoulins, hated politics, and kept themselves apart from it. One woman, whose story is exceptionally interesting, and deserves a few words, was Olympe de Gouges. Of her early life very little is known; but there can be no doubt that she was an extremely clever though very uneducated woman. It is even asserted that she could not write, and it is known that the plays by which she hoped to win fame were all dictated by her. Her

¹ See *Les Femmes célèbres de 1789 à 1795, et leur Influence dans la Révolution*, by A. Lairtullier. 2 vols. Paris: 1840.

first play, called *Zamor et Mirza*, was produced at the Comédie Française in 1785 without success; but the outbreak of the Revolution gave her the opportunity of using her facile power of dictating plays. The fashion for *pièces de circonstance* exactly suited her, and she produced, in rapid succession, *L'Esclavage des Nègres*, in 1789; *Le Couvent, ou Les Vœux Forcés*, in 1790; *Mirabeau, aux Champs-Élysées*, in 1791; and *La Vivandière, ou l'Entrée de Dumouriez à Bruxelles*, in 1792. She also took an interest in politics, and published a quantity of pamphlets, of which the most notable for its courage, if not for its ability, was *Olympe de Gouges, defender of Louis Capet, to the President of the National Convention*. The unfortunate woman was undoubtedly a well-known character, but the Terror did not spare her, in spite of her many affectations and want of better education, and she perished on the scaffold. Of the Goddesses of Reason, the actresses Maillard, Julie Candaille, and Sophie Momoro, the wife of the printer, little need be said; the fact that they took part in the orgies of the Fêtes of Reason is enough to characterize them. But a little more must be said about the market-women, the *tricoteuses*, or knitting-women, of infamous memory. These market-women had been treated as heroines ever since their march to Versailles in October, 1789; government after government of Paris delighted to show them honour; they received medals and valuable presents, and always had good seats at all public festivities and in the galleries of the Assemblies. They formed their societies after the fashion of the Jacobin Club, presided over by Renée Audu, Agnès Lefevre, Marie Louise Bouju, and Rose Lacombe, and went about the streets of Paris insulting respectably dressed people, and hounding on the sans-culottes to deeds of atrocity. These Mænads were encouraged by Marat, and played an important part in the street history of Paris, up to the Reign of Terror, when their power was suddenly taken from them. On May 21, 1793, they were excluded by a decree from the galleries of the Convention; on May 26 they were forbidden to form part of any political assembly; and when

they appealed from the Convention to the Commune of Paris, Chaumette abruptly told them "that the Republic had no need of Joans of Arc." Thus deprived of active participation in politics, the market-women became the *tricoteuses*, or knitting-women, who used to take their seats in the Place de la Révolution, and watch the guillotine as they knitted. Their active power for good or harm was gone, and it is important to grasp this fact, because, in most accounts of the Terror, the market-women are made to play an important part, and are represented as exercising an influence which they had lost, and which the Great Committee and the Commune took care they should not regain.

Life during the Terror in Paris has been described just now as being, in all essential particulars, very similar to life in Paris at any other period. But it differed in little things, in little affectations of liberty and equality, which are amusing to study. The fashions of dress everywhere betrayed the new order of things. A few men, such as Robespierre, might still go about with powdered hair and in knee-breeches, but the ordinary male costume of the time was designed to contrast in every way with the costume of a dandy of the *ancien régime*. Instead of breeches, the fashion was to wear trousers; instead of shoes, top-boots; and instead of shaving, the young Parisian prided himself on letting his moustache grow. In female costume a different motive was at work. Only David's art disciples ventured to imitate the male apparel of ancient Greece and Rome, but such imitation became the fashion among women. Waists disappeared; and instead of stiffened skirts and narrow bodices, women wore short loose robes, which they fancied resembled Greek *chitons*; sandals took the place of high-heeled shoes; and the hair, instead of being worked up into elaborate edifices, was allowed to flow down freely. For ornaments, gun-metal and steel took the place of gold, silver, and precious stones, for every woman was supposed, as a true republican, to have sent her jewellery to the National Treasury, and the favourite design was the guillotine. Little guillotines were worn as brooches, as ear-

rings, and as clasps, and the women of the time simply followed the fashion without realizing what it meant. Indeed, the worship of the guillotine was one of the most curious features of the epoch. Children had toy guillotines given them; models were made to cut off imitation heads, where wine or sweet syrup flowed in place of blood;¹ and hymns were written to La Sainte Guillotine, and jokes made upon it, as the "national razor." The revolutionary desire to turn everything away from its old signification was shown in the revolutionary packs of cards, in which Liberties, Equalities, and Fraternities took the place of Kings, Queens, and Knaves of the suits. Even revolutionary pottery was made of patriotic designs,² and the very shapes of confectionery and cakes were made to imitate guillotines and other patriotic objects. It is well known that the desire to emphasize the abolition of titles was followed by the abolition of the terms "Monsieur" and "Madame," and that their places were taken by "Citizen" and "Citizeness;" and also how the use of the second person plural was dropped, and it was considered a sign of a good republican to *tutoyer* every one, that is, to call them "thou" and "thee." Most absurd change of all was the alteration of names. Men dropped their old names if they wished to appear good republicans, especially if that name was Louis, and borrowed names out of the classics. To quote but a few instances of well-known or notorious persons, the Prussian Baron Jean Baptiste Cloots called himself Anarcharsis Cloots; Georges Chaumette, the procureur to the Commune of Paris, called himself Anaxagoras Chaumette; and Pierre André Coffinhal, the well-known judge of the Revolutionary Tribunal, took the name of Mucius Scævola Coffinhal. But, let it be noted, none of these men were members of the Great Committees, where the deputies were far too busy in organizing and governing the country to have time to spare for such trivial play.

¹ De Goncourt, *La Société française pendant la Révolution*, pp. 429, 430.

² See Charles Dubosq, *Les Faïences Révolutionnaires*, in the *Révolution Française*.

This is but a faint attempt to show how the Reign of Terror was established in Paris, how it was organized, and how life went on under it. Nothing is more difficult than to realize existence in a bygone era. The perspective which years, as they roll by, give to past ages, emphasizes certain salient points and leaves the background vague, and it is only by saturating the mind in contemporary literature, diaries, and letters, that an idea can be formed of ordinary life during a past period. But even then it is difficult to convey to a reader an impression of a time in which one has not lived; it is more—it is almost impossible. The Reign of Terror in Paris seems to us an age of unique experiences, a time unparalleled in the history of the world; yet to the great majority of contemporaries it did not appear so; they lived their ordinary lives, and it was only in exceptional cases that the serenity of their days was interrupted, or that their minds were exercised by anything more than the necessity of earning their daily bread.

CHAPTER XI.

THE TERROR IN THE PROVINCES.

The provinces in 1792—The institution of deputies on mission—Its development—The increase of their power—The proconsuls and their system of government by Terror—Special missions—The Terror in Lyons—Collot d'Herbois and Fouché—The Fusillades—The Terror at Marseilles—Barras and Fréron—The Terror at Toulon—The Terror at Bordeaux—Tallien, Madame Tallien, and Ysabeau—The "destruction" of La Vendée—The Terror at Nantes—Carrier—The Noyades—The Terror at Arras and Cambrai—Joseph Le Bon—The Terror in the Vaucluse—The "destruction" of Bedoin—Maignet—The Terror at Saint-Étienne—Javogues—The insurrection of Charrier in the Gévaudan—The Terror in the Lozère and Haute-Loire—Châteauneuf-Randon and Reynaud—Moderate proconsuls; André Dumont, Lakanal, etc.—The Proconsulates of Bernard of Saintes, Dartigoyte, Lecarpentier, Borie, Cavaignac, etc.—Cities and districts which escaped the Terror—The tribunals of the Terror in the provinces—The victims of the Terror—Noblemen who escaped—The Comte d'Haussonville—Conclusion.

THE general features of life in Paris during the months between September, 1793, and July, 1794, which properly constitute the Reign of Terror, have been treated as a whole without attempting to follow the sequence of events, and it is now necessary to turn to the provinces, and see by what means the Great Committee of Public Safety established its absolute authority over the departments, and how the Reign of Terror was there originated and administered. No complete chapter has been devoted to the history of the Revolution in the provinces since the close of the Constituent Assembly,¹ and

¹ Vol. i. chaps. v. and xvi.

it is therefore necessary to say a few words on this subject before coming to the establishment of the Terror.

It has been shown that the course of revolutionary opinion progressed on parallel lines in Paris and in the provinces during the session of the Constituent Assembly, and that the notion that Paris made the Revolution and that the provinces merely acquiesced is entirely erroneous. Political excitement was at quite as great a height in the provincial towns and country villages during the years 1789, 1790, 1791, and 1792 as it was at Paris; little Bastilles were stormed, new authorities elected, and clubs formed everywhere in connection with the Jacobins, and each province, town, and village had its own separate revolutionary history. It has been already said that the deputies to the Legislative Assembly were local men, who represented the spirit of the departments,¹ and that, though Paris had originally taken the lead in the Revolution, it was the departments which at this period sent up Jacobin deputies to carry on the campaign, when Parisian politicians were rather wearying of it. These new deputies included nearly all the first procureur-général-syndics of the departments, and all the leading provincial statesmen of the first period, and their election to the Legislative Assembly left vacancies, which the members of the provincial Jacobin clubs were not slow to fill. In a few instances, ex-Constituants accepted local offices, such as Boissy d'Anglas, who became procureur-général-syndic of the department of the Ardèche; but as a rule the new local authorities were simply the nominees of the clubs, and were distinctly more democratic than their predecessors. This fact became obvious as the struggle between the king and the Jacobins became more acute. It is true that the authorities of several departments sent the king addresses of condolence and congratulation after the events of June 20, 1792;² but in the events which followed the storming of the Tuileries, the departments acquiesced. The war and its reverses for France profoundly affected the people; the young men who felt any military aptitude hastened to enlist; and the Re-

¹ Vol. ii. p. 11.

² Vol. ii. chap. iii. p. 97.

public was accepted everywhere. Then came the elections to the Convention, the execution of Louis XVI., and the struggle between the Girondins and the Jacobins, when the people of the provinces were too much occupied with their own affairs, and especially with the conscription, to concern themselves much with what was happening at Paris. The disastrous failure of the scheme of the Girondins to appeal to the provinces has been already noticed, and the members of the Great Committee of Public Safety, when they organized their system in September, 1793, felt that they would have little difficulty in establishing the Reign of Terror in the departments of France.

This they did mainly through the instrumentality of the representatives on mission, and the history of the gradual growth of the power of these representatives is important and interesting. When, owing to the weakness of the ministry, the Constituent Assembly became the court of appeal in all executive questions, it might have been expected that it would have sent some of its deputies on missions of inquiry. But the high opinion which the deputies to the Constituent Assembly had of their legislative functions prevented them from leaving Paris; and the only instance of a deputy of any position going on a mission was when Dandré went as royal commissioner to Aix, in 1791,¹ to inquire into the riots, stained by the murder of Pascalis, an appointment which Mirabeau had thought of soliciting. The Legislative Assembly followed the example of the Constituent, and on July 18, 1792, a proposition by Tardiveau, that eight deputies should be despatched to the frontiers to inquire and report, was rejected, as tending to decrease the responsibility of the ministers.² On July 31, however, the state of disorganization at the great camp at Soissons, owing to persistent rumours that the bread served out to the soldiers stationed there was poisoned, threatened such danger to the capital that the Legislative Assembly decided to intervene, and sent three deputies—Carnot, Gasparin,

¹ Vol. i. p. 509.

² Wallon's *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. iv. p. 8.

and Lacombe-Saint-Michel—to inquire into the matter. The capture of the Tuileries and the suspension of the king on August 10 entirely changed the attitude of the Assembly. It was of vital importance for the revolutionary leaders to know how the news of the great movement in Paris would be received by the armies on the frontiers and their generals, and on August 11 twelve deputies were despatched with orders to secure the adhesion of the armies to the new state of affairs, and with power to dismiss or suspend all who refused to acknowledge the change. The names of these first deputies on mission, whose vigour and success doubtless did much to gain favour for the system, deserve record. Lacombe-Saint-Michel, Gasparin, and Rouyer, who were nominated to the armies of the south generally, were received with enthusiasm, not only by the soldiers, but by all the inhabitants of the departments through which they travelled. Delmas, Bellegarde, and Dubois-Dubais, who were allotted to the army of the north, raised volunteers, and tried to put the fortresses in a state of defence against the expected advance of the Austrians. Carnot, Coustard, and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or used their powers at the head-quarters of the army of the Rhine by arresting the Prince de Broglie, Biron's chief of the staff, and suspending several other officers, including Rouget de Lisle, the author of the *Marseillaise*, who refused to recognize the legality of the suspension of the king. The most dangerous task was that given to Antonelle, Kersaint, and Peraldi, who were despatched to the armies of Lafayette and Lückner, and who were promptly arrested at Sedan by the former general.¹ The Assembly at once nominated three more deputies to the army of Lafayette—Quinette, Isnard, and Baudin of the Ardennes; and three to that of Lückner—Laporte, Lamarque, and Bréard. Many other deputies were also sent on special missions, such as Gossuin to Maubeuge, and Ruamps and Niou to the port of Rochefort, with general powers to examine the state of public feeling, as well as some particular task to perform, and there is no record of any opposition being shown to them.

¹ Vol. ii. p. 137.

in spite of their ill-defined position. At the same time, the ministers sent forth thirty commissioners, with the same instructions to report directly to them, of whom the most notable were Fréron, sent to Metz; the printer Momoro, to the department of Calvados; and Choderlos de Laclos, to the army of Lückner; and on September 3 the Commune of Paris, on the motion of Hébert, sent forth twenty-four commissioners on its own account,¹ including Xavier Audouin to La Vendée, and Billaud-Varenne to the camp at Châlons.

When therefore the Convention met, the system of representatives on mission was in full exercise. It had been found that the inhabitants of the departments were ready to receive these delegates, and were willing to obey them, and the Convention, immediately on taking the executive government into its own hands after the proclamation of the Republic, flooded the country with its representatives on mission. These first emissaries were sent mainly to the armies and to conquered countries; their powers were undefined, and they reported both to the ministry and to the Convention, and it was chiefly from among the men who distinguished themselves in these first missions that the proconsuls, who, in later days, under the Great Committee of Public Safety, established the Reign of Terror in the provinces, were selected. Of the deputies on mission with the armies, of whom Merlin of Thionville and Rewbell, the defenders of Mayence, are the most famous examples, more will be said in the next chapter, and the names of the chief emissaries to conquered countries have already been mentioned. Of them the most famous were Couthon, who annexed the little principality of Salm;² Danton and Lacroix, who were sent to Dumouriez' army during its victorious march through Belgium; and Grégoire and Jagot, who arranged the annexation and organization of Nice, and later, with Hérault de Séchelles and Simond, performed the same functions in Savoy. Most of the deputies on mission were recalled in January, 1793, to be present at the trial of the king,³ at which time, however, fifteen were still absent; but after that event

¹ Vol. ii. p. 136.

² Vol. ii. p. 296.

³ Vol. ii. p. 217.

a still greater number were despatched both to the provinces and to the armies. On March 8, on the reception of the news of the reverses of Dumouriez, which were to culminate in the defeat of Neerwinden and the fresh invasion of France, the Convention felt the need of vigorous action, and selected eighty-two deputies to go two and two throughout the departments to superintend the raising of the new levy of three hundred thousand men.¹ This extraordinary measure was succeeded on the following day by the establishment of the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris. These representatives on mission felt that they had higher duties than the mere raising of soldiers, and did not hesitate to take upon themselves the general duties of administration, and in La Vendée they arranged and conducted the war on the part of the Convention. Mention has been already made of the vigour, courage, and ability of these deputies in La Vendée,² of whom the greatest were Philippeaux, Choudieu, and Bourbotte, and the institution of representatives on mission received a wonderful impulse when it was decreed on April 8, on the motion of Danton, that they should correspond with the newly formed Committee of Public Safety, as well as with the Convention.³ After this decree, the deputies on mission had no longer to carry out vaguely what they believed to be their duties, hoping for the approval of their colleagues in Paris, but felt themselves under the direct orders of a body of men who could appreciate their difficulties, give them advice, and lay their recommendations before the Convention. These deputies had serious dangers to encounter. Fabre of the Hérault was killed in action; Duquesnoy and Chasles were wounded in battle; Léonard Bourdon was attacked at Orleans; and the four deputies arrested by Dumouriez—Camus, Quinette, Lamarque, and Bancal des Issards—as well as Drouet, captured at Maubeuge, remained in Austrian prisons until 1795. It is very notable that none of the leading Girondins are to be counted among the deputies who, during the first nine months of the session of the Convention, distinguished themselves on mission.

¹ Appendix X.² Vol. ii. pp. 260, 263, 265.³ Vol. ii. p. 232.

These men, some of whom counted upon the support of the provinces, never troubled to go and see what was the general feeling in France, as apart from Paris; they either did not care to weaken their party by sending any of its members on mission, or else believed that their words in the Convention would have more effect than the deeds of their opponents. This neglect of an opportunity to win public opinion to their side in the provinces is incomprehensible, when it is remembered that the Girondin party commanded a majority throughout the early months of 1793, and could have chosen their own nominees; but it yet remains a fact that not one of the Girondin leaders—not even Buzot, the chief of the federalist section—ever went on mission at all. The deputies on mission were chosen almost entirely from the Marsh or the silent members of the Mountain; none of the great talkers, except Danton and, in later days, Saint-Just, ever made themselves conspicuous in an important mission.¹

The overthrow of the Girondins in Paris by the *coup d'état* of June 2, followed as it was by the rising in Normandy and the insurrections in Lyons, Bordeaux, Marseilles, and Toulon, called for immense efforts on the part of the deputies on mission, and their universal success justified the principle of placing supreme authority in the hands of individuals. The elaborate machinery of local government devised by the

¹ The work of the representatives on mission has until recently been much neglected. When this chapter was written, there was only one book, and that a very small one, on the subject, *Les Missionnaires de 93 par l'auteur du "Génie de la Révolution :"* Paris, 1819; and it was necessary to consult local histories and original documents. Since then, however, a masterly work has appeared, *Les Représentants du Peuple en Mission et la Justice Révolutionnaire dans les Départements en l'An. II.* (1793–1794), by Henri Wallon, 5 vols., Paris, 1889–90, which has been freely used. The French government have understood the important nature of the subject, and under their auspices have appeared the two first volumes of the *Recueil des Actes du Comité du Salut Public, avec la Correspondance officielle des Représentants en Mission, et le Registre du Conseil exécutif provisoire*, ed. by F. A. Aulard, which will, when completed, be the most valuable contribution to the history of the Revolution issued for many years.

Constituent Assembly utterly broke down in the moment of crisis; the system of checks and counter-checks proved to be worthless for purposes of maintaining order without the assistance of a strong central executive. The period for the influence of elective officers and deliberative bodies was gone by; it was seen that such arrangements were only possible in a time of profound peace; and nominated local authorities and despotic government by single individuals took their place. The pacification of Normandy by Robert Lindet, and the reconquest of Lyons by Dubois-Crancé, have been already described, together with the termination of the first phase of the Vendéan war, and full credit has been given to the efforts of the representatives on mission; it now remains to be seen how their power was defined and systematized, and how it was used by the Great Committee of Public Safety to establish the Reign of Terror in the provinces of France. The representatives on mission of the year 1793 were to become the great proconsuls of 1794.

The success of the eighty-two deputies sent on mission on March 8 caused an effort to be made on April 30 to regulate their position. By this decree they were granted unlimited powers to do whatever seemed good to them for the public weal, with the proviso that they must act in couples, and that the signature of a single deputy was to be of no effect. They could dismiss and replace civil authorities, but their nominations to military appointments had to be confirmed by the Convention. They were to report every day to the Committee of Public Safety, and every week to the Convention, and the Committee was to make a summary report on their proceedings every week. Their vigour in preventing the federalist movement, encouraged by the Girondins, from gaining ground seemed to justify these extreme powers, and many more deputies were sent on mission at the end of June, 1793, to secure the adhesion of the primary assemblies to the Constitution of 1793. In August Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois were elected to the Great Committee of Public Safety for the express purpose of establishing revolutionary government in France, and corresponding with the repre-

sentatives on mission, and one of the first changes they made was to allow the couples of deputies, by agreement between themselves, to divide their districts, and to assume supreme power. They were instructed by Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois, to whom they now became practically responsible, that their powers were absolute and unlimited;¹ they were encouraged to overthrow the elected local authorities and to appoint new men at their own discretion; they were authorized to appoint the "national agents" who were to supersede the procureur-syndics of the districts; they could imprison any one at their will, and have them tried for their lives by the ordinary courts, or they could easily obtain leave to establish revolutionary tribunals, resembling that of Paris, if they thought it necessary; they could take possession of goods, or exact money from communities or individuals for the service of the state; appeals against their decisions and actions were invariably rejected; and, though exhorted to listen to the advice of leading democrats in the different districts, they were in reality entrusted with absolute power over life and property. By the law of 14 Frimaire, Year II. (December 4, 1793), which organized the revolutionary government, the representatives on mission were definitely ordered to renew all the constituted authorities in their localities, and on 9 Nivôse (December 29) fifty-eight representatives, most of whom were already on mission, were named for this task. It would indeed be wonderful if the whole number of the men entrusted with such powers had proved mild and merciful and at the same time efficient governors. They were encouraged to shed blood, if they thought it necessary to maintain peace in their provinces; but if they could maintain quiet without bloodshed, they were allowed to rule as they liked, as long as they maintained their ascendancy by means of Terror. Such despotic powers were enough to turn the heads of the bourgeois thus suddenly entrusted with them, and it is no wonder that many of the deputies on mission, such as Carrier, Regnaud, Javogues, and

¹ Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. i. pp. 24, 25.

Joseph Le Bon, have left reputations stained for ever with the recollection of their atrocities. Yet it must be noted that the very atrocities of these men gave other deputies on mission the opportunity to act with lenience under a show of enforcing the Reign of Terror. It may be doubted if André Dumont could have maintained his bloodless rule in the departments of Picardy, had not Joseph Le Bon terrified all Frenchmen for leagues around with his cruel rule at Arras. Would Dauphiné have remained tranquil, if Maignet had not destroyed Bedouin and established his revolutionary tribunal at Orange? Must not the influence of the horrible atrocities perpetrated by Carrier at Nantes have spread far over the interior departments of France, and caused the remarkable absence of bloodshed in the midlands of France, which has been universally recognized? It does not make the proconsulates of Carrier, Maignet, and Le Bon less horrible to point out that their cruelties established the ascendancy of the Terror and helped to keep France tranquil, any more than the fact that the daily executions in Paris made Paris peaceful makes those executions in any way excusable. Throughout the Reign of Terror in the provinces, the same system of government is to be perceived, namely, that any one who disapproved of the present régime, or who hesitated in his absolute obedience, should be frightened out of even dreaming of active resistance.

But before examining the Reign of Terror in the provinces, as established under the superintendence of the proconsuls and of the Great Committee of Public Safety, attention must be called to the missions of the members of the Great Committee, which were always of the greatest importance. First in order comes the famous missions of Carnot to the army of the north, which resulted in the victories of Hondschöten and Wattignies;¹ next, the mission of Couthon to Auvergne, which had so great an influence on the capture of Lyons;² and the punitive mission of Collot d'Herbois to the same city; then the numerous missions of Jean Bon Saint-André to the ports of France, and his participation in the

¹ Vol. ii. chap. viii. p. 255.

² *Ibid.*, p. 268.

defeat of June 1, 1794; and, finally, the missions of Saint-Just to the armies on the eastern and north-eastern frontiers. These special missions of members of the Great Committee have been or will be especially insisted upon in their proper places. It will be advantageous first to describe the punitive missions to the provinces and cities which had opposed the establishment of the government of the Great Committee, and by which Terror was, in the words of Barère, made "the order of the day" in the provinces, and then to examine the new *régime* in other parts of France, which had offered no resistance to the course of the Revolution.

Of all the resistance which the Mountain and the Great Committee of Public Safety had experienced, that of the city of Lyons had been the most obstinate, and Lyons was therefore the city selected for the first example of the meaning of the words "Revolutionary Government," or Reign of Terror, in the provinces. The decree of 21 Vendémiaire (October 12) of the Convention, ordering the destruction of Lyons and the change of its name to Commune-Affranchie, has been already noticed, but the deputies who had been instrumental in its capture would not carry out the severe orders of the Convention, and were all recalled.¹ Even Couthon, whose vigour had been undeniable, was loth to carry out the cruel decree, and though he made a great parade of being carried on the shoulders of four sans-culottes, and solemnly striking the façade of one of the houses in the Place Bellecour, he only directed the destruction of the ramparts, the old castle of Pierre Scize, and of about forty houses. This mildness was not at all pleasing to the members of the Great Committee, who thought that the capture of Lyons afforded an admirable pretext for initiating the Reign of Terror in the provinces. They therefore recalled all the deputies then at Lyons, and on October 30, 1793, sent one of their own number, Collot d'Herbois, to punish the conquered city, and added as his assistants Sébastien de La Porte and Joseph Fouché, an old acquaintance of Billaud-Varenne, who had been on mission

¹ Vol. ii. p. 269.

ever since March, 1793, and had given evidence of energy on each occasion. This was the first important appearance of Fouché on the political stage, and the former life of the future colleague, rival, and opponent of Talleyrand, as a typical deputy on mission, deserves a few words.

Joseph Fouché was the son of a merchant captain, and was born at La Martinière, near Nantes, on September 19, 1754. His health was not strong enough for him to become a sailor, as his father had wished, so, after receiving a good education at Nantes, he devoted himself to teaching. He was for some time a tutor at the military college at Vendôme, where he made the acquaintance of Cazalès, and next acted as professor of mathematics at the famous Oratorian college at Juilly from 1784 to 1787, where he had Billaud-Varenne among his colleagues. He took minor orders, and then went to Arras, where he is said to have made the acquaintance of Charlotte Robespierre, to whom, report goes, he in later days proposed marriage. After 1790 he returned to Nantes as principal of the college there, and, throwing off his orders, became a prominent member of the local Jacobin club. In September, 1792, he was elected sixth deputy to the Convention by the department of the Loire-Inférieure, on the proposition of Méaulle.¹ He made no mark as a speaker in that assembly, and worked quietly in the Committee of Public Instruction until March, 1793, when he was selected to go on mission. He was despatched in that month for recruiting purposes with Villers to the departments of the Mayenne and the Loire-Inférieure, and showed such vigour that he was transferred in June to the departments of the Aube and Yonne to raise recruits for the Vendéan war, and in July to those of the Nièvre and the Allier for the same purpose.² In each of these latter departments he reorganized the authorities, and from the first named especially he sent large sums of money to the

¹ *Le Conventionnel Méaulle*, by Léon de Montluc, in the *Révolution Française* for November, 1883, p. 442.

² *Types révolutionnaires: Fouché et le Communisme pratique en 1793*, by the Comte de Martel. 2 vols. Paris: 1873-79.

Convention, and in all he showed such vigour that, on the nomination of Billaud-Varenne, he was selected by the Great Committee of Public Safety to be the principal coadjutor of Collot d'Herbois in punishing the city of Lyons.

The two deputies reached Lyons on November 4 and 8, and after holding a grand ceremony in honour of Chalier,¹ whose mutilated head was sent to Paris, and who became a Jacobin martyr after the manner of Marat and Lazouski, on November 10, they formed a revolutionary commission on November 27, nominally consisting of seven members, but never really of more than five, of which Pierre Mathieu Parein, the son of a harness-maker, a conqueror of the Bastille, and formerly president of the military commission attached to the army of the coasts of La Rochelle in La Vendée, was appointed president. This commission superseded the military commission established by Couthon after the capture of the city on October 12, and as the prisons were crowded with denounced and suspected men, there was no difficulty in finding victims. There was also little difficulty in condemning them, for the bulk of the bourgeois of Lyons had openly taken part in the defence of the city, and there was little need to demonstrate that they were guilty of war against the Republic. Their lot was a hard one, but at least they had made a fight for it, and if they had to recognize the truth of the Roman adage *Væ victis*, it was not so hard upon them to be condemned as it was for the inhabitants of Arras, for instance, who had made no open resistance to the Republic. The revolutionary commission had not condemned more than an average of five prisoners daily to the guillotine between November 9 and December 4,² when the deputies on mission, feeling that they were not giving a sufficient evidence of the Reign of Terror, instituted the horrible *fusillades* on the Plaine des Brotteaux,

¹ Vol. ii. p. 268. Balleydier's *Histoire du Peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution*, vol. ii. p. 163.

² Raverat, *Lyon sous la Révolution*, Appendix ; *Liste générale des Contre-révolutionnaires, mis à mort à Commune-Affranchie, d'après les jugements rendus par le Tribunal de Justice populaire, la Commission militaire et la Commission révolutionnaire.*

which form the counterpart of Carrier's *noyades* at Nantes. On 14 Frimaire (December 4) sixty individuals, all recognized as having borne arms against the Republic, were condemned at the first sitting of the revolutionary commission, and were shot in a confused mass upon the plain, and on the next day two hundred and eight more suffered. The horrors of the scene have been graphically painted, and if they have been somewhat coloured and exaggerated by royalist writers, there can be no doubt that the punishment inflicted was most horrible.¹ Throughout the early days of December, executions both by the guillotine and the fusillade continued, and when Collot d'Herbois returned to his duties at Paris, he was able to report, on the 1st Nivôse (December 21, 1793), that Lyons, or rather Commune-Affranchie, was peaceful, and being purified of contre-révolutionnaires. To take the place of Collot, Méaulle² was ordered to Lyons on 9 Nivôse (December 29), and he remained there with Fouché and La Porte, who had succeeded Maribon-Montaut, until the beginning of April, 1794, when the former colleague of Collot was recalled. The revolutionary commission continued in existence until 17 Germinal (April 6, 1794), when it was dissolved, after condemning at its last sitting the executioner and his assistant, and the three deputies summed up its work in their report of 20 Germinal (April 9). How Lyons was ruled after the departure of Collot d'Herbois,

¹ On the Terror in Lyons, see *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de la Ville de Lyon pendant la Révolution*, by the Abbé Guillon, reprinted in Berville and Barrière's series of *Mémoires* (2 vols., 1824), and *Les crimes des Jacobins à Lyon*, by A. Maurille (Lyons, 1801), both of which, though written by contemporaries, contain many obvious exaggerations. More important are the accounts given in Balleydier's *Histoire Civile, Politique, et Militaire du Peuple de Lyon*, vol. ii., and Morin's *Histoire de Lyon depuis la Révolution de 1789*, vol. ii. Among more modern works, see Raverat's *Lyon sous la Révolution*; the Comte de Martel's *Fouché; Lyon et ses Environs sous la Terreur*, by Salomon de la Chapelle (Lyons, 1886); Wallon's *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. iii. pp. 102-172; *L'Insurrection et le Siège de Lyon* in the *Révolution Française*, April, 1885, to February, 1886.

² On Méaulle, see his valuable biography by Léon de Montluc in the *Révolution Française*, November, 1883, to February, 1884.

and how far the Terror was developed by him is a point difficult to ascertain for certain. Some writers, defending Collot d'Herbois, have made out that the worst excesses were not committed until after his departure,¹ and that Fouché was responsible for them; others² have inclined to the view that Fouché, La Porte, and Méaulle diminished the severity of the commission, and that the Terror was checked after Collot's departure. Under this conflict of opinion, it is best to refer to the report of the three deputies on mission, who were at Lyons when the revolutionary commission ceased its operations. According to this report, 1682 persons had been executed during the five months the commission had acted, 1684 had been acquitted, and 162 had been condemned as "suspects" to detention until the peace. These figures nearly tally with those published recently from the records,³ with the exception that the number of the victims is dwelt upon, and the number of acquittals passed over. It need hardly be said that the decree passed on October 12, ordering the destruction of Lyons, was never carried into effect. It had its effect in spreading terror among other cities, and the members of the Great Committee had far too much wisdom to wish to carry any such absurd scheme of annihilation into practice. Some forty houses in the Place Bellecour, the principal square of the city, were destroyed as an example, together with the whole of the ramparts and walls behind which the bourgeois of Lyons had made their obstinate defence. Méaulle was summoned to Paris to consult with the Committee as to the measures to be adopted

¹ See, for instance, the notice on Collot d'Herbois in Larousse, *Grand Dictionnaire Historique*.

² Notably M. de Montluc, in his biography of Méaulle, p. 519.

³ Raverat, *Lyons sous la Révolution*, p. 267, gives 1687 condemned by the revolutionary commission, 99 by the military commission, and 119 by the commission of popular justice—a total of 1905, from which number, he says, 12 or 15 who escaped must be deducted; Salomon de la Chapelle, *Histoire des tribunaux révolutionnaires de Lyon et de Feurs* (Lyons, 1879), gives 1667 condemned by the revolutionary commission, 96 by the military commission, and 113 by the commission of popular justice, or a total of 1876.

to restore the prosperity of Lyons, and recommended strongly the removal of the sequestration of the private property of suspected persons, which was carried into effect by Reverchon, who had succeeded Fouché and who governed Lyons prudently and well by himself, after the recall of Méaulle and La Porte in April, until the fall of Robespierre in July, 1794. Such was the Terror in Lyons; the punishment of the conquered city was indeed severe, and nearly 2000 victims perished on the guillotine, or in the fusillades, including 131 priests or monks, 146 ci-devant nobles, 2 ex-Constituants (Jean Jacques Millanais and Marie Étienne Populus), and 43 women.¹ Yet, terrible as this severity may seem, it must be remembered that it attained its object. Lyons was kept in awe and subjection; there was no more attempted civil war in that quarter, no more rioting in the streets, and no more anarchy. The calm may have been calm that concealed a longing for revenge, but yet it was calm, and the end of the Great Committee in establishing the Reign of Terror there was secured. After all, when the numbers are looked at in their cold truth, and compared with the tens of thousands of exaggerated imaginations, they lose some of their horror. Many a conquered city in modern times has suffered more severely, not for having raised the standard of civil war, but because, in some foreign war, unhappy fate has laid it in the way of an invading army, and brought upon it the horrors of a siege, or the still greater horrors of being stormed and sacked. Among the list of victims, the large proportion of ci-devant nobles and priests is noticeable, for, as has been already said,² many of these classes had flocked to Lyons for safety from a knowledge of the indisposition of the bourgeois of the great city to submit to the new form of government; and it must further be added that many of the victims—nearly one hundred—were not inhabitants of Lyons, but were sent in—as, for instance, thirty-two federalists of Moulins—from neighbour-

¹ Raverat, *op. cit.*, Appendix, *Liste générale des Contre-révolutionnaires mis à mort à Commune-Affranchie*, pp. 215-262.

² Vol. ii. chap. viii. p. 268.

ing cities and villages to be judged and punished. It only remains to add that the *fusillades* were not carried out by the soldiers of the regular army, who refused to act as executioners,¹ but by a detachment of the revolutionary or sans-culotte army of Paris, which occupied Lyons under the command of Ronsin, the former general in La Vendée, and that if the friends of Chalier severely punished his murderers, they in their turn were made to suffer by their foes in the reaction which followed the overthrow of Robespierre.

As the resistance of Marseilles to the army of the Committee had not been so prolonged as that of Lyons, the punishment inflicted on it was not so severe, and its history under the Reign of Terror was therefore comparatively uneventful. How the city was recovered by General Carteaux has already been seen;² it remains to examine what penalty was exacted from it for its rebellion. The deputies on mission with Carteaux when he entered Marseilles were four in number, Albitte, Gasparin, Saliceti, and Escudier, who immediately released Antiboul and Bô, two deputies on mission, who had been sent to Corsica, and had been arrested on returning to Marseilles in ignorance of the counter-revolution there, and these six were soon joined by Ricord and by Augustin Robespierre, the younger brother of the statesman, who were sent from Paris, and by Barras and Fréron, who came from the army of Italy, with which they were on mission. This congress of deputies promptly despatched their two colleagues from Corsica to Paris, where Antiboul was tried with Vergniaud and his friends, and executed with them on October 31, for having degraded the character of a representative of the people in submitting to an interrogatory at Marseilles. Of the deputies who remained in Marseilles, Barras and Fréron outweighed the others in energy and influence, and they regarded it as far more important to retake Toulon from the English, to whom it had been surrendered on August 4, than to punish Marseilles. They regarded Marseilles as their base of operations against

¹ Raverat's *Lyon sous la Révolution*, pp. 194, 195.

² Vol. ii. chap. viii. pp. 269, 270.

Toulon, and wrote, in a letter read in the Convention on 19 Brumaire (November 9), of Marseilles: "This city has become, like Paris, one great arsenal; workshops have been everywhere erected, where numerous workmen are busy making firearms, while several foundries are daily turning out new cannon. . . . This city, in which public spirit is again showing itself, wishes to rush *en masse* against Toulon.¹ These sentiments, perhaps, did much to save Marseilles, or else it was that the deputies on mission were entirely occupied by the siege of Toulon; anyhow, the revolutionary commission, established at the time of the surrender, only condemned 162 persons to death, nearly all of whom had belonged to the reactionary municipality of Marseilles. This clemency did not please the supporters of the system of Terror, and on 14 Frimaire (December 4), in accordance with the instructions of the Great Committee, Barras, Fréron, Ricord, and Augustin Robespierre declared Marseilles in a state of siege. But they were still too busy to carry out the wishes of the Great Committee and establish a Reign of Terror in the great port of the south, and it was not until 1 Pluviôse, Year II. (January 20, 1794), that a military commission was appointed, which during the few days it acted ordered the execution of no less than 120 persons, most of them *ci-devant* nobles or priests.² These executions were carried out under the orders of the four deputies already mentioned, and, after the return to Paris of Barras and Fréron in March, Maignet, who was appointed sole representative on mission in the Vaucluse and the Bouches-du-Rhone, released many "suspects," and re-established the revolutionary commission, which condemned 124 more persons to death during the next four months. The Terror at Marseilles was therefore maintained by the execution of 406 individuals, in spite of the prominent part it had taken in the federalist

¹ *Moniteur*, November 11, 1793.

² See Boudin's *Histoire de Marseille*; Fabre's *Histoire de Marseille*; Laborde's *Histoire de la Révolution à Marseille*, 1839; Berriat Saint-Prix, *La Justice Révolutionnaire*, vol. i.; Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. iii. pp. 25-32, 37-47, 72-85.

movement, and its comparatively light punishment was due to the neighbourhood of that obstinate opponent of the Republic, Toulon, and to the fact that Barras, Fréron, and Maignet were not men of the bloodthirsty type of Carrier and Le Bon.

It has been stated that it was not entirely the clemency of Barras and Fréron which gave Marseilles such comparative immunity; it was rather due to the fact that the deputies on mission selected Toulon as a more fitting place to make an example of, and that it was there that they established the Reign of Terror in the south-east of France. This is not the place in which to describe the siege of Toulon, which was recaptured from the English on 29 Frimaire (December 19), but it is advisable here to notice the Reign of Terror which followed.¹ Five deputies were present at this recapture, Barras, Fréron, Saliceti, Ricord, and Augustin Robespierre, and the first news they heard was that, of their two colleagues, who had been imprisoned when Toulon had revolted, one, Pierre Baille, had committed suicide in his dungeon, and the other, Beauvais des Préaux, was too ill to live long. This news still further incensed the deputies against the city which had surrendered to the English and fought against the Republic; its name was changed to Port de la Montagne, and, in the words of a letter of Barras and Ricord, read in the Convention on 15 Nivôse (January 4, 1794), "Every one found in Toulon who had been employed in the navy, the army of the rebels, or the naval or military administration was shot."² The fusillades at Toulon cannot be compared to those at Lyons, for they were not preceded by any form of trial; hundreds were taken out and shot, simply because they happened to be inhabitants of the unhappy city during the first few days after its capture; and afterwards, in spite of the fact that the greater portion of the royalists had escaped on board the English fleet, the military commission, which the representatives

¹ Pons, *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Toulon en 1793, 1825*; De Brécy, *Révolution de Toulon en 1793*; *Histoire de Toulon depuis 1789 jusqu'au Consulat*, by Dominique M. J. Henry. 2 vols. Paris: 1855.

² *Moniteur*, January 11, 1794 (21 Nivôse).

established, managed to find and condemn over four hundred victims to death.¹

The next most important city of the southern departments of France to Lyons and Marseilles, if second to them, was Bordeaux. It has been seen that Bordeaux rather planned than executed an elaborate system of defence, and that its federalist ideas were in advance of those of any other city. Nevertheless, it did not contain so many *contre-révolutionnaires* and ex-officers of the *ancien régime* as Lyons, both because its republicanism was beyond suspicion, and because the *émigrés* had had no need to make plots for its possession, as it did not lie on their line of invasion. It was as the home of the Girondins, the capital of the federalist idea, and as the city which had expelled Ichon and Dartigoyte, and refused to admit Treilhard and Mathieu, that Bordeaux was destined to be made an example. It was there that the Reign of Terror was established, with the effectual result of maintaining absolute tranquillity in all the adjoining departments. The first deputies on mission in that quarter were Baudot and Chaudron-Roussau, who were joined at La Réole by the two deputies specially despatched to Bordeaux to put down the federalist movement; Tallien, the former clerk of the Commune of Paris, and Ysabeau, a former Oratorian, together with a detachment of the Parisian revolutionary or sans-culotte army under Brune.² The four deputies solemnly entered Bordeaux on October 16, being received, in their own words, "by the sans-culottes with branches of laurel in their hands, and with cries of 'Vive la République! Vive la Montagne!'"³ Their first act was to establish a military commission, which was practically a revolutionary tribunal judging without a jury, of the type of those instituted at Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon, of which Jean Baptiste Lacombe, a former schoolmaster at Toulouse and friend of Ysabeau, was appointed president. One

¹ Berriat Saint-Prix, *La Justice révolutionnaire dans le Provinces* vol. iv.; Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. iii. pp. 63-72.

² *Esquisse Historique sur le Maréchal Brune.* Paris: 1840.

³ *Moniteur*, 5 Brumaire (October 26).

of their next acts was to arrest Birotteau, the Girondin deputy, and Girey-Dupré, the friend of Brissot, and his successor in the editorship of the *Patriote Français*, whom they sent to Paris, and they then proceeded to establish the Reign of Terror by appointing revolutionary committees, enforcing the "law of suspects," filling the prisons, and keeping the guillotine constantly at work. Baudot had soon to leave Bordeaux for Alsace, whither he was sent on mission to the army of the Rhine, and Chaudron-Roussau departed to his special district, with his head-quarters at Toulouse, while Tallien and Ysabeau were left to exercise all the rigours of the Terror in the department of the Gironde, which they renamed the department of Bec-d'Ambès. Jean Lambert Tallien was at first the most conspicuous of the pair. This young man, who had begun life as a lawyer's clerk, was barely four and twenty, and had been conspicuous throughout the Revolution in Paris, first as foreman printer on the *Moniteur*, next as editor and printer of the *Ami des Citoyens*, the first journal which took the form of a placard affixed to the walls, then as a Jacobin orator and one of the leaders of the people on August 10, which secured his election as secretary and clerk to the Commune of Paris, and finally as deputy to the Convention for the department of the Seine-et-Oise. Tallien was a good specimen of the type of proconsul who spread the Reign of Terror over the provinces of France without shedding much blood. He made an immense bluster over his ferocity; he took a lodging from which he could see the guillotine at work, and was always talking in his speeches at the club at Bordeaux of the Terror, and of the necessity to feed "la sainte guillotine." But with all his blustering words, he ordered but comparatively few executions. He was naturally pitiless against all the supporters of the federalist movement and the declared friends of the Girondin party, and under the "law of suspects" and the system of denunciation, he filled the prisons with ci-devant nobles and priests and representative bourgeois. His comparative mildness may be judged from the fact that, during his proconsulate with Ysabeau, only 123 individuals,

of whom nine were women, lost their lives upon the guillotine in the department which had defied the Convention.¹ This mildness has been generally attributed to the romantic influence exercised over him by Theresa de Fontenay, the most beautiful woman of her time, and though it may have been exaggerated, there can be no doubt that, after he met her, the stringency of the Terror was relaxed. Theresa de Fontenay, who by her merciful influence over Tallien obtained the sobriquet of "Our Lady of Mercy,"² was the daughter of Francis Cabarrus, the famous banker and finance minister of Spain, who had first introduced paper money into that kingdom and established the bank of Saint Charles at Madrid, and had been married in 1788, when only fourteen years old, to the elderly Comte de Fontenay, a councillor of the Parlement of Bordeaux. Her beauty and wit had made her an ornament of Parisian society in the early years of the Revolution, and she had at first shared in all the aspirations of the revolutionary party. But the increasing rigour of the revolutionary government made it necessary for her and her husband to escape to her father in Spain. They got only as far as Bordeaux, when they were arrested as suspects, and it was as a prisoner at Bordeaux that she first met Tallien. He fell in love with her, and after releasing her husband, on condition of his applying for a divorce, she consented to become first his mistress and then his wife. It must have been a strange spectacle to see a young man of twenty-four and a girl of nineteen disposing absolutely of the lives and property of the inhabitants of one of the greatest cities in France. Many people, including, for instance, Madame de Valence, daughter of the Comtesse de Genlis, confessed in after-days that they owed their lives to her intercession. This connection of Tallien's and his clemency were by no means pleasing to the

¹ See *Ephémérides des jugements de la commission militaire sous la Terreur à Bordeaux du 30 Octobre, 1793, au 31 Juillet, 1794, par un Bordelais* (E. de Mirasseur). Bordeaux : 1883.

² *Notre Dame de Thermidor*, by Arsène Houssaye, Paris, 1866 ; a wordy but interesting sketch of the life of Madame Tallien.

members of the Great Committee, who believed that Bordeaux was particularly fitted to be a centre of the Reign of Terror in the provinces. Tallien was attacked as a moderate, and to defend himself he returned to Paris in March, 1794, whither he was followed by Theresa, who was immediately imprisoned in La Force as a suspect. Until June, 1794, Ysabeau remained at Bordeaux as sole proconsul; and this former priest of the Oratory was a Terrorist of the type of Tallien, who loved to make a great show of enforcing the most horrible penalties, but who really wished to produce the effect of Terror with as little actual bloodshed as possible. Under these circumstances, the Committee despatched a mere youth of nineteen, Marc Antoine Jullien, generally known as Jullien of Paris, to distinguish him from his father, a deputy to the Convention, known as Jullien of the Drôme, to Bordeaux to examine the state of affairs, and on his report the kindly Ysabeau was recalled on 14 Prairial (June 2, 1794). Jullien of Paris then ruled the city, and Lacombe giving way to his bloodthirsty tendencies unchecked, sent eighty-six victims to the guillotine, before the arrival of Garnier de Saintes on 24 Messidor (July 12, 1794). It was Jullien who tracked down the proscribed Girondins at Saint-Émilien,¹ but all his vigour could not secure him a legal position, and he found himself completely deprived of work by Garnier de Saintes. That stalwart deputy was no Ysabeau, and during his proconsulate of barely three weeks eighty-four more lives were sacrificed on the guillotine. In all 301 persons were executed at Bordeaux during the months of Terror, a smaller number than perished at Lyons, or even at Marseilles.²

If Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux had all to suffer for their attempt to divide France by civil war in the presence of

¹ Vol. ii. p. 277.

² On the Terror at Bordeaux, see the *Ephémérides* already quoted; *Bordeaux sous le régime de la Terreur*, an anonymous pamphlet published at Bordeaux, 1849; O'Reilly's *Histoire complète de Bordeaux*, part ii. vol. ii; *Histoire de la Terreur à Bordeaux*, by Aurélien Vivié (2 vols. Bordeaux: 1877); and Wallon's *Les Représentants en Mission*, ii. 191-293.

the foreign enemy, still more had unhappy La Vendée and the unfortunate city which was regarded as the head-quarters of the Vendéan rebellion, Nantes. The Reign of Terror there reached its climax; the inhabitants of La Vendée and of Nantes suffered as severely under the despotic régime of the Committee of Public Safety as ever any rebellious district was punished by a victorious emperor or king. The ravages of the republicans in La Vendée and the cruelties of Carrier in Nantes are only to be equalled in the annals of despotism by such deeds as Turenne's devastation of the Palatinate or Cromwell's massacre of Drogheda. After the overthrow of the Vendéan army at Cholet, and cessation of the first Vendéan war after the repulse from Granville,¹ the Great Committee considered the fighting part of the war to be over, and directed the punitive part to begin by establishing the Reign of Terror. On the report of Barère, 22 Vendémiaire (October 13), the number of representatives on mission in La Vendée and the districts affected by the war was reduced to five, of whom one was to remain at Saumur and one at Nantes. These five deputies were Francastel, Pinet, Bourbotte, Louis Turreau, and Carrier. Under their superintendence, General Turreau, the brother of the deputy, divided the army of the West into twelve columns, in January, 1794, which were directed to march up and down the rebellious district, to arrest suspects, and to burn all the villages on their route. These "infernal columns," as they were called, moved on without interruption for two or three months, exacting terrible reprisals for the cruelties committed by the Vendéans in the war, and burning, pillaging, and slaying wherever they went.² Nevertheless it seems impossible not to recognize the fact that this "destruction" of La Vendée much resembles the "destruction" of Lyons; a vast parade of republican enthusiasm was made, and the deputies on mission said that they were carrying fire and the sword throughout La Vendée. What the inhabitants really had to suffer was very much the same as

¹ Vol. ii. chap. viii. p. 265.

² *Mémoires* of Turreau in Lescure's *Mémoires sur La Vendée*.

in other districts similarly under punishment for rebellion the villages which ill-fortune brought in the way of the "infernal columns" were burnt, and most of the inhabitants slain, but none of the columns advanced far or fast, and even royalist historians are obliged to admit that Turreau's soldiers destroyed fewer lives than Carrier and his tribunal at Nantes. But, as will be seen, these measures of the Terror only broke the spirit of the peasants of La Vendée for a time; Charette still remained in arms in Lower Poitou; recruits flocked to him, and the Great Committee of Public Safety soon had to grasp the fact that they had another Vendéan war on their hands, a guerilla war, as opposed to the regular civil war of 1793, and one infinitely more difficult to terminate.

When the new arrangements were made under Barère's report of 22 Vendémiaire (October 13), Carrier was the deputy on mission appointed to Nantes, and a few days later he began to exercise his supreme powers, and commenced his proconsulate as deputy on mission in the capital of Lower Brittany. This man, Jean Baptiste Carrier, was borne at Yolay, near Aurillac, in 1756, and was a procureur in moderate practice in that town in 1789. He was not prominent enough to make much mark during the first two years of the Revolution, but when the elections of 1791 to the Legislative Assembly had removed the first officials under the Constitution of 1791, he came to the front and, after becoming a leader in the local Jacobin Club, he was elected procureur-syndic of the district of Aurillac in 1791. He must have made himself conspicuous during the ensuing year, for when the election of the deputies to the Convention for the department of the Cantal was held at Aurillac in September, 1792, he was elected fifth deputy after Thibault, the ex-Constituant and constitutional bishop of the department, Milhaud, the future cavalry general of Napoleon, Méjansac the procureur-général-syndic, and Jean Baptiste Lacoste.¹ In the Convention he sat with the deputies of the Mountain, and he had won no special reputation, when he

¹ *La Proclamation de la République*, by Gustave Bord, in the *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. ii. p. 159.

was selected in March, 1793, to go on recruiting duty in the departments of the West, as one of the eighty-two deputies sent two and two through the departments. He remained in the background until the decree of Barère of 22 Vendémiaire, under which he was chosen to rule Nantes, where he established himself on 28 Vendémiaire (October 19), 1793. He knew that he was placéd at what was called the head-quarters of the Vendéan insurrection, in order to establish and organize the Reign of Terror, and most effectively he carried out his instructions. He found all the instruments ready to his hand; a revolutionary committee was already in existence, and had superseded the municipality of Nantes; a revolutionary commission was at work, judging the prisoners and "suspects" taken during the Vendéan war, and in the previous month the representatives on mission at Nantes, Méaulle and Philippeaux, had dissolved the elected authorities of the department of the Loire-Inférieure, and had nominated a departmental commission to carry on the administration, with Minée, the constitutional bishop, at its head.¹ Carrier at once established his Reign of Terror. This petty provincial lawyer exhibited a ferocity in his functions as representative on mission which has made his name infamous; when on his trial in after days he claimed, like Fouquier-Tinville, to have merely carried out the orders of the Great Committee, but this was justly held to be no excuse for his atrocities. The Great Committee wished, indeed, to establish a Reign of Terror in Nantes in order to terrify the neighbourhood into acquiescence in their government, but they neither intended nor countenanced the gratuitous horrors which Carrier invented. His first measure was to establish a sans-culotte army, after the fashion of the revolutionary army of Paris, to carry out his bidding, which took the name of the "Company of Marat," and his next to hurry on the work of execution. There was at first no need to enforce the "law of suspects" or to encourage denunciation. The prisons of Nantes were filled to overflowing

¹ On this man, see the remarkable study entitled *Minée et son Episcopat*, by A. Lallié, in the *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. ii.

with prisoners from La Vendée, including alike peasants who had fought under Cathelineau and La Rochejacquelein, small gentry who were suspected of favouring them, and above all priests, who had not taken the oath, and who had been collected from all the neighbouring districts to be deported to Guiana. Carrier's first effort was to clear the prisons of these prisoners, and this he did in three ways. However hard the revolutionary commission worked, the guillotine could not decapitate enough persons to make any appreciable difference in the number of the prisoners, and Carrier therefore had resort to "fusillades" and "noyades." The first of these means was resorted to entirely for the punishment of men who had really borne arms, or who were suspected of having borne arms, in the Vendéan war. They were taken out of their separate prisons, and shot in batches on a plain outside the walls of Nantes. As these unfortunate victims were shot without any form of trial, or without even a list being drawn up of their numbers, it is impossible to assert how many perished in these "fusillades." The estimates given vary from 418¹ to 8000,² but the most trustworthy evidence is that taken on Carrier's trial, when the majority of witnesses fixed the number at about 1800. Peculiar to the Terror at Nantes and to Carrier were the "noyades." The first of these "drownings" took place on 26 Brumaire (November 16), when ninety priests, who had refused to take the oath to the civil constitution of the clergy, were drowned. It has been asserted, and probably with truth, that this first "noyade" was the result of an accident. The overcrowding of the prisons had caused recourse to be had to some of the numerous old hulks on the Loire as places of confinement,³ and the first to sink or be sunk was one which happened to contain, as has been stated, ninety priests who had not taken

¹ See Proust, *Archives de l'Ouest*, vol. iii.

² This estimate is even exceeded by some royalist writers; it is the one given by Beauchamp in his *Histoire de la Guerre de la Vendée*. Paris: 1820.

³ *Les Noyades de Nantes*, by Alfred Lallié. Nantes: 1879.

the oath. This first "noyade" may be charitably assigned to accident, as also may be the second of fifty-eight priests, who had been sent from Angers to Nantes, and had been placed in an obviously leaky hulk, but the same excuse cannot by any possibility be made for those which succeeded. The idea of drowning his victims struck Carrier as a novel and pleasing way of exhibiting the Terror and clearing the prisons of Nantes, and during the next few weeks previous to 20 Nivôse (January 9), at least seven more "noyades" took place, in which, by the most moderate calculation, 1777 persons were drowned in the Loire. The unfortunates who perished in the "noyades" were all Vendéans or suspected Vendéan soldiers or refractory priests. This rapid clearance of the prisons left room for the arrest of the bulk of the bourgeois of Nantes under the "law of suspects" and the system of denunciations, and these new prisoners were reserved for the guillotine. In all, according to the records, 323 persons perished on the guillotine¹ at Nantes, including most of the former administrators of the Loire-Inférieure and of the municipal officers of Nantes, and on 7 Frimaire (27 November) 132 of the richest and most respectable bourgeois of Nantes were sent to Paris, to be tried by a great Revolutionary Tribunal there for an alleged conspiracy. But this carnage was not sufficient for Carrier; he went to still further extremes, supported by his creatures Goullin² and Forgey, and invented a new mode of punishment, by which condemned prisoners were tied hand and foot and thrown into the Loire, instead of being drowned in a hulk. From this custom has arisen the story of the horrible "republican marriages," when a man and a woman were bound together naked and cast into the Loire. Evidence was given of this abomination at the trial of Carrier, and it found a place in the deed of accusation against the proconsul drawn up by Romme, but the evidence was very slight, and the latest authority³ gives Carrier the credit of the

¹ Berriat Saint-Prix, *La Justice révolutionnaire dans les Provinces*.

² See *Le Sans-culotte J. J. Goullin*, by Alfred Lallie. Nantes: 1880.

³ Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, i. 422.

doubt. Carrier himself made a show of great personal purity, and caused the arrest of all the known prostitutes of the city, of whom eighty-three are said to have been drowned in one "noyade." These horrors were bound to defeat their object, to make the Republic loathed instead of merely feared, so the Great Committee decided to send young Jullien of Paris to Nantes to report on the conduct of Carrier. His first report, dated 2 Pluviôse, Year II. (January 21, 1794), deserves quotation as showing how the atrocities of Carrier showed themselves to a young man who had lived during the Terror in Paris, and thoroughly understood what Billaud-Varenne and Collot d'Herbois meant by Terror: "The combination of three plagues, war, pestilence, and famine, threatens Nantes. A crowd of royalist soldiers have been shot, not far from the city, and the heaped-up masses of corpses, joined with the pestilential exhalations of the Loire, which is entirely polluted with blood, have corrupted the air. Some national guards have been sent from Nantes by Carrier to bury the dead, but nevertheless two thousand persons have died in less than two months of a contagious disease. The mouth of the Loire has been quite blocked up, which prevents food from arriving, and the city is prey to most horrible famine." On 15 Pluviôse he wrote again to the Great Committee from Angers: "The war in La Vendée is beginning again. Montaigu has been taken, and the Committee of Public Safety is being deceived. . . . Carrier has had it spread abroad that he is sick and in the country, but all the time he is well and in Nantes, neglecting his work and living surrounded by women and sycophants with epaulets (epauletiers flagorneurs), who form his seraglio and court." On the following day from Tours, Jullien sent an elaborate review of Carrier's evil deeds: "Carrier is invisible to all the patriots; he gives it out that he is ill in the country, while he is really well and living in a seraglio, surrounded by insolent sultanas and things with epaulets acting as his eunuchs. . . . He has, indeed, crushed the bourgeois, but since that time he has made Terror the order of the day against the patriots themselves. . . . He glories in his noyades, and

argues that revolutions can only be carried out by similar measures. . . . He considers Prieur of the Marne an imbecile, whose idea is only to imprison suspected persons. . . . In short, Carrier must be recalled at once."¹ The result of these reports was the summons of Carrier to Paris on 20 Pluviôse (February 8), but he, for a time, escaped punishment for his excess of zeal, although the Great Committee took care not to employ him again upon any other mission. Between 20 Pluviôse and 9 Thermidor (February and July), after the recall of Carrier, various deputies ruled in Nantes, who, while maintaining the Reign of Terror, found no need to have recourse to Carrier's horrible methods. He had done the work of terrifying Nantes and the surrounding country so effectually that his successors had no need to keep the guillotine at work, and the worst accusation brought against one of them, Prieur of the Marne, was that he ordered eighty bourgeois to conduct a convoy to the army of the West, who were cut to pieces by the Vendéans.² These deputies deserve mention, if only because their conduct compares favourably with that of Carrier. They were, in order of time, Bourbotte, a fighting deputy who has been already mentioned;³ Prieur of the Marne, the member of the Great Committee who was sent especially to put an end to the renewed Vendéan war; and Bô, who, in conjunction with Bourbotte, arrested the whole revolutionary committee, and the president of the local revolutionary commission, Phelippes-Tronjolly, on 24 Prairial (June 12), even before the fall of Robespierre, and sent them in custody to Paris. Altogether the Terror at Nantes, though it nominally lasted from October, 1793, to July, 1794, was only at its height during the proconsulate of Carrier from October, 1793, to February, 1794, during which time, in the "fusillades," the "noyades," and on the

¹ See Jullien's reports, printed in Courtois' *Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée de l'examen des papiers trouvés chez Robespierre et ses complices*. Paris: Year III.

² *Mémoires de Blanchard*, in the *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. iv. p. 114, Documents.

³ Vol. ii. chap. viii. p. 265.

guillotine, at least five thousand individuals perished, or more than suffered death throughout the whole Reign of Terror in Paris.¹

The reasons which induced the Great Committee of Public Safety to establish the Reign of Terror at Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, Bordeaux, and Nantes, are obvious, but it is difficult to understand for what possible cause Arras was also treated as a doomed city. It is easy enough to make conjectures. Some writers have asserted that Robespierre brought its fate upon it in order to revenge himself on enemies of his earlier days, which is absurd, considering Robespierre's weakness in the Great Committee, and the fact that he owed the origin of his political career to his fellow-citizens; other writers have said that the selection was a manoeuvre of Robespierre's enemies in the Great Committee, in order to make him unpopular in the city of his birth, which is equally far-fetched. The probability is that it was mere chance which caused the misfortunes of Arras. All the deputies on mission after October, 1793, were supposed to establish the Reign of Terror in their departments, and it rested with the deputy himself whether he should carry out the letter of his instructions, like Carrier and Le Bon, or make a great bluster without shedding much blood, like André Dumont and Laplanche. Ghislain Joseph François Le Bon was born at Arras, on September 25, 1765, and was educated at the

¹ On the Terror at Nantes there is naturally an immense literature. Among contemporary works the most valuable accounts are those given in the published *Procès de Jean Baptiste Carrier et des membres du Comité révolutionnaire de Nantes* (Paris, Year III.), and more especially in the separately printed *Plaidoyers* of Tronson-Ducoudray and Villenave, and in Babeuf's *La Vie et les Crimes de Carrier* (Paris, Year III.). See also Du Chatellier's *Histoire de la Révolution dans les départements de l'ancienne Bretagne* (1836), vol. iv., and Mellinet's *Commune et Milice de Nantes* (1841), vol. ix.; and, among modern works Berriat Saint-Prix *La Justice Révolutionnaire*, vol. i., Lallié's *Les Noyades de Nantes* (Nantes, 1879), *Le Sans-Culotte J. J. Goullin* (Nantes, 1880), and *Les Fusillades de Nantes* (Nantes, 1882), as well as the numerous articles and documents published in the *Revue de la Révolution*, of which the most valuable is the *Mémoires* of Blanchard contained in vol. iv. (1883).

Oratorian College at Arras. He showed such aptitude for teaching, that he was persuaded to join the Oratorians, and was sent as a professor to the Oratorian College at Beaune, where he remained for three years, after which he was ordained priest by Talleyrand, the newly appointed Bishop of Autun, at Christmas, 1788. He took a keen interest in the early progress of the Revolution, and after losing his professorship in 1790, on account of his politics, he was elected constitutional curé, first of Vernoi, near Beaune, and in 1791 of Neuville-Vitasse, near Arras. He acquired such a high reputation for patriotism and eloquence, that he was soon after elected to the vicarage of Saint Vaast, at Arras, which he held with his other living. He chiefly lived at Arras, where he entertained Robespierre when on a visit to his native city in 1792, and became a leading orator of the local Jacobin club, and he finally rejected clerical for political ambition, and was elected Mayor of Arras on September 16, 1792, on the arrival of the news of the events of August 10 in Paris, and shortly after first deputy *suppléant* for the Pas-de-Calais to the Convention. In November he resigned his mayoralty, on being elected to the Directory of the department, and remained in comparative obscurity, with the reputation of being a moderate, until the overthrow of the Girondins in June, 1792, when he was summoned to take his seat in the Convention in the place of Magniez, who had protested against that *coup d'état* and resigned. He at once took his seat on the Mountain, and became very intimate with his compatriot Guffroy, his future deadly foe, by whose influence, doubtless, he was nominated, on August 9, to replace Chabot as the colleague of André Dumont on mission to the departments of the Somme and the Pas-de-Calais. In this mission Joseph Le Bon did little but allow Darthé, an administrator of the department, to suppress a rising known as the insurrection of Pernes.¹ It hardly deserves the name of an insurrection, for it consisted only of the assembly of a body of armed peasants, on August 25, to resist the decree of the *levée en masse*, who were easily conquered by

¹ Lecesne, *Arras sous la Révolution*, vol. ii. pp. 50-53.

Darthé and General Ferrand. Joseph Le Bon at once established a special tribunal and a guillotine, and had thirteen unfortunate workmen and peasants executed in his attempt to make this little rising of importance, and on August 28 he was recalled to Paris. Whether it was owing to this triumph or not, it is obvious that Le Bon must have become popular in the Convention, for on September 11 and on September 14 he was elected to the Committee of General Security. He did not long retain his seat there, for on 8 Brumaire (October 29) he was appointed by the Great Committee of Public Safety to go with full powers to Arras, to establish the Reign of Terror there. The reason was said in the decree of the Committee to be "because attempts had just been made to carry out a plan of federalism,"¹ which was absolutely without foundation. Arras was distinguished for its patriotism and republicanism, yet it had to undergo all the rigours of the Terror, not because of any excessive culpability on its part, but simply because the deputy on mission was a man who took his orders literally, and instead of making a parade of Terror, really made it "the order of the day." There is no need to particularize the various phases through which Le Bon's government of Arras passed; he had the same instruments as Fouché, Fréron, Tallien, and Carrier, a ferocious revolutionary committee and a docile revolutionary tribunal. It was free from the atrocities of Carrier's rule at Nantes, but it lasted longer, until the fall of Robespierre, and was marked by more steady bloodshed. There is not, however, for Le Bon the excuse of Carrier, that most of his victims were men who had been in arms against the Republic. The victims who perished were persons who in any other city would have been merely detained in prison as suspects, and the prisons were crowded with people who in other places would have been left entirely free. Le Bon's attitude and character differed greatly from Carrier's. He was an educated young man, only twenty-eight years of age, of engaging manners, and of studious appearance, rather timid than bold, whose faults lay in two directions—that

¹ Lecesne, *Arras sous la Révolution*, vol. ii. p. 71.

he did not dare not to execute his orders literally, and that he had no dislike for bloodshed; two points in his character which made him a ferocious proconsul, though a kindly man, and have ranked him for ever with Carrier. It only remains to add that, during Le Bon's proconsulate, 392 persons suffered on the guillotine at Arras, and 149 at Cambrai, whither he transported himself in April and in May, 1794, and established another revolutionary tribunal.¹

The excesses of the Terror in the six cities of the provinces which felt its greatest weight, and the men who established it in them, with the measures they adopted, have been examined; it is now time to see the Terror at its height in two or three departments as opposed to cities. There is no event more famous in the whole history of the Terror in the provinces than the "destruction" of Bedoin, and no proconsulate better known than that of Maignet, in the departments of the Vaucluse and the Bouches-du-Rhone. Étienne Christophe Maignet was born at Ambert on July 9, 1758, where his father had been a notary, and where he himself was a wealthy country avocat, beloved by all the peasants of the mountains of the neighbourhood, in 1789.² The Revolution plunged him, then a man of nearly middle age, into politics, and he was elected an administrator of the Puy-de-Dome in 1790, and first deputy³ for that department to the Legislative Assembly in 1791. He made no great mark there, except as reporter of the Committee on Public Assistance, but he was nevertheless re-elected to the Convention, where he continued the friendship with Couthon and Soubrany which he had formed with them during the session of the Legislative Assembly. He again spoke but little, but voted for the execution of the king

¹ On Le Bon and the Terror at Arras, see *Joseph Le Bon dans sa vie privée et dans sa carrière politique*, by his son, E. Joseph Le Bon (Paris: 1861); *Histoire de Joseph Le Bon et des tribunaux révolutionnaires d'Arras et de Cambrai*, by A. J. Paris (Arras: 1864); and Lecesne's *Arras sous la Révolution* (Arras: 1885), vol. ii. pp. 71-414.

² *Les Conventionnels d'Auvergne: Dulaure*, by Marcellin Boudet, (Clermont-Ferrand: 1874), pp. 113-115, notice on Maignet.

³ Mège's Introduction to Couthon's *Correspondance*.

in January, 1793, and in April of the same year, he was sent on mission to the army of the Moselle to provide provisions. After his return, he was nominated with his compatriots, Couthon and Châteauneuf-Randon, to go to Auvergne,¹ and raise the people there to march on Lyons. The success of these deputies has been already noticed; and after the capture of the city, Maignet was present at the solemn ceremony of Couthon's knocking a stone off the façade of a house in the Place Bellecour, and saw how it was possible to make a parade of the system of the Terror. He returned to Paris with Couthon, and soon after, in December, 1793, he succeeded the representatives on mission, Rovère and Poultier, and was directed to organize revolutionary government in the departments of the Bouches-du-Rhône and the Vaucluse. At Marseilles Maignet showed his justice and clemency by ordering a general inspection to be made of the prison registers, and releasing several "suspects" who were unjustly detained,² and he then made his way to Avignon, the capital of the department of the Vaucluse, which had been formed by his predecessors. The horrors which had been committed in Avignon and the county of the Venaissin³ had left this district in a state of deplorable anarchy, and Jourdan Coupe-tête and his friends were taking advantage of the supremacy in local affairs which Rovère and Poultier had given to them. Maignet, however, did not fear them; he soon discovered that they were engaged in swindling intrigues with regard to the sale of church and *émigrés'* property, in which Rovère himself, though a deputy to the Convention, was concerned, and he immediately sent Jourdan Coupe-tête to Paris, where he was tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal, and executed on 8 Prairial (May 27, 1794),⁴ and disgraced or arrested his allies. He appointed new authorities in Avignon, but finding it impossible to cope by ordinary means with the anarchy in the Venaissin,

¹ Vol. ii. p. 268.

² Boudin's *Histoire de Marseille*, p. 521.

³ Vol. i. chap. xvi. pp. 509-514; vol. ii. chap. i. pp. 28-31.

⁴ It is stated by error on p. 31 that Jourdan was executed at Avignon, in July, 1794.

he asked his friend Couthon to obtain the sanction of the Great Committee for the establishment of a special revolutionary commission. This commission, which is known as the Tribunal of Orange, from the city where it sate, was not installed until 1 Messidor (June 19, 1794); it consisted of five judges, and continued its work until 17 Thermidor, after the fall of Robespierre,¹ and by the time of its dissolution it had condemned 332 persons, chiefly ci-devant nobles and priests, to death. This tribunal had the natural result of extending the effect of Terror in the south of France and restoring order, but not so much as the decree for the destruction of Bedoin near Carpentras. This little town was reported by Suchet, commandant of a battalion of volunteers of the Ardèche, who had distinguished himself at the capture of Toulon, to be the headquarters of anarchy and anti-revolutionary feeling, and as it gave a pretext by cutting down its tree of liberty, and refusing to give up the names of the culprits, it was sentenced by the Convention to be destroyed. The criminal tribunal of Avignon held a sitting at Bedoin on 9 Prairial (May 28, 1794), and sentenced the principal inhabitants to death, and the destruction of the town was then undertaken by Suchet, the future Marshal of France and Duke of Albufera, after Maignet had warned the inhabitants to remove all their belongings. But the town was only set alight to, it was not burnt down, as Maignet himself pretended it was in order to spread the reputation of the Terror, for after nine or ten houses were destroyed, the soldiers, under the direction of Suchet, extinguished the flames.² The example had its effect, and when

¹ Berriat Saint-Prix, *La Justice révolutionnaire dans les départements de France*, vol. vi.; *Le Tribunal révolutionnaire d'Orange*, by V. de Baumeftort, Avignon, 1875, and *Les 332 Victimes de la commission populaire d'Orange en 1794*, by the Abbé Bonnel. 2 vols. Orange: 1888.

² *Le Maréchal Suchet*, by C. H. Barrault-Rouillon, 1854, p. 217, the notice on Maignet in Rabbe's *Biographie des Contemporains*, Paris, 1836, etc.; it is only fair to state that Berriat Saint-Prix, relying on a letter from Agricol Moureau in Courtois, *Papiers trouvés chez Robespierre*, p. 393, which he admits is incorrect in some details, and on other documents, all dated *after* the Terror, when Rovère, Maignet's personal enemy, was in

Maignet returned to the Convention in Fructidor, 1794, he was able to report that, for the first time since 1789, the department of the Vaucluse, including Avignon and the Venaissin, was tranquil.

Far more severe was the Reign of Terror, which was instituted by Javogues in the department of the Loire, with his head-quarters at Saint-Étienne. Claude Javogues was born at Bellegarde in 1759, of an old family of notaries, but had been a man of no steady profession himself. He had been a soldier and a lawyer's clerk, and was in 1789 an *avocat* practising at Montbrison. The Revolution gave him a career, and he made the most of it; and, after being elected first a municipal officer and then an administrator of the district of Montbrison in 1791, he was elected to the Convention as fourteenth deputy for the Rhone-et-Loire in 1792. At the time of the revolt of Lyons, Javogues was sent on mission as a local deputy to assist in the siege. He soon made his presence felt in the little province of the Forez, and forcibly insisted on all the able-bodied inhabitants of Montbrison and Saint-Étienne following him to Lyons. When that city had fallen, he returned to the departments of the Rhone-et-Loire and Saône-et-Loire, and there exercised and established the Reign of Terror. He himself resided at Saint-Étienne, while he sent emissaries to Montbrison and Roanne, the other two important towns of the province. He had an excuse for his enormities in that all three towns had shown some sympathy with the insurgents at Lyons, and that they had openly provided food and ammunition for them. Indeed, had it not been for Saint-Étienne, the Lyons people would not have been able to stand a siege, for it was Lesterpt-Beauvais, the

power, takes the other view and argues that Bedoin was destroyed by the flames; Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, III., pp. 174-179, who is obviously hostile to Maignet, adopts the same view. It is much to be desired that Maignet's unpublished memoirs, which are preserved at his native place, Ambert, and which are said to attribute all the blame to Suchet (*Les Conventionnels d'Auvergne: Dulaure*, by M. Boudet, pp. 417-447. Clermont-Ferrand: 1874), should be printed, as throwing light on the career of one of the best known representatives on mission.

Girondin deputy on mission to inspect the manufactories of war material, who had handed over to them all the muskets and guns to be found in that great manufacturing centre. Javogues did not forget this. He established himself at Saint-Étienne, and there began his Reign of Terror. It was a reign of arrests and insults, but not of bloodshed, for the revolutionary commission at Feurs only operated for a very few days, and he had to send any victims of importance to Lyons, where they were tried by the military commission, and either shot or guillotined. It might be possible that Javogues did not wish to shed blood, but his general conduct was too bad for this excuse to be made for him. It was marked by cruel insults. He kicked women out of his room, and boxed old men's ears, and he carried his libertinism so far that he raised taxes for his mistresses, and it was through them alone that he could be appealed to.¹ His proconsulate is still remembered in the Forez, where the peasants call their worst oxen or horses "Javogues" to this day, and, though it may be that other deputies were more severe and caused more deaths, none of them were so brutal as Javogues.² His power did not last long, for he began to abuse Couthon in his public speeches for sparing the people of Lyons, and on Couthon's motion he was ordered to return to Paris on 20 Pluviôse (February 8, 1794). There he was left alone, though attacks upon him increased day by day, and denunciations poured in against him, until 13 Prairial, Year III. (1 June, 1795), when he was arrested by a decree of the Convention with the most cruel of the other proconsuls. He was amnestied with the rest at the dissolution of the Convention, but he joined in the plot of the camp of Grenelle, and was shot by order of the Directory on 6 October, 1796.

The only other district, as opposed to cities, which it will be worth while to examine as a scene of the Terror in the provinces, is that of Upper Auvergne, which had shown its

¹ *Dénunciation des Stéphanois*, p. 21.

² *Le Forez sous la Terreur. Dénunciation des Stéphanois contre le Représentant Javogues*, with notes by J. M. Devet. Saint-Étienne : 1884.

royalism in the camps of Jalès,¹ and threatened to become a second La Vendée. It was there that, in July, 1792, the formidable conspiracy, known as the conspiracy of Saillans, from the name of the young count who headed it, broke out which was suppressed, like the gatherings at Jalès, by General d'Albignac.² The same feeling appeared in the insurrection of Charrier in May, 1793, which brought upon the departments of the former provinces of the Upper Auvergne and the Vivarais, namely, the Haute-Loire, Cantal, Aveyron, and Lozère, all the horrors of the Reign of Terror. Marc Antoine Charrier had been elected deputy for the tiers état of the bailliage of Mende to the States-General, and throughout the session of the Constituent Assembly he had differed from the bulk of the deputies of his estate in espousing the cause of the privileged classes. He was originally a notary at Nasbinals, a quaint little town perched up among the hills which form the border line of the departments of the Lozère and the Haute-Loire, and the centre of the Auvergne cheese industry, and it was thither that he returned, after a short visit to Coblenz in October, 1791, with plans of an elaborate conspiracy and full powers from the Comte d'Artois. He soon became all-powerful in his mountainous district, and, under the pretext of forming a national guard at Nasbinals, he contrived to arm and discipline his supporters. He managed to keep out of danger until April, 1792, when Châteauneuf-Randon, the ci-devant marquis, and ex-Constituant, and the future deputy to the Convention, as president of the department of the Lozère, ordered his arrest. Charrier made his escape to the neighbouring department of the Aveyron, and he set to work in secret to organize a great popular rising; he travelled in disguise up and down the Gévaudan, now the departments of the Lozère and the Aveyron, combining his plans, and finding associates in every lonely farmhouse where

¹ See vol. i. chap. xvi. pp. 493-501.

² On the conspiracy of Saillans, see Ernest Daudet's *Histoire des conspirations royalistes du Midi*, pp. 113-217, and Simon Brugal's articles in the *Revue de la Révolution*.

ci-devant noblemen and hunted priests were hidden.¹ Of these assistants the most important were the Comte de Noyant, the Chevalier de Salgues and Claude and Dominique Allier, who had played a part in all the troubles in the Vivarais. It is necessary to insist upon the personal history of Charrier, and the names of his associates, in order to show that his rising was essentially royalist in its character, and not federalist, as were the insurrections of the cities. His preparations were well made, as had been those of the Comte de Saillans in the Vivarais in the previous July; but any chance of success he might have had was ruined by precipitation. The decree for the forced levy of three hundred thousand soldiers had created universal disgust among the youth of the Gévaudan, as it had in many other places, and on March 20 there was a rising of three thousand men at La Panouse, which was prevented from developing into a Vendéan war by the prompt action of eight hundred national guards of Milhau,² and then sternly suppressed like the rising at Pernes in the Pas-de-Calais. The evidence of the spirit of the peasants shown by this rising, and still more the triumphant advance of a Spanish army into Roussillon, headed by a band of émigrés, made the royalist leaders eager to raise their partisans at once in insurrection. In vain did Charrier point out that they were not yet strong enough to revolt with any hope of success, and that over-precipitation had ruined the chances of Saillans; the eloquence of Claude Allier won the day, and on May 26, 1793, a royalist army, which never exceeded two thousand men, and was led chiefly by abbés and curés, collected under the command of Charrier, and occupied the little town of Marvejols. Unfortunately this royalist success was marred with cruelty; seven houses were pillaged and thirteen leading republicans murdered.³ From Marvejols, Charrier marched to the more important town of Mende, which he took without opposition, and where a municipal officer was murdered. But

¹ Ernest Daudet, *Histoire des conspirations royalistes du Midi*, pp. 225-228.

² *Ibid.*, p. 230.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

the authorities of the Lozère were now on their guard; troops were applied for to the army of the Eastern Pyrenees, and the national guards of the neighbouring departments were poured in from all sides. The royalists marched out from Mende, and won a victory at Chanac on May 30;¹ but Charrier felt that this success could not be utilized, and, when he heard of the reoccupation of Marvejols and Mende by the republicans, and of the dispersion of the garrisons he had left there, he dismissed his army on May 31, and the insurrection was at an end.²

This insurrection in the Gévaudan was followed by crue reprisals and by the establishment of the Reign of Terror in all the neighbouring departments. Gleizal, the deputy on mission at the time of the assemblage of La Panouse, had previously formed what he called a "garde nationale d'élite" in the month of April, which resembled in its composition the revolutionary army of Paris, and formed a fitting instrument for the propagation of the Terror. The Committee of Public Safety had, on hearing of this insurrection, despatched Château-neuf-Randon and Malhes to suppress it and punish the guilty parties, and the former of these representatives made Terror "the order of the day" in the Lozère. This deputy felt that he had to show extra zeal in order to palliate his noble birth, and he therefore listened to numerous denunciations and filled the prisons of Mende with unfortunate peasants, suspected of being concerned in the recent rising. The most distinguished of his prisoners was Charrier himself, who was caught in his underground retreat at Nasbinals, and who, after a fair trial before the criminal tribunal of Rodez, was executed in that town on July 17, 1793. His chief adviser, Claude Allier, was also arrested after long wanderings among the mountains, and was guillotined at Mende on September 5. The guillotine was kept busy at Mende, Florac, and Marvejols, and sixty-nine individuals were executed in these three towns, chiefly ad-

¹ Ernest Daudet, *Histoire des conspirations royalistes du Midi*, pp. 262, 263.

² On the rising of Charrier, see Ernest Daudet, *op. cit.* pp., 217-312.

herents of Charrier, forty-nine poor peasants of whose army were executed in one day at Florac; but it is worth noting that this severity was only exercised against priests, nobles, and men who had actually taken up arms against the Republic, and that Charrier's secretary even was acquitted.¹ The vigour of Châteauneuf-Randon caused him to be despatched to the siege of Lyons, with all the troops he could collect, in September, 1793, and after the conquest of that city he was employed on many other missions in which he showed himself a brave soldier. He was succeeded by Jean Guillaume Taillefer, who had been a doctor at Domme, and was elected deputy to the Legislative Assembly and to the Convention by the department of the Dordogne, who, during his proconsulate in the Lozère and the Aveyron, stamped out the lingering remnants of opposition. All the neighbouring departments suffered the rigour of the Terror for this insurrection of Charrier. Claude Reynaud—who substituted the name of Solon for his Christian name—and his successor, Guyardin, for instance, ruled the Haute-Loire with a rod of iron from August, 1793, to July, 1794, and during their proconsulates fifty-two "suspects" were condemned to death at Le Puy, and guillotined in that city. The persecution of the unfortunate lace-workers in this department, who had been in the habit of forming little communities, and commencing their work together with prayer, by these two representatives makes their rule especially odious. For this custom the poor women, who refused to take the oath of fidelity to the nation from ignorance of its meaning, were stigmatised as "dévotés" or "béates" and imprisoned or hunted down by hundreds.² This severity of Guyardin and Reynaud was really far more terrible than that of Maignet; but the latter professed to make a greater show of Terror, and so the name of the destroyer of Bedoin has been handed down to posterity as execrable, while those of the proconsuls of the Haute-Loire are forgotten.

From the description of these manifestations of the Reign

¹ Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. ii. p. 319.

² *Ibid.*, vol. iii. pp. 219-232.

of Terror in the provinces, it is a relief to turn to the departments and cities where the Terror was little more than a name. The difference was chiefly due to the characters of certain representatives on mission, who knew how to rule with firmness and a great show of severity, but with real moderation. Among the deputies of this class André Dumont may be taken as a type. He had been sent on mission to the Somme, one of the most wealthy of the departments, and containing many priests and ci-devant nobles, and from his letters it might be imagined that he was a second Joseph Le Bon. He made numerous arrests, and boasted of them; but while pretending to harass the "suspects" and inveighing in violent terms against religion and aristocracy, he skilfully avoided the erection of a revolutionary tribunal, by declaring it unnecessary. Under an appearance of brutality, he really looked after the comfort of the prisoners, and not a single execution stains the annals of his proconsulate, which was extended to the departments of the Oise, the Aisne and the Nord, towards the end of 1793, and lasted until after the fall of Robespierre.¹ This fact of itself proves that the Great Committee, while sanctioning harsh government, when the representatives on mission established it, could yet appreciate the value of a governor who ruled without shedding blood, and were willing to encourage him. The history of these departments during the Terror is one which well deserves special attention, because, from his violent proclamations and letters to the Convention, André Dumont has been held up as one of the worst of the Terrorists, when really he was one of the best.² He was not alone in his conduct. Lakanal, the advocate of that state system of popular education and a former Oratorian,

¹ On the proconsulate of André Dumont, see *Amiens et le Département de la Somme pendant la Révolution*, by F. I. Darsy (Amiens: 1878); *Histoire de la Ville d'Amiens*, by H. Dusevel (Amiens: 1832), vol. ii.; and for his conduct at Abbeville, the *Souvenirs d'un cheval-léger de la Garde du Roi*, by L. R. de Belleval, Marquis de Bois-Robin (Paris: 1866).

² For instance, in the violent little book, *Les Missionnaires de '93* (Paris: 1819), M. Wallon, though hostile to the proconsuls, does André Dumont grudging justice, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. iii. p. 387.

during his long mission in the departments of the Dordogne, Lot, Lot-et-Garonne, and Gironde, though he destroyed châteaux and used forced labour to make roads, never arrested a single person.¹ Similarly mild were the proconsulates of Lejeune of the Mayenne and his successor Michaud in the Indre, where in all only four executions took place;² of Bô in the Marne and the Aube, where there were no executions at all, though he sent four leading citizens of Troyes to Paris in custody, who were condemned by the Revolutionary Tribunal, after dissolving the popular society, which had terrorized the town;³ of Roux-Fazillac in the Périgord, whose only victim was Valady, the Girondin deputy, who had been outlawed, and was therefore executed without trial at Périgueux;⁴ of Gouly, who in March, 1794, tried to undo the effect of some of the horrors perpetrated by Javogues in the department of the Saône-et-Loire;⁵ of Siblot, who ruled the departments of the Seine-Inférieure and the Eure, in spite of the bad repute left by the Girondin rising, from February to July, 1794, with only four executions at Dieppe; of Lanot in the Haute-Vienne and the Corrèze; of Chaudron-Roussau in the Aude and the Ariège; and of Monestier of the Puy-de-Dôme in the Hautes- and Basses-Pyrénées. These are the most marked instances of proconsuls who made an appearance of Terror to save the reality; but something must be said of those who, without rivalling the ferocity of Javogues, Carrier, and Joseph Le Bon, cannot be classed for moderation with Lakanal, Bô, and André Dumont. Such were the proconsulates of Bernard of Saintes

¹ *Lakanal*, by Paul Le Gendre, pp. 45-52. Paris: 1882.

² *Histoire de Déols et de Châteauroux*, by Dr. Fauconneau-Dufresne, vol. i. pp. 518-543 (Châteauroux: 1873); *Un Conventionnel Pontissalien. Michaud de Doubs*, by Jules Mathez (Pontarlier: 1885); Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. ii. pp. 128-130.

³ *Histoire de la Ville d'Épernay*, by Victor Fiévet, vol. ii. pp. 77-96. Épernay: 1868; *Histoire de Troyes pendant la Révolution*, by Albert Babeau, pp. 196-214 (Paris: 1874); Wallon, vol. v chap. iii. pp. 347-69.

⁴ *Études sur la Révolution dans le Périgord*, by Georges Bussière. Paris: 1885.

⁵ Wallon vol. v. chap. iii. pp. 241-246, 259.

at Dijon, of Dartigoyte in the Gers and the Landes, of Lecarpentier in Brittany and Normandy, of Borie in the Gard and the Hérault, of Cavaignac and Pinet, of Albitte in the Ain, of Ingrand and Piorry at Poitiers, and of Garnier of Saintes at Blois. Of these missions the most representative is that of Bernard of Saintes, who ruled the departments of the Jura and the Côte-d'Or from March, 1793, to July, 1794. This deputy was a man of the type of André Dumont. He fixed his head-quarters at Dijon, and made an immense bluster about his patriotism; he filled the prisons of Burgundy with "suspects," and established revolutionary committees everywhere. But he was sparing of human life; and it was not until March, 1794, that, to show his patriotism, he sent off thirteen prisoners to Paris, chiefly *ci-devant* nobles and former officials, who were all condemned to death by the Revolutionary Tribunal; and on subsequent occasions he sent twenty-five prisoners more to the capital, of whom twenty-three were executed. He also—and in this showed his inferiority to Dumont—directed the ordinary criminal court of Dijon to act as a revolutionary tribunal, and in this capacity, it condemned eleven individuals to death, of whom nine were *émigrés*.¹ Dartigoyte was even more exaggerated in his language than Bernard of Saintes; he was accused of making Terror "the order of the day" at Dax, Tarbes, and Auch, but he did not do much except destroy altars and dance round them, and avoided bloodshed until after an attempt was made to murder him at Auch. He expressed his willingness to pardon the young man who had thrown a tile at him, but the popular society of Auch appealed to the Convention. The military commission of Bayonne was ordered to hold a sitting there, and nine persons were condemned to death, seven of whom were *ci-devant* nobles, who had not been present at the time of the so-called attempt to murder.²

¹ *La Révolution à Dijon*, by E. Ledeuil (Paris: 1872); *Histoire de Beaune*, by M. Rossignol, pp. 474-479 (Beaune: 1854); *Histoire de la Révolution dans le Jura*, by A. Sommier (Paris: 1846); *Frochot, Préfet de la Seine*, by Louis Passy (Évreux: 1865); Wallon, vol. iii. pp. 315-331.

² *La Justice Révolutionnaire à Auch*, by Amédée Tarbouriech (Paris: 1869); Wallon, vol. ii. pp. 410-417.

Lecarpentier, who was proconsul in the departments of the Manche, the Ille-et-Vilaine, and the Côtes-du-Nord, had the credit of driving back the Vendéans when they attacked Granville,¹ and after that occurrence seems rather to have played a ridiculous than a ferocious part. His delight was to be treated like a petty monarch, and to drive about in a superb coach with his wife; but, unfortunately, he was not satisfied with this display, and sent up in all seventy-four persons to Paris, as implicated in the Girondin rising in Normandy, most of whom were executed.² Jean Borie, or Borie-Cambort, deputy for the Corrèze, whose proconsulate extended over the departments of the Gard and the Hérault from 2 Pluviôse (21 January) until 14 Fructidor (31 August), after the fall of Robespierre, had a difficult task to perform. Nîmes, the headquarters of his district, and the capital of the Gard, had always been a turbulent city,³ and had taken a prominent part in the federalist rising of Marseilles, even going so far as to send a body of troops to co-operate with the insurgents of Marseilles, which had only been prevented from forming a junction by the rapid advance of General Carteaux. Courbis, the mayor of Nîmes, was a petty tyrant, who threw thousands of his fellow-citizens into prison on the pretext that they had sympathized with the federalists. Boisset, the first proconsul in the Gard, dismissed and arrested Courbis, whose loud complaints that he was persecuted for his patriotism caused Boisset's recall, and his supersession by Borie. The new proconsul reinstated Courbis, and finding that the criminal tribunal of the Gard insisted on pronouncing acquittals, established a revolutionary commission at Nîmes on 8 Germinal (28 March), which condemned 115 persons to death before it

¹ Vol. ii. chap. viii. p. 265.

² *Précis du proconsulat exercé par Lecarpentier sous le tyronnie de Robespierre dans la commune de Port Malo*, by G. Duault (Paris : Year III.); *Histoire de la Révolution dans le département des Côtes-du-Nord*, by A. Guichard (Saint Malo : 1874); and *Les Conventionnels de la Manche*, by the Abbé H. Desforgues (Paris : 1875).

³ Vol. i. pp. 487-489.

was dissolved.¹ Cavaignac and Jacques Pinet should be ranked rather with the deputies with the armies, but for one circumstance, for they were nominally deputies on mission with the army of the Western Pyrenees from October, 1793, until after July, 1794. This circumstance was their discovery of a real or pretended plot among the Basques to assist the Spaniards in their invasion. They immediately established an extraordinary military commission at Bayonne, which condemned to death at that place, at Saint-Sever, Dax, Auch, and Mont-de-Marsan, seventy-two persons, including the nine condemned at Auch for the attempt on Dartigoyte's life, and fourteen émigrés taken prisoner while fighting in the Spanish army.² Antoine Louis Albitte, though better known as a representative on mission with the armies, must be mentioned here for his mission in the Ain. He was a man of the type of Dartigoyte and Bernard de Saintes, who delighted to desecrate churches by absurd ceremonies, and used the most exaggerated language; yet the worst deed alleged against him is that he sent fourteen of the principal citizens of Bourg en Bresse to Lyons, while the revolutionary commission was at work there, all of whom were condemned to death.³ François Pierre Ingrand, who ruled in Poitou, first with Piorry, then with Brival, and finally alone from August, 1793, to July, 1794, exercised his powers in a still more moderate manner. Poitou was sufficiently involved in the Vendéan war for Poitiers to be as severely punished as was Nantes, but fortunately Ingrand, though a Terrorist, was not so severe a proconsul as Carrier; he was not allowed to establish a revolutionary commission, and the ordinary criminal tribunal only condemned thirty-five people to death for federalism and offences against the Revolution,

¹ *Pièces et Documents officiels pour servir à l'Histoire de la Terreur*, by M. Fajon (Nîmes : 1869) ; Wallon, vol. ii. pp. 452-471.

² Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. ii. pp. 406, 423, 495-497 ; *La Révolution dans le département des Landes*, by H. Castonnet-Desfosses in the *Revue de la Révolution* for June, 1886.

³ Wallon, vol. iii. pp. 246-250 ; Le Duc, *La Révolution dans l'Ain*, vols. iv. v.

including the father of the deputy Thibaudeau, of whom twenty-four were condemned during the month of Nivôse.¹ The mission of Garnier of Saintes at Blois was more remarkable for its bloodshed; the city prisons were crowded with real or suspected Vendéans, and Garnier cleared them by "fusillades" resembling those of Lyons, Toulon, and Nantes.²

It is impossible, of course, to go over all the developments of the Terror in the provinces. Mention has, however, been made of all the chief districts and cities which suffered the most; and enough has been said to show how differently the various proconsuls, who carried out the directions of Collot d'Herbois and Billaud-Varenne to establish the Reign of Terror in the provinces, understood and carried out their instructions.³ It only remains to mention a few cities and districts, which were never seats of any revolutionary commission or the headquarters of any deputy on mission, and which therefore escaped entirely the worst horrors of the Terror. In them, however, new authorities were invariably appointed by the proconsuls sent to establish the revolutionary government in the winter of 1793, and it was only owing to chance, or to the fact that they were removed from any scene of civil war, that they escaped. Thus, for instance, Dauphiné, though a border province, escaped almost entirely, there being but three executions of priests throughout its whole extent, two at Grenoble and one at Nyons;⁴ and Lorraine, the Périgord, Champagne, and the Limousin were quite as fortunate. Taking some of the principal cities at random, there only took

¹ *Histoire du terrorisme dans le département de la Vienne*, by A. C. Thibaudeau; Giraudet's *Histoire de la Révolution dans Poitou* (Poitiers: 1875); *La Révolution dans le Bas Poitou*, by the Vicomte Lastic de Saint Jal (Niort: 1875); Duval's *Archives Révolutionnaires de la Creuse* (Guéret: 1875); Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. ii. pp. 131-150; and the defences published by Ingrand and Piorry, Year III.

² *Histoire de Blois*, by L. Bergevin and A. Dupré (Blois: 1846), and a curious pamphlet, *Tableau des prisons de Blois* (Blois: Year III).

³ See Appendix X., The Representatives on Mission.

⁴ *Histoire du Dauphiné*, by Jules Taulier, p. 309 (Grenoble: 1865); *Histoire de Grenoble*, by J. J. A. Pilot (Grenoble: 1829).

place one execution at Lille,¹ none at Douai,² two at Orleans,³ none at all at Nancy,⁴ none at Épernay,⁵ none at Meaux,⁶ none at Rheims,⁷ four at Laon,⁸ none at Calais,⁹ none at Boulogne,¹⁰ none at Provins,¹¹ none at Amiens, Abbeville,¹² or Peronne,¹³ nineteen at Caen,¹⁴ none at Rouen,¹⁵ three at Angoulême,¹⁶ and eight at Montpellier.¹⁷ But it must be remembered that from some of these places the accused were sent to Paris, and swelled the list of the victims of the Revolutionary Tribunal there. Nevertheless these figures show more eloquently than any number of words that if the Terror in the provinces was terrible in Nantes and Arras, it was free from excesses in many other places, and will bring out the truth, that it was only partial in its action, and that the end of the Great Committee was attained because the examples made in some places secured tranquillity in others.

¹ *Histoire de Lille et de la Flandre Wallonne*, by Victor Derode. Lille : 1848.

² *Douai sous la Révolution*, by Louis Dechristé. Douai : 1880.

³ Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. ii. p. 117.

⁴ *Histoire de Nancy*, by Jean Cayon. Nancy : 1848.

⁵ *Histoire de la Ville d'Épernay*, by Victor Fiévet, vol. ii. p. 77. Épernay : 1868.

⁶ *Histoire de Meaux et du pays Mellois*, by A. Carro, pp. 436-442. Meaux : 1865.

⁷ *Histoire de Reims et de la Champagne*, by E. Fleury and A. Barbat de Bignicourt. Reims : 1871.

⁸ *Histoire de la Ville de Laon*, by M. Melleville. Paris : 1846.

⁹ *Annales de Calais*, by Charles Demotier. Calais : 1856.

¹⁰ *Histoire du Boulonnais*, by J. Hector de Rosny, vol. iv. Amiens : 1873.

¹¹ *Histoire de Provins*, by Félix Bourquelot, vol. ii. pp. 340-350. Provins : 1839.

¹² *Amiens et le département de la Somme pendant la Révolution*, by F. I. Darsy. Amiens : 1878.

¹³ *La Révolution à Péronne*, by G. Ramon. Paris : 1878.

¹⁴ *La Révolution dans la Basse Normandie*, by G. Vaultier. Caen : 1859.

¹⁵ Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. ii. pp. 71-83.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. pp. 169-172.

¹⁷ *Montpellier sous la Révolution*, by J. Duval-Jouve, vol. ii. Montpellier : 1881.

To sum up, it appears that the Terror was very much localized in the provinces, some districts and cities suffering severely, others not at all. M. Berriat Saint-Prix¹ gives the number who perished on the guillotine, by "noyades" and by "fusillades" at 16,000, but this number is not to be trusted, because the number who perished by the latter two means of death are not and can never be known owing to the careless manner in which these executions *en masse* were carried out. He also includes in various round numbers the number of people killed during the sieges of Lyons and Marseilles, men who died fighting in war, and therefore certainly not victims or martyrs. M. Wallon,² who, like M. Berriat Saint-Prix, writes in a tone distinctly unfavourable to the representatives on mission, but whose judgment may be taken as fairly accurate upon the whole, sums up that 14,807 condemnations to death were pronounced in the provinces before the fall of Robespierre, and 326 after that event; but against this must be set the fact that condemnations were sometimes pronounced *en contumace* in the absence of the accused, and that it does not follow that every one condemned to death was executed. With regard to the courts which sent nearly fifteen thousand people to their death, there were five Revolutionary Tribunals in imitation of that of Paris, generally consisting of four judges, a public accuser, and a paid jury, namely, at Arras and Cambrai, under the management of Joseph Le Bon; at Rochefort, established by the deputies on mission, Laignelot and Lequinio, to judge naval officers, which condemned fifty-six persons to death;³ at Brest, established by Laignelot and Tréhouart, in spite of the violent opposition of Jean Bon Saint-André, on 17 Pluviôse (February 5, 1794), which was remodelled by the latter, and sent in all seventy-one victims to the guillotine, including in one day twenty-six of the

¹ Berriat Saint-Prix, *La Justice Révolutionnaire dans les départements*, vol. xi. pp. 265-303.

² Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. v. p. 366.

³ *Histoire de la Ville et du Port de Rochefort*, by J. F. Viaud and E. Fleury, vol. ii. pp. 331-360.

administrators of the department of the Finistère, who had sent volunteers to support the Girondin rising at Caen;¹ and at Toulouse, established by the deputies Paganel and Dartigoyte, which condemned thirty persons to death between 25 Nivôse (January 14) and 2 Floréal (April 21), 1794;² also twelve Revolutionary Commissions without any juries, of which the best known are those of Lyons, Bordeaux, Marseilles, Nantes, Blois, Nîmes, and Orange, and sixty military commissions, appointed to judge men caught with arms in their hands, which were chiefly employed in La Vendée, and of which the most terribly severe were those of Angers, Laval, Le Mans, Rennes, and Toulon. As a rule, however, the representatives on mission found it enough to empower the ordinary criminal tribunals to act as revolutionary tribunals, and it is to the credit of the French judicial profession, that the regular judges refrained to make much use of the vast powers thus conferred on them, and acted with studied moderation as compared with the various special tribunals.³

But who were the people who, both in Paris and in the provinces, were sent to the guillotine to maintain the system of Terror, and that their deaths might terrify their neighbours? They were first of all chiefly priests who had refused to take the oath, against whom the deputies on mission waged pitiless war, not only as priests, but because they looked on them as possible leaders of a general revolt, owing to their action in La Vendée, the Vivarais, and the Gévaudan. Next to priests, *ci-devant* nobles were the favourite victims, especially if their rank was exalted, and they had been officers of the old royal army. Of politicians, the Girondins and their supporters, the federalists in the local administrations, were most vigorously hunted down, and next to them *ex-Constituants*. Those suspected of holding any communication with *émigrés* were seldom spared; forgers of assignats, opponents of the law of the maximum, and young men who refused to go to the

¹ Levot, *Histoire de la Ville de Brest pendant la Révolution*, pp. 198-374.

² Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. ii. p. 302.

³ Wallon, *op. cit.*; *passim*.

armies, were always condemned ; and in Nantes and Bordeaux especially, wealthy bourgeois were made to suffer on account of their wealth. Poverty was not allowed as an excuse, and the tribunals and commissions often condemned poor labourers and artisans on as slight evidence as their more educated neighbours. There were, of course, many hairbreadth escapes, many instances of romantic devotion, in spite of the law of the suspects, and many long months spent in secret hiding-places ; into these there is no space to go, for, however true and interesting, they illustrate moral excellences rather than points of historical importance. But it might be worth while to note the names of a few great noblemen who had taken no conspicuous part in politics, taken at random out of various books, who preserved their estates and lives, just to prove how partial the Terror was in the provinces. For instance, the Duc de Charost-Bethune, the Duc de Luynes, the Duc de Nivernais, who, however, had to undergo a short imprisonment,¹ the Marquis de Biencourt² and the Comte Destutt de Tracy,³ both ex-Constituants, the Marquis de Barbançois,⁴ the Marquis de Murinais,⁵ and the Vicomte de La Bedoyère. Equally interesting is the history of the good Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt's estates. He himself had fled to England after the failure of his scheme to rescue Louis XVI. in August, 1792,⁶ and his estates were, of course, sequestrated as the property of an émigré and ordered to be sold, when the authorities of the department, the Côtes-du-Nord, in which his estate of Liancourt was situated, claimed it for the department, with the assertion that the schools and model farms and factories, which the duke had established, were of public value. Thus were his good deeds rewarded, for on his return

¹ *La Comtesse de Rochefort et ses amis*, by Louis de Loménie, chap. vii. 1867.

² Duval's *Archives Révolutionnaires de la Creuse*.

³ Mignet's notices of Tracy in his *Notices Historiques*.

⁴ Fauconneau-Dufresne's *Histoire de Déols et de Châteauroux*, vol. i. p. 529.

⁵ *Un homme d'autrefois : Les Souvenirs du Marquis de Costa-Beauregard*.

⁶ Vol. ii. chap. iv. p. 112.

to France in 1800 the authorities of the department at once handed Liancourt over to him.¹ Even more striking is the story of the Comte d'Haussonville, who had been present at the Tuileries upon June 20 and August 10, 1792, and who had on the latter day accompanied the king to the hall of the Assembly, and whose son, the Vicomte, was serving in the army of the émigrés. Yet this proud nobleman, who never thought of emigrating himself, and who yet certainly never denied his attachment to the royal family and to the principle of royalty, was allowed to live quietly at his château of Gurcy in Lorraine. He was imprisoned for a very short time in the Jacobin convent at Provins during the height of Terror, but otherwise he suffered no inconvenience, and led, according to his grandson, much the same life at Paris and in the country as he had done during the *ancien régime*.²

Such stories as these are worth recalling; they help to keep in mind the fact that during the Terror everybody in France was not occupied in thinking about the Terror, that life went on much the same for all but violent politicians or soldiers, and the stories of escapes, of kindnesses shown and favours done, which abound, show that human nature was not devoid of kindness in those terrible times, and that there were not many Suards living who would repulse a Condorcet.

¹ *Vie du Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt*. Paris : 1827.

² See the *Vie de mon père* in the Comte d'Haussonville's *Souvenirs et Mélanges*. Paris : 1878.

CHAPTER XII

THE REPUBLICAN ARMY AND NAVY.

The Republican army—The military policy of the Convention—The War Office—Pache—The Military Committee of the Convention—Calon—The reports of Dubois-Crancé—The system of demi-brigades—The control of the war by the Great Committee of Public Safety—The Topographical Committee—D'Arçon and Montalembert—The deputies on mission with the armies—The deputies on mission to the interior for military purposes—Nœl Pointe—The armies of the Republic—The armies of the North and the Ardennes—Jourdan—The army of the Moselle—Hoche—The army of the Rhine—Pichegru—The situation of these armies—The mission of Saint-Just and Le Bas—The Terror in Strasbourg—Schneider—The winter campaign of Hoche and Pichegru, and expulsion of the Austrians from Alsace—The army of the Alps—The value of the neutrality of Switzerland—The army of Italy—The insurrection, siege, and capture of Toulon—The occupation of Corsica by the English—The armies of the Eastern and Western Pyrenees—The generals of the Republic—The effect of the rule of the Great Committee on the army—The state of the navy—Its disorganization under the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies—The naval policy of the Convention—Jean Bon Saint-André—Naval expeditions in the Mediterranean—Surrender of the Toulon fleet—The Brest fleet—Saint-André restores discipline—The French frigates and privateers—Conclusion.

THE Reign of Terror was inaugurated by the Great Committee of Public Safety, and endured by France for the express purpose of maintaining peace and unity in the interior while the French soldiers were fighting on the frontiers. The triumphs of those soldiers are known, and it remains to be seen how the armies were composed, organized, and led to victory. Such a study is a difficult one to pursue, for while

accounts of the French Revolution are almost innumerable, it is very hard to get information as to the actual life of the soldiers who fought in the great wars, and as to the organization of the republican army.

The military policy of the Constituent Assembly has been already described,¹ and its effect in utterly disorganizing the old royal army of France without substituting an effective new one. Its excellent work in making the higher ranks of the service open to all, and its fatal mistakes in weakening the bonds of discipline have been pointed out, as well as the natural result that the French army in its transition state was everywhere defeated² during the summer of 1792. These defeats were followed by the overthrow of the king, the meeting of the Convention, the proclamation of the Republic, and the victory of Valmy. This victory, followed as it was by that of Jemmappes, by the conquest of Belgium, Mayence, Savoy, and Nice, seemed to show that the damage done by the policy of the Constituent Assembly was not so great as might have been expected, and many republican orators loudly declared that patriotic enthusiasm could take the place of military discipline, and that the ardent soldiers of the French Republic would everywhere defeat the paid hirelings of kings. But statesmen knew better, and understood that the victories of Dumouriez, Custine, and Montesquiou were the result of the carelessness of their enemies, of their contempt for the republicans, and of various lucky chances, and they therefore expected a series of reverses when the allied powers understood how serious the war was in which they were engaged, and put forth all their strength. They knew that the successive crowds of national guards, volunteers, and of the *levée en masse*, which were despatched to the frontiers could not be made into soldiers in a moment, and the defeats of the spring and summer of 1793 showed that they were right. It has been pointed out that this series of reverses directly led to the grant by the Convention of full powers to the Great Committee of Public Safety, and that this was followed by two

¹ Vol. i. chap. xiii. pp. 386, 387.

² Vol. ii. chap. iii. pp. 77, 78.

famous victories, at Hondschöten and at Wattignies.¹ But these victories did not turn the balance of the war in favour of France, though they led the way to it, and the military policy of the Convention and of the Great Committee deserves the minutest study, because it gives evidence of the constructive power of the first republican administrators as opposed to the destructive faculty of the unpractical deputies to the Constituent Assembly. The measures must be studied which converted the patriotic republican mobs, which followed Dumouriez, Custine, and Montesquiou into the superb armies of Pichegru, Moreau, and Bonaparte; the growth of the military spirit, as opposed to the republican, which caused the triumphs of the Revolution to end in a military despotism, will later be analysed. The history of the armies of France, of their struggles, defeats, and victories, is the history of what is noblest and most patriotic in France. It was towards the frontiers that the eyes of every French man and French woman were perpetually turned; news of defeats braced them and news of victories encouraged them to bear all hardships, and they submitted to the Reign of Terror, under the conviction that it was necessary for the sake of the war against the ring of foreign enemies, which hedged them round.

The Legislative Assembly had made no alterations in the military system devised and put into operation by the Constituent Assembly; it had no power to make organic changes by the terms of the Constitution, and its military committee, which contained many remarkable men, notably Carnot, Lacombe Saint-Michel, Delmas, Lacroix, Lacuée, Gasparin, Perignon, and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, could do nothing but legislate in matters of detail.² The conduct of the war on the frontiers in its first stages was left entirely to the generals in command, under the general superintendence of the War Office at Paris, where minister succeeded minister with unusual rapidity during the summer months of 1792. The

¹ Vol. ii. chap. viii. p. 255.

² For the names of the members of this committee, see Iung's *Dubois-Crancé*, vol. i. pp. 242, 243.

meeting of the Convention changed all this, and the Military Committee which it appointed had two great problems before it—how to make soldiers of the men whom decrees of the Convention were hurrying to the front, and arm, feed and clothe them, and how to form some central authority which would ensure harmonious action between the armies on the different frontiers. The first question was met by the amalgamation in 1793 and the creation of the demi-brigades in the spring of 1794; and the second by the creation of the Great Committee of Public Safety, advised by the Topographical Committee, and governing the various armies through the deputies on mission.

Before the establishment of the Committee of Public Safety, the general management of the war was supposed to rest in the hands of the Minister for War and of the generals in command, with the natural result that an able and self-willed general like Dumouriez was able to do pretty much what he pleased with his army. Over both the Ministry and the generals the authority of the Convention, which was delegated to the Military Committee, was acknowledged to be supreme, and the first difficulty was to make the Committee and the War Office work in harmony. The prestige of the Ministry had greatly decreased, when Pache succeeded Servan as Minister for War on October 20, 1792. Such abuse was showered upon Pache, alike by the Girondins and the partizans of Dumouriez, that it is worth while glancing for a moment at his previous career. It is quite true that he was the son of a "suisse," or hall porter; but the royalist writers, who from this fact have described him as illiterate and vulgar to a degree, have ignored his education and early career. His father was "suisse" to the Maréchal Duc de Castries, and the duke took a fancy to him when a child, had him well educated, made him tutor to his own children, and when he became Minister of the Marine, in 1780, first secretary of his bureau. He remained under the Maréchal de Castries for seven years, as Secretary to the Navy and then as superintendent of the provisions of the navy, and in 1787 was appointed by Necker

controller of the king's household. This post he soon resigned, and it was not until 1792 that he again entered office at Roland's request, in order to reorganize the Ministry of the Interior. His administrative powers and experience made him very acceptable to the Girondin ministers, and in May, 1792, he was transferred to the War Office to reorganize that department for Servan. This sketch of his history and career shows that Pache was no illiterate Jacobin, but an experienced administrator. He, however, had the misfortune to offend the Girondins by not adhering to their party, and Dumouriez by not backing him up better in his ambitious schemes, with the result that they loaded him with abuse. Part of this abuse he deserved, because he filled the War Office with such men as Vincent and Xavier Audouin, who were conspicuous Jacobin orators and not men of business; but to say that he did not know his work is ridiculous. The labours entailed on the War Office by such measures as the calling out of the volunteers were more than could be dealt with by any man, however skilful he might be, and it is no wonder that the chaos which existed in every public department during the latter months of 1792, existed in a more marked degree in the War Office. Danton knew the merits of Pache, but he also felt the necessity for appeasing Dumouriez, who looked upon the shortcomings of the War Office as a personal affront to himself, and on February 4, 1793, he secured the election of General Bournonville, a friend of Dumouriez and his trusted subordinate in the campaign of Valmy, as Minister for War. His tenure of office was only for two months, for, when on a mission to the frontier, he was delivered up to the Austrians, with the deputies on mission, by Dumouriez.¹ His successor was Bouchotte, a lieutenant-colonel in the army and ex-captain in the Esterhazy hussars, who proved himself an able administrator and obedient servant to the Military Committee of the Convention and to the Great Committee of Public Safety until the abolition of all the ministries in April, 1794.

From this sketch it will be perceived that the importance of

¹ Vol. ii. chap. vii. p. 230.

the War Office diminished as that of the committees increased; and it is now necessary to examine the composition and work of the Military Committee of the Convention, which undid the work of the Military Committee of the Constituent Assembly, and constructed a new republican military constitution to replace the old royal military organization which the latter had destroyed. This committee consisted of no less than twenty-four members, and was thus both more numerous and less manageable than that of the Constituent Assembly. Of the first committee elected on September 27, 1792, little need be said, for as most of its members were soon found to be absent on mission, a new one was elected in its place on October 17. Without enumerating all the names of these twenty-four members, it is well to point out that only one had served on the Military Committee of the Constituent Assembly, Dubois-Crancé, and ten on that of the Legislative Assembly, and that eleven of the twenty-four had been officers in the old royal army. Of these eleven, Carnot and Milhaud belonged to the engineers, Lacombe Saint-Michel to the artillery, Châteauneuf-Randon to the cavalry, Delmas and Gasparin to the infantry, and Dubois-Crancé, Dubois de Bellegarde, Dubois-Dubais, and Coustard de Massy to the Mousquetaires and Gardes du Corps, while Sillery was a retired brigadier-general. It so happened that there were exactly eleven other officers in the Convention, not at this time belonging to the Military Committee, though they were all constant speakers on military subjects, and had much influence on the development of the republican army, either in committees or as deputies on mission. Of these eleven, Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, Letourneur of the Manche, and Varlet de la Vallée had served in the engineers, Aubry and Espinassy in the artillery, Soubrany in the cavalry, Barras in the infantry, Rovère and Valady in the household troops, the former in the Mousquetaires, the latter in the Gardes Françaises, Doulcet de Pontécoulant in the Gardes du Corps, while Calon had been attached to the staff as a geographer. It is worth while calling attention to the names of these officers, for every one

of them made his mark in some capacity, and it is a remarkable fact that the Convention, which was to direct the largest armies and the most extended series of wars known in the modern history of Europe, should have contained, among its thousand members, only twenty-two men who had any knowledge of war or of military discipline. It is curious to note the political opinions and subsequent career of these twenty-two officers. No less than seven of them, Sillery, Valady, Coustard, Aubry, Doulcet, Espinassy, and La Vallée, were pronounced Girondins, of whom the three former were guillotined, and the four latter excluded from the Convention for signing the protest of the seventy-three; two, Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, were members of the Great Committee of Public Safety; five, Barras, Dubois-Crancé, Bellegarde, Soubrany and Châteauneuf-Randon, were conspicuous for vigour as deputies on mission; three, Barras, Delmas, and Rovère, ranked with the chief Thermidorians, while Soubrany has his place among the last Montagnards; three, Barras, Letourneur, and Carnot, became Directors; two, Aubry and Rovère, were victims of the *coup d'état* of Fructidor, 1797; Gasparin died in the November of 1793; Dubois-Crancé acted for some time as Minister for War; two became famous generals under Napoleon, Milhaud and Lacombe Saint-Michel; and two, Dubois-Dubais and Doulcet de Pontécoulant, became senators of the Empire. Of these twenty-two officers, however, only nine took a continuous and active part¹ in the military discussions in the Convention, and had much influence in deciding its military policy. Of these nine, Dubois-Crancé was the greatest, and continued to urge his great idea of national conscription, which he had broached in the Constituent Assembly; ² Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or have already been noticed; ³ Aubry, Lacombe Saint-Michel, and Letourneur did not come to the front until after the fall of Robespierre;

¹ Jung's *Dubois-Crancé*, vol. i. p. 321.

² Vol. i. pp. 383-386. Dubois or Crancé changed his signature to Dubois-Crancé on the abolition of titles.

³ Vol. ii. chap. ix. pp. 300-303.

Châteauneuf-Randon and Delmas were relatively unimportant, and only Calon deserves a few words.

Étienne Nicolas Calon was one of the oldest members of the Convention, being sixty-seven years of age. He had entered the old royal army in 1750 as an engineer geographer, and had served in Germany during the Seven Years' War, and in the West Indies, but had never risen above the rank of captain. He had been employed for the greater part of his life in making maps, and was an accomplished mathematician, and in these capacities he had long been attached to the head-quarters staff of the army. At the commencement of the Revolution, he entered political life, and became in succession an administrator of the department of the Oise, and a deputy, first to the Legislative Assembly and then to the Convention. In these assemblies he never distinguished himself as an orator, but in both, his advanced age, experience and knowledge of the science of war made him an influential member of the military committees. In the Military Committee of the Convention he was particularly useful, for he was the only military member who never went on mission, and his first important motion resulted in the establishment of the "depôt-general" of maps, of which he was appointed director-general on April 16, 1793. It was Calon who suggested the formation of the famous "Topographical Committee," which advised Carnot on the general conduct and strategical combinations of the great war, and he was the most influential member of that Committee from the fact of his being a deputy, which enabled him to protect his colleagues, as well as many other experienced officers, including Berthier, the future Prince of Neufchâtel and Wagram. A mere mention will suffice of the civilian members of the Military Committee of the Convention, which, during the latter months of 1792 and the beginning of 1793, included Carra, Lecointe-Puyraveau and Lidon, the Girondins, Lacroix and Fabre d'Eglantine, the friends of Danton, Merlin of Douai, Jean Debry, Albitte, Laurent, Goupilleau of Fontenay, Duquesnoy, and Olivier-Gérente.

The influence of the Military Committee was at first small,

but the time rapidly approached when the Convention wisely resolved to hand over its executive functions to committees. The first great united Committee was the Committee of General Defence, elected on January 3, 1793, by the six principal committees, of which the Military was one. Its very creation had indeed been the work of Dubois-Crancé, who had proposed its formation on January 1, and he was naturally elected to it by the Military Committee, together with Lacombe Saint-Michel and Doucet de Pontécoulant. The vigour of Dubois-Crancé during the month of January was extraordinary, and he was charged to draw up a report on the reorganization of the army for the Military Committee, and a report on a plan of campaign for the ensuing year on behalf of the Committee of General Defence on the same day. On January 25, four days after the execution of Louis XVI., Dubois-Crancé read the latter report, in which he demanded the creation of nine armies, to consist in all of 502,800 men,¹ and to act chiefly on the Belgian frontier, and in which appeared the following remarkable passage: "Recollect that our troops of the line are neither in full number, nor armed, nor equipped; that the same facts are true as regards our volunteers; that the majority of our general officers have emigrated, and that the rest, while betraying us, are receiving their pay and robbing the nation; that our fortresses are utterly void of everything, and that our arsenals are without workmen."² Recognizing these gloomy facts, Dubois-Crancé hurried on his report on the reorganization of the army, and on February 7 he opened the debate on the subject, in which he demanded the entire fusion or amalgamation of all the troops on the frontiers, by destroying all distinctions between regulars and volunteers, and its natural corollary, national conscription for the future. His plan of conscription had been rejected by the Constituent Assembly; it was now hotly opposed. The debate lasted over several days; Barère, Buzot, and Aubry were the chief opponents, Lacombe Saint-Michel

¹ See Appendix XI., The Armies of the Republic.

² Iung's *Dubois-Crancé*, vol. i. p. 333.

and Saint-Just the most notable defenders of the new schemes of amalgamation and conscription; and Dubois-Crancé summed up the debate in a speech of which the following sentence contains the most powerful arguments in favour of his scheme: "I say that the army is disorganized, because, owing to the diverse elements which compose it, trained soldiers desert every day to join the volunteers, while captains and even lieutenant-colonels of volunteers request as a favour from the minister to be granted sub-lieutenancies in the regular army."¹ He won the day, and on February 26, 1793, his plan was adopted. His great services were fully recognized. On the same day that his ideas of amalgamation and conscription were accepted, Dubois-Crancé was elected President of the Convention, and on March 26 he was elected first to the second Committee of General Defence.²

This Committee was too unwieldy to be efficient, and, as has been seen, it was succeeded after the desertion of Dumouriez and the invasion of the English and Austrians, by the smaller and more powerful Committee of Public Safety, elected on April 9.³ In this new Committee, to which Dubois-Crancé was not elected, Lacroix and Delmas took charge of the war, and the latter was directed to discuss the question of amalgamation with its author, Dubois-Crancé. He had thoroughly thought it out, and in a brochure⁴ addressed to the army, and approved by Delmas, he developed the scheme of the demi-brigades. According to old custom, the French armies in the field were divided into divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions. Dubois-Crancé preserved the old nomenclature with the exception of substituting demi-brigades for regiments. According to his system, each brigade was to be composed of a regiment of the line and four regiments of volunteers, and as this would make an unwieldy brigade of five thousand men, the battalions of the regiment were to be separated, and each

¹ Jung's *Dubois-Crancé*, vol. i. p. 343.

² Vol. ii. pp. 229, 230.

³ Vol. ii. p. 232.

⁴ *Dubois-Crancé, général de brigade, ex-président de la Convention d'Armée*. Paris: 1793.

brigade was to be divided into two demi-brigades, which were to consist of a battalion of regulars and two regiments of volunteers, and be treated as independent units. This was systematizing the principle which Dumouriez had already acted upon of using the regulars to strengthen, steady, and instruct the volunteers, and thus converting them into good soldiers. Excellent and even essential as this reform was, it was forgotten during the struggle between the Jacobins and the Girondins, in spite of its having been sanctioned by the Convention, as soon as its author, Dubois-Crancé, was sent on mission to the army of the Alps—a mission which involved him in the siege of Lyons, and from which he did not return until October, 1793.¹ He immediately re-appeared at the Military Committee, where he only found five of his old colleagues, Milhaud, Dubois de Bellegarde, Albitte, Châteauneuf-Randon, and Delmas, and insisted on the carrying into effect of his scheme of demi-brigades. The Committee heartily entered into all his views, and went elaborately into the details of the system which was to transform the heterogeneous masses of regulars, national guards, volunteers, and peasants into an harmonious and well-arranged army. For more than two months they laboured at these details, but when the scheme was elaborated, and Dubois-Crancé named reporter, the Military Committee met with unexpected opposition from the Great Committee of Public Safety. Carnot himself came down to the Military Committee on Nivôse 5 and 7 (December 25 and 27), 1793, and after hearing his objections, the majority of the Military Committee veered round in a docile manner, and, deciding to report to the Convention in favour of the battalion as the military unit instead of the demi-brigade, named Cochon de Lapparent reporter on the reorganization of the army instead of Dubois-Crancé. Whether Carnot was jealous of Dubois-Crancé, whether he was persuaded by Barère, a consistent opponent of amalgamation, to interfere, or whether he was conscientiously opposed on some, to modern eyes inexplicable, grounds, it is impossible to say, but he certainly did not frighten the in-

¹ Vol. ii. p. 269.

ventor of demi-brigades. Dubois-Crancé absolutely refused to surrender his scheme in acquiescence to the wishes of a member of the Great Committee, although the Reign of Terror was in full exercise; he wrote boldly in favour of it,¹ and on Nivôse 17 (January 6), 1794, he spoke so strongly and convincingly that Cochon's report was rejected, and his own scheme for the infantry accepted by the Convention. On Nivôse 18, the system of demi-brigades was also sanctioned for the cavalry, and on Pluviôse 11 for the light infantry, and the victory of Dubois-Crancé was complete. His success deserves remark, not only as a proof of the independence of the Convention during the Terror, but also because it made of the French army the wonderfully organized machine which drove back all invaders, and eventually carried the war into the enemies' quarters.

Such was the history of the consolidation of the *débris* of the old royal army and of the hosts of volunteers into the republican army. Enough has been said of the share of the Military Committee, and more especially of Dubois-Crancé, in this important work; how this great machine was directed and what it did remains to be seen. The attempts made to direct the war by the harmonious action of the Military Committee and the War Office utterly failed, as dual administrations always do. The successes of Dumouriez and Custine had been due to fortuitous circumstances, and when reverses came it was seen to be necessary that the direction of the war should be placed in strong and responsible hands. This was done by granting supreme power to the Committee of General Defence and its successor, the Committee of Public Safety, which was empowered to treat the Minister for War and his officials as subordinates, and which corresponded directly with the generals in command by means of representatives on mission. Many deputies had been sent on missions to the armies during the first six months of the session of the Convention, of whom the best known were Danton and Lacroix, Camus and Treilhard, Gossuin and Merlin of Douai, who were despatched to organize Belgium as part of France, and attached

¹ Iung's *Dubois-Crancé*, vol. ii. pp. 67-76.

to Dumouriez' army, but their powers had been undefined.¹ They had been obliged to correspond directly with the Convention as a whole, or else hurry back to report to it in person, and it was not until April 30, 1793, that the Convention decreed that four representatives should be constantly on mission with each army, with absolute control over its administration, to report weekly to the Committee of Public Safety, and to act as the mouthpiece of the Committee in conveying its orders to the generals in command. It has been seen also that the disasters of the summer of 1793 led to the conference of still greater powers on the second or Great Committee of Public Safety, and that the Great Committee, recognizing that the management of the war was the main reason for its existence, co-opted two engineer officers of the old royal army, Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, on purpose to superintend this department on August 14. Great as were the services rendered to France by Carnot, who took for himself the special work of directing the movements of the armies, as opposed to Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, who concerned himself with the improvement and supply of war *matériel*, it must also be acknowledged that he had a most able body of advisers in the Topographical Committee.

The direction of ten armies, all acting on different frontiers, for the armies of the coasts of Cherbourg, Brest, and La Rochelle may at present be excluded from consideration, was more than any man could superintend alone, and it is therefore no wonder that Carnot had advisers; the wonder rather is that he should have been believed capable of so much, and that his advisers should have been so completely ignored. The Topographical Committee was officially presided over by the deputy Calon, whose genius for topography has been already referred to, and was really originated by him. It used to meet at his room in the War Office, and discuss the reports sent in from the various frontiers, and make suggestions upon them based upon a careful study of maps, and directed by the long experience in war of the officers assembled. In this office at a

¹ Appendix X., The Representatives on Mission.

later time Bonaparte and his future War Ministers, Clarke and Lacuée de Cessac, used to work and make suggestions, but during the Terror the most notable members of the Committee were two generals, whose birth was noble, and whose names were famous in the old royal army. Jean Claude Éléanore Michaud d'Arçon came of a good family in Franche Comté, and was born in 1733. He entered the engineers in 1751, and after serving in the Seven Years' War, had risen to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, when in 1780 he was charged with the engineering details of the siege of Gibraltar. His famous invention of the protected and bomb-proof sea batteries was not successful, owing to the energy of the English governor, General Elliot, who made use of red-hot shot, but it gave him the highest reputation in Europe as a military engineer. Yet in his own country he was only promoted colonel in 1782, and it was not until after the outbreak of the Revolution, in July, 1791, that he was promoted *maréchal-de-camp*, or major-general. He acquiesced in the proclamation of the Republic, and served as chief engineer with the army of the Alps from October, 1792, to February, 1793, when he joined Dumouriez and superintended the sieges of Breda and Gertruydenberg. He was promoted lieutenant-general in March, 1793. Carnot appointed this ornament of his own corps to be inspector-general of fortifications, a post which kept him in Paris and enabled him to give his valuable assistance to the Topographical Committee. The other famous officer who assisted Calon and Carnot was Marc René, Marquis de Montalembert, a man of eighty, twenty years older than d'Arçon. He entered the army in 1731, and after serving in the cavalry and the household troops, he had attained the rank of *maréchal-de-camp* in 1761. It was not so much as a soldier, but as a mathematician and military engineer that Montalembert was celebrated, and his works on the latter subject had become text-books. He had retired from the army in 1783, at the age of seventy, but the perils of his country brought him back to work again, and on September 27, 1793, he was placed on the active list by Bouchotte, and attached to the Topographical Committee.

These were Carnot's chief advisers in Paris; it remains to be seen how he was served at the front. The representatives on mission with the armies were of the same type as the deputies on mission who established the Terror in the provinces. They were by no means all officers of the old army; most of them were *avocats*, who had never seen a shot fired in their lives, yet they all showed themselves steady under fire, and many of them gave evidence of real heroism. The gallant deeds of Merlin of Thionville and Rewbell in the defence of Mayence and in La Vendée have been already mentioned, and allusion has also been made to the courage and military qualities of certain other deputies in La Vendée, such as Bourbotte, Choudieu, and Richard.¹ In inspiring the most obstinate defence of the French fortresses besieged by the enemy, they were especially successful, and the deputies Briez and Cochon de Lapparent in Valenciennes, Berlier and Trullard in Dunkirk, Drouet in Maubeuge, and Dentzel in Landau, deserve to be compared with the defenders of Mayence. The dangers which they had to run were not slight; Fabre of the Hérault was killed in one of the battles on the Spanish frontier, Duquesnoy and Chasles were wounded when with the army of the North, and Drouet was taken prisoner in trying to break out of Maubeuge. The deputies with the armies had to bear all responsibility: it was to them that the generals in command made their complaints, that the officers made their suggestions and the soldiers grumbled; they had to provide ammunition, food, and clothing; they had to see that the generals obeyed the orders of the Great Committee, and had to watch them closely for the slightest sign of disloyalty to the Republic or of disobedience to the Committee, when they had to arrest them even at the head of their troops. The constant activity of mind and body displayed by the representatives may be imagined from this sketch of their multifarious duties, and the wonder is that so many men should have been found to do the work so well. These deputies on mission with the armies were drawn from the

¹ Vol. ii. chap. viii. p. 265.

same class as the deputies on mission in the provinces, that is, from the practical, hardworking men of the Marsh or the silent followers of the Mountain, and they were not talkers but men of resolution and courage. They, too, had to establish the Reign of Terror over the armies; the treason of Dumouriez made the Great Committee very cautious, and a general commanding was liable to be arrested and sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal at Paris, either for being defeated, or for being too flushed with victory, while the closest watch had to be kept on officers of all ranks for signs of any tendency of discontent with the Republic. Besides, representatives on mission with the armies had the supreme powers of deputies on mission in the provinces in the districts where they happened to be stationed. It was thus that Barras had his share in establishing the Reign of Terror at Marseilles and Toulon, Cavaignac in the department of the Landes, and Saint-Just at Strasbourg. Among the more famous deputies on mission with the armies were Duquesnoy, Bentabole, Levasseur of the Sarthe, Lacombe Saint-Michel, Delbrel, Richard and Choudieu, attached to the armies of the North and the Ardennes; Hentz, Milhaud, Ruamps, Richaud, Soubrany, J. B. Lacoste, and Baudot to the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle; Fabre of the Hérault, Cassanyes, Milhaud, and Soubrany to the army of the Eastern Pyrenees; Dartigoyte, Cavaignac, Garran de Coulon, Monestier of the Puy-de-Dôme, and Pinet to that of the Western Pyrenees; Albitte to the army of the Alps; and Barras, Saliceti, Ricord, and Augustin Robespierre to that of Italy.

But the deputies on mission with the armies were not the only deputies despatched from the Convention for military purposes. Thus eighty-two deputies had been sent out in March, 1793, to superintend the carrying out of the decree for the levy of 300,000 men, and for general recruiting purposes; sixteen more, including Alquier and Lakanal, were despatched in August, 1793, to requisition horses for the use of the army; several were sent at different times and to different districts under the direction of Prieur of the Marne

and Robert Lindet to provide provisions and clothing for the troops; and, lastly, certain deputies, with special knowledge and aptitudes, were sent to superintend the manufacture of guns and ammunition. Of the latter class might be mentioned Noël Pointe,¹ who had been an armourer and working iron-smith at Saint-Étienne, and sate in the Convention as deputy for the Rhone-et-Loire. He had been sent to his native town with Lesterpt-Beauvais to superintend the great cannon foundries there in the summer of 1793, but had returned to Paris when his colleague declared himself a federalist and sent arms to Lyons.² In October, 1793, he was again despatched by the Great Committee to establish and superintend cannon foundries in the central departments with his head-quarters at Nevers, and he remained there, doing useful work in a modest way, until September, 1794.

This, then, was the machinery with which the Great Committee carried on the great war, after supreme power had been granted to it. At the head of the military arrangements stood Carnot and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, advised by the Topographical Committee, well served by Bouchotte, the Minister for War, assisted in details of administration by the Military Committee of the Convention, and kept in touch with all the armies by the deputies on mission. The nine armies proposed by Dubois-Crancé in January, 1793, had grown into eleven armies in Barère's report of April 30, and into thirteen armies in Cambon's report of July 15,³ armies differing greatly in size and importance. They were reduced to ten at the close of the first Vendéan war, when the armies of the coasts of Brest and the coasts of La Rochelle were amalgamated as the army of the West. The army of the coasts of Cherbourg or of Normandy chiefly existed on paper; it was intended either to invade England or to resist an invasion by the English, and what troops did belong to it were stationed

¹ *Le Conventionnel Noël Pointe*, by L. Leouzon Le Duc, in the *Révolution française*, February-May, 1885.

² Vol. ii. pp. 267, 268.

³ See Appendix XI., *The Armies of the Republic*.

at various places along the seaboard and were not united. The armies of the North and of the Ardennes, though kept separate in their staffs, were yet under the command of one general; they formed the largest and best equipped body of troops under arms, who, having been constantly on active service for more than a year, had become excellent soldiers, and were the especial charge of Carnot. Next to them upon the frontier towards the south came in succession the armies of the Moselle and of the Rhine, which were in October, 1793 still kept separate, though soon to be joined together. Then came the weak army of the Alps, which occupied Savoy and kept guard towards Switzerland and Piedmont, and still further south the army of Italy, a fine body of men, which had been largely reinforced for the siege of Toulon. The remaining armies were those of the Eastern and Western Pyrenees, cantoned at each end of that range of mountains.

Of these armies the largest was that of the North and of the Ardennes joined, which had won the victories of Hondschöten and Wattignies, and had driven the English and Austrians out of France in October, 1793,¹ and which still remained in the following month under the command of Jourdan, the future Marshal of Napoleon. Jean Baptiste Jourdan was the son of a surgeon, and was born at Limoges in 1762. His father died in 1777, and he was sent to Lyons, where his uncle, a silk merchant, tried to bring him up to his own business. But the boy did not like commerce, and ran away in 1778 and enlisted in the Regiment of Auxerre. His regiment was at once ordered to America, and he served there in the American war of Independence until 1784. He then left the army and set up a draper's shop in the Rue des Taules at Limoges, as his uncle refused to help him. At the commencement of the Revolution, Jourdan was a happy and prosperous bourgeois, and had a profound disdain for politics; but his services as an old soldier were known to his fellow-citizens, and he was in consequence elected a lieutenant of the chasseurs, or *corps d'élite*, established in his native city in connection with the

¹ Vol. ii. p. 255.

National Guard in 1790. He must have become trusted and popular in this capacity, for when the demand for men for active service came he immediately volunteered, and in September, 1792, was elected colonel of the second volunteer battalion of the Haute-Vienne. He at once went to the front with his battalion, and distinguished himself throughout Dumouriez' Belgian campaigns, and especially at the battles of Jemmappes and Neerwinden, and afterwards under Dampierre and Custine at Famars and Cæsar's Camp. The deputies on mission noticed his military skill and bravery, and he was promoted by them general of brigade on May 27, and general of division on July 30, 1793. He was soon after appointed to the command of a corps of observation watching the Duke of York before Dunkirk; he commanded the centre column at the battle of Hondschooten, where he was wounded, and on September 5 was appointed by Carnot to command the army of the Ardennes, and on September 22 the army of the North. At the head of these armies he attacked the Austrians under the Prince of Coburg on October 15 and was repulsed, but on the following day he won the great victory of Wattignies, which relieved Maubeuge and drove the Austrians back to Belgium. Such was the man at the head of the armies of the North and the Ardennes during the winter of 1793. He absolutely refused to advance into Belgium, as he was ordered to do, in imitation of the campaign of Dumouriez, and even appeared before the Great Committee of Public Safety to insist on the necessity for going into winter quarters, and on the danger of pursuing the main army of the enemy, while the Austrians held the fortresses of Valenciennes, Condé, and Le Quesnoy. Carnot did not forget this opposition, and in January, 1794, Jourdan was superseded by General Pichegru. He retired to Limoges, and hung up his general's uniform in his draper's shop, while the armies of the North and the Ardennes remained in winter quarters until the arrival of their new commander-in-chief.

It was far otherwise with the armies of the Moselle and of the Rhine; their winter campaign brought out the merits

of two great generals, Hoche and Pichegru, and is further illustrated by the visit on mission of Saint-Just to Strasbourg. It will be remembered that Alexandre de Beauharnais was arrested on August 3, 1793, for not having made greater efforts to save Mayence,¹ and that Houchard was about the same time transferred to the army of the North.² The latter was succeeded in the command of the army of the Moselle by General Schauembourg, an old officer of the former royal army, who was dismissed as incompetent by the deputies on mission in September, 1793, and succeeded after an interval by a young general from the army of the North, named Lazare Hoche. This glory of the republican army was born at Montreuil on February 24, 1768, of extremely poor parents,³ and it was only by his ardent love of study that he learnt to read and write at all. Being a tall, handsome youth, and feeling a vocation for the army, he enlisted in the Gardes Françaises at the age of seventeen, and soon received the rank of sergeant. Allusion has already been made to his privations in these early days,⁴ but they did not last long, for on the commencement of the troubles in Paris in 1789, the Gardes Françaises became a body of paramount importance, and the popular young sergeant was a universal favourite. He took a leading part in all the stirring events in which the Gardes Françaises were engaged during that year, and when the regiment became the paid battalion of the National Guard of Paris,⁵ Hoche was appointed adjutant. When the war broke out he at once applied to go to the front, and as he was in every way qualified for a commission, he was appointed to a lieutenancy in the Regiment of Rouergue in June, 1792. He first saw service in the defence of Thionville, and so greatly distinguished himself during the advance into Belgium that

¹ Vol. ii. p. 256.

² Vol. ii. p. 254.

³ On Hoche, see *Vie de Lazare Hoche*, by Rousselin de Saint-Albin, 2 vols. (Paris : Year VI. (1799)) ; *Le Général Hoche*, by Hippolyte Durand (Paris : 1832) ; and *Hoche, sa Vie, sa Correspondance*, by A. Duchatellier (Paris : 1874).

⁴ Vol. i. p. 373.

⁵ Vol. i. p. 153.

General Leveneur took him on his staff as aide-de-camp, and he was promoted captain. This was the rank which he held when he brought to Paris the news of the desertion of Dumouriez,¹ and his conduct, as well as his military abilities, as manifested in a plan of campaign which he submitted, were so highly thought of by the Committee of Public Safety and the War Minister, that he was nominated adjutant-general and sent in that capacity to Dunkirk. He did important service in Souham's defence of that city against the English,² and his bravery was so conspicuous in the battle of Hondschöten that Berlier and Trullard, the deputies on mission, nominated him general of brigade on September 15. His military reputation stood so high, and his patriotism was so well known in Paris, that he was selected by the Convention, on the news of the disasters in Alsace, for the command of the army of the Moselle, and arrived at its head-quarters on October 31, 1793.

The army of the Rhine had also at last got an efficient chief. Alexandre de Beauharnais had been succeeded first by Landremont, an officer of the former royal army, and then by Carle, another old general, who had in the first campaign of the war commanded the division invading Belgium, along the coast from Dunkirk.³ He also proved to be inefficient, and after the loss of the lines of Wissembourg, was superseded by Pichegru. Charles Pichegru was quite as remarkable a man as Hoche, and, like him, had served in the old royal army. He was the son of a labourer at Arbois in the Jura, and was born on February 16, 1761. He was educated at the college of Arbois, and showed such ability that his tutor took him to the military school at Brienne, and got him an ushership there. But Pichegru did not care for being an usher; and in 1783 he enlisted in the First Regiment of Artillery, with which he served in America, and in which he rose with extreme rapidity to be sergeant and adjutant-sous-officier. When the Revolution commenced, he was quartered at Besançon, and at once became a political personage and

¹ Vol. ii. p. 230.

² Vol. ii. p. 254.

³ Vol. ii. p. 77.

president of the local Jacobin club. From his position in the army he was unable to enter the National Guard, but when the war broke out, he promptly left his regiment, and accepted the lieutenant-colonelcy of the first battalion of the volunteers of the Gard, to which he was unanimously elected as the battalion passed through Besançon on its way to the front. He soon distinguished himself and was promoted, in rapid succession, colonel, general of brigade, and, on October 4, 1793, general of division. He was known throughout the army not only as an able officer, but also as a violent politician and an ardent republican, and this latter cause doubtless had much to do with his selection by the representatives on mission, on October 27, to take command of the army of the Rhine.

It now remains to be seen what were the disasters which Hoche and Pichegru had to remedy by a winter campaign, and to examine the famous mission of Saint-Just and Le Bas to Alsace, which had as great an influence upon the armies and the military situation in that quarter, as the visit of Carnot to the north-eastern frontier. The loss of Mayence had inaugurated a series of disasters. The Prussian army, which had taken that city, was exhausted, and the generals who commanded it were very unwilling to advance into France for the second time. This unwillingness was caused as much by political as military motives, for the Prussian generals were almost all opposed to the war with France; they believed that they were being used to serve the private ends of Austria, and looked on France as their natural ally, and, in spite of the wishes of King Frederick William, the Prussians satisfied themselves with occupying the position of Kaiserslautern. But if the Prussians did not take full advantage of the capture of Mayence, the Austrians were not slow to do so. Covered by Mayence, a powerful Austrian army, under Marshal Würmser, invaded Alsace. It was everywhere successful: the lines of Pirmasens were carried on September 14, Haguenau was occupied and Landau blockaded, and on October 13, just three days before the battle of

Wattignies, Marshal Würmser carried the famous lines of Wissembourg, the main defence of Alsace, and then formed the siege of Bitche, the fortress which covered the road through the Vosges into France. It is not difficult to account for these defeats of the French; all the best troops of the army of the Moselle were removed to the army of the North, and the picked men of the army of the Rhine had been left in Mayence. These men, as has been said, were bound not to serve again for one year against the allies by the terms of the surrender, and the remainder of the army of the Rhine was weak and disorganized. Alexandre de Beauharnais had shown neither military nor administrative ability; his battalions of volunteers were left scattered over Alsace, and no attempt had been made to form them into an army, and the condition of the army of the Moselle was even worse. Upon these disorganized battalions came the shock of Würmser's trained columns, and it was no wonder that the Austrians won victory after victory.

The news of the Austrian invasion of Alsace caused a profound sensation in Paris; and the Great Committee of Public Safety, understanding the critical position of affairs in the east, despatched one of its members, Saint-Just, together with a young friend of his, a deputy of the Pas-de-Calais, Philippe Le Bas, with supreme powers to the scene of the disasters. The pair reached Strasbourg on 3 Brumaire (October 24), and by their vigour soon changed the aspect of affairs. The first thing was to reinvigorate the army. This was done by appointing Pichegru, a general who had inspired the soldiers with confidence by his conduct during the foregoing year, to the command-in-chief of the army of the Rhine, and then by establishing a supreme military tribunal on 5 Brumaire (October 26) to restore discipline. This tribunal passed some severe but necessary sentences, of which the sentence of death on a general officer, General Eisenberg, for running away at the skirmish of Bischwiller, is the most remarkable, and a test of its efficiency is to be seen in the repulse of the Austrians from Saverne on the very next day.

Saint-Just and Le Bas were not content to throw all responsibility on the tribunal; they looked into everything with their own eyes; and among other things issued orders that the soldiers should always sleep dressed to be ready for surprises, and that the officers should be obliged to live in tents like their men, while they degraded an adjutant-general named Perdieu to the ranks for leaving his post and going to the theatre. But Saint-Just felt that more than punishment was necessary to restore efficiency. The best disciplined army in the world can do nothing without provisions and clothes. To meet these requirements, Saint-Just requisitioned 10,000 pairs of shoes and 2000 beds from Strasbourg, and on 10 Brumaire (October 31) levied a contribution of nine millions of francs from the rich men of the city. He also quashed the municipality of Strasbourg, except the mayor Monet, and the administration of the department of the Bas-Rhin on 13 Brumaire (November 3), and established revolutionary government, that is, the Reign of Terror. This energy was followed by a combined forward movement of the armies of the Moselle and the Rhine, signalized by victories won by Hoche on November 16, and by Pichegru on November 18. Bitche, which had been gallantly defended by Oudinot, a retired sergeant of the royal army, who had been elected colonel of the third battalion of volunteers of the Meuse, was relieved on 1 Frimaire (November 21), when Saint-Just returned to Paris for three days to consult with his colleagues.

The history of the Reign of Terror in Alsace and Strasbourg was purposely omitted in discussing the Terror in the provinces, because the situation was different there, and because Saint-Just differed greatly from the ordinary proconsul, owing to his position as a member of the Great Committee. The peculiar circumstances of Strasbourg as a German-speaking and Protestant town, the eagerness with which its possession was coveted by the House of Austria, and the plot of the émigrés to gain a footing in it, have been already noted,¹ and it need hardly be said that its attitude towards the Re-

¹ Vol. i. pp. 188, 189; vol. ii. pp. 36-38.

public was now more important than ever since the Austrians were in Alsace. Spies of all nations were at work there, and secret emissaries alike of the émigrés and of the great powers spent money freely in bribery and corruption. Party spirit had run high, and Dietrich, the patriotic mayor, in whose house the Marseillaise had first been played and sung, was overthrown by a young Savoyard named Monet. Two parties appeared, each of which bid high for popular support and professed democratic opinions. Of these parties the one was French, full of admiration for Paris and the Convention, the other German, and desirous of the establishment of the city either as an independent Republic, or as the basis of a Rhenish Republic, in which it should be united with Mayence, Spires, Worms, etc. This latter party was naturally the most powerful in a German-speaking city, and it is creditable to the vigour of the young French deputy on mission that it should have been so quickly overthrown by the nomination of a new municipality. The leaders of this Germanizing party were the Prussian Baron Klauer, the Baron Frei, a son of the Prince of Hesse, the printer Cotta, and Euloge Schneider. The last-named was certainly the most remarkable man of the four. Born at Wipfeld, near Würzburg, in 1756, he had been in turn a Franciscan monk at Bamberg, Professor of Hebrew at Augsburg, court preacher to the Duke of Wurtemberg, and Professor of Greek in the University of Bonn. His eloquence had made him famous as a preacher, as had his edition of Anacreon as a scholar, when his evil fortune brought him to France. He was induced to come to Strasbourg by Dietrich in order to counteract the influence of the German preachers sent into Alsace by the Cardinal de Rohan to attack the Revolution. He was appointed grand-vicar of the diocese and dean of the faculty of theology in the University of Strasbourg, by Brendel, the constitutional bishop of the Bas-Rhin; but he would not confine himself to theology, and threw himself into politics. He became the leading speaker in the "Miroir" Club, and edited a German journal entitled the *Argus*. This accomplished preacher and scholar was sure to

make his mark in those stirring times; he threw off his orders and became a member of the municipality of Strasbourg in November, 1791, mayor of Haguenau in October, 1792, and public accuser to the criminal tribunal of the Bas-Rhin in January, 1793. He played a conspicuous part in local politics, and when the representatives on mission, on October 20, 1793, established a revolutionary army of 1000 men to be accompanied in its travels through Alsace by a revolutionary commission and a guillotine, the "Marat of Strasbourg," as Schneider was called, was appointed commissioner and practically chief of the expedition. While on this tour, during which Schneider established the Reign of Terror in Alsace and his commission condemned thirty-three persons to death, he married a Mdle. Stamm, at Barr, under romantic circumstances,¹ and he re-entered Strasbourg in a coach drawn by six horses, escorted by the National Guard of Barr. Saint-Just on the next day returned from Paris, whither he had gone to report the relief of Bitche and the renewal of the campaign, and was at once informed of Schneider's tour in Alsace. Saint-Just had deliberately established the Reign of Terror in Alsace, but he had no love for ferocity and injustice; he was disgusted to see the way in which Schneider abused his power, and was not sorry to have a good and popular reason for overthrowing the ablest man of the German party. On 24 Frimaire, therefore, he had the Marat of Strasbourg arrested and exposed on the guillotine, and then despatched him to Paris, where he was executed on 11 Germinal (April 1, 1794).² The quashing of the administration of the Bas-Rhin, and of the municipality of Strasbourg, the arrest of Schneider, and the establishment

¹ See Charles Nodier's *Souvenirs de la Révolution* for this story, and the more correct version of it in *L'Alsace: Récits Historiques d'un Patriote*, by Édouard Siebecker (Paris: 1873), on the former of which Thackeray based his "Story of Marie Ancel" in the *Paris Sketch-Book*.

² On the Terror in Strasbourg and Alsace, see the various works of F. C. Heitz; Ludwig Spach's *Histoire de Basse Alsace*; Véron-Réville's *Histoire de la Révolution dans le Haut-Rhin* (Paris: 1865); *Strasbourg pendant la Révolution*, by E. Seinguerlet (Paris: 1881); and Wallon's *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. v. pp. 297-401.

of friends of the Republic in office, secured Alsace, and removed the most pressing internal danger; and even in small matters Saint-Just and Le Bas tried to rally the people to France, as, for instance, by the following decree, issued by them on 24 Brumaire (November 14): "The citizenesses of Strasbourg are invited to give up wearing clothes made according to the German fashions, since their hearts are French."¹

The vigour of Saint-Just and Le Bas broke the power of the German party in Strasbourg, and the Terror which they established awed the inhabitants of Strasbourg and Alsace, who objected to the Revolution, into submission. The campaign proceeded favourably; Hoche indeed failed to drive the Prussians from Kaiserslautern on 8, 9, 10 Frimaire (November 28, 29, 30), but the vigour of his attack so impressed the enemy that he was allowed to re-occupy Pirmasens, Hornbach, and Deux-Ponts. On 2 Nivôse (December 22) Pichegru defeated the Austrians in front of Haguenau; on 3 and 4 Nivôse Hoche won victories at Wörth and Reichshoffen, and Baudot and J. B. Lacoste on the latter day gave the successful general the supreme direction of Pichegru's army in addition to his own command. On 6 Nivôse (December 26), at the head of the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle, Hoche won a great victory at Geisberg, which drove the Austrians from the lines of Wissembourg, and on 8 Nivôse (December 28) he relieved Landau, which had been gallantly defended by General Labaudère and Dentzel, the representative on mission. These successes freed Alsace from the invaders, and Saint-Just returned to Paris, whither he speedily summoned Pichegru, who was nominated to succeed Jourdan at the army of the North, when the latter opposed the idea of a winter campaign in that quarter. Saint-Just and Le Bas left able representatives on mission with the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle, of whom the best known were Baudot and J. B. Lacoste, the steady friends of Hoche, who with the latter army drove the Prussians out of their strong position of Kaiserslautern on 13 Nivôse (January 2, 1794), and occupied Worms. The Great

¹ Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. v. p. 328.

Committee nominated an old soldier named Michaud to succeed Pichegru in command of the army of the Rhine, who justified his appointment by taking Fort Vauban on 29 Nivôse (January 18, 1794). The history of this campaign is characteristic of the success of the Great Committee of Public Safety; its members knew what they wanted, and used the supreme powers with which they were entrusted with vigour and discretion, as was shown by Carnot and Saint-Just. The latter's mission is most notable; it not only reinvigorated the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle, but crushed the German party in Strasbourg and Alsace, and in the course of the Revolution that great province became more and more French in feeling, and felt itself more and more identified with France.

The next army in geographical order was the army of the Alps, which was commanded by many different generals during the winter of 1793,¹ and was allowed to become numerically the weakest of all the frontier armies. Montesquiou, after his conquest of Savoy,² had been succeeded by Kellermann, whose best troops had been taken from him to share in the campaigns against Lyons and Marseilles.³ The bulk of this army remained cantoned along the frontier of Savoy, but it did not attempt to cross the Alps and enter Piedmont. One reason for this was to be found in its weakness, and another in the fact that none of its generals had daring enough to commence further offensive warfare, while the King of Sardinia showed no signs of invading Savoy, and the Great Committee regarded the other frontiers as in a far more critical situation. The duty of this army was to watch the movements of the Piedmontese and of the Swiss, and it was with regard to the latter country that its most important functions were performed.

Switzerland, as a neutral country, was the centre of all intrigue and the head-quarters of the French foreign policy, and the Swiss frontier was the only one on which there was no war. In Switzerland, therefore, assembled crowds of

¹ Appendix XL, The Armies of the Republic.

² Vol. ii. p. 195.

³ Vol. ii. pp. 268, 269.

émigrés of the different migrations, from the old royalists to the escaped Girondins, such as Dulaure, of whom the most eminent was the man who had been Duc de Chartres and General Égalité, the eldest son of the Duke of Orleans, who was one day to be King Louis Philippe, but who was now happy to be a teacher of mathematics at Lausanne. The royalist intrigues all centred round Mr. Wickham, the English Minister Resident at Berne, who disposed of vast sums of money in the attempt to combine operations against the Republic both within and without France.¹ The republican intrigues centred round M. Barthélemy, the Minister of the Republic at Basle, whose great effort was to open friendly relations with Prussia, and who had indeed managed so well with Marshal Möllendorf, that the Prussian general had opposed the invasion of France after the capture of Mayence. Switzerland was also crowded with minor agents of the Republic, who were sent there to purchase food. Owing to the neutrality of Switzerland, the idea of a blockade of France was utterly frustrated; England might blockade the ports, the neighbouring powers might carefully close all communications, but through Switzerland the French Republic was able to get all the supplies it needed. A large proportion of the money coined out of church plate and other articles of value went to Switzerland, where the inhabitants were quite willing to receive it. Switzerland, by itself, could not have met all the needs of France, but, as has been already² pointed out, the South German princes were by no means hostile to the Revolution. They hated Austria, and under the influence of their ministers, who were generally *illuminati*, and inclined to the new ideas, they utterly refused to stop the flow of food into Switzerland for sale to the Republic. France therefore counted, not in vain, on the resources of Bavaria and the neighbouring states to supply her needs for corn, cattle, and other commodities in exchange for ready money, a circumstance which made this period of war

¹ See *Correspondence and Journals of the Right Hon. William Wickham*, vols. ii. and iii.

² Vol. ii. pp. 36, 69, 70.

most profitable to the Swiss and South German farmers and peasants. The policy of the army of the Alps was therefore to watch and in every way to avoid hurting the susceptibilities of the rulers of the Swiss cantons.

The operations of the army of Italy were like those of the army of the Alps, rather employed against internal enemies than foreign foes. The occupation of Nice by General Anselme,¹ and the quarrel between General Brunet and the representatives on mission,² have been already referred to, but the most important operations of this army during the remainder of 1793 were those directed against Toulon. There had been many disturbances in this city, which was the chief port of the French navy in the Mediterranean, and the revolt of the dockyard and arsenal workmen against their official superiors³ had ended in favour of the former. Their ascendancy was most distasteful to the bourgeois of Toulon, and of course to the numerous naval and administrative officers, who found themselves reduced to the degrading position of being subject to the caprices of their workmen. Their situation was not improved after the proclamation of the Republic, when the last vestiges of authority were taken from the bourgeois. They bore with impatience the visits of the various representatives on mission, and at last, on August 3, 1793, acting under the influence of some royalist officers, they seized and imprisoned two deputies on mission, Pierre Baille and Beauvais des Préaux, hoisted the white flag in the name of Louis XVII., and invited Admiral Lord Hood, the English Admiral commanding in the Mediterranean, to come to their assistance. The English Admiral, who was cruising with the Spanish Admiral, Don Juan de Langara, blockading the Mediterranean ports of France, and studying where he could strike a blow, at once accepted the invitation and entered the port with the two allied fleets. He at once hoisted the English flag on certain of the outlying forts, while Langara hoisted that of Spain on the remainder, and issued a proclamation stating that he

¹ Vol. ii. p. 196.

² Vol. ii. p. 257.

³ Vol. i. pp. 398-401.

took possession of the town for King George III., to hold for his Majesty King Louis XVII. This proclamation greatly offended the royalists, because it made no mention of the émigré princes, Monsieur and the Comte d'Artois, and held out as a pretext for excluding them the name of the son of Louis XVI., the little prisoner in the Temple. Hood and Langara permitted the townspeople to govern themselves, with the natural result of perpetual quarrels between the royalist officers and the bourgeois, and looked only after the defence of the city. Hood brought three regiments from Gibraltar, one of them, the 52nd, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel, afterwards General Sir, John Moore, and placed them under the command of Major-General Lord Mulgrave, who happened to be a visitor on board his ship, and who took another visitor, Mr. Thomas Graham, afterwards General Lord Lynedoch, as his aide-de-camp, while Langara brought over a corps of 3000 men from Barcelona. Mulgrave was succeeded, first by General David Dundas, and then by General O'Hara, and these three generals defended Toulon for nearly five months. The news of the occupation by the English and Spaniards of the chief port of the French Mediterranean fleet was received with fury by the Convention and the Great Committee of Public Safety, who directed the deputies on mission to make special efforts against it. Barras and his colleagues brought up the corps d'armée of 3300 men, with which Carteaux had taken Marseilles, under that general, at the end of August, but as this division was not strong enough to commence offensive operations, they ordered the greater part of the army of Italy from the frontier under the command of General Lapoype. The representatives on mission with the army before Toulon were all men of vigour and decision, namely, Barras, Albitte, Saliceti, Gasparin, Fréron, Ricord, and Augustin Robespierre; they promptly replaced Carteaux by Dugommier, who had played such an important part in the events of the Revolution at Martinique,¹ and who had afterwards sat in the Legislative Assembly as deputy for that

¹ Vol. i. p. 524.

island, and on September 18, 1793, the three former signed the appointment of Captain Napoleon Bonaparte, of the 4th Regiment of Artillery, to be *chef de bataillon* commanding the siege artillery in chief. This appointment he undoubtedly owed to his compatriot Saliceti, who was deputy for Corsica, and who answered for the young Corsican's republicanism, as shown in the brochure he had recently published at Sabin Tournai's presses in Avignon,¹ the "*Souper de Beaucaire.*" In this brochure he had discussed the state of France in the form of a dialogue between two Jacobins, with, as may be judged from the printer's name, most revolutionary and republican sentiments. The arrival of reinforcements from the army of Italy brought up the numbers of the besieging army to 8000 men, a number quite inadequate to form the siege of Toulon, while a blockade was, of course, useless, as the English fleet commanded the sea. It was therefore thought that it would be necessary to storm the city, until Bonaparte pointed out that the capture of a series of forts on the neck of land, which formed one of the sides of the port, would give the French artillery the command of the harbour, and force the English and Spanish ships to retire. This series of forts commenced with the village of Ollioules and continued to a new fort, called Fort Victory, which had just been erected on the edge of the harbour. The deputies on mission then ordered an attack on Ollioules, and for more than a month there was perpetual fighting there. On November 2 the Spaniards were driven out of the village, but on the following day it was recovered by the English at the point of the bayonet. Bonaparte then concentrated his artillery on the spot, and on November 27 announced that it was time for another assault. The English soldiers made a brave defence: their general, O'Hara, was taken prisoner by Colonel Suchet, and they lost eight officers and a hundred and thirty men in killed and wounded; but the village and its outworks were eventually carried. General Dundas perceived the importance of this loss, and he judged it advisable to abandon the city

¹ Vol. i. p. 510.

under cover of the forts still held by the allies, instead of waiting for them also to be stormed. Lord Hood, whose relations with Langara had been anything but pleasant, and who had been urged by the English Government to occupy some permanent position in the Mediterranean, as the headquarters of the fleet, gladly complied. His ships all needed repairs; his base of operations was as far distant as Gibraltar; and Hood was anxious to take possession of Corsica, where the Paolist party had already made overtures to him. He therefore made preparations to retire; as many of the royalists, who feared the vengeance of the republican army, as possible were taken on board the English and Spanish ships, and on December 17 the allied fleets sailed out of the harbour, and waited for the completion of a dangerous and difficult operation entrusted to Captain Sidney Smith of H.M.S. *Tigre*, namely, the setting fire to all the completed and uncompleted ships of the French Mediterranean squadron in Toulon dockyard, which the allies could not man or take away. Sidney Smith partially accomplished his task; the republican army stormed the remaining forts, and on 29 Frimaire (December 29) entered the city. The punishment inflicted on the city by the deputies on mission has been mentioned;¹ the rewards given to the two men who had been most instrumental in the success of the siege, were that Dugommier was appointed to the command of the army of the Eastern Pyrenees, and that Bonaparte was promoted to be general of brigade, and nominated to the command of all the artillery attached to the army of Italy. That army had remained in a watching attitude along the Maritime Alps, under the command of Dumerbion, and could do nothing, while the best troops belonging to it were serving at the siege of Toulon, at the conclusion of which a large portion of the successful army was despatched to the army of the Eastern Pyrenees, under Dugommier, to drive the invading Spaniards out of Roussillon.²

¹ Vol. ii. p. 380.

² On the siege of Toulon and the events which led up to and followed it, see *Précis Historique sur les événements de Toulon en 1793*, by the Baron

It was to Corsica that Hood proceeded after parting with the Spanish fleet and revictualling at Elba, and it is interesting to see what had been the history of that island since the termination of the riots of 1790.¹ Paoli had returned in a blaze of triumph with the royal commission as lieutenant-general, and Corsica had been regularly organized as a French department, with the elaborate local institutions devised by the Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless there remained the two parties: the Paolists, who yearned for the entire independence of the island, and the young Corsican party, led by Saliceti. The situation became more and more acute during the year 1792; the Paolists managed to occupy all the most influential posts in the local administration, and among others that of commandant of the National Guard of Ajaccio, for which Lieutenant Napoleon Bonaparte had been a candidate, and his rejection had thrown him into the arms of the young Corsican party and had made him an ardent supporter of the French connection and of Saliceti. This most able man had succeeded Aréna as procureur-général-syndic of Corsica when the latter was elected to the Legislative Assembly; but all his efforts to strengthen the French party were in vain, and when the election of deputies to the Convention took place, in September, 1792, the Paolists caused the electoral assembly to be held at Corte, their stronghold, and though they could not prevent the election of Saliceti, they gave him, as colleagues, a group of federalists, who all sat among the Girondins, and of whom four, Andrei, Moltedo, Chiappe, and Casabianca, an ex-officer of the royal navy, who was afterwards killed at the battle of the Nile, signed the protest of the seventy-three. In

d'Imbert (Paris: 1816); *La Révolution de Toulon en 1793 pour le rétablissement de la Monarchie*, by the Baron de Brécy (Paris: 1828); *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de la Ville de Toulon en 1793*, by A. Pons (Paris: 1825); *Histoire Maritime de la France*, by Léon Guérin, vol. vi. chap. i.; and for the military details, from both the English and French point of view, see *Life of Lord Lynedoch*, by Major A. M. Delavoye, chap. iii. (London: 1878), and Iung's *Histoire de Bonaparte*, vol. ii. chap. iv.

¹ Vol. i. chap. xvi. p. 474-476.

Corsica itself party feeling ran still higher after the proclamation of the Republic and the commencement of the general war; the friends of Paoli thought there was no reason why Corsica should be involved in the war, and recurred to their favourite idea of an independent Corsican Republic. The failure of the expedition directed against Cagliari, the capital of Sardinia, in January, 1793, made them argue that France was not strong enough to protect Corsica; Aréna denounced Paoli to the Convention as the cause of this failure; he was "decreed of accusation," and an insurrection immediately broke out. On June 26 the establishment of a Corsican Republic was solemnly proclaimed at Corte, with Paoli as president, and within a week the French garrisons were driven from every town except Bastia and Calvi. In July Paoli wrote to Lord Hood requesting help; his letter was forwarded to England, where his overtures were favourably received; and when he left Toulon the English admiral was directed to occupy Corsica. His first task was to besiege Bastia and Calvi, which were bravely defended by the deputy on mission, Lacombe-Saint-Michel, but were eventually stormed by the British sailors under the command of Captain Horatio Nelson, who lost an eye at Calvi. The British occupation was not followed by any cessation of the internal dissensions. The Paolists insisted on their Republic, and it may incidentally be remarked that Colonel John Moore was ordered to leave the island for sympathizing with them;¹ but eventually a new party, which had sprung up amongst the Paolists, headed by Pozzo di Borgo, won the day, and the crown of Corsica was offered to George III. He accepted it, and was solemnly proclaimed King of Corsica, and the English ministers appointed Sir Gilbert Elliot, afterwards Earl of Minto, as viceroy, who ruled in that island, until the victories of Napoleon Bonaparte in Italy, in 1796, made it necessary for the English to abandon Corsica.

The war against Spain, though its importance was some-

¹ *Life of Sir John Moore*, by his brother, vol. i. p. 156.

what dwarfed by the greatness of Pichegru, Hoche, and Jourdan, and their defeats of the English, Prussians, and Austrians, none the less caused much anxiety to the rulers of the Republic. The succession of generals in command of the armies of the Eastern and Western Pyrenees¹ from De Flers to Dugommier and from Servan to Müller is most confusing, and the deputies on mission, though only too ready to cashier generals and send them to Paris to be tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal, were unable to effect the thorough change in the position of affairs effected by Carnot and Saint-Just in other quarters. General d'Aoust, at the head of the army of the Eastern Pyrenees, by winning a victory at Peyrestortes on October 1, relieved Perpignan, and kept the Spaniards in the mountainous southern districts of Roussillon, where they spent their strength in besieging Port-Vendres, Fort St. Elmo, and Collioure, at the capture of which latter place a deputy on mission, Fabre of the Hérault, was killed. To remedy these disasters, Dugommier came across, in January, 1794, with some disciplined battalions from Toulon, and two able deputies on mission, Milhaud and Soubrany, were attached to him. General and deputies alike showed the greatest energy in reorganizing the army. A military commission was appointed, which condemned many officers to death, and Dugommier, ably seconded by such generals as Augereau, Perignon, and Victor, the future marshals of Napoleon, dashed across Roussillon, masking the lost fortresses, and turned the tables on the Spaniards by invading Catalonia.² The succession of generals in the army of the Western Pyrenees was at first quite as rapid as in that of the Eastern Pyrenees, but in October, 1793, the deputies on mission, Monestier, Pinet, and Cavaignac, found a general to their taste in Jacques Louis Müller, who had been a captain in the German Regiment of Courten, and they retained him in command for more than a year. He did not attempt much at first beyond storming a Spanish fortified camp in front of

¹ See Appendix XI., *The Armies of the Republic.*

² *Les Campagnes de la Révolution Française dans les Pyrénées-Orientales.* by Colonel Fervel, 2 vols : Paris.

Bayonne and driving the enemy back on Irun, and devoted the winter to training and disciplining his army with the help of Moncey, the future marshal of Napoleon.

From this sketch of the history of the achievements of the armies of the Republic during the winter of 1793, it will be seen that no attempt was made to place ignorant men like Ronsin and Rossignol to oppose trained armies. The first generals of the Republic were generally members of the liberal noblesse and ex-Constituants, like Custine, Montesquiou, and Alexandre de Beauharnais. Then came a series of general officers, chosen from the officers of the old royal army, such as Dampierre, Kilmaine, Houchard, Carle, and Schauembourg, who were in their turn replaced in the command of the three most important armies by men who had been in the ranks, before the Revolution, like Hoche, Jourdan, and Pichegru. The same was to be observed with regard to the advancement of subordinate generals; promotion indeed was rapid, but the rank of a general officer was seldom granted except to those who had served in the royal army in some capacity. The prevalent suspicion of aristocrats, which lay at the foundation of the "law of the suspects," and assumed that men of noble birth must necessarily be inclined to be traitors to the Republic and to France, affected the judgment of even the wisest statesmen of the Great Committee and of the ablest representatives on mission. Generals, not only generals commanding in chief, such as Biron and D'Aoust, but generals of division and of brigade, were often dismissed, and even arrested and sent to Paris to be tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal, in spite of their services and tried attachment to the Republic, on account of their birth, to the great detriment of the efficiency of the armies. Hoche, for instance, complained bitterly when he was deprived of the services of his best staff officer, General d'Hedouville, on this account, and he certainly had no affection for traitors or aristocrats. This prejudice, however, chiefly affected generals, and was based on the recollection of the desertions of Lafayette and Dumouriez, for the dearth of good regimental officers was too great for it to be put into general

application. Certain deputies on mission, like Duquesnoy with the army of the North, did indeed issue decrees, proscribing or ordering the arrest of all officers of noble birth of whatever rank; but the manifest absurdity of such wholesale measures prevented them from having any effect, and even in the height of the Terror, when it was dangerous to speak in favour of aristocrats, some men were to be found to protest against such exaggerated notions, as for instance André Dumont,¹ and Pinet and Cavaignac, the deputies on mission with the army of the Western Pyrenees.² A Reign of Terror was indeed established in the armies, but it affected not only suspected royalists and nobles, but rather cowards, men who refused to obey orders, and fraudulent commissaries; the ridiculous notion of the Constituent Assembly that soldiers were to be treated like ordinary citizens³ was utterly discarded, and discipline was restored in the French army and maintained by the Great Committee of Public Safety by the same stringent and effective, if in individual cases unjust and cruel, measures of Terror, which kept Paris and all France in peace and tranquillity.

It is interesting to notice in which armies of the Republic at this period the most famous French generals of the next twenty years of war made their reputations and won their first brevets as generals from the various deputies on mission, and the list of their names shows that merit was quickly perceived and rewarded by Carnot and his correspondents. Kléber and Marceau were among the defenders of Mayence, and were promoted to the rank of general during the Vendéan war; Moreau, Souham, Vandamme, and Macdonald won promotion in the army of the north; Bernadotte, Davout, and Ney in that of the Ardennes; Soult, Lefebvre, and Bessières in that of the Moselle; Desaix, Oudinot, and Gouvion Saint-Cyr in that of the Rhine; Bonaparte, Masséna, Laharpe, Suchet, Joubert, and Serrurier in that of Italy; Augereau, Perignon, and Victor in that of the Eastern Pyrenees; and

¹ Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, vol. iii. p. 389.

² *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 370.

³ Vol. i. p. 387.

Moncey, Frégeville, Harispe, and La Tour d'Auvergne in that of the Western Pyrenees. With such officers to command and to lead them, it is not to be wondered at that the mixed crowds of Frenchmen of different levies became in a short time trained and experienced soldiers. The best youth of France was serving on the frontiers; in the ranks there nobles and bourgeois found safety, peasants and artisans food and clothing. The change which the Great Committee of Public Safety brought about was not caused by the raising of larger armies, but by utilizing those already formed. The Convention had hurried plenty of men to the front, but had left them there in undisciplined, unarmed, and starving masses. The Great Committee altered this state of affairs: enormous public workshops and foundries were established, requisitions were enforced on every side of whatever might be of use, and France was treated as if it were one vast arsenal and provision store for its armies. Discipline was strictly maintained in these armies by the establishment of the Reign of Terror, and the punishment of death was inflicted on the slightest pretext. Unity of direction in the conduct of the war was secured by the presence of Carnot on the Great Committee, and the representatives on mission insisted on his orders being carried out, and were ready and able alike to support good generals and to degrade incapable or cowardly officers. But all this was not enough. The Great Committee could and did give the French armies every material means to secure success, but all would have been vain had not the soldiers themselves been inspired by the most ardent patriotism. In the summer of 1793 they had loved France, but had been disorganized and knew not where to look for guidance; by the winter they felt the effect of the strong government at home, and the knowledge added confidence to their bravery. In addition to patriotism, which moved the majority, the more capable and daring knew that there was before them the possibility of satisfying the most soaring ambition, for the rapid rise of men like Hoche and Pichegru encouraged the poorest private. All felt that the Republic had need of the gallantry of all her sons,

and those most fitted for command were conscious that in the time of danger their chance might come. For such an army, well equipped, well directed, and well commanded, fired alike by patriotism and ambition, only one thing was needed—that it should be homogeneous. This was secured by Dubois-Crancé's scheme of amalgamation, after which volunteers and national guards felt themselves to be as much soldiers of France as the enlisted regulars. Under these conditions the tide turned after the winter of 1793; there were no more invasions of France; the French in their turn became invaders.

What Dubois-Crancé, Carnot, and Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, with the assistance of the Topographical Committee and of the representatives on mission, and the hearty support of the Great Committee of Public Safety and of the Convention, did for the French army, Jean Bon Saint-André tried almost single-handed to do for the French navy.¹ But a new navy could not be formed with the same rapidity and success as a new army; Saint-André had not as good material to work upon as Dubois-Crancé, for the old French royal navy was practically destroyed. The officers of the *ancien régime*, and particularly those of the higher ranks, who were all nobles and generally Bretons or Normans, had either emigrated or resigned in disgust; the newly appointed officers, who were either drawn from the merchant service or too quickly promoted from the lower grades, were inexperienced in war; the crews of the ships in commission were mutinous; the dock-yards were in a state of chaos, and the fortified ports in a state of anarchy; only the vessels, and especially the frigates, remained of the French royal navy, unaffected by the Revolution, and testifying to the superiority of the French naval constructors. The policy of the Constituent Assembly and the Naval Constitution of 1791 had brought about this disastrous

¹ Guérin, *Histoire Maritime de la France*, vol. v.; *Histoire de la Marine Française sous la première République*, by E. Chevalier (Paris: 1886); *Histoire des Marins Français sous la République*, by Charles Rouvier (Paris: 1868); *Guerres Maritimes sous la République et sous l'Empire*, by Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, 2 vols. (Paris: 1864); *Histoire Générale de la Marine Française*, by Van Ténac, 4 vols. (Paris: 1853).

result.¹ The French royal fleets, as has been said, fought on equal terms with the English at sea in the eighteenth century; the new republican fleets were invariably beaten. What was the reason of this? It was not that the sailors of France are inherently inferior to those of England; the battles of D'Orvilliers and De Suffren prove the contrary; it was because discipline and experience are more necessary on board ship than in a regiment. The republicans of 1793, as well as the constitutionalists of 1791, failed to perceive this; both alike allowed the spirit of mutiny to grow to an alarming height in the navy, and all the efforts of Jean Bon Saint-André to create a successful fleet were thwarted by the habit of disobedience among the sailors and the want of experience among the officers.

The disorganization of the French navy, which began during the session of the Constituent Assembly, was not checked by the Legislative Assembly. The impunity enjoyed by the rioters at Toulon in spite of their behaviour towards Comte d'Albert de Rions,² encouraged them in their mutinous career. M. de Glandèves, the successor of D'Albert de Rions, was imprisoned by the workmen of the dockyard, and their lawless conduct reached its height on September 10, 1792, when, on the news of the massacres in the prisons of Paris, Rear-Admiral de Flotte, the naval commandant of the station of Toulon, and four captains in the royal navy, whose ships lay in the port, were cruelly murdered. Things went no better at Brest;³ Bougainville indeed put down a mutiny on board the *America*, but he was very glad to resign his command of that station, when the squadron put into commission there at the time of the apprehension of war with England in 1790, was disarmed in January, 1791. The pernicious interference of the people of Brest with the naval arrangements in the harbour still continued; and in November, 1791, a band of rioters prevented Captain de Lajaille from assuming the command of the *Duguay-Trouin*, to which he had been nominated.

¹ Vol. i. pp. 404-407.

² Vol. i. pp. 399-401.

³ Vol. i. pp. 401-403.

and forced him to fly for his life. The Legislative Assembly not only did not punish the ringleaders in this riot, but consented to quash the nomination of Captain de Lajaille, and appointed Captain Trogoff de Kerlessi, on the special recommendation of the municipality of Brest, to take his place. Neither the Constituent nor the Legislative Assembly did anything to reconcile the experienced officers of the old royal navy to the new order of things. The former at the very close of its session passed a decree, on September 21, 1791, placing the naval ports and the dockyards under purely civil administration, and the latter followed up this measure, on September 28, 1791, by excluding all naval officers from employment in the ministry of marine. Such naval policy as the Legislative Assembly pursued was directed by Kersaint, whose influence on the Naval Committee of the Constituent has been already alluded to,¹ and he allowed his zeal for innovations to outrun his desire to improve the condition of the service to which he belonged. He warmly approved of the Naval Constitution of 1791, of which he had been indeed the principal author, and the chief alteration which he introduced was the abolition of gunners in the navy, and the formation of a corps of marine artillery, commanded not by specially trained officers but by officers chosen from the ordinary field artillery. The policy of the Constituent and the Legislative Assemblies thoroughly disgusted the officers of the royal navy, and many of the most experienced men, who had refused to emigrate, nevertheless resigned their commissions, not from attachment to the royal family, but from a belief that the service was being utterly ruined. This spirit is exhibited in a letter, which Bougainville, one of the most famous sailors and navigators France ever produced, wrote to the Minister of Marine in 1792. "Sir," he wrote on the news of his promotion to be vice-admiral, "I have received the letter, which you have done me the honour to write to me, and the list of the new formation of the navy. My duty to my country forbids me, however, to accept a high rank, which would confer merely a title upon

¹ Vol. i. p. 405.

me *sans fonction*. Military discipline, that sacred discipline, without which no armed navy can possibly exist, is annihilated. A general officer cannot act without coadjutors, and I look in vain for men who unite with theory the knowledge of manœuvres and experience in war. After long patience on their part, the repeated excesses of insubordination consecrated by impunity have driven such men from the theatre of their labours. Be good enough, sir, to be the interpreter of my sentiments to His Majesty. I may add that I shall be most unhappy if I cannot devote my last days to the service of my country, and terminate my career in the service in which I commenced it.”¹

The meeting of the Convention found France at war with no great naval power, and the deputies concentrated their attention on the state of the armies without paying much heed to naval affairs. Yet they must have known that their proceedings were bound to lead to war with England, and that the former contest for the mastery of the seas would soon recommence. Only three naval officers were elected to the Convention, namely, Vice-Admiral Kersaint, by the department of the Seine-et-Oise; Rear-Admiral de Rochemore, who had sat in the Constituent Assembly and been a member of its Naval Committee, by the Tarn; and Captain Casabianca, by the island of Corsica; but they had among their colleagues a few men conversant with the sea, such as Jean Bon Saint-André, who had been captain of a merchant-ship before becoming a Protestant pastor, Jean Baptiste Nicolas Topsent, Louis Jacques Taveau, and Jean Jacques Breard. These deputies formed the nucleus of the Naval Committee of the Convention, and ought to have done the same work for the navy that the Military Committee did for the army. The Minister of Marine, with whom they had to act, was Monge, an eminent mathematician and an honest and upright administrator, who, however, showed none of the extraordinary energy which the desperate state of affairs demanded, and whose office was filled by

¹ Chevalier, *Histoire de la Marine Française sous la première République*, pp. 32, 33.

inexperienced civilians. On January 13, 1793, when war with England was imminent, the Convention ordered that a fleet of fifty-two vessels should be at once commissioned and got ready for sea, and it was not until then that the havoc wrought by three years of anarchy and insubordination became manifest. The workmen in the dockyards at Toulon and Brest, and in the smaller naval ports, received their orders, but preferred meeting in their clubs and denouncing aristocrats to working; the sailors were also busy in their democratic societies, and showed no eagerness to go to sea, and officers of experience were almost entirely lacking. Under these circumstances, Jean Bon Saint-André, who had been selected as reporter of the Naval Committee, came to the front. Some account of this remarkable man has already been given.¹ He, like the other statesmen of the Great Committee of Public Safety, only developed the knowledge of the arts of government and of administration after he had entered the Committee and had gained experience; and his first scheme for the re-organization of the navy, which was decreed by the Convention on March 18, 1793, teemed with absurdities. He mocked at the Naval Constitution of the Constituent Assembly,² not because of its weak point in substituting officers drawn from the merchant service for officers trained to fight at sea, but because it did not depend entirely on the merchant service. He proposed that, instead of having a body of officers regularly attached to the navy, and promoted by merit or length of service, all officers in future should be elected. He did not go so far as to suggest that the sailors of each frigate and ship of war should elect their own officers, as was the case with the battalions of volunteers and national guards, but propounded a scheme, by which all the merchant officers in every port and maritime district were to assemble and propose to the Minister of Marine a list of candidates for every grade whom they considered suitable, and the minister was bound to fill up all vacancies out of these lists. Jean Bon Saint-André, like the politicians of the Constituent Assembly, failed to

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 303, 304.² Vol. i. pp. 405-407.

understand that a long and laborious training, united with special aptitude, was needed to make a good naval officer. He, too, was led away by the example of the successful privateersmen of the seventeenth century, such as Jean Bart and Duguay-Trouin, who, he said, "were not great mathematicians, but who had the high courage and power of quick decision, which are the true evidences of talent in a sailor and which alone command success." And he added, inspired doubtless by the recollection of Jemmappes, and not yet knowing of the defeat of Neerwinden: "Our sailors, despising from calculation and reflection all scientific manœuvres, will, perhaps, consider it more suitable and more useful to fight always by boarding at once, in which method of fighting at sea the French have always been successful, and thus to astonish all Europe by fresh prodigies of bravery." The curious ignorance of the importance of naval tactics and of the need for trained officers, exhibited by Saint-André in this speech and in his scheme of naval re-organization, accounts for the failure of the French navy to do anything of importance for some months after the declaration of war against England; but it will be seen that, as a member of the Great Committee of Public Safety, experience taught him stern truths, and that he atoned for the absurdity of his words at this period by his energy and his determination to restore discipline during the Reign of Terror.

Before the war with England broke out on February 1, 1793, and the old naval struggle between the two great rivals began again, the French fleet in the Mediterranean took part in some important operations. Rear-Admiral Truguet, with five ships of the line, co-operated by sea in the capture of Nice, and on October 23, 1792, burnt the town of Oneglia, between Nice and Genoa, for harbouring privateers. This gave the sailors confidence, and in December, 1792, Captain Latouche-Tréville, an ex-Constituant, was sent with ten ships of the line and two frigates to make a demonstration against the city of Naples. Ferdinand IV., King of the Two Sicilies, was under the influence of his queen, Marie Caroline, a sister of Marie

Antoinette, and it need hardly be said that neither of them looked with favour on the rapid progress of the Revolution in France. It was alleged that their envoy at Constantinople, Ludolf, had advised the Sultan not to receive Huguet de Sémonville, who had been nominated as ambassador of the French Republic to the Porte, and on this pretext the squadron of Latouche-Tréville was despatched to Naples. He anchored in the bay on December 16, in spite of the protests of Acton, the prime minister, and the timid court of Naples at once gave in and promised to recall Ludolf, and to make a formal apology to the French Republic. Far less successful was the expedition to Sardinia, undertaken by Truguet and Latouche-Tréville in January, 1793. The Convention, full of its belief that all foreign countries wished to be delivered from their monarchs, decided to assist the Sardinians in winning their liberty. For this purpose the French Mediterranean fleet was ordered to carry about five thousand volunteers from Marseilles and the neighbouring towns to Cagliari, where they expected a cordial welcome. They were much deceived. The sailors and volunteers, by their turbulent conduct at Ajaccio, offended the people of Corsica; and when, instead of being welcomed, they were violently opposed when they attempted to land in Sardinia, the volunteers made no pretence of fighting, and the badly conceived and badly carried out expedition utterly failed.¹ Rear-Admiral Truguet was at once summoned to Paris, and it was fortunate for him that it was in the month of January, 1793, and not during the Reign of Terror, that his expedition had failed. He was succeeded in the command of the Mediterranean fleet by Trogoff de Kerlessi, the former friend of the municipality of Brest, who had since been promoted to the rank of rear-admiral, and during the spring and summer of 1793 discipline was conspicuous by its absence on board the ships of the republican navy stationed at Toulon.² The

¹ Chevalier, *Histoire de la Marine Française*, pp. 41-46; *Les Révolutionnaires et l'Expédition de Sardaigne*, 1792-93, by A. Guasco, in the *Revue de la Révolution* for February, 1884. . .

² Chevalier, *Histoire de la Marine Française, sous la première République*, pp. 58-65.

municipality of Toulon, which was under the influence of the advanced Jacobins, who had been the authors of all the riots since the days of Comte d'Albert de Rions, practically ruled the fleet; it secured the degradation and promotion on officers, and controlled the movements of the ships, and on May 28, 1793, it carried the tyranny of injustice so far as to cause Captain Basterot, of the *Melpomene*, to be shot for not putting to sea, although that unfortunate officer had done his very best to persuade his crew to obey him. Under these circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at, that Trogoft and his subordinate officers did not make a very sturdy resistance to the occupation of Toulon by the English and Spaniards under Lord Hood and Don Juan de Langara, in August, 1793, which destroyed the existence of the French Mediterranean fleet for the rest of the year. The siege of Toulon has already been described, but it must be noticed here that on September 13, 1793, the allies sent off to the Atlantic ports between five and six thousand French sailors, who had surrendered at Toulon, on board four French men-of-war, the *Orion*, *Apollon*, *Patriote*, and *Entreprenant*.

The outbreak of war with England caused great efforts to be made to send a fleet to sea from Brest, in order to protect the merchant ships coming from the French colonies in the West Indies, and in the month of March a small cruising squadron was despatched under the command of Vice-Admiral Morard de Galle. It was severely damaged by a storm, but it was not the weather so much as the mutinous behaviour of the men, which impressed the mind of the admiral. Part of his despatch of March 22, 1793, to the Minister of Marine deserves quotation, as showing how entirely the recent years of mutiny and insubordination had sapped the spirit of discipline in the French navy. "The spirit of the sailors is entirely lost," he wrote, "and until there is a change, nothing but reverses can be expected, even in engagements in which we have the superiority in force. The vaunted ardour which is so generally attributed to them is to be found solely in their constant use of the words 'patriot' and 'patriotism,' and in

their loud cries of 'Vive la nation! Vive la République!' when they have been well flattered. They show no inclination to do any good or to perform their duties."¹ Nevertheless, Morard de Galle put to sea again in the month of May, and cruised about with his fleet to protect commerce and keep the English from landing in La Vendée, without once meeting the Channel fleet under Lord Howe until August 26, 1793, when he put in to revictual at Quiberon Bay. The Committee of Public Safety ordered him to continue his cruise, as soon as he had refitted, but the sailors did not understand that a new and strong executive had been created; they mutinied at once, and in spite of the protests and orders of Tréhouart, the deputy of mission, they deliberately refused to obey, and sailed back into Brest on September 27.

The Great Committee was, however, not to be disregarded, as the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies had been, and at once sent two of its members, Jean Bon Saint-André and Prieur of the Marne, to Brest to restore discipline and efficiency. Jean Bon Saint-André, who chiefly acted with Breard, for Prieur of the Marne soon departed for La Vendée, saw that the insubordinate spirit could only be quelled by the exercise of unflinching severity. He began by ordering that the ships should not be allowed to communicate with each other or with the shore, and then ordered the arrest of three captains and several officers and sailors. But the arrival of the *Patroite* and the *Entreprenant* from Toulon gave him a better opportunity for establishing the Reign of Terror. He ordered every man on board those ships to be arrested, "for not having fought to the death against the occupation of Toulon by the English," and sent some of them to be tried and condemned by the Revolutionary Tribunal. He next reconstituted the Brest fleet. All the flag officers of the fleet of 1793 were removed; Vice-Admiral Morard de Galle was superseded, Rear-Admirals Le Large and Kerguelen were dismissed from the navy, and the resignation of Rear-Admiral Landais was accepted. He was equally severe with the captains, two of whom were dis-

¹ Chevalier, *op. cit.* p. 52

missed, three imprisoned at Brest, and two more sent to Paris to be tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal. To fill their places, he promoted Villaret-Joyeuse, Martin, Cornic, and Van Stabel, to be rear-admirals. Of these officers, the first-mentioned was a distinguished officer, whose gallantry had been noticed by the Bailli de Suffren, but who had only received his captaincy in 1791, while Martin and Cornic were only sub-lieutenants, and Van Stabel, an old merchant captain, had only re-entered the service, in that year. The captaincies of the ships were even more difficult to fill, owing to the extent of the emigration, and of the twenty-six ships forming the fleet under Villaret-Joyeuse in 1793, fourteen were commanded by lieutenants and sub-lieutenants of the old navy, nine by former captains of merchantmen, and two by old sailors and pilots. But it was not enough to reconstitute the *personnel* of the fleet, discipline had to be restored. For this purpose, Jean Bon Saint-André and Breard issued a decree at Brest, on November 20, 1793, containing a regular naval penal code, which was sanctioned by the Convention, and applied to the whole French navy on January 5, 1794. By this decree the strictest subordination was insisted upon, all the mutinous behaviour of the past four years was reprobated, and the punishment for disobedience, presenting petitions, or impertinence to superior officers, was death. Further, at the demand of the Committee of Public Safety, the Convention decreed the penalty of death against any municipality or local authority which should interfere in any way with the naval forces of the Republic. By these stringent measures Jean Bon Saint-André restored discipline in the navy and the authority of the executive in naval affairs, and if the fleet as reconstituted by him failed to achieve success against the English on June 1, 1794, the failure was due largely to the inexperience of his officers, for which he was not to blame, and not to the insubordination of the sailors, of which Morard de Galle had so bitterly complained.

Hitherto mention has only been made of the operations of the French fleets, consisting of ships of the line. Something

must also be said of the actions in which single ships, generally frigates, were engaged, and about the privateers. Of the "encounters of detached ships," as James calls them, in 1793, the most noteworthy were the actions between H.M.S. *Venus* and the *Sémillante* on May 27, H.M.S. *Nymphe* and the *Cléopâtre* on June 18, H.M.S. *Boston* and the *Embuscade* on July 31, H.M.S. *Crescent* and the *Réunion* on October 19, and H.M.S. *Thames* and the *Uranie* on October 24.¹ After all that has been said about the spirit of insubordination and mutiny being rife in the French fleets, it is important to lay weight on these detached encounters, for though the English were generally successful, they invariably had to fight hard for their victory, and the gallantry and capacity of the French sailors and officers on these frigates shows either that the spirit of disaffection had not spread to the smaller ships, or, what is more likely, that it disappeared when the moment of battle was at hand. In the first-mentioned action, H.M.S. *Venus* and the *Sémillante* were both 32-gun frigates; they had a sharp combat, both suffered severely, Lieutenant Gaillard, who commanded the *Sémillante*, and his second in command were killed, and a young man of twenty-six, Lieutenant Garreau, fought the ship until she was succoured by the arrival of the *Cléopâtre*. The second action, between H.M.S. *Nymphe*, Captain Edward Pellew (afterwards famous in English naval history as Admiral Lord Exmouth), a 36-gun frigate, and the *Cléopâtre*, a 32-gun frigate, Captain Jean Baptiste Mullon, is still more remarkable. The French captain had risen from the ranks, having been a common seaman in the royal navy, and he fought in a way which almost justified the expectation of Jean Bon Saint-André of a new race of Jean Barts. He and nearly all his officers were killed during the fight, and his ship was only taken after sixty-three of the crew were killed or wounded, and after inflicting a loss of fifty killed and wounded on his opponent. The action between H.M.S. *Boston*, Captain Courtenay, and the *Embuscade*, Captain Bompard,

¹ James's *Naval History*, vol. i. pp. 99-134; *Les Marins de la République*, by H. Moulin (Paris : 1883), pp. 13-37.

both 32-gun frigates, was fought off the American coast in the presence of a crowd of citizens of the United States upon the beach, and ended, the English captain being killed, in both ships retiring to refit. The capture of the *Réunion*, a 32-gun frigate, Captain Denian. by H.M.S. *Crescent*, a 36-gun frigate, commanded by Captain Saumarez, afterwards Admiral Lord de Saumarez, in sight of Cherbourg, deserves record not so much on account of the action, but because the *Réunion* had committed the greatest ravages among the English merchantmen in the Channel, and its capture was hailed with national rejoicings. The last encounter of 1793 worth mentioning was that between H.M.S. *Thames*, 32 guns, Captain James Cotes, and the *Uranie*, a 40-gun frigate, commanded by Captain Jean François Tartu, a gunner in the old royal navy, who had re-entered the service as a captain on the outbreak of war, and an advanced republican, who had been elected first deputy *suppléant* to the Convention by the department of the Loire-Inférieure. The fight was one of the most severe on record; Captain Tartu was killed, both ships drew off crippled, and H.M.S. *Thames* surrendered to the *Carmagnole* a few days later without being able to make further resistance. It will be seen from this rapid summary that the French frigates made no contemptible stand against their opponents; men, like Mullon and Tartu, suddenly promoted from the ranks, showed themselves gallant and skilful captains, and the strictures of Morard de Galle on the French sailors of 1793 must be modified with regard to the French frigates. Indeed the probability is that all the best sailors in France served on board frigates and privateers, and that the temptation of prize-money, which the sailors on board of the ships of the line could hardly hope to obtain, had attracted the bravest and most experienced men away from the regular fleets, and left only the lazy and discontented mutineers. The encouragement of privateers was one of the most marked points of the naval policy of the Convention. Letters of marque were issued at the outbreak of the war, and the appointment of an old privateer captain, Dalbarade, to be Minister of Marine, in the place of

Monge, in April, 1793, showed the appreciation in which private ventures of this sort were held. These privateers were excellently manned and fitted, and they had the commerce of the whole of Europe to prey upon. On May 9, 1793, the Convention decreed that the privateers and national frigates were authorized to capture and take into French ports any ships laden with food of any sort, which they might meet. If the goods on board belonged to a nation at war with the Republic, they were to be sold for the benefit of the captors; if they belonged to a neutral country, and this is the most curious provision, they were to be seized all the same, and paid for at the rate current in the port for which they were destined. The only ships excluded from suffering under this decree, were those belonging to the United States of America. Under these circumstances, it was no wonder that an enormous number of merchant ships fell into the hands of the French cruisers. There are no statistics about the captures of the privateers, but the frigate *Uranie*, before its combat with H.M.S. *Thames*, sent in over sixty prizes, taken off the Spanish coast, and the frigate *Réunion* over one hundred prizes taken in the English Channel, before its capture by H.M.S. *Crescent*.

The history of the French navy, by which is meant the French fleets in Toulon and Brest, as distinguished from the frigates, during the Revolution, runs parallel with that of the French army. Both were disorganized by the policy and absurd decrees of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies; both remained in a state of confusion during the early days of the Republic, and both became disciplined and were put on a sound footing by the Great Committee of Public Safety. The republican navy did not indeed illustrate the annals of the Republic as the republican army did; the defeat of June 1, 1794, has to be set against the victory of Fleurus. Yet the Brest fleet of 1794 was far superior in every way to the Brest fleet of 1793, and Jean Bon Saint-André, though he failed to organize victory, yet deserves his place by the side of Carnot, Prieur of the Côte-d'Or, and Dubois-Crancé, for doing the same work for the navy that they did for the army, and the rule of the Great

Committee was justified by the improved discipline of the French sailors, as much as by the triumphs of the armies and the tranquillity of Paris and the provinces. The Reign of Terror forms a strange episode in the history of the French Revolution, but it cannot be denied that it was followed by success, and that the Great Committee of Public Safety, which established and maintained its power by the system of Terror, fulfilled the purpose of its creation.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE COLONIES AND THE ÉMIGRÉS.

The colonial policy of the Legislative Assembly and the Convention—The abolition of slavery—The effect of the Revolution on the Colonies—San Domingo—The rule of Sonthonax and Polverel—The English Invasion—Martinique—Guadeloupe—Saint Lucia—Tobago—French Guiana—The Île de France, or Mauritius—The Île de Bourbon, or Réunion—The French settlements in India—General result of the Revolution in the Colonies—The émigrés—Hatred and fear felt for them in France—Feeling in Europe towards them—The position of Monsieur—The conduct of the Comte d'Artois—Policy of the great powers towards the émigrés—Their attitude towards the great powers—The military émigrés—The religious émigrés—The émigrés in Germany—The émigrés in England—The émigrés in Switzerland—The émigrés in America and India—Poverty and heroism in adversity of the émigrés—Contrast between the state of France at the close of 1791 and at the close of 1793.

SOME account has been given in a previous chapter¹ of the history of the colonial possessions of France during the first two years of the Revolution. The ill-considered decrees and badly directed policy of the Constituent Assembly, though suggested by the best of motives, had thrown the flourishing colonies in the West Indies into a state of utter confusion; civil war had broken out in Martinique, and a general insurrection among the negro slaves had laid waste many of the plantations in San Domingo. The decree of May 15, 1791 which did not actually abolish slavery, as was stated,² but gave mulattoes and negroes born of free parents the full rights

¹ Vol. i. pp. 516-529.

² Vol. i. p. 521.

of French citizens, had been repealed on the news of the insurrection it had caused in San Domingo just before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, and it is an open question whether the decree or its revocation had the worse effect upon the state of the colonies. The Legislative Assembly, in which the most influential deputy was Brissot, the founder and principal orator of the Société des Amis des Noirs, was even more entirely under the sway of humanitarian theories about the absolute freedom of all men of whatever colour, than the Constituent had been. Brissot was himself too much occupied in the Diplomatic Committee to take the lead in discussing colonial questions, but Garran de Coulon, the habitual reporter of the Colonial Committee, shared his views. On February 29, 1792, Garran de Coulon proposed the abrogation of the decree of September 24, 1791, a general amnesty to all insurgents in the colonies, and the convocation of a colonial assembly in San Domingo to propose a scheme for the abolition of slavery. The Legislative Assembly refused its assent to such sweeping measures, but on April 4, 1792, it re-enacted the decree of May 15, 1791, and afterwards directed the Minister of Marine, to whose department the administration of the colonies belonged, to send fresh governors to all the colonies, accompanied by commissioners with full powers to arrange for the manner of their government in future. The summer and autumn of 1792 were too full of stirring events in France itself for the deputies to the Legislative Assembly, and its successor, the Convention, to pay much attention to the state of affairs in the colonies. The latter assembly left colonial questions, almost without interruption, to the Minister of Marine and to the Colonial Committee, which contained none of the leading statesmen or orators, and of which the most influential members were such comparatively unknown deputies as Creuzé-Latouche, Brunel, and Pénier. The Great Committee of Public Safety, when it assumed the whole executive power of the Convention, had more important problems to solve than the state of the colonies, and had recourse to its usual expedient of entrusting its agents with absolute and supreme authority.

This system worked well in the departments of France, where the representatives on mission and their subordinates could be controlled by the Committee of Public Safety, but it was not likely to succeed in distant colonies, with which it was impossible to carry on a regular correspondence. The outbreak of war with England caused further complications. The weakness of the French Republic at sea left the colonists dependent on their own resources for defence and interrupted their communications with the mother country, which enabled them, as in Martinique and Guadeloupe, to hoist the white standard of the Bourbons, or, as in the Mauritius, to disregard the decrees of the Convention. For these reasons the French colonies, during the years 1792 and 1793, were but slightly influenced by the home government, even when the Great Committee of Public Safety was in power; but in their history during this period is nevertheless to be seen the working of the spirit of the Revolution, with all its noble aspirations and singularly inadequate acts. One decree of the Convention, although it was not passed until 1794, must be mentioned here. On 16 Pluviôse, Year II. (February 4, 1794) after the admission of one negro and two mulattoes among the deputies for San Domingo, slavery was formally abolished in all the colonies of France. It had been condemned both by the Constituent and the Legislative Assemblies, and the commissioners in San Domingo had six months previously declared the freedom of the slaves in that island, but it was not until this day that the emancipation of all negro slaves was decreed. The momentous result of this measure on the prosperity of the colonies, and the difficulty of carrying it into effect, do not seem to have occurred to the majority of the members of the Convention. Only Danton understood them. He was as great an enthusiast for the emancipation of the negro slaves as his colleagues, but, after applauding their action, he felt it necessary to add a word of warning. "The Convention has just done its duty," he said in one of the last speeches he ever delivered,¹ "but after having conferred the boon of liberty, we

¹ *Œuvres de Danton*, edit. Vermorel, p. 247.

must show moderation. Let us refer this measure to the Committee of Public Safety and the Colonial Committee, in order that means may be found for rendering this decree useful and not dangerous to humanity." Unfortunately, the spirit of moderation was not displayed by the French commissioners in San Domingo, where the emancipation of the slaves was regarded as a political measure, and effected the final ruin of the planters.

The insurrection of the negro slaves in the French part of the island of San Domingo in August, 1791, has been described.¹ No war is ever marked by such horrors as a slave war, for the atrocious cruelties of savages, who have the wrongs of years of servitude to avenge, are always met by the most terrible reprisals. The slave war in San Domingo formed no exception. In the province of the North alone it was estimated that, during the months of August and September, 1791, 2000 white colonists were murdered, 180 sugar plantations and 900 coffee, cotton, and indigo settlements were laid waste, and at least 10,000 negroes were killed.² The mulattoes came to the help of their half-brothers, and with their aid the progress of the insurrection was checked for a time. The negroes who escaped fled to the mountains in the interior of the island, where they formed themselves into bands under the command of various chiefs, of whom the most powerful were Biassou and Jean François, and it is worthy of notice that Toussaint Louverture took service with the latter of these chiefs under the title of "Medecin des Armées du Roi." The conduct of the mulattoes met with the recognition it deserved, and on September 20, 1791, the white inhabitants of Port-au-Prince withdrew their opposition to the decree of May 15th, declared the execution of Ogé³ infamous, and agreed to form the mulattoes into armed companies of militia. Under these circumstances, which were of course not then known at Paris, the news of the repeal of the decree of May 15, 1791, had a

¹ Vol. i. p. 522.

² *History of the West Indies*, by Bryan Edwards, 2nd edit., 1801, vol. iii. p. 103.

³ Vol. i. p. 520.

most pernicious result. The mulattoes and freed negroes believed that they were being betrayed, and again attacked the whites. They took Saint Louis in the province of the South, and were only repulsed from Port-au-Prince after laying one-third of the city in ashes, while the bands of escaped slaves came down from their mountain fastnesses and recommenced their ravages among the plantations. Blanchelande, the governor of French San Domingo, proved to be quite unfit to meet the situation; his authority was defied by all classes of the colonists, who accused him of treachery, his soldiers were mutinous, and he only looked on at the scenes of war and destruction, which were devastating the island. Such was the state of affairs in January, 1792, when three commissioners, who had been nominated by the Constituent Assembly in September, 1791, with full powers, on hearing of the negro insurrection, arrived at Cap Français. They were Mirbeck and Roome, two avocats of Paris, and Saint-Leger, who had made himself conspicuous in 1790 in the island of Tobago.¹ They at once proclaimed the Constitution of 1791, and declared it in operation, as a panacea for all troubles, and promised a general amnesty. But neither the colonists, nor the mulattoes, nor the revolted slaves, paid the slightest attention to the commissioners. The colonists wanted soldiers and generals, not lawyers; the mulattoes showed their contempt for the Constitution by executing thirty-four white prisoners at Petit Goave;² and the negroes continued their ravages. The Colonial Assembly also showed itself suspicious of the large powers granted to the commissioners, and they returned to France separately in March and April, 1792. The Legislative Assembly then proceeded to take decided measures. The decree of April 4th was passed; a new governor was directed to be despatched at once to San Domingo with six thousand soldiers; and three supreme commissioners were appointed with orders to dissolve all existing assemblies, and to send Blanchelande and all the authors of the recent troubles in the colony in custody to France.

¹ Vol. i. p. 525.

² Edwards, *op. cit.*, vol. iii. p. 132

The three commissioners selected were Sonthonax, an avocat of Paris, an intimate friend of Brissot, and a member of the Société des Amis des Noirs; Polverel, a lawyer from Navarre; and Ailhaud; and the new governor, nominated by the Minister of Marine, was General d'Esparbés. They sailed with the troops in July, 1792, and reached Cap Français in September. The commissioners were men of energy and determination, and at once seized the reins of government. They immediately sent Blanchelande to France, where he became the first victim of the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris,¹ and as they met with some opposition from the colonists of the planter and bourgeois classes, they deported all their leading men, including the colonel and most of the officers of the local regiment of Cap Français, as well as the principal municipal officers of the town. Then they resolved on crushing the revolted slaves and putting an end to the insurrection. In this they were assisted by the freshly nominated governors of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the Vicomte de Rochambeau, son of the marshal, and General Collot, with the four thousand soldiers they had at their disposal, for these generals had not been allowed to disembark by their predecessors in the governments to which they had been appointed. A combined movement was arranged from three separate points on the coast, and three columns, under the direction of the Vicomte de Rochambeau, Count Philippe de Montesquiou-Fézensac, and General Laveaux, advanced simultaneously, and drove the negroes into the mountains with terrible slaughter. Sonthonax and Polverel, who had soon persuaded their colleague Ailhaud to return to France, then began to negotiate with the mulatto leaders, and with the free negroes, to the great concern of the colonists, who managed to inspire the governor, General d'Esparbés, with their apprehensions. But the two commissioners looked on their supreme powers as the representatives on mission in the departments of France did, and ordered the arrest of the governor. They formed a *commission intermédiaire* of six whites and six mulattoes to advise them, and

¹ Vol. ii. p. 228.

when two of the former protested against the financial measures of Sonthonax, they ordered their arrest also. They were both sincere republicans, and hailed the news of the capture of the Tuileries on the 10th of August, and of the proclamation of the Republic, with an enthusiasm, which was shared by the mulattoes and freed negroes. Their supreme powers in San Domingo were confirmed by the Convention, and having established their authority, firmly as they believed, at Cap Français, they started with the troops they had brought with them from France, and a sort of revolutionary army of negroes, which they had formed, to establish it over the whole island. Sonthonax took the province of the North; Polverel, who was accompanied by General Laveaux, that of the West, and they speedily reduced all the towns, including even Port-au-Prince, which had hitherto been subject to a sort of Reign of Terror under the domination of certain "mean" whites and mutinous soldiers.

On June 10, 1793, the two commissioners, delighted with their success, returned to Cap Français, where they found that they had a new and formidable opponent to reckon with. In February, 1793, after the execution of Louis XVI., and the declaration of war with England, Monge, the Minister of Marine, appointed General Galbaud, a member of a well-known colonial family, to be governor of French San Domingo in succession to D'Esparbés. He arrived at Cap Français on May 7, 1793, during the absence of Sonthonax and Polverel, and was warmly welcomed by the few remaining planters and wealthy colonists, who were disgusted at the favour the commissioners showed to the mulattoes and free negroes, and who were terrified at the expectation that the emancipation of the slaves would soon be proclaimed by them. Galbaud sympathized with the colonists, and loudly declared that he was not bound to obey the commissioners, and that he did not intend to be ruled by them. Sonthonax and Polverel, on their return to Cap Français, accepted his challenge, and on the 13th of June, alleging an old statute, which forbade a planter to hold the office of governor, they ordered Galbaud to return to

France at once, and appointed La Salle governor in his place. Galbaud was not to be intimidated ; he seized the arsenal, and for some days civil war raged in the streets of Cap Français. Galbaud was supported by the colonial militia, the planters, and the sailors from the ships in the harbour ; the commissioners by the regular troops, the revolutionary army of negroes, and the mulattoes. For a time the issue remained doubtful, until the commissioners took the step of inviting the revolted slaves from the interior to come to their help. Jean François and Biassou, the principal chieftains, refused to leave the mountains ; but another negro leader, named Macaya, a most ferocious savage, consented, and brought a band of three thousand negroes into the town. For three days these savages massacred the enemies of the commissioners, and committed every conceivable atrocity, and they ended by setting the town on fire. Galbaud could offer no further resistance, and, taking as many of his friends as he could with him, fled to the United States. Nearly all the remaining planters, whose slaves had hitherto been faithful, and whose plantations had escaped the ravages of war, now left the island, and found refuge in the United States, in Jamaica, or in the Spanish part of San Domingo. Sonthonax and Polverel were victorious ; the French colony of San Domingo was in their power, but its wealth and importance were destroyed ; the negroes, who used to work on the plantations, were camping in the mountains ; while the white men, whose capital and intelligence had developed the prosperity of those plantations, were dead or in exile.

The outbreak of war between France and England, and France and Spain, created fresh difficulties for the commissioners, which fortunately for them did not begin until after the expulsion of Galbaud. Don Joachim Garcia and the Marquis of Harmona, who were in succession governors of the Spanish part of San Domingo, looked with no unfavourable eye on the devastation of the flourishing French colony, for the Spaniards had always been jealous of the existence of the French in the island. They treated the French planters who

escaped into their territory kindly, but at the same time they allowed the revolted negro slaves, when hard pressed, to take refuge there also. This policy recoiled on its authors, for the formation of a negro empire in the French part of San Domingo was speedily followed by the expulsion of the Spaniards from the island. The intervention of England was purely military, utterly unnecessary, and resulted in the loss of many valuable lives. The insurrection of the slaves in 1791 and 1792 had roused the sympathy of the English planters and officials throughout the English West Indies. The good services of Captain Affleck, R.N., in saving the lives of many French colonists, has been mentioned,¹ and the assistance rendered by the Earl of Effingham, Governor of Jamaica, was acknowledged by a vote of thanks in the Assembly. After the commencement of the war, however, General Adam Williamson, who had succeeded Lord Effingham as Governor of Jamaica, represented to the English Government that the planters of San Domingo longed for the assistance of England against the tyranny of the republican commissioners. He was, on these representations, granted permission, in July, 1793, to accept the capitulation of any town in the island which solicited his protection, and was authorized to garrison it with English troops. The little town of Saint-Jérémie was the only one to apply to him, and on September 20, 1793, it was accordingly occupied by the 13th Regiment and seven companies of the 49th under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Whitelocke. Anything more absurd than the invasion of San Domingo at this period cannot be imagined; the party of the planters, on whose royalist sentiments Williamson relied, was practically extinguished at the time of Galbaud's flight. The republican commissioners were absolutely supreme, and had at their disposal six thousand French soldiers, some eight or nine thousand militia, either "mean" whites or mulattoes, well trained to arms during the recent disturbances, and their revolutionary army of seven thousand blacks, either free negroes or freed slaves. Even with this powerful force at their command,

¹ Vol. i. p. 522.

which was infinitely stronger than the whole English army in Jamaica, they did not feel secure, and on August 29, 1793, nearly six months before the emancipation decree of the Convention, they declared slavery abolished in San Domingo, and summoned the revolted negroes from the mountains to join them. They again divided their authority; Sonthonax took entire and supreme charge of the province of the North, Polverel of those of the West and the South, and both prepared to resist the invaders. Against this imposing array of force, the English expedition, even when reinforced, could make but little head. Colonel Whitelocke occupied the Mole St. Nicolas, Leogane and Cap Tiburon, and in February, 1794, Major Brent Spencer stormed Fort L'Acul. These successes on the coast hardly affected the authority of the French commissioners; very few French colonists or mulattoes joined the invaders; the English troops were decimated by yellow fever, and any attempt to penetrate into the interior would have ended in disaster. Brigadier-General Whyte took Port-au-Prince on May 31, 1794, but his success did not bring the reduction of the colony any nearer. The French soldiers, under General Laveaux, established themselves at Jacmel; the mulattoes were organized by one of their own birth, Rigaud, who proved himself an able guerilla chieftain, and harassed the English outposts and cut off their communications; and the more civilized of the revolted negroes, such as Touissaint Louverture, came down from the mountains and took service under the tricolour flag on hearing that the Convention had abolished slavery. In the midst of their successful resistance to the English, Sonthonax and Polverel, whose vigour and energy resembled that of the representatives on mission in France, as did their republican sentiments, despotic administration, and frothy proclamations, were recalled. It was not forgotten that it was through the influence of Brissot that they had been nominated to San Domingo, and the friendship of Brissot, as the political chief of the Girondin party, was a cause for proscription during the Reign of Terror. On their return they were thrown into prison, where Polverel died; and after

the fall of the party of Robespierre a commission was appointed to inquire into the accusations against Sonthonax. The inquiry lasted over eight months, after which Sonthonax was declared to have acted to the best of his ability, and he was in 1796 charged with another mission to San Domingo by the Directory.¹

In the French Windward Islands, General de Béhague, who in 1791 had succeeded the Vicomte de Damas as Governor-General of the French Antilles, with his seat of government in Martinique, was a man of experience and ability. He acted in harmony with the Colonial Assembly of Martinique, and succeeded in putting down without much difficulty the partial insurrection of the slaves, which had broken out as a natural result of the civil war which raged in the island in 1790 and 1791.² Béhague was an enthusiastic royalist, and when a report reached him from the English colony of Montserrat in August, 1792, that the Prussians had taken Paris, and that Louis XVI. was restored to his former authority, he at once hoisted the white flag, and his declaration in favour of the Bourbons met with no opposition from the planters and officials at Saint-Pierre. His example was followed by most of the naval officers commanding ships on the station, who not only hoisted the white flag themselves, but compelled the merchantmen in the harbour to do so likewise. The town of Fort-Royal, which was always in opposition to Saint-Pierre, alone maintained the tricolour, and civil war between the two towns was on the point of breaking out again, when a squadron under the command of Captain Bruix of the *Sémillante* arrived off the island, with the Vicomte de Rochambeau and two thousand soldiers on board, in September, 1792. It will be remembered that new governors had been nominated for all the colonies by direction of the Legislative Assembly in

¹ The best general works on the history of the Revolution in San Domingo are the volume of Bryan Edwards, already quoted, and *Histoire de la Révolution à Saint-Domingue*, by A. M. Delmas. 2 vols. Paris : 1814.

² Vol. i. pp. 522-524.

the summer of 1792, at the same time that D'Esparbés, Sonthonax, Polverel, and Ailhaud had been sent to San Domingo. Rochambeau had been appointed Governor-General of the French Antilles, and he was surprised and indignant when Béhague, supported by the Colonial Assembly of Martinique, refused to allow him to land. Rochambeau then proceeded to San Domingo, where he did good service against the revolted negroes,¹ and Béhague prepared to hold the island of Martinique for the king. This was no easy matter. His chief supporters, the naval officers on the station and the planters, were few in number; while his opponents, who had fled to Saint Lucia, kept up a constant correspondence with the colony, and plotted against him. When authentic news arrived from France of the capture of the Tuileries and the proclamation of the Republic, of the battle of Valmy and the retreat of the Prussians, Béhague felt that the cause of the Bourbons was lost; and when he heard that Captain Lacrosse had been favourably received by the inhabitants of Guadeloupe, he left Martinique on January 11, 1793, and took refuge in the Spanish island of Trinidad. The colonists of Martinique then sent for Captain Lacrosse and recognized the French Republic. On Lacrosse's recommendation, an application was sent to Rochambeau to come and undertake the government of the colony. He accepted, and the numerous exiles also returned from Saint Lucia. The most revolutionary ideas were propounded and accepted; popular clubs, in which white men, mulattoes, and negroes sat together, were founded; the decree of April 4, 1792, was put into full operation, and the freed negroes were allowed to vote in the primary assemblies, which elected a new colonial assembly, and four deputies to the Convention. Rochambeau, in spite of his noble birth, did not yield to the leaders of the clubs in republican enthusiasm, and even sent an address to the Convention, congratulating the deputies on the execution of Louis XVI. The principal republicans all resided in the town of Fort-Royal, and their old jealousy of Saint-Pierre induced them to urge the governor

¹ Vol. ii. p. 473.

to attack the planters' stronghold. He complied, and on the news of the outbreak of civil war, Major-General James Bruce, the governor of the English island of Dominica, resolved, on the invitation of the planters, to try the effect of an expedition to Martinique. General Bruce arrived on June 16, 1793, with eleven hundred English soldiers, and advanced on Saint-Pierre in conjunction with eight hundred French colonists, opposed to Rochambeau. The attack was a failure, and on June 21st the English expedition left the island, taking their unfortunate allies with them. This success strengthened the position of Rochambeau both in the island and with the Convention, and he remained in command of the colony during the remainder of the year 1793 without being interfered with by any republican commissioners. The Convention could only give him applause; it could send him no efficient aid. The English were the masters of the seas, and no reinforcements could reach the West Indies; and Rochambeau had with his small force soon to resist a much more formidable invasion than that of General Bruce. The English ministry determined to subdue and annex all the French Windward Islands, a measure which was very popular with the English mercantile community, and since it had only been possible to capture Tobago on the outbreak of war with the forces already in the colonies, it was resolved, towards the end of 1793, to send a powerful expedition to the West Indies. The fleet was placed under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B., afterwards Earl Saint Vincent, and carried over six thousand soldiers commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Grey, K.B., afterwards Earl Grey. This numerous and well-equipped army disembarked on the island of Martinique on February 5, 1794; Rochambeau could make no effective resistance; Saint-Pierre surrendered on February 17, and Fort-Royal on March 22. The garrisons of the forts on the island were allowed to march out with the honours of war, and to be conveyed to France, and Sir Charles Grey, in his despatch, pays the highest compliment to the stubborn defence of the French. "The gallant defence made by General Rochambeau and his

garrison," he writes,¹ "was strongly manifested on entering Fort Bourbon, as there was scarce an inch of ground untouched by our shot and shells; and it is but justice to say it does them the highest honour." Rochambeau, after this surrender, retired to the United States of America, and Lieutenant-General Robert Prescott was appointed Governor of Martinique on behalf of George III.²

In the island of Guadeloupe, which was almost as populous and as important as Martinique, the Revolution took nearly the same course. Captain de Clugny, the governor, though officially independent of M. de Béhague, the Governor-General of the French Antilles, adopted his policy. He also had to put down a partial insurrection of the slaves, and next turned his attention to the inhabitants of Basse Terre, which was the head-quarters of the radical party, and defeated them.³ Many of their leaders he deported to France, and many more escaped to Saint Lucia, where they prepared schemes of vengeance against him. De Clugny died in the summer of 1792, and his successor *ad interim*, Colonel d'Arrot, was persuaded by the Comte de Mallevault-Vaumorant, commanding the *Calypso* frigate, to hoist the white flag on receipt of the false intelligence from Montserrat that the Prussians had taken Paris and restored the full authority of Louis XVI. General Georges Henri Victor Collot, who was appointed Governor of Guadeloupe, when Rochambeau was nominated to Martinique, was forbidden to disembark in September, 1792; and Captain Lacrosse, who arrived with the news of the proclamation of the Republic in December, was at first treated in the same fashion. But D'Arrot did not possess the influence of Béhague nor indeed the strong royalist convictions of that officer. Captain Lacrosse sent numerous letters and messengers from his head-quarters in Saint Lucia to insist upon the benefits

¹ Sir C. Grey's Despatch, see *Annual Register* for 1794; Appendix to the Chronicle, p. 69.

² On the Revolution in Martinique, see *La Martinique depuis sa découverte jusqu'à nos jours*, by Pardon (Paris: 1877); and Guérin's *Histoire Maritime de la France*, vol. vi.

³ Vol. i. pp. 524, 525.

which would accrue to the inhabitants of Guadeloupe, if they acknowledged the Republic promptly, and upon the severe punishment which the Convention would inflict, if they obstinately resisted. Hopes and fears being thus aroused, the people of Point-à-Pitre hoisted the tricolour flag on December 28, 1792, and invited Lacrosse to come and join them. The Comte de Mallevault vainly endeavoured to stem the current of popular feeling; Captain Lacrosse landed in Guadeloupe on January 5, 1793, with a band of exiles from Saint Lucia, and Colonel d'Arrot at once fled to Trinidad. Lacrosse was enthusiastically received; the Republic was universally recognized; four deputies for the colony were elected to the Convention; popular clubs were established; and the property of the Church and of émigrés was sequestered. Lacrosse consented to act as governor until the arrival of General Collot from San Domingo. When that officer arrived he did his best with inadequate means to put his island into a state of defence, and, like Rochambeau, he made a gallant defence against the armament commanded by Sir Charles Grey and Sir John Jervis. But long resistance was impossible, and on April 20, 1794, the island of Guadeloupe was surrendered to the English, and Major-General Dundas was appointed the first English governor.¹

Saint Lucia, it will have been noticed, was the place of refuge for all those colonists of Martinique and Guadeloupe who disapproved of the proceedings of Béhague and Clugny. When the white flag was hoisted in these two important islands by Béhague and D'Arrot, Clugny's successor, who thus declared themselves the enemies of the Revolution and supporters of the supremacy of the king, Colonel Laroque-Montels, the administrator of Saint Lucia, continued to use the tricolour flag and to wear the tricolour cockade. He immediately reported the conduct of the two governors to the Convention, and declared he had ceased to obey the orders of the governor-

¹ On the Revolution at Guadeloupe, see *La Guadeloupe depuis sa découverte jusqu'à nos jours*, by Pardon (Paris: 1881); and Guérin's *Histoire Maritime de la France*, vol. vi.

general, Béhague, since his superior officer had infringed the Constitution. He welcomed and assisted the democratic exiles, and fortified the Morne Fortuné, in case he should be attacked, and cheerfully handed over his command to General Ricard, who had been appointed his successor, when Rochambeau and Collot received their nominations. The island continued to be the head-quarters of the partisans of the Revolution in the French Antilles, and the Convention recognized its staunch behaviour by altering its name from Saint Lucia to La Fidèle, "The Faithful Island." When Captain Lacrosse arrived in December, 1792, with the news of the proclamation of the Republic, it was at Saint Lucia that he established himself, and it was there that he combined his successful schemes for winning Martinique and Guadeloupe back to the tricolour. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that General Ricard opposed as stubborn a resistance as his small force would allow to the armament of Grey and Jervis, which attacked him after leaving Martinique and before going on to Guadeloupe; but the Morne Fortuné was taken by storm on April 4, 1794, when the island fell entirely into the hands of the English, and Colonel Sir Charles Gordon was appointed governor.

Of the smaller French islands, it need only be noted that Mariegalante, under the government of Captain de Kermené, followed the example of Saint Lucia and became a place of refuge for the exiled partisans of the Revolution, and that it, as well as Desirade, surrendered to the English under the command of Captain Lord Garlies, R.N., after the capture of Guadeloupe. Tobago, which was largely inhabited by Englishmen, and had only been ceded to France in 1783 at the Peace of Versailles, was the first island to be attacked by the English, even before reinforcements arrived from England. The cession of this colony had been a severe blow to the pride of Englishmen, and as soon as the news of the outbreak of war between France and England arrived in the West Indies, Vice-Admiral Sir John Laforey, Bart., the admiral commanding the station, and Major-General Cornelius Cuyler, commanding the troops at Barbadoes, determined to recapture it. On April 14, 1793,

General Cuyler landed at Tobago with a small force of 470 men. M. de Monteil, the successor of M. Jobal,¹ refused to capitulate at once, but on the following day Fort Scarborough, the only fortified post of importance on the island, was stormed, and the colony passed into the possession of its former owners. The islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, off the coast of Newfoundland, with a population of about 1500, chiefly fishermen and their families, were occupied without opposition by a small English force under the command of Brigadier-General Ogilvie and Captain Affleck, R.N., on May 14, 1793.

The history of French Guiana during this period of the Revolution is marked by no violent struggles, but by an honest attempt to obey the decrees of the Legislative Assembly and the Convention. In September, 1792, M. Guyot, the commissioner nominated for French Guiana, when Sonthonax and Polverel were selected for San Domingo, and M. d'Alais, the governor appointed to succeed M. Bourgon,² arrived at Cayenne. The garrison was inclined to oppose their landing, but by the advice of M. Mettesau, the president of the Colonial Assembly, they were allowed to undertake their duties. They did not long remain in office, for after the execution of Louis XVI. in January, 1793, Jeannet-Oudin, Mayor of Arcis-sur-Aube, first deputy *suppléant* for the department of the Aube, and a nephew of Danton, was appointed commissioner with supreme powers for French Guiana. He manifested some of his uncle's energy, and by immediately sending off to France MM. Guyot and d'Alais and five officers of the garrison, he established his authority on a firm basis. The little colony was not disturbed by the horrors of civil war or of an insurrection among the slaves; no trace appeared of any affection for the Bourbons; and André Pomme, called the American, who was elected deputy for French Guiana to the Convention soon after Jeannet's arrival, and who took his seat in April, 1793, did much by his correspondence to keep the colony true to the Republic. The English were too much

¹ Vol. i. p. 525.² Vol. i. p. 526.

engaged in conquering the French Antilles to trouble about South America, but the prosperity of Cayenne was seriously affected by the interruption of its commerce with the mother country, and Jeannet-Oudin tried to compensate for the scarcity of specie by issuing colonial assignats, to which he gave a forced circulation. The most important event was the arrival of the news on 26 Prairial, Year II. (June 14, 1794), that the Convention had abolished slavery throughout French territory. Jeannet-Oudin immediately had this decree proclaimed through the colony with beat of drum, and announced his intention of summoning primary assemblies in the following September, in which the new freedmen should exercise their right to vote. But the sudden declaration of emancipation had its inevitable result. The negroes looked upon liberty as the right to live without working; they refused to gather the crops, and even the sick in the hospitals were left without attendants. Famine and ruin stared the colonists in the face after a very few days of unrestricted liberty, and on 20 Messidor, Year II. (July 8, 1794), Jeannet-Oudin proclaimed that all labourers were obliged to work, and that those who still declined should be treated as "*gens mal-intentionnés*." This compromise of declaring the slaves free and yet saying that they must work was felt to be but a temporary expedient, and on 19 Pluviôse, Year III. (February 7, 1795), the Colonial Assembly of French Guiana drew up a scheme by which every former slave was obliged to bind himself to some employer of labour for a term of not less than one year under the sanction of the municipality, and which allowed the employer to make use of certain stated punishments for negligence or disobedience. This scheme was not approved by the Convention, which on 6 Prairial, Year III. (May 4, 1795) refused to confirm it, and, while repeating the doctrine of universal liberty, prescribed the duty of labour under pain of death. Jeannet-Oudin was succeeded by Cointel in November, 1794, but the colony was in such a peaceful state, that when the Convention, tired of the guillotine, resolved to substitute deportation for the punishment of death, it was to Cayenne and Sinnamari that Billaud-Varenne and Collot

d'Herbois were ordered to be sent, an example followed by the Directory in 1797, when it deported Pichegru, Barbé-Marbois, Rovère, and the other victims of the *coup d'état* of Fructidor to the same place of exile.¹

Passing over the French establishments at Goree and in Senegambia, on the west coast of Africa, which were practically ruined, first by the decree of the Constituent Assembly, abolishing the Senegal Company,² and then by the war with England, which put a stop to their taking a share in the slave trade, on which they existed, it is now necessary to turn to the flourishing French colonies in the Indian seas, the Île de France, better known as the Mauritius, and the Île de Bourbon, which was given the name of Réunion by the Convention in 1793. These islands, like French Guiana, showed a marked and pleasing contrast to San Domingo and the French Antilles, for they were ravaged neither by civil wars nor slave insurrections, and the most violent decrees of the Convention did not affect them disastrously, owing to the wisdom and tact of their governors and leading colonists.

On June 17, 1792, the Comte de Malartic, a general in the army, a veteran soldier, and a former governor of Guadeloupe, arrived in the Mauritius with the king's commission as governor-general of the islands of France and of Bourbon, and commandant-general of all French establishments in Asia, accompanied by M. Duplessis-Vigoureux, the new governor under him of the Île de Bourbon. He at once took over the government from M. Charpentier de Cossigny, who had been acting *ad interim* since the departure of the Comte de Conway,³ and found that the planters and merchants, while satisfied with the administration of the Colonial Assembly, were yet full of apprehensions with regard to the effect of the decree of May 15, 1791. He adopted from the first a bold and

¹ For the history of the French Revolution in French Guiana, see *Notice historique sur la Guyane Française*, by H. Ternaux-Compans. Paris: 1843.

² *Le Senegal*, by the Comtesse Dobrojowska.

³ Vol. i. pp. 527, 528.

statesmanlike course, and, trusting to the distance of the colony from France, he suggested and sanctioned two decrees, by one of which all resolutions taken by the Colonial Assembly of the Mauritius and assented to by the governor were to have the force of law within the island, and by the other all laws passed by any legislative authority in France had to be submitted to the Colonial Assembly, which was to assume the power of sanctioning or adjourning their application to the colony. By this prudent but almost treasonable measure, the decrees of May 15, 1791, April 4, 1792, and 16 Pluviôse, Year II. (February 4, 1794) were quietly suppressed, and all danger of an insurrection of the slaves averted in the island of Mauritius. When the news of the overthrow of the monarchy and of the proclamation of the Republic arrived, Malartic accepted the accomplished fact, and made no attempt to hoist the white flag or to maintain the supremacy of the Bourbons. On March 12, 1793, two deputies were elected to the Convention for the colony, one of whom, Gouly, the secretary of the Colonial Assembly, played an important part in France as a deputy on mission and as a Thermidorian. The news of the execution of the king and of the democratic measures adopted by the Convention greatly excited the soldiers in the garrison, who had not forgotten the expulsion of their leaders,¹ the poorer class of whites and the half-castes, who established in the capital a democratic club, in imitation of the Jacobin Club, which was called the "Chaumière," and had branches in every town in the island. Malartic wisely prevented the wealthy colonists from interfering with this club; and persuaded them to wait the course of events, instead of putting the island into confusion by open opposition. For about a year, the Chaumière club contented itself with talking about liberty and equality, planting trees of liberty, wearing red caps, and aping what they heard was done by the sans-culottes of Paris, but in the middle of 1794 it suddenly determined to play a part in politics. It persuaded the governor-general to send one hundred of the members on a government

¹ Vol. i. p. 528.

ship to the Ile de Bourbon, or Réunion, in order to bring for trial in the Mauritius three officials, who were accused of corresponding with the English, namely, M. Duplessis-Vigoureux, the governor, M. Fayol, the intendant, and Vice-Admiral the Marquis de Saint-Felix, commanding the naval station. M. de Malartic did not object; he thought that the prisoners would be more safe in the Mauritius than in Réunion. When they arrived, the Chaumière club set up a guillotine in a public square, and the president of the club thus addressed them: "The people accuse you, and the people will judge you." Malartic adroitly adopted this idea, and argued that the most thoroughly popular tribunal would be a court-martial consisting of members duly elected in the primary assemblies of the island. An immense amount of time was skilfully wasted over these elections, and by the time the court-martial had been chosen and had decided it would not act, the excitement caused by the first cry of treason was exhausted. Soon after, the tidings of the revolution of Thermidor and of the end of the Reign of Terror in France reached the Mauritius, and Malartic and the Colonial Assembly then took courage to close the Chaumière club, to send its leaders to France, to destroy the guillotine, and to release the three prisoners. The conduct of Malartic throughout these years merits the highest praise, and his wisdom and moderation contrast strongly with the policy pursued by Blanchelande and Béhague in the West Indies. While doing his duties as governor well, he did not forget that France was at war with England, and he greatly increased the prosperity of the island of the Mauritius by encouraging numerous privateers to be equipped and despatched to prey upon the commerce between England and India, and these ships captured many very rich prizes.¹

In the Île de Bourbon, or as it became by a decree of the

¹ On the history of the Revolution in the Mauritius, see *History of the Mauritius, or the Isle of France, and the Neighbouring Islands, composed from the Papers and Memoirs of Baron Grant*, by Charles Grant, Viscount de Vaux (London: 1801); and *Statistique de l'île Maurice, suivi d'une Notice historique*, by the Baron d'Unienville. 2 vols. Paris: 1838.

Convention in 1793, Réunion, there was more revolutionary excitement than in the Mauritius. The Colonial Assembly was not composed of exactly the same class of men, and acted with greater independence. When M. Duplessis-Vigoureux, the governor who had come out with Malartic from France in 1792, came to take up his appointment, he was not allowed to land. The excuse made was that there was smallpox raging in the Mauritius, and that he might bring the infection with him; but the real reason was the old jealousy which existed between the two islands. Réunion thought it ought to be quite independent of the Mauritius, and resented the supremacy of the latter island. Besides, in Colonel Prosper de Chermont, Colonel of the Régiment de Pondichéry, the colonists had an administrator just to their taste, an experienced soldier, yet possessing popular manners. Malartic was far too prudent to thrust his friend on the smaller colony, and it was not until October, 1793, some months after Colonel de Chermont had gone to take up a new appointment as Governor of Pondicherry, that M. Duplessis-Vigoureux was allowed to land. He soon became unpopular, and with Fayol, the new intendant of the finances, was accused of intriguing with Saint-Felix, the admiral commanding the naval station. Vice-Admiral the Marquis de Saint-Felix was a most distinguished naval officer; he succeeded the murdered Macnamara¹ in 1791, and resigned his command to Rear-Admiral Rosily from ill health in November, 1792. In 1793, however, he was ordered by Monge to take up the command again, and to send Rosily at once with a squadron and a convoy of provisions to France. He found himself in direct opposition to his officers and sailors, as well as to the Colonial Assembly of Réunion, which had no desire to lose the protection of any of the few ships of war on the station. Rosily refused to go to France, and the naval opposition was led by a young officer named Decrés, who was afterwards to be Minister of the Marine under Napoleon. The struggle became acute, and on December 3, 1793, the Colonial Assembly suspended the Admiral de Saint-Felix from his functions.

¹ Vol. i. p. 528.

He naturally refused to recognize their authority, and eventually the Colonial Assembly placed a price of 20,000 livres upon his head, and decreed the pain of death to any one who sheltered him or gave him asylum. He hid for a time in the woods, but was at last arrested on May 22, 1794. Duplessis-Vigoureux and Fayol were arrested as his accomplices, and there is no knowing what fate they might have met had not they been carried off by a hundred members of the Chaumière club of the Mauritius, with the result that has been already mentioned.¹

A few words have been said in the first volume on the influence of the Revolution on the French settlements in India.² The curious development of events there, however, deserves a fuller description, if only to show how Frenchmen resident in distant trading settlements—for it would be absurd to call them colonies—were affected by the revolutionary spirit. Pondicherry, the capital of Dupleix, was still the principal French settlement in India; it contained a population of 50,000 souls, and, though but a shadow of its former self, it was even yet a wealthy city. The news of the capture of the Bastille and of the first measures of the Constituent Assembly caused the greatest excitement in Pondicherry, and the Frenchmen resident there immediately elected a committee to draw up a constitution for the French stations in India. Discordant opinions were naturally heard at this committee, as to the measures to be adopted, but the governor, the Chevalier du Fresne, soon put an end to all opposition by sending the principal orators and agitators to France in September, 1790. In July, 1791, a representative constitution for French India was promulgated by the committee, according to which Pondicherry was to elect fifteen deputies to the central assembly, Chandernagore three, and Mahé, Karikal, and Yanaon one each. This was Pondicherry's scheme, to which

¹ On the Revolution in Réunion, see *Histoire de l'île Bourbon depuis 1643, jusqu'au 20 Décembre, 1848*, by G. Azema (Paris: 1862); and *Histoire de l'île de la Réunion*, by E. Trouette (Paris: 18).

² Vol. i. pp. 528, 529.

the smaller settlements paid little or no attention, for each was busy with a revolution and a representative scheme on its own account. At Chandernagore, which was fast losing its commercial importance owing to the close proximity of Calcutta, the revolutionary spirit ran into the wildest excesses. Certain adventurers, headed by a M. Richemond, formed a municipality there, elected judges, raised a force of 125 sepoys, and arrested Colonel de Montigny, the governor. They took possession of and divided among themselves the contents of the storehouses of the French East India Company, and acted in absolute independence of any authority whether at Pondicherry, the Mauritius, or in France. They even went so far as to place Colonel de Montigny in custody on a ship bound for France, and protested loudly when he was released by Lord Cornwallis, the English governor-general, and kindly entertained by him at Calcutta. At Karikal, which is not far from Pondicherry, a municipality was formed, in which two parties appeared, one claiming absolute independence of the capital and the other opposing it, and there was such violent fighting between them that M. du Fresne was obliged to send some French soldiers to occupy the town. At Mahé the newly elected mayor arrested the newly elected commandant of the national guard; but in spite of their quarrels the settlement elected a deputy to the colonial assembly at Pondicherry. At Yanaon the situation was still more curious. No attention whatever was paid to the central authority at Pondicherry; the governor, M. de Sommerat, was deprived of all authority, and nine individuals formed themselves at one and the same time into a representative committee, a council of justice, an administrative chamber, and a municipality.¹

After promulgating this constitution for the government of the whole of the French settlements in India, the committee at Pondicherry proceeded to arrange a scheme of local government for the city itself. A municipality was established, a national guard, consisting of distinct companies of Europeans and Eurasians, was formed, and judges were elected to take

¹ *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 245.

the place of the former courts of justice. The new order of things was followed by a succession of disturbances; the French soldiers of the garrison refused to grant military precedence to the Eurasian companies of the national guard, and were suspicious of their own officers, because of their noble birth; while the elected judges, by an act of flagrant injustice to a native suitor, destroyed the confidence of the native merchants and ruined the credit of the French authorities. M. Durfort de Civrac, the first Mayor of Pondicherry, was a man of prudence and moderation, but he found it no easy matter to reconcile the various disturbing elements, the soldiers, the Eurasians, and the natives, and, as a result of constant riots and disputes, commerce was nearly at a stand-still, and natives of all classes left the city in such numbers that the population dropped from fifty thousand in 1789 to twenty thousand in 1793. The French rulers further heard with dismay that after three campaigns, Tippoo Sahib, the son of their former ally, Haidar Ali, had been forced to make peace with Lord Cornwallis, and to cede the greater portion of his father's conquests to the English East India Company, the Nizam and the Mahrattas. M. Durfort de Civrac died on July 18, 1792, and in the following October two commissioners, M. Daniel Lescallier, a former intendant of French Guiana,¹ and M. Dumorier, arrived at Pondicherry with supreme powers from the Legislative Assembly to undertake the reorganization of the French settlements in India. The governor, M. du Fresne, naturally objected to have his authority superseded by that of the commissioners, but he made no active opposition until the return of the agitators, whom he had sent off to France in 1790. These men had been treated as martyrs for the cause of liberty by the Jacobin club of Paris, and had been given free passages back to India, and when they established a popular club, and were encouraged and favoured by the commissioners, the governor resigned in disgust on February 5, 1793. He was succeeded by Colonel de Chermont,² the former administrator of Île de Bourbon, who had had considerable

¹ Vol. i. p. 526.² Vol. ii. p. 489.

Indian experience. The commissioners spent their time in drawing up an elaborate scheme for a representative constitution with the assistance of a new colonial assembly which they had convoked, and made no attempt to check the rapid decline of the prosperity of the French settlements in India. In March, 1793, arrived the news of the overthrow of the monarchy and of the proclamation of the Republic; it was received with only moderate enthusiasm at Pondicherry, for it was felt that after such events war with England was imminent, and that, since the power of Tippoo Sahib was broken, the result of such a war must be disaster for the cause of France in India. In May, 1793, it was reported that hostilities had commenced in Europe between France and England. Colonel de Chermont recognized that it was impossible to defend Pondicherry with his feeble garrison of 600 French soldiers, 50 sailors, 50 dragoons, 900 sepoy, 250 French and 110 Eurasian national guards,¹ and proposed that the troops should embark for Trincomalee, in Ceylon, where the Dutch garrison of five thousand men was largely composed of Frenchmen, and should from that almost impregnable town combine a plan of operations with the numerous French officers in the service of the native princes of India against the English East India Company, and especially with Tippoo Sahib and General Raymond, the commander-in-chief of the Nizam's army. This scheme was too bold for the French commissioners, Lescallier and Dumorier; they rejected it, and Pondicherry awaited its fate.

On June 3, 1793, Sir Charles Oakeley, the Governor of Madras, announced officially that war had commenced; and in July a powerful army under the command of Colonel James Braithwaite appeared before Pondicherry, and summoned it to surrender. During the siege, which lasted for three weeks, information was received from a Madras newspaper and from

¹ These are the numbers given by M. Castonnet-Desfosses, in the *Revue de la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 387; but in the English reports of the siege of Pondicherry, it is said that 645 Frenchmen and 1614 sepoy surrendered.

an Italian named Anselme, who had made his way into the city, that Louis XVI. had been guillotined. The majority of the French residents expressed the deepest sorrow at hearing these tidings, and collected round the democratic club with cries of "Vive le Roi! Vive Louis XVII." After such a manifestation of discontent with the Republic, the commissioners felt that their power was gone, and that it would be useless to prolong their resistance to the English. The city was bombarded on August 20 and 22, and on the 23rd Colonel de Chermont, feeling that he had done enough for the honour of the French arms, capitulated. As soon as the English troops entered the city, the French inhabitants assumed the white cockade, and on August 24 a solemn memorial service in honour of Louis XVI. was held in the largest church. By the terms of the capitulation of Pondicherry the French soldiers became prisoners of war, and many of them enlisted in the English East India Company's European regiments, while the officers mostly took service with the Indian native princes, and especially with Tippoo Sultan and the Nizam. The other French settlements, Chandernagore, Karikal, Mahé, and Yanaon, surrendered without a blow, and the French flag ceased to wave in India.¹ The destruction of the French power in India was not due to the Revolution. The policy of Dupleix had been abandoned, before the Revolution commenced, in favour of that of La Bourdonnais and Conway, which aimed at making the Mauritius the headquarters of French influence in the Eastern seas, and looked for expansion towards Madagascar rather than India.² The defences of Pondicherry and the other settlements in India had been deliberately neglected, and the garrisons reduced, and it was perfectly well known, long before 1789, that they could be easily reduced by the English the moment war broke out. During the Revolution no attempt was made to alter this

¹ On these events, see a series of articles by H. Castonnet-Desfosses, entitled *La Révolution et les Clubs dans l'Inde française*, in the *Revue de la Révolution* for March, April, and May, 1883.

² Vol. ii. p. 527.

policy, but the Convention cannot be held responsible for the loss of Pondicherry; if any blame is to be given, it rests upon the Comte de Conway and the ministers of Louis XVI. Yet it is not the less interesting to see how the events of the Revolution affected the French residents in India; how, in spite of their small number, they were seized by the fever for making constitutions, and founding municipalities; how during the reign of freedom despotic commissioners took possession of supreme power; and how they rejected the only feasible scheme for successfully opposing the English, that proposed by Colonel de Chermont. Residence in Asia seems to have made no difference; the passion for electing their authorities seized upon Frenchmen in Pondicherry and Chandernagore as well as upon the inhabitants of France. But it is worthy of note that, in all the schemes for political regeneration, no mention was ever made of admitting the natives to a share of power or even to civil rights; no idea was ever expressed that liberty and equality were as much the inheritance of Hindus as of Frenchmen.

The influence of the Revolution upon the colonial possessions of France merits thoughtful consideration. The noblest sentiments were expressed with regard to them, and especially in reference to the existence of slavery, in all the legislative assemblies, but the measures taken were as ill-considered as the intentions were good. The result of the decrees of the Constituent and the Legislative was universal confusion wherever the French flag waved, and to remedy that confusion the only notion which occurred to the rulers of France, was to confer absolute and despotic powers upon certain commissioners. Occasionally, as in the Mauritius and French Guiana, a prudent governor or commissioner managed to maintain peace and tranquillity, if not prosperity, but as a rule fresh disasters followed each act of the legislature and each change of the executive. The most important of the French colonies was that in the island of San Domingo, and it was there that the worst results ensued. Civil wars and insurrections of the slaves combined to ruin its prosperity and

exterminate the French population. In the Windward Islands the royalist proclivities of the governor-general added a fresh complication, but without that, they were bound to fall into the hands of England, as mistress of the seas. San Domingo was saved from that fate by the republican commissioners but their success did more harm in the end to France, for, whereas she recovered possession of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and their dependencies, she has never been able to establish her dominion again in San Domingo. Perhaps the most curious development was that in India. The French residents in the settlements there can hardly be called colonists; they were nearly all servants of the French East India Company; yet they too imitated the course of the Revolution in France, and yielded to the prevalent mania for the making of constitutions.

It is impossible to conclude this volume without some account of the policy, opinions, and general situation of the émigrés. The influence exerted by them, not so much directly as indirectly, upon the course of the Revolution was enormous. It was because they were sheltered and welcomed that the Legislative Assembly hurried France into war, and it was the exigencies of the war which produced the rapid development of the Revolution; it was because it was generally and naturally believed in France that the monarchs of Europe intended to restore the monarchy in all its former power that the war became a national war; and the Reign of Terror was allowed to exist because it promised a strong government, which should defeat the foreign armies and thus overthrow all the hopes of the émigrés. It was not merely the sentiment of liberty, the love of political freedom, and the desire for representative institutions, which induced the people of France to submit to the despotism of the Terror; their interests were involved in the maintenance of the victories won by the Revolution and in the abolition of the Bourbon monarchy. Every man who valued the possession of civil liberty, equality before the law, and the destruction of arbitrary authority, every farmer and peasant, every bourgeois and artisan who

had suffered under the uncertainty and injustice of feudal imposts and feudal customs, every man who had obtained ever such a small portion of the property of the Church or of the émigrés, felt himself bound to do everything he could or to suffer whatever he might be called upon to bear in the cause of defending the new state of affairs established by the Revolution and of defeating its enemies. Hatred of the émigrés and fear that foreign armies would place the old monarchy again in power to restore the ancient government, and to exact punishment from those who had overthrown it, were the sentiments which induced the vast majority of Frenchmen to acquiesce in the proclamation of the Republic, the execution of Louis XVI., and the Reign of Terror. The threatening language of the émigrés at Coblenz, the formation of the army of Condé, and that general's plots to seize Strasbourg,¹ were the direct cause of the decrees of the Legislative Assembly, which plunged France into war; the proclamation of Brunswick, which was drawn up by an émigré,² led to the capture of the Tuileries; the advance of the Prussians, aided by a corps of émigrés, caused the massacres of September, 1792, in the prisons; the belief that many inhabitants of France, relations or friends of the exiles, hoped and conspired for the return of the émigrés, was the ground for the acquiescence of the majority in the arbitrary and sanguinary rule of the Great Committee of Public Safety. The detestation in which the émigrés were held by the majority of the population is undoubted, as well as the fear of their return; they were loathed as traitors; no measures against them were considered too severe; they were cheerfully abandoned to death, and generally considered to deserve it.

Under these circumstances, it is necessary to see what foundation existed for this generally expressed fear and detestation of the émigrés, which had such important results. As a matter of fact, they had but slight influence in the councils of the monarchs of the continent. Austria and Prussia were forced to fight France on account of them, but the restoration

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 36-38.

² Vol. ii. p. 106.

of the power of the Bourbons formed but a secondary motive in the minds of the statesmen of those countries, when once the war had commenced; they looked upon the distracted state of France rather as affording a favourable opportunity for crushing her influence for ever, and for extending their own boundaries at her expense. The smaller German princes, who had always looked to France for help and support, hated the émigrés;¹ and in Spain and Italy they were looked on with disfavour as deserters from the side of the king and queen. If this was the attitude of foreign countries during the year 1792, when the noisy protestations of the émigrés gave ground for the belief that a counter-revolution would soon take place, and that they would soon be summoned back in triumph to their estates, the feeling of dislike and contempt was heightened in 1793, when it became obvious that France would undergo any privations and would fight to the death against all Europe rather than receive back her nobles and her clergy, her princes and their courtiers. Their boasts of the love entertained for them in France, were seen to be vain, and their expectation of a speedy return to be founded on a hopeless misunderstanding of their real position. As deserters, and hated and powerless deserters, they were, as a body, despised, and when, in spite of the manifest weakness of their cause, they still indulged in the language of lofty scorn towards the actual rulers of the country they had abandoned, and quarrelled among themselves on points of policy and precedence, they were treated with neglect and regarded with contemptuous dislike.

The campaign of 1792, the victory of Valmy, the retreat of the Prussians, the successful defence of Lille, the victory of Jemmappes, and the conquest of Belgium by Dumouriez, broke up the merry meetings at the courts of the émigré princes at Coblenz, and showed them that their return to France was not to be the triumphal promenade they had expected. The execution of Louis XVI. in reality affected the position of the princes very slightly, and only made their return to France the

¹ Vol. ii. p. 36.

more impossible. But they thought otherwise; Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, as next brother to the king, assumed the title of Regent, and named the Comte d'Artois, Lieutenant-General of France. Monsieur then endeavoured to obtain the recognition of his claim to the regency from the great powers. This recognition was generally refused. Lord Grenville, the English Foreign Secretary, argued that such recognition would make it infinitely more difficult to open negotiations for peace with the French Republic, if it became necessary or expedient to make overtures; and when Lord Hood and Don Juan de Langara took possession of Toulon, they did so in the name of Louis XVII., the little prisoner in the Temple, and made no mention of the Regent. Baron Thugut, the Austrian minister, was even more determined; he at first declared that Marie Antoinette was the rightful regent, and even after her execution, he paid no attention to the demands of the Comte de Provence. After the failure of the Prussian invasion of 1792, Monsieur retired first to Liège, then to the Château of Hamm, near Dusseldorf, and then to the court of Turin. The King of Sardinia had cordially welcomed his daughter, the Comtesse de Provence, but had no desire to entertain Monsieur and the Comtesse de Balbi; and the King of Spain consented to receive him only on condition that he dismissed his train of courtiers. The unfortunate prince then established himself, under the title of the Comte de Lille, at Verona, where he claimed the right to live from the Republic of Venice, because his name was entered in the Golden Book. He was most unfortunate in the choice of his personal advisers; though a prince of intelligence, and, as he showed in after life, by no means unfitted to play the part of a constitutional monarch, he was persuaded to take up an attitude of uncompromising hostility towards the Revolution, and to declare again and again that he would never confirm the concessions granted by Louis XVI., and would insist upon a complete return to the *status quo ante* 1789. Calonne, who had been the principal adviser of the princes at Coblenz, was disgraced on the failure of the Prussian invasion, and the Regent formed a council of ministers

composed of the Maréchal de Castries, who was succeeded by the Duc de la Vauguyon, Mgr. de Conzié, Bishop of Arras, the Baron de Flachslanden, and the Comte de Jaucourt. These noblemen were all uncompromising absolutists; they condemned not only those who had made or accepted the Constitution of 1791, but all who had served Louis XVI. since 1789 and had not emigrated at once, and they were unsparing in their strictures upon the conduct of Louis XVI., whom they declared to be the real author of the Revolution, since he had been guilty of convoking the States-General. The poverty-stricken court at Verona was further torn by violent disputes and personal dissensions, for all the émigrés there were jealous of the credit possessed by the Comte d'Avaray, who had won the friendship of the Regent by managing his escape from France in 1791,¹ although that nobleman carefully avoided any interference with politics.

If the policy of Monsieur and his attitude towards the Revolution were mistaken, the conduct of the Comte d'Artois was far more contemptible. He was always raising the hopes of the émigrés by declaring his intention of entering France and placing himself in command of the Catholic army. He was always boasting of the great conquests he was about to make as the champion of legitimate monarchy in France. The insurgents in Lyons, in the Gévaudan, and in La Vendée, were all assured that the prince was going to join them and to fight at their head; they all expected him; but he never came, and probably never intended to come. He did serve with some émigré cavalry during the campaign of 1792, in France, but showed no military capacity, and on the expulsion of the Prussians, he was for a short time imprisoned at Maestricht for debt.² His one desire was to get money, and for that purpose he did not hesitate to use the purses of his friends, and to make the most grovelling supplications to foreign courts. In February, 1793, he went to St. Petersburg, where he was favourably received by the Empress Catherine, who applauded his inten-

¹ Vol. i. pp. 458, 459.

² Forneron, *Histoire Générale des Emigrés*, vol. i. p. 378.

tion of placing himself at the head of the Vendéans, and presented him with a sword worth forty thousand francs, with the motto "Avec Dieu pour le Roi."¹ With this trophy, which he soon sold, he returned to Hamm, where he spent his time in encouraging schemes of counter-revolution in France, and in making excuses for not coming to England to take part in an expedition to La Vendée.

Since this was the conduct of the French princes, it is no matter for surprise that foreign powers did not take them seriously or pay much attention to their protests and their claims. Austria and Prussia, as has been said, cared little about the Bourbons as a dynasty, but both hoped to gain substantial territorial aggrandizement, and to degrade France from its rank as a great power. Austria had cared for Louis XVI., whose marriage with Marie Antoinette had been of great importance to her, but when he was dead, neither the Emperor Francis nor Thugut, his minister, made any secret of their intention to get as much of Alsace and French Flanders as they could from any government which might be established in France. Prussia understood this policy; she too had hoped for substantial annexations, but when, instead of easy conquests, she met with defeats, King Frederick William, and still more his chief generals and statesmen, began to be more afraid of Austria than of France, and prepared to revert to the old alliance of Prussia and France against Austria, which had existed before the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. The Empress Catherine encouraged the émigrés, and tried to engage Prussia and Austria in war against France, that she might be able to carry on her own designs against Poland without interruption from them. Sardinia and Spain both showed by their treatment of Monsieur and the Comte d'Artois that they were not fighting France for the sake of of the Bourbons, but because they were obliged to defend themselves against French aggression. England alone was at war with the Republic, not in order to annex Dunkirk and

¹ Pingaud, *Correspondance intime entre le Comte de Vaudreuil et le Comte d'Artois*, vol. ii. p. 138.

Calais, as was absurdly stated, or even from fear of invasion, but for a principle. That principle was not the re-establishment of the old Bourbon monarchy. Pitt and Grenville were too clear-headed to be carried away by all the enthusiasm of Burke; they had no desire to restore arbitrary government at Versailles, but they insisted that the Low Countries should not fall in to France, and they refused to allow Antwerp to become the rival of London. It was to their interest to make peace as soon as possible; but they would make no peace which left the Catholic Netherlands to France, and they would make no peace except with a stable government, which had the power and the inclination to keep the peace it made. Pitt and Grenville saw no stability in the French Republic, and therefore in 1792 and 1793 they vainly hoped for the restoration of the monarchy by the arms of the continental powers, and from 1794 to 1797 they encouraged the futile conspiracies of the émigrés.¹

The émigrés, like the French princes, could not understand this. They argued that it was the duty of all reigning princes to restore hereditary monarchy in France, and were indignant at the continental powers claiming payment for their exertions in cessions of territory. The advisers of the exiled princes had their different policies. The ministry at Verona was assiduous in its warnings against Austria, the hereditary enemy of France; the Comte de Vaudreuil, the intimate friend of the Comte d'Artois, was equally certain that England was the cause of all the troubles of the Revolution;² the Duc d'Havré saw safety only in a close union with Spain;³ and all alike abused Prussia and the Duke of Brunswick, as traitors to the cause, for having been defeated in Champagne. Obtaining but little encouragement from foreign powers, the

¹ On the attitude of England, see the able preface by M. Albert Sorel to *L'Angleterre et l'Émigration Française*, by André Lebon. Paris: 1882.

² *Correspondance intime du Comte de Vaudreuil et du Comte d'Artois*, ed. by Léonce Pingaud, 2 vols. (Paris: 1889); vol. ii. *passim*, esp. pp 185, 186.

³ Forneron, *Histoire Générale des Émigrés*, vol. ii. p. 65.

political leaders of the émigrés turned their eyes to France, and tried to organize insurrections in the interior. There was no difficulty in finding agents and spies, and the Comte d'Antraigues, who held the threads of these secret machinations, believed he could manage to rouse a feeling in France in favour of the restoration of the monarchy. During 1793 these plots merely exasperated the republicans, and gave reason for the strict application of the measures of the Terror, but after the overthrow of the Great Committee of Public Safety, England began to find money for them, and they became of more serious importance.

Of all the émigrés, the most important were the military émigrés. Mention has been made of the formation of the army of Condé at Worms.¹ It did good service with the Austrians throughout the campaign of 1793, and was kept in Austrian pay. But it was to a great extent an army of officers without soldiers, and the only expedient suggested to remedy this defect was to enlist the French prisoners of war for the ranks, which naturally did not tend to improve its military efficiency. Badly paid and badly fed, obliged to fight *à l'outrance*, on account of the law which ordered all émigrés taken with arms in their hands to be shot on the spot, it slowly dwindled away, and after the peace of Campo Formio, its remains were transported to Russia, to become finally extinct there.² But not all the military émigrés were with Condé; many, including one regiment raised by the Duc de la Châtre, and called by him "Loyal-Émigrant," served in the Netherlands in the pay of Austria or Holland, and a strong legion was formed by the Duc de Saint-Simon, who was a grandee of Spain as well as a French nobleman, for the service of Spain, and distinguished itself in all the campaigns

¹ Vol. ii. pp. 35, 36.

² On the army of Condé and its campaigns, see *Histoire des trois derniers Princes de la Maison de Condé*, by Crétineau Joly, vol. i.; *Histoire de l'Armée de Condé*, by Théodore Muret, 2 vols. (Paris: 1848); *L'Armée de Condé*, by M. de Boutetière (Paris: 1861); and *Journal d'un Fourrier de l'Armée de Condé: Jacques de Thiboult de Puisact*, ed. by Comte Gérard de Contades (Paris: 1882).

against the French army of the Western Pyrenees. England in 1795 took the débris of the émigré regiments, which had served in the Netherlands, into her pay, and equipped them for the expedition to Quiberon; and she also commissioned three regiments into the regular army, which were known from their colonels' names, as Dillon's, Roll's, and Meuron's, and which did good service until the end of the war with Napoleon.

The military émigrés had their swords, and thus might hope at least for the means of existence. It was far otherwise with the clerical émigrés, who had left France sooner than accept the civil constitution of the clergy; they had nothing to offer, and soon fell into a state of destitution. These exiles chiefly fled to Italy and to England. At Rome they were at first cordially received by the Cardinal de Bernis, the former minister of Louis XV., who had been the French ambassador to the Holy See, and who, after his salary was stopped by the Constituent Assembly, received a thousand crowns a month from the King of Spain. But the position of Bernis soon became difficult; Mesdames of France, the king's aunts, who, on their escape from France,¹ had taken up their residence at Rome, made the Abbé Maury their special friend, and secured for him the Italian bishopric of Montefiascone, and eventually a cardinal's hat. He at once put himself into opposition to Bernis on the question of the expediency of excommunicating the priests who had taken the oath, and succeeded in securing their excommunication, in spite of the more moderate counsels of the older statesman.² The Pope did not show himself very liberal to these poor exiles for conscience sake; even bishops and learned theologians had to be content with an occasional livre, and the Italian monasteries which were requested to entertain them, did so most unwillingly.³ Among the religious exiles themselves, the same

¹ Vol. i. p. 424.

² *Le Cardinal de Bernis depuis son Ministère*, by Frédéric Masson. Paris: 1884.

³ Forneron, *Histoire Générale des Émigrés*, vol. i. p. 422.

pitiable jealousies which appeared among the politicians were rife; Mgr. Champion de Cicé, Archbishop of Bordeaux, in spite of his having refused to take the oath, was driven from every table in Rome,¹ because he had accepted the office of Keeper of the Seals from Louis XVI., after the capture of the Bastille.² The reception accorded to this class of exiles in Protestant England was far more generous. Nearly eight thousand priests, mostly from the northern provinces of Brittany and Normandy, found refuge across the Channel,³ including many bishops, one of whom, Mgr. de la Marche, Bishop of Saint-Pol de Léon, was recognized by the English government as their official representative. Many were sheltered in the King's House at Winchester; others found employment in London in the tapestry works especially started for them by the Marchioness of Buckingham; while the Abbé Carron, a Breton priest, organized several schemes to provide for their subsistence.⁴ But the most curious charity was that shown by the Duke of Bridgewater, who erected numerous buildings in his park, and succoured many monks of many religious orders on one condition—that when the dinner-bell rang, they should all promenade in the park, breviaries in hand, before the windows of his castle, each in the costume of his order, “for,” said the duke, “they look far more picturesque than sheep or deer.”⁵

In every country and in nearly every city of importance, French émigrés were to be found living in abject poverty, save where they had gained favour in the eyes of some sovereign or noble. In Germany they abounded. At Berlin they met with scant hospitality; only a few remained at the Prussian court, notably Dampmartin and Chamisso, and the Chevalier de Boufflers, who there married Madame

¹ Forneron, *Histoire Générale des Émigrés*, vol. i. pp. 430, 431.

² Vol. i. p. 150.

³ *Journal historique et religieux de l'Émigration du Clergé de France en Angleterre*, p. 13. London: 1804.

⁴ Forneron, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. pp. 54–57.

⁵ *Souvenirs et Mélanges*, by the Comte d'Haussonville; *La Vie de mon Père*, p. 36, 2nd ed. Paris: 1879.

de Sabran, one of the most famous hostesses of Paris in the days before the Revolution.¹ At Vienna, the nobles of Lorraine were made especially welcome, for it was not forgotten that the husband of Maria Theresa was Duke of Lorraine, and most of them, headed by the Prince de Lambesc² and the Prince de Vaudemont, entered the Austrian service. But, on the other hand, the Polignacs, former favourites of Marie Antoinette, and the Comte de Vaudreuil met with a cold welcome, and were soon forced to retire to a castle in Hungary, lent them by Prince Esterhazy, where they lived on a very modest income.³ And on October 23, 1792, the Emperor issued a proclamation in which, though he did not proscribe the émigrés already in his service, he ordered the arrest of French exiles entering any of his cities.⁴ At Brunswick and Waldeck, the émigrés were kindly treated, but as a rule the example of the Emperor was followed, and they were proscribed and banished. Hamburg, as befitted a free city of the Empire, became the asylum of quite a colony of French émigrés, who had to use all their wits to earn a livelihood. Among them M. de Montlau, a former officer in the Gardes-Françaises, became an actor, and M. Goffreteau de la Gorce prompter at the theatre. Many great ladies of the *ancien régime* had to work with their hands to earn something to live on; and Madame de Tessé, the daughter of the Maréchal de Noailles, with her niece, Madame de Montagu, took a farm and made butter and cheese with the same gaiety which she had shown, when mistress of one of the most famous salons in Paris. There was plenty of amusing society to be found at Hamburg; Beaumarchais set up a house of business there; and so did the Duc d'Aiguillon, with Charles and Alexandre de Lameth in partnership; they had their journal, *Le Spectateur du Nord*, edited by M. de Baudus and Charles de Vielcastel; Rivarol, the famous wit, stayed there for a time quizzing the

¹ Vol. i. pp. 105, 106.

² Vol. i. p. 133.

³ *Correspondance intime du Comte de Vaudreuil*, vol. ii. pp. 199, 200.

⁴ Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, vol. iv. pp. 532, 533.

little society and their kind Hamburg hosts,¹ and so did two famous lady novelists, Madame de Genlis and Madame de Flahaut, better known as Madame de Sousa, after her marriage with the Portuguese *chargé d'affaires*. Many émigrés hoped to find a refuge in distant Russia, and a scheme was put on foot, when the Austrians were forced to evacuate Belgium, signed by more than one hundred of them, to found a colony in the Crimea;² and, as a matter of fact, it was a French nobleman, the Duc de Richelieu, who created Odessa and made it the centre of the trade of the Black Sea.

England and Switzerland were, however, the two chief refuges of the émigrés. The English upper classes, roused by the philippics of Burke against the republicans, and regarding the émigrés as martyrs, felt that they could not do enough for them, a sentiment which was not echoed by the middle and lower classes. "The fools here," wrote Sir James Bland Burges to Lord Auckland, "are opening subscriptions for their relief and support, which I understand our own poor take amiss."³ A bazaar was opened for the sale of articles made by the émigrés in London; the Marchioness of Buckingham found the capital to start a shop for French millinery, embroidery, and artificial flowers, in which many great ladies, such as the Marquise des Réaux, the Comtesse de Saisseval, and the Comtesse de Lastie, were employed; some worked in the girls' school founded by the Abbé Carron, and in the various establishments superintended by that worthy priest. Nor was pure charity neglected. Lady Sheffield founded a hospital for them, and died from a disease contracted while nursing in it; and, at the suggestion of the Duchess of York, a committee of English ladies was formed to seek out and relieve those in absolute need.⁴ The noblemen, like the ladies, were not above

¹ *Rivarol et la Société Française pendant la Révolution et l'Émigration*, by M. de Lescure. Paris : 1883.

² *Journal d'un Fourrier de l'Armée de Conde*, p. 9.

³ *Journal and Correspondence of William, Lord Auckland*, vol. ii. p. 442. London : 1861.

⁴ *Forneron, Histoire Générale des Émigrés*, vol. ii. pp. 48-54.

trying any means to gain an honest livelihood. M. Gauthier de Brécy catalogued a library; the Comte de Caumont started a bookbinder's shop; the Chevalier de Payen and many others became dancing-masters or fencing-masters; many gave French lessons, and one is said to have made an income by going from house to house mixing salads *à la Française*.¹ A certain poor gentleman, who had served as an officer, was reduced to becoming a domestic servant, and on this being known his conduct was solemnly considered by a council of general officers, who ordered that he should no longer be permitted to wear the insignia of a knight of Saint Louis,² and advertised their decision in the English newspapers. Some were actually brought to starvation, and Chateaubriand, who had made the campaign of 1792, and arrived in London almost penniless, was only saved by the timely assistance of Peltier, the former editor of the *Actes des Apôtres*, who gave him and his comrade a good dinner at the London Tavern, and found him work for the London booksellers.³ But all the émigrés did not live in London. They sometimes settled down in little colonies in the country. Lord Harcourt deemed it an honour to entertain the French branch of his family in their exile, and many other English noblemen and country gentlemen repaid the hospitality which had been formerly shown to them in France. Around the house at Staines, which Lord Harcourt had bought for the Duc d'Harcourt, assembled a little society of the oldest noblesse of France, the Duc and Duchesse de Fitzjames, the Duc and Duchesse de Mortemart, the Prince and Princesse de Beauvau, the Vicomte d'Haussonville, and M. d'Aramon, who spent their time gaily and happily in spite of their comparative poverty.⁴ Even more interesting was the little group which collected at Juniper Hall, near Norbury Park, in Surrey. It consisted

¹ Brillat-Savarin, *Physiologie du Goût*, ed Bertall, p. 364.

² Forneron, *Histoire Générale des Émigrés*, vol. ii. pp. 47, 48.

³ On the story of his sufferings in London, see Chateaubriand, *Mémoires d'Outre-tombe*, ed. 1849, vol. iii. pp. 151-181.

⁴ D'Haussonville's *Souvenirs et Mélanges*, ed. 1879, pp. 32-35.

mainly of the constitutionalists of 1791; Lally Tollendal Mathieu de Montmorency, the Comte de Narbonne, the Comte de Guibert, the Marquis de Jaucourt, Stanislas de Girardin, and for a time Talleyrand and Madame de Staël. Fanny Burney has left a vivid sketch of this society in her diary,¹ and she ended by marrying an émigré, General d'Arblay, a former lieutenant of Lafayette, when that nobleman was commandant of the National Guard of Paris.

Switzerland, like England, was crowded with émigrés, who were put to the same straits to live. The most illustrious of these exiles was the Duc de Chartres, who became Duke of Orleans on the execution of his father in November, 1793, and who was to be king of the French as Louis Philippe. He had left the French army, in which he commanded a division, after the battle of Neerwinden, and went to Switzerland, where a fellow-émigré, General de Montesquiou, the conqueror of Savoy, got him a place as a teacher in the college of Reichenau. What distinguished the émigrés in Switzerland was that they were mostly politicians. While the exiles in England and Germany had to work for their living, and found that occupation enough, those in Switzerland were perpetually organizing plots and conspiracies in France. Being a neutral country, and indeed the only neighbouring country not at war with France, Switzerland was the only place where the partisans of the monarchy and the republic could meet. It was therefore full of spies and plotters; the republicans controlled by Barthelemy, the French minister resident, at Basle; the émigrés surrounding Lord Robert Stephen Fitzgerald, the English minister resident, at Berne. The people of Switzerland made no distinction between them; and republican emissaries sent to purchase horses or provisions, sat at the same *table d'hôte* with émigrés, whose lives were forfeited if they crossed the border into France. The two most important politicians among the émigrés were Mounier and Mallet du Pan, who drew up many long and important memoirs for the

¹ *Diary and Correspondence of Madame d'Arblay (Fanny Burney)*, vol. v.

information of the English government, advising them as to the condition of France, and the course which ought to be taken to restore the monarchy. Lord Robert Fitzgerald contented himself with forwarding these memoirs to the English Foreign Office, but refused to take any active steps or to encourage any plots.¹ He was, however, succeeded in 1794, after the fall of Robespierre, by Mr. William Wickham, who followed a very different line, and became the heart and soul of the party in Switzerland, which was trying to rouse France into rebellion against the Republic. The most curious body of émigrés in Switzerland were some escaped Girondins, who seemed strangely out of place with royalists who had followed the Comte d'Artois in 1789 and Monsieur in 1791, and with the constitutionalists, who had fled in 1792. One of these men, Dulaure, has left a curious account of what he saw in Switzerland at this time, and spent his enforced leisure in writing his *Memoirs*.²

But the emigration was not confined to Europe. Many of the émigrés found their way across the Atlantic to the United States. Of these the most notable were Talleyrand, who was expelled from England after fraternizing with the Whig leaders,³ and joining the society at Juniper Hall, by Lord Grenville under the Alien Act, in 1794; and the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, who, after spending the first days of his exile near his friend, Arthur Young, at Bury St. Edmunds, spent some years in travelling in the United States. Thither too repaired Brillat-Savarin, who has left an amusing account of his anxiety over the right way to cook a wild turkey he had shot.⁴ Some even went to India, and took service with the native princes there, among whom may be mentioned M. de Beaumetz, the ex-Constituant, who died at Calcutta,

¹ Lebon *L'Angleterre et l'Émigration Française*, pp. 1-6.

² *Les Conventionnels d'Auvergne: Dulaure*, by Marcellin Boudet. Paris: 1874.

³ *The Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand*, ed. by the Duc de Broglie, English translation, vol. i. pp. 169-171. London: 1891.

⁴ Brillat-Savarin, *Physiologie du Goût*. p. 60.

and the Comte de l'Etaing, who became superintendent of the stud to the Nawab of Oudh.¹

One thing is noticeable with regard to all these émigrés, from the princes downward : all were in a state of direst poverty. This was the result of the savage laws against sending any money to them from France, for the offence of communicating with an émigré was invariably punished with death. They had no subsistence beyond what little they could raise upon any jewels or valuables they might have taken with them when they emigrated, for only in the rarest instances did they receive any remittances to help them. It would seem that the French republicans could have had little to fear from people in such an unfortunate and wretched condition. Yet it was a true instinct which caused them to be detested and feared. It was not only because they were deserters and traitors to France that they were persecuted and hated ; it was because of the principle they represented, because their return would mean the loss of everything the Revolution had gained for France, and the restoration of the old monarchy with all its abuses. And the émigrés themselves were answerable for this ; not one word of concession ever came from the mouths of their political leaders ; their one desire was to get back to France, even though their return should involve the absolute defeat of their country's arms and the permanent abdication of her place among the great nations of the world ; their one desire was to punish. The pitiable quarrel of these deluded wretches over the spoil they were some day to receive ; their petty intrigues in the councils of the princes and at the courts of foreign powers ; their absolute inability to recognize either their own absurd position or the strength of the opposition against them ; their mutual recriminations and violent weakness ; all this seems to justify their proscription by the Republic, ay, and even the Reign of Terror. But for the victims of the emigration, the noble women face to face with starvation, and working with weary fingers to earn their bread, the gallant gentlemen put to

¹ *Private Journal in India*, by the Marquis of Hastings, vol. i. p. 212.

extremest shifts for mere existence, yet all the time preserving the courtly grace of the salons and the ineffable gaiety and polish of the *ancien régime*, nothing but pity and admiration can be felt. The old French society at least knew how to expire nobly; if it failed to perceive that the current of the thought of the world was changing, and that the time for the existence of a benefited class was gone, it expiated its fault gallantly. The great ladies who held their courts in the prisons of Paris, and mounted the guillotine without a shadow of fear, were rivalled in constancy and courage by those who suffered the pangs of hunger as exiles. "We work ten hours a day for our bread," wrote one of them,¹ "but we always remain as gay as ever." "We laughed at Dame Fortune," says Chateaubriand, "that thief, who was in such a hurry to carry off what we never asked her to restore."² Alas for the French nobility that it laughed so much! that laughter rang true in adversity, but a little gravity a few years earlier, a little well-timed concession to the oft-repeated call for reform, would have spared the noblesse the need for showing how courageously gentle blood could face trouble and disaster.

Great was the difference between France at the end of 1791 and at the end of 1793. At the former date all looked hopeful for the future; the king was the father of his people; the Constitution of 1791 was to regenerate France, and set an example to Europe; all old institutions had been renovated; everything was new, and popular on account of its novelty. But even at the end of 1791 there were two threatening clouds on the horizon, the gathering of the émigrés with its invocation of the help of foreign powers, and the schism in the Church due to the civil constitution of the clergy. By the end of 1793 all looked threatening for the future; for the purpose of repelling her foreign foes, who included nearly the whole of Europe, France submitted to be ground down by the most despotic and arbitrary government ever known in modern history, the Great Committee of Public Safety; the Reign of Terror was

¹ Forneron, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 49.

² *Mémoires d'Outre-tombe*, vol. iii. p. 155.

in full exercise, and it was doubtful whether even the energy, audacity, and concentrated vigour of the Great Committee would enable France to be victorious over Europe, and thus secure for her the right of deciding on the character of her own government. She was to be successful; but at what a cost! Torrents of the blood of her bravest and wisest sons were yet to flow on the scaffold and on the battle-field, before she was able to dictate terms of peace to some of her foes, and thus divide the forces of her enemies.

APPENDICES.

- I. MINISTERS.
- II. PRESIDENTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.
- III. PRESIDENTS OF THE CONVENTION.
- IV. THE GIRONDIN PARTY.
- V. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1793.
- VI. THE COMMITTEES OF THE CONVENTION.
- VII. THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.
- VIII. THE COMMITTEE OF GENERAL SECURITY.
- IX. THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL OF PARIS.
- X. THE REPRESENTATIVES ON MISSION.
- XI. THE ARMIES OF THE REPUBLIC.
- XII. CONCORDANCE OF THE REPUBLICAN WITH THE GREGORIAN
CALENDAR.

APPENDIX I.

MINISTERS FROM 1791 UNTIL THE MINISTRIES WERE ABOLISHED 12 GERMINAL, YEAR II. (APRIL 1, 1794).

MINISTERS OF PUBLIC CONTRIBUTIONS, OR THE FINANCES.	MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.	MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR.	MINISTERS FOR WAR.	MINISTERS FOR THE NAVY AND COLONIES.	MINISTERS OF JUSTICE.
Louis Hardouin Tarbé, May 15, '91-Mar. 23, '92.	Comte de Montmorin, July 15, '89-Nov. 27, '91.	Antoine de Valdec de Lessart, Jan. 25-Nov. 29, 1791.	Louis Duportail, Nov. 16, '90-Dec. 2, '91.	Antoine de Valdec de Lessart, (<i>ad interim</i>), Sept. 18-Oct. 2, 1791.	Marguerite Louis François Duport du Tertre, April 27, '91-Mar. '93, '92.
Étienne Clavière, Mar. 23-June 13, 1792.	Antoine de Valdec de Lessart, Nov. 28, '91-Mar. 17, '92.	Bertrand Charles Cahier de Gerville, Nov. 29, '91-Mar. 23, '92.	Louis Marie Jacques Amairic de Narbonne-Lara, Dec. 6, '91-Mar. 9, '92.	Antoine François de Bertrand de Molleville, Oct. 4, '91-Mar. 15, '92.	Jean Marie Roland (<i>ad interim</i>), Mar. 22-April 13, 1792. Henri Duranthon, April 13-July 3, 1792.
François Beaulieu, June 13-July 29, 1792.	Charles Francis Dupérier, called Dumouriez, Mar. 17-June 14, 1792.	Jean Marie Roland, Mar. 23-June 13, 1792.	Pierre Marie de Grave, Mar. 9-May 8, 1792. Joseph Servan, May 9-June 13, 1792.	Étienne Clément Lacoste, Mar. 15-July 21, 1792.	
Louis Leroux de Laville, Aug. 1-10, 1792.	Charles de Naillac, June 14-17, 1792.	Louis Étienne Mourgues, June 13-16, 1792.	Charles François Dumouriez, June 13-17, 1792.	François Joseph Gréat Dubouchage, July 21-Aug. 10, 1792.	Henri Dejoly, July 3-Aug. 10, 1792.
Étienne Clavière, Aug. 10, '92-June 2, '93.	Sébastien Guillaume de Chambonas, June 17-Aug. 1, 1792.	Charles Louis Terrier de Monciel, June 17-July 23, 1792.	Pierre Auguste Lajard, June 17-July 23, 1792.		Georges Jacques Danton, Aug. 12-Sept. 29, 1792. Dominique Joseph Garat, Oct. 19, '92-Mar. 14, '93.
Louis Grégoire Deschamps Destournelles, '94.	Charles Joseph Bigot de Sainte-Croix, Aug. 1-10, 1792.	Louis Champion de Villeneuve, July 21-Aug. 10, 1792.	Charles Xavier Joseph D'Abancourt, July 23-Aug. 10, 1792.	Jean Baptiste Noel Bouchotte, '94.	Louis Jérôme Gohier, Mar. 20, '93-April 1, '94.
	Pierre Henri Hélène Marie Lebrun-Tondou, Aug. 12, '92-June 2, '93.	Jean Marie Roland, Aug. 10, '92-Mar. 14, '93.	Joseph Servan, Aug. 10-Oct. 18, 1792. Jean Nicolas Pache, Oct. 20, '92-Feb. 3, '93.	Gaspard Monge, Aug. 12, '92-April 10, '93.	
	Louis Henri Deforgues, June 14, '93-April 1, '94.	Dominique Joseph Garat, Mar. 14-Aug. 15, 1793.	Pierre de Riel de Bournonville, Feb. 4-Mar. 29, 1793.		
		Jules François Paré, Aug. 15, '93-April 1, '94.	Jean Baptiste Noel Bouchotte, '94.	Jean Dalbarade, April 10, '93-April 1, '94.	

THE REPUBLIC.

APPENDIX II.

**PRESIDENTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 1, 1791,
TO SEPTEMBER 21, 1792.**

Antoine Charles Bartauld, deputy for the department of the Côte d'Or, presided as eldest deputy, Oct. 1, 1791.

Elected

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| 1. Claude Emmanuel Joseph Pierre Pastoret , deputy for the department of Paris | Oct. 3, 1791 |
| 2. Jean Baptiste Louis Ducastel , deputy for the department of the Seine-Inférieure | Oct. 17 „ |
| 3. Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud , deputy for the department of the Gironde | Oct. 30 „ |
| 4. Vincent Marie Viennot de Vaublanc , deputy for the department of the Seine-et-Marne | Nov. 15 „ |
| 5. Bernard Germain Étienne de la Ville de Lacépède , deputy for the department of Paris | Nov. 28 „ |
| 6. Pierre Edouard Lemontey , deputy for the department of the Rhône-et-Loire | Dec. 10 „ |
| 7. Nicolas François [de Neufchâteau], deputy for the department of the Vosges | Dec. 26 „ |
| 8. Jean Antoine Daverhoul t, deputy for the department of the Ardennes | Jan. 8, 1792 |
| 9. Marguerite Élie Guadet , deputy for the department of the Gironde | Jan. 22 „ |
| 10. Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet , deputy for the department of Paris | Feb. 6 „ |
| 11. Mathieu Dumas , deputy for the department of the Seine-et-Oise | Feb. 19 „ |
| 12. Louis Bernard Guyton de Morveau , deputy for the department of the Côte-d'Or | Mar. 4 „ |
| 13. Armand Gensonné , deputy for the department of the Gironde | Mar. 18 „ |
| 14. Jean Dorizy , deputy for the department of the Marne | April 2 „ |
| 15. Félix Julien Jean Bigot de Préameneu , deputy for the department of Paris | April 15 „ |
| 16. Jean Gérard de Lacué de Cessac , deputy for the department of the Lot-et-Garonne | April 29 „ |
| 17. Honoré Muraire , deputy for the department of the Var | May 13 „ |

	Elected
18. François Alexandre Tardiveau, deputy for the department of the Ile-et-Vilaine.	May 27 1792
19. Antoine Français [de Nantes], deputy for the department of the Loire-Inférieure	June 11 „
20. Cécile Stanislas Xavier de Girardin, deputy for the department of the Oise	June 25 „
21. Jean Baptiste Annibal Aubert-Dubayet, deputy for the department of the Isère	July 8 „
22. André Daniel Laffon de Ladébat, deputy for the department of the Gironde	July 23 „
23. Antoine Merlet, deputy for the department of the Maine-et-Loire	Aug. 6 „
24. Jean François de Lacroix, deputy for the department of the Eure-et-Loir	Aug. 19 „
25. Marie Jean Héault de Séchelles, deputy for the department of Paris	Sept. 2 „
26. Pierre Joseph Cambon, deputy for the department of the Hérault	Sept. 16 „

APPENDIX III.

PRESIDENTS OF THE CONVENTION, SEPTEMBER 20, 1792, TO

4 BRUMAIRE, YEAR IV. (OCTOBER 26, 1795).

Philippe Jacques Rühl, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Bas-Rhin, presided as eldest deputy, Sept. 20, 1792.

	Elected
1. Jérôme Pétion, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Eure-et-Loir	Sept. 21, 1792
2. Jean François de Lacroix, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Eure-et-Loir	Oct. 4 „
3. Marguerite Élie Guadet, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Gironde	Oct. 18 „
4. Marie Jean Héault de Séchelles, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Seine-et-Oise	Nov. 1 „
5. Henri Grégoire, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Loir-et-Cher	Nov. 15 „
6. Bertrand Barère, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Hautes-Pyrénées	Nov. 29 „
7. Jacques Defermondes Chapellières, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Ile-et-Vilaine	Dec. 13 „

Elected

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|---|---------------|
| 8. Jean Baptiste Treillard, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Seine-et-Oise | Dec. 27 1792 |
| 9. Pierre Victurnien Vergniaud, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Gironde | Jan. 10, 1793 |
| 10. Jean Paul Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Aube | Jan. 24 „ |
| 11. Jean Jacques Breard, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Charente-Inférieure | Feb. 7 „ |
| 12. Edmond Louis Alexis Dubois-Crancé, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Ardennes | Feb. 21 „ |
| 13. Armand Gensonné, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Gironde | Mar. 7 „ |
| 14. Jean Antoine Joseph Debry, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Aisne | Mar. 21 „ |
| 15. Jean François Bertrand Delmas, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Haute-Garonne | April 4 „ |
| 16. Marie David Albin Lasource, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Tarn | April 18 „ |
| 17. Jean Baptiste Boyer-Fonfrede, deputy for the department of the Gironde | May 2 „ |
| 18. Maximin Isnard, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Var | May 16 „ |
| 19. François René Auguste Mallarmé, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Meurthe | May 30 „ |
| 20. Jean Marie Collot d'Herbois, deputy for the department of Paris | June 13 „ |
| 21. Jacques Alexis Thuriot de la Rozière, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Marne | June 27 „ |
| 22. Jean Bon Saint-André, deputy for the department of the Lot | July 11 „ |
| 23. Georges Jacques Danton, deputy for the department of Paris | July 25 „ |
| 24. Marie Jean Héault de Ééchelles (second time), deputy for the department of the Seine-et-Oise | Aug. 8 „ |
| 25. Maximilien Marie Isidore Robespierre, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of Paris | Aug. 22 „ |
| 26. Jacques Nicolas Billaud-Varenne, deputy for the department of Paris | Sept. 5 „ |
| 27. Pierre Joseph Cambon, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Héault | Sept. 19 „ |
| 28. Louis Joseph Charlier, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Marne | Oct. 3 „ |

Elected

29. **Moyse Bayle**, deputy for the department of the
Bouches-du-Rhône 1st day, 2nd month, year II
(Oct. 22, 1793)
30. **Pierre Antoine Laloy**, Ex-Législateur, deputy
for the department of the Haute-Marne . . . Brumaire 16, year II
(Nov. 6, 1793)
31. **Charles Gilbert Romme**, Ex-Législateur, deputy
for the department of the Puy-de-Dôme . . . Frimaire 1, year II
(Nov. 21, 1793)
32. **Jean Henri Voulland**, Ex-Constituant, deputy
for the department of the Gard Frimaire 16, year II
(Dec. 6, 1793)
33. **Georges Auguste Couthon**, Ex-Législateur,
deputy for the department of the Puy-de-
Dôme Nivôse 1, year II
(Dec. 21, 1793)
34. **Jacques Louis David**, deputy for the depart-
ment of Paris Nivôse 16, year II
(Jan. 5, 1794)
35. **Marc Guillaume Alexis Vadier**, Ex-Constituant,
deputy for the department of the Ariège . . . Pluviôse 1, year II
(Jan. 20, 1794)
36. **Joseph Nicolas Barbeau du Barran**, deputy
for the department of the Gers Pluviôse 16, year II
(Feb. 4, 1794)
37. **Louis Antoine Léon Florelle de Saint-Just**,
deputy for the department of the Aisne . . . Ventôse 1, year II
(Feb. 19, 1794)
38. **Philippe Jacques Rühl**, Ex-Législateur, deputy
for the department of the Bas-Rhin Ventôse 16, year II
(Mar. 6, 1794)
39. **Jean Lambert Tallien**, deputy for the depart-
ment of the Seine-et-Oise Germinal 1, year II
(Mar. 21, 1794)
40. **Jean Pierre André Amar**, deputy for the de-
partment of the Isère Germinal 16, year II
(April 5, 1794)
41. **Jean Baptiste Robert Lindet**, Ex-Législateur,
deputy for the department of the Eure . . . Floréal 1, year II
(April 20, 1794)
42. **Lazare Nicolas Marguerite Carnot**, Ex-Légis-
lateur, deputy for the department of the Pas-
de-Calais Floréal 16, year II
(May 5, 1794)

Elected

43. Claude Antoine Prieur-Duvernois, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Côte-d'Or Prairial 1, year II
(May 20, 1794)
44. Maximilien Marie Isidore Robespierre (second time), deputy for the department of Paris Prairial 16, year II
(June 4, 1794)
45. Élie Lacoste, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Dordogne Messidor 1, year II
(June 19, 1794)
46. Jean Antoine Louis, deputy for the department of the Bas-Rhin Messidor 17, year II
(July 5, 1794)
47. Jean Marie Collot d'Herbois (second time), deputy for the department of Paris Thermidor 1, year II
(July 19, 1794)
48. Philippe Antoine Merlin [de Douai], Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Nord Thermidor 16, year II
(Aug. 3, 1794)
49. Antoine Christophe Merlin [de Thionville], Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Moselle Fructidor 1, year II
(Aug. 18, 1794)
50. André Antoine Bernard [de Saintes], Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Charente-Inférieure Fructidor 15, year II
(Sept. 1, 1794)
51. André Dumont, deputy for the department of the Somme Vendémiaire 1, year III
(Sept. 22, 1794)
52. Jean Jacques Régis Cambacérès, deputy for the department of the Hérault Vendémiaire 16, year III
(Oct. 7, 1794)
53. Pierre Louis Prieur, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Marne Brumaire 1, year III
(Oct. 22, 1794)
54. Louis Legendre, deputy for the department of Paris Brumaire 16, year III
(Nov. 6, 1794)
55. Jean Baptiste Clauzel, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Ariège Frimaire 4, year III
(Nov. 24, 1794)

Elected

56. Jean François Rewbell, Ex-Constituant,
deputy for the department of the Haut-
Rhin Frimaire 16, year III
(Dec. 6, 1794)
57. Pierre Bentabole, deputy for the department
of the Bas-Rhin Nivôse 1, year III
(Dec. 21, 1794)
58. Étienne François Louis Honoré Letourneur,
Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department
of the Manche Nivôse 17, year III
(Jan. 6, 1795)
59. Joseph Stanislas François Xavier Alexis Ro-
vère, deputy for the department of the
Bouches-du-Rhône Pluviôse 1, year III
(Jan. 20, 1795)
60. Paul François Jean Nicolas Barras, deputy for
the department of the Var Pluviôse 16, year III
(Feb. 4, 1795)
61. François Louis Bourdon, deputy for the de-
partment of the Oise Ventôse 1, year III
(Feb. 19, 1795)
62. Antoine Claire Thibaudeau, deputy for the
department of the Vienne Ventôse 16, year III
(March 6, 1795)
63. Jean Pelet, deputy for the department of the
Lozère Germinal 4, year III
(March 24, 1795)
64. François Antoine Boissy d'Anglas, Ex-Con-
stituant, deputy for the department of the
Ardèche Germinal 16, year III
(April 5, 1795)
65. Emmanuel Joseph Siéyès, Ex-Constituant,
deputy for the department of the Sarthe Floréal 1, year III
(April 20, 1795)
66. Théodore Vernier, Ex-Constituant, deputy for
the department of the Jura Floréal 16, year III
(May 5, 1795)
67. Jean Baptiste Charles Mathieu [de Miranpal],
deputy for the department of the Oise Prairial 7, year III
(May 26, 1795)
68. Jean Denis Lanjuinais, ex-Constituant, deputy
for the department of the Ille-et-Vilaine Prairial 16, year III
(June 4, 1795)

Elected

69. Jean Baptiste Louvet, deputy for the department of the Loiret Messidor 1, year III
(June 19, 1795)
70. Louis Gustave Doucet [de Pontécoulant], deputy for the department of the Calvados Messidor 16, year III
(July 4, 1795)
71. Louis Marie Larevellière-Lépaux, Ex-Constituant, deputy for the department of the Maine-et-Loire Thermidor 1, year III
(July 19, 1795)
72. Pierre Claude François Daunou, deputy for the department of the Pas-de-Calais Thermidor 16, year III
(Aug. 3, 1795)
73. Marie Joseph Chenier, deputy for the department of the Seine-et-Oise Fructidor 2, year III
(Aug. 19, 1795)
74. Théophile Berlier, deputy for the department of the Côte-d'Or Fructidor 16, year III
(Sept. 2, 1795)
75. Pierre Charles Louis Baudin, Ex-Législateur, deputy for the department of the Ardennes Vendémiaire 1, year IV
(Sept. 23, 1795)
76. Jean Joseph Victor Genissieu, deputy for the department of the Isère Vendémiaire 16, year IV
(Oct. 8, 1795)

APPENDIX IV.

THE GIRONDIN PARTY.

IN order not to encumber the text with long lists of names, it has been decided to give the following analysis of the composition of the Girondin party in an appendix. It was not a party in the modern sense of an organized political body, acting in absolute harmony and under recognized leaders, and innumerable mistakes of fact have been made with regard to it, often involving false conclusions and serious misconceptions. In the following study, much use has been made of two valuable modern works, *La Légende des Girondins*, by Edmond Biré, and Aulard's *Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention*, book iii., chap. i. (vol. i. pp. 147-167).

The only way to get a true idea of the leaders and the rank and file of the Girondin party is from an examination of the lists of proscription

drawn up against them. The twenty-two deputies originally accused by the Commune of Paris on April 15, 1793 (p. 238) were, in alphabetical order : Barbaroux, Birotteau, Brissot, Buzot, Chambon, Doulcet, Fauchet, Gensonné, Gorsas, Grangeneuve, Guadet, Hardy, Lanjuinais, Lanthenas, Lasource, Lehardi, Louvet, Pétion, Salle, Valady, Valazé, and Vergniaud. Several changes were made in this list, and the names of Ducos, Dusaulx, Isnard, Lesage, and Lidon were at different times inserted in the place of Doulcet, Hardy, Lanthenas, Valady, and Valazé. The Committee of Twelve elected under Girondin influence on May 20, 1793 (p. 240) consisted of : Bergoeing, Bertrand-La-Hosdinière, Boileau, Boyer-Fonfrede, Gardien, Gomaire, Kervelegan, Larivière, Mollevaut, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Saint-Martin-Valogne, and Viger. On June 2, 1793, the first list of proscription was carried (p. 246), and the following twenty-nine deputies were ordered to be excluded from the Convention and kept under guard in their own houses : Barbaroux, Bergoeing, Bertrand-La-Hosdinière, Birotteau, Boileau, Brissot, Buzot, Chambon, Gardien, Gensonné, Gomaire, Gorsas, Grangeneuve, Guadet, Kervelegan, Lanjuinais, Larivière, Lasource, Lehardi, Lesage, Lidon, Louvet, Mollevaut, Pétion, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Salle, Valazé, Vergniaud, and Viger, while Fauchet and Isnard, who had voluntarily suspended themselves from their functions as deputies, were ordered not to leave Paris. Of the twenty-nine deputies, proscribed on June 2, ten were members of the Committee of Twelve, the other two, Boyer-Fonfrede and Saint-Martin-Valogne, having been saved by Legendre, and nineteen were from the list of Girondin leaders. Seventeen of these nineteen were named on the original list of twenty-two presented by the Commune of Paris, the five excluded being Doulcet, Fauchet, Hardy, Lanthenas, and Valady, and two had been added since, Lesage and Lidon. Many of these deputies escaped into the departments at different dates (pp. 251, 272), and tried to organize a general movement against the Convention ; they were outlawed on July 28, 1793, and with them certain other deputies, not hitherto proscribed, who had joined them, such as Cussy and Meillan. These measures of proscription were boldly attacked by those deputies who had been allowed to retain their seats in the Convention, notably by Boyer-Fonfrede and Ducos, Doulcet de Pontécoulant and Lauze-Deperret, and a protest against them was signed by seventy-four or seventy-five deputies of the Right, which is known as the Protest of the Seventy-three (pp. 247, 248). This protest was kept secret, but it was found among the papers of Lauze-Deperret after the arrest of Charlotte Corday, and utilized to procure the extinction of the political power of the remaining Girondins, when the Great Committee of Public Safety desired to establish a Reign of Terror over the Convention itself.

On October 3, 1793, Amar, in the name of the Committee of General Security, brought up a report on the Girondins, which was accepted with-

out opposition by the Convention. By it no less than one hundred and twenty-nine deputies were proscribed. They were divided into three categories. Twenty-one, who had escaped and were still in hiding, were again declared outlaws : Barbaroux, Bergoeing, Birotteau, Buzot, Chambon, Chasset, Cussy, Gorsas, Grangeneuve, Guadet, Kervelegan, Languinais, Larivière, Lesage, Lidon, Louvet, Meillan, Pétion, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Salle, and Valady. Forty-three deputies, many of whom however escaped, were ordered to be sent for trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal : Andrei, Antiboul, Boileau, Bonet, Boyer-Fonfrede, Bresson, Brissot, Carra, Condorcet, Couppé (of the Côtes-du-Nord), Coustard, Defermon, Delahaye, Devérité, Doucet, Duchastel, Ducos, Duprat, Jean Pierre Duval (of the Seine-Inférieure), Philippe Égalité, Fauchet, Gamon, Gardien, Gensonné, Hardy, Isnard, Lacaze, Lasource, Lauze-Deperret, Lehardi, Lesterpt-Beauvais, Mainvielle, Masuyer, Mollevaut, Noël, Richou, Rouyer, Savary, Sillery, Valazé, Vallée, Vergniaud, and Viger. The name of Philippe Égalité, the ci-devant Duke of Orleans, who was certainly not a Girondin, was not contained in the report of the Committee of General Security, as read by Amar, but was added on the motion of Billaud-Varenne. Sixty-five deputies, who had signed the Protest of the Seventy-three, with Bresson, Chasset, Duprat, Gamon, Lacaze, Lauze-Deperret, Masuyer, Vallée, Savary and Defermon, included in the above list, were on that account ordered to be excluded from the Convention and imprisoned in houses of detention, namely : Amyon, Aubry, Babey, Bailleul, Blad, Blanqui, Blaux, Blaviel, Bohan, Cazeneuve, Chastellain, Corbel, Coupé (of the Oise), Dabray, Daunou, Delamarre, Delleville, Derazey, Descamps, Doublet, Dubusc, Dugué-d'Assé, Dusaulx, Estadens, Pierre Joseph Faure (of the Seine-Inférieure), Fayolle, Ferroux, Fleury, Garilhe, Olivier Gérente, Girault, Grenot, Guiter, Hecquet, Jary, Laplaigne, Laurence, Laurenceot, Le Breton, Julien Le Febvre (of the Loire-Inférieure), Pierre Louis Stanislas Lefebvre (of the Seine-Inférieure), Maisse, Marbos, Massa, Mercier, Moysset, Obelin, Peries, Peyre, Queinnec, Rabaut-Pomier, Ribereau, Rouault (of the Morbihan), Rouzet, Royer, Ruault (of the Seine-Inférieure), Saladin, Salmon, Saurine, Serre, Soubeyran de Saint-Prix, Tournier, Varlet de la Valée, Vernier, and Vincent. These three lists do not include the names of all the Girondin leaders, and of their supporters. Some were forgotten like Gomaire, who had been in prison since July 28, and Dulaure, a signatory of the Protest of the Seventy-three, whose name was omitted by mistake, and added on the motion of Amar on October 22 ; some had resigned their seats in the Convention, like Kersaint and Rebecqui, Dechézeaux and Larevellière-Lépaux ; some had already been arrested, like Despinassy, and their names had not been repeated ; some had signed the departmental protests of the deputies of the Somme, the Aisne, and the Haute-Vienne, which were kept secret (Mortimer-Ternaux,

Histoire de la Terreur, vol. vii. pp. 546-554); and others are well known to have been in sympathy with the Girondins. From various sources, notably from M. Aulard's list (*Les Orateurs de la Législative et de la Convention*, vol. i. pp. 158-165) and M. Jules Guiffrey's *Les Conventionnels*, the following list of fifty-five deputies, who were either leaders of, members of, or active sympathizers with the Girondin party, has been compiled: Asselin, Bancal des Issards, Belin, Marc Antoine Bernard (of the Bouches-du-Rhône), Bertrand-La-Hosdinière, Brunel, Camboulas, Casabianca, Casenave, Corenfustier, Jean Debry, Dechézeaux, Delecloy, Despinassy, Devars, Dufestel, Dulaure, Dupin, Duplantier, Faye, Fiquet, Forest, François, Gantois, Antoine Girard (of the Aude), Giroust, Gomaire, Kersaint, Jean Michel Lacroix (of the Haute-Vienne), Lanthenas, Larevellière-Lépaux, Larroche, Le Carlier, Jean Baptiste Leclerc (of the Maine-et-Loire), Lemaignan, Loiseau, Pierre Florent Louvet (of the Somme), Loysel, Magniez,¹ Manuel, Martin-Saint-Romain, Mennesson, Guillaume Michel (of the Morbihan), Antoine Michet (of the Rhône-et-Loire), Thomas Paine, Pénier, Personne,² Petit, Pilastre, Rebecqui, Rivaud, Rivery, Saint-Martin-Valogne, Soullignac, and Vitet. Of course some names may be omitted, but these one hundred and eighty-three deputies include all the leaders and a very large proportion, if not quite all, of the members of what may be called the Girondin party.

In the first category of twenty-one outlaws, nine were captured and guillotined: Barbaroux, Birotteau, Cussy, Gorsas, Grangeneuve, Guadet, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Salle, and Valady; two, Buzot and Pétion, were found dead in the fields (p. 278); Lidon committed suicide; Chambon was killed in defending himself from arrest; and eight escaped: Bergoeing, Chasset, Kervelegan, Lanjuinais, Larivière, Lesage, Louvet, and Meillan. Of the forty-two in the second category, for Philippe Égalité is not to be reckoned a Girondin, twenty-three were guillotined: Antiboul, Boileau, Boyer-Fonfrede, Brissot, Carra, Coustard, Duchastel, Ducos, Duprat, Fauchet, Gardien, Gensonné, Lacaze, Lasource, Lauze-Deperret, Lehardi, Lesterpt-Beauvais, Mainvielle, Masuyer, Noël, Sillery, Vergniaud, and Viger, of whom twenty were executed in Paris on October 31 (pp. 339, 340); two, Condorcet and Valazé, committed suicide; and the other seventeen were allowed to take their seats again in the Convention, with the survivors of the outlaws, by a decree of 18 Ventôse Year III. (March 18, 1795). Of the sixty-five deputies in the third category, Doublet died in prison, and the remainder were recalled to the Convention on 18 Frimaire Year III. (December 8, 1794) where they never ceased to demand the reinstatement of their surviving leaders. Of the fifty-five who have being named in the fourth list, Bernard, Dechézeaux,

¹ Lecesne's *Arras sous la Révolution*, vol. ii. p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. pp. 392, 393.

Kersaint and Manuel were guillotined ; Rebecqui committed suicide, Bancal des Issards was surrendered to the Austrians by Dumouriez ; those who had escaped, like Despinassy, Dulaure, and Giroust, returned ; those who had resigned their seats, like Larevellière-Lépaux, withdrew their resignations ; and some, like Lanthenas and Pénierès remained undisturbed during the Terror.

In analyzing the composition of the Girondin party, it will be convenient, if not perfectly accurate, to term the twenty-one outlaws and the forty-two in the second category, from which Philippe Égalité is to be excepted, leaders ; the sixty-five in the third category, protestants ; and the fifty-five in the fourth list, sympathizers. Under this classification, of the sixty-three leaders, thirteen were ex-Constituants : Bonet, Buzot, Chasset, Couppé, Cussy, Defermon, Kervelegan, Lanjuinais, Lesterpt-Beauvais, Pétion, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Salle, and Sillery ; and sixteen had been members of the Legislative Assembly : Brissot, Condorcet, Coustard, Ducos, Fauchet, Gamon, Gensonné, Grangeneuve, Guadet, Isnard, Larivière, Lasource, Lauze-Deperret, Masuyer, Rouyer, and Vergniaud. Of the sixty-five "protestants," seven were ex-Constituants : Babey, Grenot, Jary, Julien Le Febvre, Royer, Saurine, and Vernier ; and eleven former members of the Legislative : Bohan, Corbel, Coupé, Descamps, Dusaulx, Olivier Gérénte, Laplaigne, Le Breton, Saladin, Salmon, and Soubeyran de Saint-Prix. Of the fifty-five "sympathizers," five were ex-Constituants : Larevellière-Lépaux, Le Carlier, Leclerc, Lemaignan, and Pilastre, all of whom, except Le Carlier, were deputies for the Maine-et-Loire, and ten were former members of the Legislative : Belin, Jean Debry, Despinassy, Faye, Fiquet, Giroust, Kersaint, Pierre Florent Louvet, Loyse, and Rivery. It is curious to observe that out of the sixteen constitutional bishops, who sate in the Convention, five were active supporters of the Girondin party, of whom Fauchet, Bishop of Calvados, was guillotined, and Cazeneuve, Marbos, Royer, and Saurine, bishops respectively of the Hautes-Alpes, the Drôme, the Ain, and the Landes, were imprisoned as "protestants."

The following geographical analysis shows that leaders and members of the Girondin party came from all parts of France, but especially from the provinces to the north of the Loire. Though the department of the Gironde naturally supplied the most famous leaders, of whom seven were guillotined and only one, Bergoeing, escaped, they had, as will be seen, but very few supporters in the other departments of Guienne. Sympathy with the Girondins was very strongly felt by the deputies from the provinces of Brittany, Normandy, and Anjou ; departmental protests against the proscription of June 2 were signed by the majority of the deputies for the Aisne, the Haute-Vienne, and the Somme ; all the three deputies, Blanqui, Dabray, and Massa, for the newly formed department of the Alpes-Maritimes, which had been constituted out of the County of

Nice, were imprisoned as "protestants," as were six out of the eight deputies for the Jura : Amyon, Babey, Ferroux, Grenot, Laurenceot, and Vernier. On the other hand, out of the twenty-four deputies for Paris, only one, Dusaulx, was imprisoned as a "protestant," though Manuel, who had resigned his seat in the Convention in disgust at the condemnation of the king, may be accounted a "sympathizer," and among the deputies for the following twenty-five departments, the Girondin leaders could not reckon on a single supporter : the Allier, the Ariège, the Cantal, the Cher, the Côte-d'Or, the Creuse, the Dordogne, the Doubs, the Isère, the Loir-et-Cher, the Lozère, the Marne, the Haute-Marne, the Mayenne, the Meuse, Mont-Blanc (Savoy), the Nièvre, the Nord, the Hautes-Pyrénées, the Bas-Rhin, the Haut-Rhin, the Haute-Saône, the Seine-et-Marne, the Vendée, or the Vienne. The localization of the supporters of the Girondins will be best understood from the following table :—

	Leaders.	Protestants.	Sympathizers.	Total.
Brittany	6	11	2	19
Normandy	12	11	1	24
Maine		1		1
Paris		1	1	2
Isle de France	2	3	8	13
Picardy	2	1	8	11
Artois		2	3	5
French Flanders				0
Departments of the North	22	30	23	75
Champagne	2	1	1	4
Lorraine	4	1		5
Alsace				0
Franche Comté		6 *		6
Burgundy	2	1		3
Departments of the East	8	9	1	18
Nivernais, Bourbonnais and the Marche				0
Orléannais	4		2	6
Touraine	1			1
Berri		1		1
Limousin	3		5	8
Auvergne			2	2
Lyonnais	1		4	5
Departments of the Centre	9	1	13	23

* All from the department of the Jura.

	Leaders.	Protestants.	Sympathizers.	Total.
Anjou	1		4	5
Poitou	1			1
Aunis and Saintonge . . .			1	1
Angoumois		1	1	2
Departments of the West	2	1	6	9
Guienne	9 *	7	4	20
Béarn	1		1	2
Departments of the South-	—	—	—	—
West	10	7	5	22
Nice		3		3
Dauphiné		5		5
Provence	6	2	3	11
Languedoc	4	6	3	13
Roussillon	1	1		2
Savoy and Foix				0
Departments of the South-	—	—	—	—
East	11	17	6	34
Corsica	1		1	6
	63	65	55	183

In a more general way, considering France as divided roughly into three zones, twenty-two leaders, thirty "protestants," and twenty-three "sympathizers" represented the northern; nineteen leaders, eleven "protestants," and twenty "sympathizers" the middle; and twenty-two leaders, twenty-four "protestants," and twelve "sympathizers" the southern departments.

After studying the composition of the Girondin party, it is next advisable to show how it was divided against itself, and for this purpose it will be enough to analyze the votes given by the leaders in the famous scrutinies on the trial of Louis XVI. (pp. 216-218), and by the "protestants" and "sympathizers" in the third of those scrutinies. On the first question as to whether Louis was guilty of treason towards the nation, the Convention was practically unanimous, and of the Girondin leaders, Fauchet, Lanjuinais, and Rouzet voted in the affirmative with reservations, Valady was neutral, Chasset, Noël, and Larivière refused to vote, and Duchastel, Lasource, Mainvielle, and Viger were absent. The second scrutiny was far more important. The idea of allowing the nation in its primary assemblies to decide the fate of the King, was the notion of the wisest thinkers of the Girondin party, and yet it will be seen that there

* Of these nine, eight were deputies for the department of the Gironde.

was a considerable difference in the views of its leaders. In analyzing this and the two other scrutinies, it must be noted that Mainvielle and Viger had not yet taken their seats, and that the votes of sixty-one leaders only have to be considered. Of these sixty-one, forty-three, or more than two-thirds, voted in favour of the reference to the people; thirteen voted against it, namely, Boileau, Boyer-Fonfrede, Carra, Chasset, Condorcet, Couppe, Doucet de Pontécoulant, Ducos, Gardien, Lacaze, Lauze-Deperret, Lesterpt-Beauvais, and Masuyer; two refused to vote, Bergoeing and Noël; Vallée was neutral; and two, Duchastel and Lasource, were absent. On the second scrutiny as to the punishment to be inflicted on Louis XVI., thirty-seven of the sixty-one leaders voted in favour of banishment, detention until a peace, or some punishment less than death; thirteen voted for death, namely, Barbaroux, Birotteau, Boileau, Bonet, Boyer-Fonfrede, Carra, Chambon, Ducos, Duprat, Gensonné, Isnard, Lasource, and Rouyer; ten voted for death conditionally, generally accepting Mailhe's amendment, namely, Brissot, Buzot, Gamon, Lesage, Lesterpt-Beauvais, Lidon, Louvet, Pétion, Valazé, and Vergniaud, while Noël was not present. In the last scrutiny, whether the sentence should be executed at once, or whether there should be a respite, thirty-nine of the sixty-one leaders voted in favour of the respite; fifteen voted against it, namely, Barbaroux, Boileau, Boyer-Fonfrede, Carra, Chasset, Ducos, Duprat, Gensonné, Gorsas, Isnard, Lasource, Lidon, Masuyer, Rouyer, and Vergniaud; five declined to vote, Chambon, Condorcet, Grangeneuve, Lacaze, and Noël; Antiboul declared himself neutral; and Duchastel was absent. A careful examination of these lists of names will show a large amount of cross-voting, but the most extraordinary feature is that Chasset, Gorsas, and Masuyer, who had voted against the penalty of death, and that Lidon and Vergniaud, who had only voted for it conditionally, should have voted against the respite. It is not necessary to analyze the votes of the "protestants" and "sympathizers" in all the scrutinies; it will be enough to show the dissensions amongst them to examine the third scrutiny only. Of the sixty-five "protestants," four, Blanqui, Blaviel, Dabray, and Massa, had not yet taken their seats, and so, as in the case of the leaders, only the votes of sixty-one deputies have to be examined. Of these sixty-one, forty-five, a larger proportion than among the leaders, voted for some penalty less than death; ten voted for death, namely, Amyon, Bohan, Coupé, Descamps, Ferroux, Grenot, Laplaigne, Maisse, Ribereau, and Saladin; and six voted for death conditionally, generally in the terms of Mailhe's amendment, Aubry, Blad, Laurence, Peyre, Rabaut-Pomier, and Soubeyran de Saint-Prix. Of the fifty-five deputies who have been termed "sympathizers," Marc Antoine Bernard had not yet taken his seat. Of the other fifty-four, thirty-six voted for some penalty less than death; fourteen voted for death unconditionally, namely, Bertrand-La-Hosdinière, Camboulas, Jean Debry, Despinassy.

Dulaure, Duplantier, François, Girard, Larevellière-Lepaux, Le Carlier, Loiseau, Pénier, Petit, and Rebecqui; and four voted for death with Mailhe's amendment, Delecloy, Lanthenas, Loysel, and Mennesson.

It remains only to give a conclusive proof of the influence which the Girondin leaders possessed over the Convention up to the very moment of their overthrow. The Convention elected a president and three secretaries every fortnight, and sometimes additional secretaries; the president held office for a fortnight, the three secretaries for a month, in order that there should be always six secretaries at the bureau. Now, of the nineteen presidents elected up to May 30, 1793, nine were among the leaders of the Girondin party, Boyer-Fonfrede, Defermon, Gensonné, Guadet, Isnard, Lasource, Pétion, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, and Vergniaud, and out of the sixty-six secretaries elected during the same period, twenty-eight were selected from the same group of sixty-three deputies, namely, Barbaroux, Boyer-Fonfrede, Brissot, Buzot, Carra, Chambon, Chasset, Condorcet, Defermon, Doucet de Pontécoulant, Ducos, Duprat, Fauchet, Gensonné, Gorsas, Grangeneuve, Guadet, Isnard, Lanjuinais, Lasource, Lehardi, Lesage, Louvet, Masuyer, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Salle, Valazé, and Vergniaud. At the very opening of the Convention, the Girondins were supreme, for on September 20, 1792, Pétion was elected the first president, and Brissot, Camus, Condorcet, Lasource, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, and Vergniaud the first secretaries; while the last elections before their overthrow are even more striking, for on April 18, 1793, Lasource was elected president, and Doucet, Lehardi, and Chambon secretaries; on May 2, Boyer-Fonfrede president, Genissieu, Masuyer, and Pénier secretaries; on May 16, Isnard president, Poullain-Grandprey, Fauchet, and Duprat secretaries; and on May 30, Mallarmé president, and Ducos, Durand-Maillane, and Méaulle secretaries. No better proof than this can be given of the influence which the Girondin leaders exercised during the first months of the session of the Convention.

APPENDIX V.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1793 COMPARED WITH CONDORCET'S SCHEME.

THE Constitution decreed by the Convention on June 24, 1793, and accepted by the primary assemblies of France on August 10, 1793, never came into use, for it was suspended on October 10, 1793, on the report of Saint-Just, one of its authors, in the name of the Committee of Public Safety, and revolutionary government, that is the Reign of Terror, was substituted for it. After the fall of Robespierre and his friends on

9 Thermidor, Year II. (July 27, 1794), the new rulers of France, the Thermidorians, considered the Constitution of 1793 to be impracticable, and drew up and decreed instead the Constitution of the Year III. (1795). The Constitution of 1793 has therefore only an academic interest, as the projected government of France according to the ideas of the leading statesmen of the Mountain, and is here compared with the scheme of constitution prepared by the Girondin leaders before their expulsion, and published by them.

As soon as the Convention met and proclaimed the abolition of royalty and the proclamation of the Republic, it appointed a Committee of Constitution. The Constitution of 1791, with its recognition of royalty and its division of the people into active and passive citizens, was obviously doomed to abrogation in spite of the short time it had been in operation. This Committee of Constitution consisted of Barère, Brissot, who was almost at once succeeded by Barbaroux, Condorcet, Danton, Gensonné, Tom Paine, Pétion, Siéyès, and Vergniaud, and the majority in it consisted of leaders of the Girondin party. It set to work at once, and on February 15 and 16, 1793, Condorcet, as its reporter, presented its plan of a constitution. According to Madame Roland, Gensonné was answerable for part of this plan,¹ and it may well be believed that Siéyès, as one who had had experience in the drawing up of constitutions in the Constituent Assembly, had a share at least in the elaboration of the elective principle; but nevertheless it was Condorcet who actually presented it as reporter, and common tradition, as well as probability, marks him out as its principal author.

Condorcet's plan of a constitution consists of 404 articles, divided into fourteen chapters, and preceded, like the Constitution of 1791, by a Declaration of the Rights of Man. Its main features were its care in depriving the executive of any authority, its mania for elections, and its transference of all power to the primary assemblies. In Condorcet's report, which was published with his scheme, he expounds the principles on which the Committee of Constitution had acted. A few sentences from it deserve quotation. "All political heredity," he says, "is at once an evident violation of natural equality and an absurdity, since it pre-supposes that the qualities fitted for fulfilling any public function can be hereditary. . . . The reunion of the citizens in the primary assemblies ought to be considered as a means for conciliating peace and liberty, and not as a danger to public tranquillity. These assemblies, composed of men occupied in peaceful and useful labours, cannot be troubled, unless too long meetings induce them to be attended only by unemployed and lazy, and therefore dangerous, men, or unless they are left to themselves and exposed to the risk of being led away by individuals. We have therefore neglected no

¹ Madame Roland's *Mémoires*, ed. C. A. Dauban, p. 317.

means for preserving all the natural utility of these reunions, and for removing from them the influence of parties and of intriguers. . . . The sovereignty of the people, equality amongst men, and the unity of the Republic, these are the principles which have guided us in the choice of the combinations, which we have adopted ; and we have believed that the constitution, which would be the best in itself, and the most conformable to the spirit of the nation, would be the one in which these principles are the most carefully observed." According to Condorcet's scheme,¹ the supreme administration of the country was placed in the hands of an Executive Council, consisting of seven ministers and a secretary, elected by the primary assemblies, of whom half were to retire every January. The primary assemblies were also to elect *suppléants* to take the place of any minister retiring, dying, or being removed during his year of office. This Executive Council was to carry out all the decrees of the Legislative Body, in which it was to have no seat, and to which it was to offer no advice unless formally requested to do so, and any member of it could be suspended by the Legislative Body and sent for trial before a special jury elected for the purpose. The Council was to be presided over by each of its members in turn for fifteen days. The power of which the Executive Council was thus carefully deprived, was not entrusted to the Legislative Body, which was to consist of a single chamber elected for one year only. This Legislative Body was, in the words of Condorcet, charged "with the only function suitable to it in executive measures, that of surveillance," and was forbidden to interfere in administrative questions. It could not even legislate or make decrees at its discretion ; any single citizen could propose a new law, the repeal of an existing law, or a vote of censure on any act of the administration. If he was supported by the signatures of fifty citizens, his proposition was bound to be laid before a primary assembly ; if he obtained a majority, all the primary assemblies of his commune were to be convoked ; if he again obtained a majority, his proposition was to be laid before all the primary assemblies of his department ; if his department agreed, the proposition was laid before the Legislative Body, which was obliged at once to decide if it was expedient to take it into consideration. Even if the Legislative Body rejected the scheme, the powers of the single citizen were not exhausted. If he could get the primary assemblies of another department to support him, all the primary assemblies in the Republic were to be summoned, and if they voted in his favour, the Legislative Body was at once to be dissolved, and a new one elected. What, then, were these primary assemblies, in which all power was to reside according to Condorcet's scheme ? "The primary assemblies shall be distributed over the territory of each depart-

¹ For an elaborate analysis, see Biré's *La Légende des Girondins*, chap. vii., *La Constitution Girondine*.

ment, and their *arrondissement* shall be so regulated that none of them shall contain less than 450, or more than 900 members." And as there were about 44,000 communes in France, there must, according to this regulation, have been more than 50,000 primary assemblies. Of whom were these primary assemblies to be composed? "Of every man, aged twenty-one, who has inscribed his name on the list of a primary assembly, and who has since resided for one year in the Republic." It is unnecessary to point out the absurdity of these proposed arrangements, or to analyze the curiously elaborate manner in which the primary assemblies were to carry out their elections, whether of ministers, deputies, or officials. It would fill several pages to recount the methods by which Condorcet hoped to prevent the existence of anything like party spirit or even the election of a very popular man, by means of lists of candidates, and it is enough to add that under his constitution the French people would have had to spend nearly all their time electing deputies, or ministers, or commissioners of the treasury, or municipal officers, or civil jurors, or criminal jurors, none of whom were to hold office for more than six months or a year.

Condorcet's scheme never became an accepted constitution, and on May 30, 1793, on the eve of the fall of the Girondins, five deputies from the Mountain were added to the Committee of Public Safety, for the purpose of drawing up another constitution as soon as possible. These five deputies were Couthon, Hérault de Séchelles, Mathieu, Ramel, and Saint-Just. Hérault de Séchelles was chosen reporter, and on June 24 the scheme of this Committee was accepted by the Convention (p. 248). It was solemnly agreed to by the primary assemblies, and is known as the Constitution of 1793, but, as has been said, it never came into working operation. Hérault de Séchelles' constitution is far simpler than Condorcet's; it is free, for instance, from the elaborate arrangements for voting, but it contains many similar absurdly unworkable and even anarchic provisions. It has the merit, however, of being considerably shorter. Like other French constitutions, it was preceded by the inevitable Declaration of the Rights of Man; this time it was in thirty-five articles, and began, "The aim of society is the happiness of all. Government is instituted to guarantee to man the enjoyment of his natural and imprescriptible rights. These rights are equality, liberty, security, and property," etc., etc. It consisted of 124 articles instead of 404, and was divided into twenty-five titles. By it the Executive Council, which was to consist of twenty-four ministers instead of eight, was not elected directly by the primary assemblies, but was chosen by the Legislative Body out of a list of candidates, of whom one was chosen by each department, and was renewed by half every year. The Legislative Body was, as in Condorcet's scheme, to consist of one chamber, elected for one year only. Its functions were to pass decrees and to propose laws. Decrees concerned matters of finance and administration; laws comprised

more than mere matters of legislation, and included such measures of importance as the declaration of a war. When a proposed law was agreed to by the Legislative Body, it was to be printed and sent to every commune in France, and unless one-tenth of the primary assemblies in more than half the departments refused to accept it, it became law. The local government was left much as it was fixed by the Constitution of 1791; every commune, district, and department was to elect its municipality, administrators of the district, and administrators of the department, half of whom were to retire every year, but the arrangements of 1791 were simplified by the abolition of directories of the districts and departments, and of the procureurs-syndics and procureurs-généraux-syndics.

In matters concerning the administration of justice, the regulations of the Constitution of 1793 were clear and simple. In civil cases, all questions were to be laid in the first instance before elected justices of peace or before private arbitrators chosen by the parties, from whom appeals lay to elected public arbitrators, all of whom were to hear the cases and give their decisions without expense to the suitors. From them appeals lay to the central tribunal of appeal, which decided only on questions of law, not of fact. In criminal cases, the accused were always to have counsel, and to be tried by a jury, which was to take cognizance of the criminal act and its intention, while sentence was to be passed by a tribunal of elected judges. The treasury was to be administered, not as in Condorcet's scheme by commissioners elected by the primary assemblies, but by agents appointed by the Executive Council, under the surveillance of special agents nominated by the Legislative Body. This constitution may not be perfect, but it is at least simple and intelligible, and an examination of it gives clear proof of the superiority of Herault de Séchelles and his colleagues of the Mountain over Condorcet and his Girondin associates. Its weakness lies in the amount of election involved, and in the weakening of the executive; but in these respects it does not go so far as the Girondin scheme, or even as the Constitution of 1791. Above all, there is no appearance of the extraordinary power for disturbance granted to the dissentient single citizen under Condorcet's scheme. But in this regard it must be noted that Herault de Séchelles felt what he called "the need of providing a guarantee for the people against the oppression of the Legislative Body." He at first proposed the institution of a "national jury" for this purpose, which was not approved, and then a plan by which a deputy should be judged by his constituents, and not be re-eligible unless acquitted by them. This was also rejected, for the Convention probably thought that as the Legislative Body was only to be elected for one year, it could not get out of touch with the people in that short period. On the whole, though the constitutions of Condorcet and Herault de Séchelles have but an academic interest, and the former was obviously impracticable, it seems a pity that the latter was not given an

opportunity of being put into operation, for it would have been interesting to know how some of its provisions, notably that about laws, would have worked in practice.

APPENDIX VI.

THE COMMITTEES OF THE CONVENTION.

THE importance of the committees of the Convention, in which the measures passed by the Convention were prepared, and which practically took charge of all matters coming within their departments, was very great. They were somewhat overshadowed after the assumption of all executive power by the two "committees of government," the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security; but, nevertheless, they remained the originators of all legislation, and certain of them, notably the Financial Committee, took an important share in the administration of the country. On September 22, 1792, directly after the Convention met, two commissions were appointed, the one consisting of Jean Debry, Léonard Bourdon, Lanjuinais, and Guyton-Morveau to decide what committees should be formed, and to regulate their work; and the other, consisting of Defermon, Gossuin, Herault de Séchelles, Mathieu, and Osselin to nominate the members to serve on these committees. As the result of their labours, twenty-one committees were formed, the names of the members of which, as they stood at the commencement of 1793, according to a Report by Gossuin at that date, are given below. It will be seen that every committee was not up to its full number, and it must be remembered that constant alterations were caused by death and absence on mission. Nevertheless, the committees remained composed of substantially the same members until after the great proscription of October 3, 1793. In the next volume, the composition of the committees of the Convention, as they stood at the commencement of 1794 and 1795, will be given. The names are, for convenience of reference, given in alphabetical order.

I. The Committee of Constitution—Nine members. Barbaroux, Barère, Condorcet, Danton, Gensonné, Thomas Paine, Pétion, Siéyès, and Vergniaud. [N.B.—Brissot was an original member of this committee, but he soon retired and was succeeded by Barbaroux.]

II. The Diplomatic Committee—Nine members. Brissot, Carnot, Anacharsis Cloots, Grégoire, Guadet, Guyton-Morveau, Kersaint, Rewbell, and Charles Villette.

III. The Military Committee—Twenty-four members. Albitte, Bellegarde, Boussion, Carnot, Carra, Châteauneuf-Randon, Coustard, Delmas,

Dubois-Crancé, Dubois-Dubais, Duquesnoy, Fabre-d'Églantine, Gasparin, Olivier Gérénte, Goupilleau de Fontenay, Lacombe-Saint-Michel, Jear François de Lacroix, Laurent Lecointre, Letourneur (of the Manche), Lidon, Merlin (of Douai), Milhaud, Sallengros, and Sillery.

IV. Committee of General Security—Thirty members. Audouin, Basire (*Vice-President*), Bernard de Saintes, Bonnier, Bordas, Brival, Cavaignac, Chabot, Coupé (of the Oise), Delaunay d'Angers (*Secretary*), Drouet, Duprat, Duquesnoy, Fauchet, Goupilleau de Montaigu, Grangeneuve, Herault de Séchelles (*President*), Ingrand, Kervelegan, Laurens (of Marseilles), Lavicomterie, Lecointe-Puyraveau, Leyris, Manuel, Maribon-Montaut, Musset (*Secretary*), Rovère, Ruamps, Tallien, and Vardon.

V. The Legislative Committee (*Comité de Législation civile et criminelle*)—Forty-eight members. Alquier, Azema (*Secretary*), Pierre Baille, Barère, Moyse Bayle, Bohan, Brival, Cambacérès, Charlier, Chasset, Cochon, Corbel, Coupé (of the Oise), Couthon, Pierre Marie Delaunay *le jeune*, Durand-Maillane, Garran de Coulon (*President*), Gossuin, Goupilleau de Fontenay, Goupilleau de Montaigu, Guadet, Guimberteau, Ingrand, Jean Michel Lacroix (of the Haute-Vienne), Lanjuinais, Laplaigne, Larivière, Lavicomterie, Lemalliaud, Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau, Robert Lindet, Louvet, Mailhe (*Secretary*), Marquis, Mathieu, Morisson, Osselin, Philippeaux, Piorry, Pons de Verdun, Maximilien Robespierre, Saladin, Sautereau, Tallien, Thuriot, Vadier, Vergniaud, and Vernier.

VI. Committee of Public Instruction—Twenty-four members. Arbogast, Bailly de Juilly, Bodin, Léonard Bourdon, Buzot, Chasset, Marie Joseph Chenier, Colaud-La-Salcette, David, Dupuis, Durand-Maillane, Dusaulx (*President*), Ferry, Fouché, Gorsas, Lanthenas, Massieu (*Secretary*), Mathieu (*Secretary*), Mercier, Prieur (of the Côte-d'Or), Quinette, Romme, Roux-Fazillac, and Villar.

VII. The Financial Committee—Originally forty-two members, but increased, and divided into four sections :—

- (1) *Section for Assignats*—Chazaud, Cussy, Devérité (*Secretary*), Dubreuil, Foucher (*President*), François (of the Somme), Frecine, Godefroy, Guffroy, Humbert, Loysel, Masuyer, Pelletier, Vernerey, and Vidalin.
- (2) *Section for Taxes*—Defermon (*Secretary*), Jacob Louis Dupont, Isoré, Le Breton, Ramel, Rouzet, Salle, Servière, Vernon, and Vernier (*President*).
- (3) *Section for ordinary and extraordinary Finance*—Pierre Baille, Cambon, Dyzez, Fouché, Gillet, Haussmann, Johannot, Mallarmé, Monnot, and Real.
- (4) *Section for the alienation of national property, and that of the former civil list, the orders of chivalry, and the émigrés*—Besson, Camus (*Secretary*), Chazal, Charles Delacroix, Delahaye,

Duchastel, Finot, Forestier, Gauthier, Jac, Le Carlier, Martel, Mauduyt, Osselin, Regnauld-Bretel, Ribereau, Treilhard (*President*), and Vignerot.

VIII. Committee for Decrees (*Comité des Décrets*)—Nine members. Albouys, Becker, Bissy (*Secretary*), Blaux, Dupuis, Laloy, Poisson (*President*), Rühl, and Vernerey.

IX. Committee for Petitions and Correspondence—Twenty-four members. Audrein, Dechézeaux, Ducos (*Secretary*), Dulaure, Duplantier, Fabre-d'Églantine, Fayau, Feraud, Gossuin (*President*), La Boissière, Lemoine (of the Manche), Leyris, Jean Baptiste Monestier (of the Puy-de-Dôme), Pierre Laurent Monestier (of the Lozère), Paganel, Siblot, Soubeyran de Saint-Prix, Thibault (*Secretary*), and Ysabeau. (*Five short.*)

X. Committee for the Management of the Hall, of the Secretariat, and of Printing (*Comité des Inspecteurs de la Salle, du Secrétariat et de l'Imprimerie*)—Eighteen members.

XI. Committee for the Business of the Convention (*Comité des Procès-verbaux, des Renvois et des Expéditions*)—Six members.

It was found convenient to merge these two committees into one, which consisted of :—Beauvais (*Secretary*), Belin, Calon (*President*), Duval (of the Seine-Inférieure), Fiquet, Gamon, Grosse-Durocher, Huguet, Jean Baptiste Lacoste, Le Bas, Pierre Nicholas Perrin (of the Aube), Projean, Robin, Saurine, Sautayra, and Sergent. (*Eight short.*)

XII. Committee for Public Relief (*Comité des Secours Publics*)—Twenty-four members. Amar, Babey, Bailly de Juilly, Beauvais (*President*), Bernard de Saint-Affrique, Bo (*Secretary*), Boussion, Cazeneuve, Claverye, Debourges, André Dumont, Dupuis, Enjubault, Fayau, François, Girot-Pouzol, Gourdan, Grenot, Lalande, Maignet (*Secretary*), Plaichard-Chollet, Saint-Martin, Sautayra, Taillefer, and Vadier.

XIII. Committee of Division—Twenty-four members. Asselin, Bassal, Carpentier, Chambon, Chaudron-Roussau, Chedaneau, Couturier, Jean Debry, Descamps, Deydier, Gaston, Gay-Vernon, Jagot, La Boissière, Élie Lacoste, Lemarechal, Lesage, Levasseur (of the Meurthe), and Vidalot. (*Five short.*)

This committee was charged with all questions arising out of the new division of France under the Constitution of 1791 into departments, districts, cantons, and communes.

XIV. The Agricultural Committee—Twenty-four members. Carpentier, Cochet, Coupé (of the Oise), Fabre (of the Hérault), Germignac, Lequinio, Loiseau, Jean Moreau (of the Meuse), Marie François Moreau (of the Saône-et-Loire), Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Rabaut-Pomier, Reverchon, Rivery, and Tellier. (*Ten short.*)

XV. The Commercial Committee—Twenty-four members. Blutel (*Secretary*), Borel, Castilhon, Champigny-Clément, Dehoulière, Giraud (of the Charente-Inférieure), Hardy, Lacaze (*Vice-President*), Laurence,

Julien Le Febvre (of the Loire-Inférieure) (*President*), François Paul Legendre (of the Nièvre), Le Tourneur (of the Sarthe), Merlino, Perrin (of the Aube), Picqué, Rebecqui, Sauvé, and Soullignac. (*Six short.*)

XVI. Committee of Domains—Twenty-four members. Allasœur (*Vice-President*), Beaugeard, Brun, Cusset, Dameron, Delahaye, Ferroux, Herard, Leclerc, Levasseur (of the Meurthe) (*President*), Lofficial, Lozeau, Martineau, Maulde, Mollevaut, and Poullain-Grandprey (*Secretary*). (*Eight short.*)

XVII. Committee for Payment of Accounts (*Comité de Liquidation*)—Twenty-four members. Auguis (*Vice-President*), Bissy, Boissy-d'Anglas, Bordas, Colombel (*President*), Faye (*Secretary*), Gelin, Jard-Panvillier (*Secretary*), Lecarpentier, Lemoine, Lesterpt-Beauvais, Marquis, Petitjean, Pottier, Célestin Poulain (of the Marne), Poultier, Richard, Ruelle, and Sevestre. (*Five short.*)

XVIII. Committee for the Examination of Accounts—Fifteen members. Baucheton, Jean Borie (*President*), Delamarre, Dupin, Geoffroy, Havin, Jorrand, Jourdan, Lacrampe, Larroche, Maignen (*Secretary*), Personne, Pinet, Texier, and Vinet.

XIX. The Naval Committee—Eighteen members. Antiboul, Blad, Breard (*Secretary*), Daubermesnil, Louis Philippe Joseph Égalité (*Vice-President*), Balthazar Faure (of the Haute-Loire), Gaudin, Granet, Marec, Maurel, Guillaume Michel (of the Morbihan), Niou (*Secretary*), Ribet, Rochegude, Rouyer (*President*), Jean Bon Saint-André, Taveau, and Topsent.

XX. The Colonial Committee—Twelve members. Blanc, Boyer-Fonfrede, Brunel, Creuzé-Latouche (*President*), Guillermin, Mazade (*Secretary*), Pénicières, Peyre, and Taveau. (*Three short.*)

XXI. The Committee in charge of the Archives—Three members. Baudin (of the Ardennes), Jean Borie, and the archivist, Camus.

All these committees had their separate offices and establishments of clerks, and the results of their labours were laid before the Convention by their reporters in the form of reports, generally followed by a suggested decree. The committees further elected a Central Commission, consisting of one member from each committee, which met every morning and prepared the "order of the day" for the Convention. This Central Commission, the important functions of which are obvious, consisted, in January, 1793, of the following deputies:—

Jean Denis Lanjuinais, *president*, representing the Legislative Committee, No. V.

Jean Borie, *secretary*, representing the Committee for the Examination of Accounts, No. XVIII.

Charles Louis Antiboul, representing the Naval Committee, No. XIX.

Jean Bassal, representing the Committee of Division, No. XIII.

Jean Baptiste Jérôme Bo, representing the Committee for Public Relief, No. XII.

Jacques Brival, representing the Committee of General Security, No. IV.

Étienne Nicolas Calon, representing the Committee for the Management of the Hall, etc., Nos. X. and XI.

Pierre Toussaint Durand-Maillane, representing the Committee of Public Instruction, No. VI.

Antoine François Gauthier, representing the Financial Committee, Section 4 (*section d'aliénation*), No. VII.

Jacques François Germignac, representing the Agricultural Committee, No. XIV.

Henri Grégoire, representing the Diplomatic Committee, No. II.

Jacques Lacaze, representing the Commercial Committee, No. XV.

Benoît Lesterpt-Beauvais, representing the Committee for the Payment of Accounts, No. XVII.

Philippe Antoine Merlin (of Douai), representing the Military Committee, No. III.

Étienne Mollevaut, representing the Committee of Domains, No. XVI.

Charles Nicolas Osselin, representing the Financial Committee, No. VII.

Pierre Paganel, representing the Committee for Petitions and Correspondence, No. IX.

Jean Augustin Pénier, representing the Colonial Committee, No. XX.

Jacques Poisson, representing the Committee for Decrees, No. VIII.

It must be noted that on the Central Commission, the Committee of Constitution and the Committee for the Archives were not represented, and that there were two representatives of the Financial Committee.

APPENDIX VII.

THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

THE first Committee of General Defence was formed by the election of three members by seven of the most important committees on January 3, 1793, to consider questions not coming directly into the departments of any single committee. It consisted of : Armand Gui Simon Kersaint, Jacques Pierre Brissot, and Louis Bertrand Guyton-Morveau, elected by the Diplomatic Committee ; Edmond Louis Alexis Dubois-Crancé, Pierre Jean Lacombe-Saint-Michel, and Louis Gustave Doulcet de Pontécoulant, elected by the Military Committee ; Emmanuel Joseph Siéyès, Armand Gensonné, and Bertrand Barère, elected by the Committee of Constitution ; Joseph Cambon, Jacques Defermon des Chapellières, and Jean Johannot,

elected by the Financial Committee ; Jean Jacques Breard, Henri Pascal Rochegude, and Louis Jacques Taveau, elected by the Naval Committee : Jean Baptiste Boyer-Fonfrede, Ignace Brunel, and Jean Augustin Pénier, elected by the Colonial Committee ; Jacques Lacaze, Jean Marie François Merlino, and Marc Antoine Alexis Giraud, elected by the Commercial Committee.

On the 26th of March this committee was superseded by a new Committee of General Defence, elected directly by the Convention (pp. 229, 230), consisting of the following twenty-four members : Charles Jean Marie Barbaroux, Bertrand Barère, Jean Jacques Breard, François Nicolas Léonard Buzot, Jean Jacques Régis Cambacérès, Armand Gaston Camus, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet, George Jacques Danton, Jean Antoine Debry, Jean François Bertrand Delmas, Benoît Simplicie Lucie Camille Desmoulins, Edmond Louis Alexis Dubois-Crancé, Armand Genonville, Marguerite Élie Guadet, Louis Bertrand Guyton-Morveau, Maximin Isnard, Marc David Albin Lasource, Jérôme Pétion, Pierre Louis Prieur (of the Marne), Nicolas Marie Quinette, Maximilien Marie Isidore Robespierre, Philippe Jacques Rühl, Emmanuel Joseph Siéyès, and Pierre Victorien Vergniaud.

This committee was found too unwieldy, and in its stead was elected, on April 7 (p. 232), the first Committee of Public Safety, consisting of Bertrand Barère, Jean François Bertrand Delmas, Jean Jacques Breard, Joseph Cambon, George Jacques Danton, *Jean Antoine Debry*, Louis Bertrand Guyton-Morveau, Jean Baptiste Treilhard, and Jean François de Lacroix, of whom Debry had to decline from illness, and was replaced by Jean Baptiste Robert Lindet.

This first Committee of Public Safety underwent many changes. On May 30 five deputies were added to it for the purpose of drawing up a Constitution (p. 248), namely, Marie Jean Hérault de Séchelles, Jean Baptiste Charles Mathieu, Dominique Vincent Ramel-Nogaret, Georges Auguste Couthon, and Antoine Louis Léon Florelle de Saint-Just. Further changes took place on June 5, when Breard retired from illness, by the election of Théophile Berlier, and on June 22, when, in place of Mathieu and Treilhard sent on mission to Bordeaux (p. 271), two new members were elected—Thomas Augustin Gasparin and Jean Bon Saint-André.

On July 10 a new committee of nine was elected (p. 283), which formed the nucleus of the Great Committee of Public Safety. It consisted of Jean Bon Saint-André, Bertrand Barère, *Thomas Augustin Gasparin*, Georges Auguste Couthon, Marie Jean Hérault de Séchelles, *Jacques Alexis Thuriot*, Pierre Louis Prieur (of the Marne), Antoine Louis Léon Florelle de Saint-Just, and Jean Baptiste Robert Lindet.

The first change in the composition of this committee was caused by the retirement of Gasparin from illness on July 27, when he was replaced,

on the nomination of the committee, by Maximilien Marie Isidore Robespierre.

On August 14 two deputies were added to the committee to take charge of the military operations (p. 284)—Lazare Nicolas Marguerite Carnot and Claude Antoine Prieur-Duvernois (of the Côte d'Or).

On September 6 two more deputies were added to establish the Reign of Terror (p. 285)—Jacques Nicolas Billaud-Varenne and Jean Marie Collot d'Herbois.

On September 20 Thuriot retired, and the twelve deputies who remained became what is known as the *Great Committee of Public Safety*. They retired every month, but on the nomination of Barère they were re-elected for nearly a year without opposition. The only change which took place, was caused by the execution of Herault de Séchelles on the 16 Germinal, Year II. (April 5, 1794), whose place was not filled up. After the execution of Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just on 10 Thermidor, Year II. (July 28, 1794), the committee was reconstituted, and the six vacancies caused by the deaths of these deputies and Herault de Séchelles, and by the absence of Prieur (of the Marne) and Jean Bon Saint-André on mission, were filled by the election of Joseph Eschasseriaux, Jean Lambert Tallien, Jean Baptiste Treillard, Jean Jacques Breard, Pierre Antoine Laloy, and Jacques Alexis Thuriot.

APPENDIX VIII.

THE COMMITTEE OF GENERAL SECURITY.

IN July, 1789, the Constituent Assembly formed a "Comité des Recherches," which was also known as the "Comité de Surveillance," to investigate and report upon suspected conspiracies, denunciations of individuals, complaints of illegal arrest, and, in short, upon all matters of administration which were brought under its cognizance after it had constituted itself a sort of court of appeal from the executive power. The Legislative Assembly followed this example and formed a similar "Comité de Surveillance," which was in May, 1792, first termed the "Comité de Sûreté Générale," or Committee of General Security.

When the Convention met, it also formed a Committee of General Security, composed of thirty members, whose names are given in Appendix VI., p. 536. This Committee was fairly representative of all parties, but the deputies of the Mountain upon it were the most regular attendants, and its functions were almost entirely managed by them. It steadily increased in importance; all matters concerning the police of the country, all arrests of suspected persons, the investigation into alleged

plots against the Republic, and, in short, all questions concerning individuals as opposed to measures of government were referred to it.

The leaders of the Girondins soon became jealous of its vast powers, and of the manner in which the deputies of the Mountain monopolized the management, and on January 7, 1793, they carried a decree that the number should be doubled, and that eighteen should form a quorum. It is hardly expedient to give the names of all the sixty members elected to the second Committee of General Security on January 9, 1793, in consequence of this decree, but it must be noted that they were nearly all Girondins or deputies of the Plain. Only two declared deputies of the Mountain, Dartigoyte and Ingrand, had seats upon it, while among leading Girondins it included Biotteau, Chambon, Delahaye, Fauchet, Gomaire, Gorsas, Grangeneuve, Kervelegan, Lauze-Deperret, and Rebecqui, and among deputies of the Plain Durand-Maillane, Genissieu, and Zangiacomi.

The leaders of the Mountain saw that it was absurd to have such a large committee to deal with delicate questions, and also objected strongly to its composition, and on January 21, 1793, the day of the execution of Louis XVI., on the motion of Fabre-d'Églantine, strongly supported by Danton (p. 223), it was decreed that it should consist for the future of twelve members, and be at once renewed. By adopting a list and voting for it *en bloc*, the Mountain managed to gain a great preponderance on this third Committee of General Security, which originally consisted of Claude Basire, André Antoine Bernard (of Saintes), François Chabot, Pierre Joseph Duhem, François Pierre Ingrand, François Lamarque, Marc David Albin Lasource, Louis Legendre (of Paris), Louis Maribon-Montaut, Joseph François Stanislas Xavier Alexis Rovère, Pierre Charles Ruamps, and Jean Lambert Tallien. On March 25, 1793, under the influence of the news of Neerwinden, it was resolved to fill up the places left vacant by the absence on mission of Basire, Bernard, Duhem, Ingrand, Legendre, and Rovère, and the following deputies were chosen: Charles Jean Marie Alquier, Armand Gaston Camus, Jacques Garnier (of Saintes), Michel Mathieu Lecointe-Puyraveau, Jean Nicolas Méaulle, and Charles Nicolas Osselin. On April 9 further additions were made; Jacques Brival and Jean Baptiste Carrier were elected to fill the places of Maribon-Montaut and Tallien sent on mission, and four *suppléants* were chosen to supply temporary vacancies: Jean Baptiste Cavaignac, Antoine Joseph Lanot, Augustin Jacques Leyris, and Nicolas Maure. These deputies remained in office until June 16, when it was resolved that the committee should consist of nine members and be entirely renewed.

The fourth Committee of General Security elected on that day consisted of Jean Pierre André Amar, Jean Bassal, André Dumont, Armand Benoît Joseph Guffroy, Joseph François Laignelot, Louis Charles Lavi-comterie, Louis Legendre (of Paris), Jean Nicolas Méaulle, and Jacques

Pinet. On August 3, on the motion of Breard, it was resolved to increase the committee from nine to twelve members, and to fill up the vacancies caused by the absence of André Dumont, Méaulle, and Pinet on mission, and on the nomination of the committee itself the following deputies were chosen: Moyse Bayle, André Antoine Bernard (of Saintes), Pierre Arnaud Dartigoyte, Charles François Dupuis, Jean Jay de Sainte-Foy, and Jean Baptiste Michaud.

On September 11, when the Great Committee of Public Safety had got possession of the reins of government, it was resolved that the Committee of General Security should be re-constituted, and on the motions of Maure and Drouet, it was decreed that it should consist of nine members and five *suppléants*. The nine members elected on the fifth Committee of General Security were Charles Jean Marie Alquier, Claude Basire, François Chabot, Jacques Garnier (of Saintes), Armand Benoît Joseph Guffroy, Jean Julien (of Toulouse), Louis Charles Lavicomterie, Silvain Phalier Lejeune (of the Indre), and Étienne Jean Panis; and the five *suppléants* were Moyse Bayle, Jean Baptiste Drouet, Reymond Gaston, Philippe François Joseph Le Bas, and Ghislain Joseph François Le Bon. It was also resolved that vacancies should be filled on the nomination of the committee itself, as in the Committee of Public Safety.

This arrangement, and the constitution of the newly elected committee, did not give satisfaction to the members of the Great Committee of Public Safety. It was essential for their supremacy, and for the establishment of the Reign of Terror under their auspices, that the Committee of General Security should act in entire harmony with them, and even in some degree in subordination to them. The power given to the new committee to nominate members to fill vacancies was therefore obnoxious to them, and the presence upon it of certain deputies, such as Basire, Chabot, and Julien, who were men of independent minds, was likely to lead to dissensions. It was therefore resolved, on the motion of Danton on September 14, that a new committee of twelve members should be elected from a list presented by the Committee of Public Safety.

The sixth Committee of General Security, which was elected on that day, and which held office through the Reign of Terror, consisted of (see pp. 326-329) Jean Pierre André Amar, Moyse Bayle, *Antoine Sauveur Boucher*, known as *Boucher-Saint-Sauveur*, Jacques Louis David, Armand Benoît Joseph Guffroy, Louis Charles Lavicomterie, *Philippe François Joseph Le Bas*, *Ghislain François Joseph Le Bon*, *Étienne Jean Panis*, Philippe Jacques Rühl, Marc Guillaume Alexis Vadier, and Jean Henri Voulland. It soon underwent three changes by the selection of Joseph Nicolas Barbeau du Barran, Grégoire Marie Jagot, and Jean Antoine Louis (of the Bas-Rhin), to fill the places of Boucher-Saint-Sauveur, Le Bas, and Le Bon, and in 1794 Élie Lacoste became a member instead of Panis. With these exceptions, it was re-elected every month, like the

Great Committee of Public Safety, and remained in office until the overthrow of Robespierre on 9 Thermidor, Year II. (July 27, 1794). Its functions were definitely fixed by a report of Billaud-Varenne, on 28 Brumaire, Year II. (November 18, 1793), which declared that all duties of government belonged to the Committee of Public Safety, and all police duties to the Committee of General Security.

APPENDIX IX.

THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL OF PARIS.

THE best way to understand the gradual but steady growth of the Reign of Terror in Paris is to study the numbers condemned to death by the Revolutionary Tribunal from month to month. The following analysis has been arrived at by an examination of the *Journal du Tribunal Révolutionnaire*, given as an appendix to each volume of Wallon's *Histoire du Tribunal Révolutionnaire de Paris*, 6 vols. Paris : 1880.

The establishment of the Revolutionary Tribunal was decreed on March 10, 1793 (p. 228), and it was formed in accordance with that decree at the end of the same month. The following are the numbers of the prisoners condemned to death and executed, with the names of the most distinguished victims, and some other notes :—

Month.	Number of death-sentences.	Notes.
April, 1793.	9	Blanchelande, ex-governor of San Domingo (vol. ii. pp. 228, 473), the first victim, executed April 15.
May, 1793.	9	General Miaczinski, accomplice of Dumouriez (vol. ii. p. 230), 22nd.
June, 1793.	13	Nine men for assaulting Léonard Bourdon, representative on mission, at Orleans, 13th; Charlotte Corday for the murder of Marat (vol. ii. p. 253), 17th.
July, 1793.	13	
August, 1793.	5	General Lescuyer, accomplice of Dumouriez (vol. ii. p. 230), 14th; General Custine (vol. ii. p. 335), 28th
September, 1793.	17	
Total, April 15 to September 30	— 66	

In September the Reign of Terror was organized ; the Revolutionary Tribunal was divided into four sections on September 22, under the arrangement proposed by Merlin of Douai on September 5 (vol. ii. p. 331), so as to be able to judge more prisoners ; on Brumaire 8 (October 29), on the motion of Robespierre, the presidents were enabled to stop any trial after three days and ask the jury if they had made up their minds, and in consequence the activity of the tribunal was much increased.

Months.	Number of death-sentences.	Notes.
October, 1793.	50	Gorsas, deputy to the Convention (vol. ii. p. 340), 7th ; Marie Antoinette, (vol. ii. pp. 336, 337), 16th ; twenty-one Girondin leaders (vol. ii. pp. 338, 339), 31st.
November, 1793.	58	Olympe de Gouges (vol. ii. p. 179), 2nd ; Adam Lux (vol. ii. p. 253), 4th ; Philippe Egalité, ci-devant Duke of Orleans, and Coustard de Massy, deputy to the Convention, 6th ; Madame Roland, 8th ; Bailly, ex-Mayor of Paris, 11th ; Manuel, ex-Procureur of the Commune of Paris (vol. ii. p. 218), General Brunet (vol. ii. p. 257), and Gabriel de Cussy, deputy to the Convention (vol. ii. p. 277), 15th ; General Houchard (vol. ii. p. 255), 16th ; Girey-Dupré, Brissot's successor as editor of the <i>Patriote Français</i> (vol. ii. p. 276), 21st ; General Lamarlière, the defender of Lille in 1792, 26th ; Duport-Dutertre, ex-Minister of Justice, and Barnave, ex-Constituant, 28th.
December, 1793.	69	Kersaint, deputy to the Convention, 4th ; Rabaut de Saint-Etienne, 5th, Madame du Barry, and Noël, deputy to the Convention, 8th ; the Duc du Châtelet, 13th ; Lesur, ex-Constituant, 17th ; Lebrun-Tondu, ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Dietrich, ex-Mayor of Strasbourg, 28th ; General Biron, ci-devant Duc de Lauzun, 31st.
January, 1794.	71	Custine <i> fils</i> , ex-Minister to Prussia (vol. ii. p. 73), 3rd ; Marshal Lückner, 4th ; Imbert, deputy-suppléant to the Convention, 7th ; Lamourette, Bishop of the Rhône-et-Loire, ex-Législateur (vol. i. p. 251 ; ii. p. 103), 11th ; Captains Duplessis-Grenedan and Coetnempren

Months.	Number of death-sentences.	Notes.
February, 1794.	73	of the navy, sent from Brest by Jean Bon Saint-André, 16th; Marc Antoine Bernard, <i>député-suppléant</i> to the Convention, 22nd; General Camille Rossi, 27th; General de Marcé, 28th; eight inhabitants of Coulommiers for a riot, 31st.
March, 1794.	127	Parent, <i>ex-Constituant</i> , 2nd; twelve inhabitants of Sarre-Libre (Sarre-Louis) for communicating with the enemy, 25th.
April, 1794.	257	Ten inhabitants of Rosay, for a riot, 2nd; Generals O'Moran, Chancel, and Davaine, 6th; fifteen inhabitants of Clamecy for a riot, 15th; Cieurac, <i>ex-Mayor</i> of Montauban (vol. i. p. 490), 16th; Masnyer, deputy to the Convention, 19th; Hébert, Vincent, Ronsin, Momoro, Anacharsis Cloots, Desfieux, Proly, Mazuel, Dubuisson, Jacob Pereyra, Jean Conrad Kock, and seven others (<i>the Hébertists</i>), 24th; Gouttes, Bishop of the Saône-et-Loire; and <i>ex-Constituant</i> (vol. i. p. 307), 26th. Euloge Schneider (vol. ii. p. 440), 1st; Danton, Lacroix, Herault de Séchelles, Philippeaux, Camille Desmoulins, Fabre d'Eglantine, Chabot, Basire, Delaunay [d'Angers], deputies to the Convention, Espagnac, Junius and Emmanuel Frey, Diedrichsen, Gusman and Westermann, fifteen in all (<i>the Dantonists</i>), 5th; first "conspiracy of the prisons"—nineteen executed; Simond, deputy to the Convention, Chaumette, Procureur to the Commune of Paris, Gobel, apostate Bishop of Paris, Generals Beysser and Arthur Dillon, the widows of Camille Desmoulins and Hébert, with twelve others, 13th; the Marquis de La Borde, the richest man in France, and formerly banker to the Court, with sixteen noblemen, ladies, and domestic servants, 18th; eighteen judges of the old Parlement of Paris (including Louis Lepeletier de Rozambo, Étienne Pasquier, Bochart de Saron, Lefèvre

Months.	Number of death-sentences.	Notes.
May, 1794.	353	<p>d'Ormesson, and Molé de Champlanteux), six judges of the Parlement of Toulouse and Colonel Nort, twenty-five in all, 20th; Malesherbes, ex-Minister and counsel for Louis XVI., his daughter Madame de Rozambo, the Marquis and Marquise de Chateaubriant, the Duchesse de Grammont, the Duchesse du Châtelet, three ex-Constituants, D'Esprémesnil (vol. i. pp. 204, 205), Le Chapelier and Thouret (vol. i. pp. 276, 277), with four others, 22nd: thirty-three persons from Verdun, sixteen soldiers, five ecclesiastics, and twelve women, 24th; a mixed group of thirty-three, including the Duc de Villeroy, Admiral the Comte d'Estaing, the Marquis de la Tour du Pin, ex-Minister for War (vol. i. p. 150), the President de Nicolaï, and Thiroux de Crosne, ex-Lieutenant of Police, 28th.</p> <p>Tassin l'Étang and twelve other officers of the battalion of national guards of the section of the Filles-Saint-Thomas, for helping to defend the Tuileries on August 10 (vol. ii. pp. 126, 128), 3rd; Marquis de Choiseul-Labaume, 4th; eleven administrators of the department of the Moselle, 6th; twenty-eight farmers-general of the taxes under the old régime, including Lavoisier, the great chemist, 8th; Princess Elisabeth, the Marquise de Senozan, sister of Malesherbes, the Marquise de Crussol-d'Amboise, five members of the family of Loménie de Brienne (namely, Comte Louis de Loménie, ex-Minister for War, Comte Alexandre de Loménie, Comte Charles de Loménie, Martial de Loménie, coadjutor-archbishop of Sens, and Charlotte de Loménie), the Marquise de Montmorin, widow of the Minister, and his son Antoine de Montmorin, 10th; Meynier, ex-Constituant, 15th; Comte Gaston de Lévis-Mirepoix, ex-Constituant, General Jean Donadieu, and Jourdan "Coupe-tête," 27th.</p>

Months.	Number of death-sentences.	Notes.
June 1-9, 1794.	122	Twenty-seven inhabitants of Sedan for having supported Lafayette in August, 1792 (vol. ii. p. 157), 3rd; twelve administrators of the department of the Ardennes for the same reason, 7th.
October 1, 1793, to June 9, 1794.	1165	

On 22 Prairial (June 10, 1794), a decree was passed depriving prisoners on trial of counsel, and in other ways accelerating the action of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and from that date until the overthrow of Robespierre on 9 Thermidor (July 27, 1794), the number of victims rapidly increased. The figures for this period will be examined in an appendix to the next volume.

The gradual increase of the activity of the Tribunal from month to month appears from the table just given. It remains to show the conclusions to be drawn. From the death of the first victim Blanchelande on April 15, 1793, to the end of September, during a period of twenty-four weeks, 66 individuals were condemned to death by the Tribunal and executed, an average of nearly 3 a week. From the beginning of October to June 9 (Prairial 21), a period of thirty-six weeks, 1165 individuals were condemned to death and executed, an average of over 32 a week. And this increase was gradual, not sudden, as the figures for each month show. Still more striking is it to mention the figures for the period of seven weeks between 22 Prairial (June 10) and 9 Thermidor (July 27), during which time 1376 individuals were sent to the guillotine, or an average of over 196 a week. Comment on these figures is needless; they show by themselves how steadily the Reign of Terror increased in severity, and to what a height it eventually developed.

APPENDIX X.

THE REPRESENTATIVES ON MISSION.

THE most valuable work on the Representatives on Mission yet published has been *Les Représentants en Mission et la Justice Révolutionnaire dans les Départements en l'An II.* (1793-94), by H. Wallon (5 vols. Paris: 1889-90). It is distinctly hostile in tone to the representatives; but it contains many

valuable facts not to be found elsewhere. Unfortunately, M. Wallon has made no consistent attempt to establish the *personnel* of the missions; the names of the most important emissaries are scattered about in his volumes, but he has not arranged them anywhere in regular order. The following study is an attempt to give a correct list of the most important *general* missions to the departments. The representatives on mission with the armies will be analyzed in the next appendix on the "Armies of the Republic." It is impossible to give all the *special* missions; the names alone would swell this appendix to an unconscionable length, for more than three hundred deputies were at different times despatched on mission between the meeting of the Convention and the overthrow of Robespierre, and it may be noted that Barère mentioned in a report on 8 Brumaire, Year II. (October 29, 1793), that no less than 140 deputies were at that time absent on mission.

The chief *general* missions were those of March 8, 1793, for the levy of 300,000 men, whose mission was in the words of the decree appointing them "to inform their fellow-citizens of the new dangers which threaten the country, and to collect a sufficient force to dissipate its enemies;" of August 23, 1793, to superintend the *levée en masse*; of October 2, 1793, to obtain horses for the armies; and of 9 Nivôse, Year II. (December 29, 1793), to establish the revolutionary government in the departments. It must be quite understood that these four lists do not contain the names of all the deputies sent on mission; but all the most important *special* missions, such for instance as those sent to Lyons, are discussed in Chapter XI., and it is not necessary to recapitulate them here. In the first despatch of deputies on mission on March 8, it was considered advisable to send deputies belonging to the departments to which they were appointed; this was found to be inconvenient, and on July 5, 1793, on the motion of Charles Delacroix, it was resolved that for the future no deputy should be sent on mission to his own department.

The decree of March 8, 1793 (vol. ii. p. 367), directed that eighty-two deputies should be sent in pairs, each pair having charge of two departments, to direct the levy of 300,000 men, and the names of the deputies nominated are given in Article 8 of the decree without specifying their districts. From a study of M. Wallon's book, already mentioned, and various provincial histories, it has been possible to compile the table of their districts given below, but it must be noted that in the list given in the decree of March 8 are contained the names of Fabre-d'Églantine and Martineau, who did not go on this mission, and not those of Elie Lacoste and Merlino, who did, and therefore the names of these latter deputies have been inserted in their proper place. As the deputies went in pairs, their names cannot be given in regular alphabetical order, but an attempt has been made to make the list useful for reference by adopting an alphabetical arrangement as far as possible.

LIST A (March 8, 1793).

Deputies.	Departments.
Amar, Jean Pierre André	{ Ain.
Merlino, Jean Marie François ¹	{ Isère.
Anthoine, François Paul Nicolas	{ Meurthe.
Levasseur, Antoine Louis (of the Meurthe)	{ Moselle.
Auguis, Pierre Jean Baptiste	{ Deux-Sèvres.
Carra, Jean Louis	{ Vendée.
Barras, Paul François Jean Nicolas	{ Basses-Alpes.
Fréron, Stanislas Louis Marie	{ Hautes-Alpes.
Bayle, Moyse	{ Bouches-du-Rhône. ¹
Boisset, Joseph Antoine	{ Drôme.
Bernard, André Antoine (of Saintes)	{ Charente.
Guimberteau, Jean	{ Charente-Inférieure.
Billaud-Varenne, Jacques Nicolas	{ Côtes-du-Nord.
Sevestre, Joseph	{ Ille-et-Vilaine.
Bo, Jean Baptiste Jérôme	{ Aveyron.
Chabot, François	{ Tarn.
Bonnier (d'Alco), Ange Elisabeth Louis Antoine	{ Gard.
Voulland, Jean Henri	{ Hérault.
Bordas, Pardoux	{ Corrèze.
Borie, Jean	{ Haute-Vienne.
Bourdon, François Louis (of the Oise)	{ Manche.
Lecarpentier, Jean Baptiste	{ Orne.
Bourdon, Louis Jean Joseph Léonard	{ Côte-d'Or.
Prost, Claude Charles	{ Jura.
Carnot, Lazare Nicolas Marguerite	{ Nord.
Lesage-Senault, Gaspard Jean Joseph	{ Pas-de-Calais.
Châles, Pierre Jacques Michel	{ Eure-et-Loir.
Levasseur, René (of the Sarthe)	{ Seine-et-Oise.
Choudieu, Pierre René	{ Maine-et-Loire.
Richard, Joseph Étienne	{ Sarthe.
Collot-d'Herbois, Jean Marie	{ Loiret.
Laplanche, Jacques Léonard Goyre	{ Nièvre.
Dartigoyte, Pierre Arnaud	{ Gers.
Ichon, Pierre	{ Landes.
Despinassy, Antoine Joseph Marie	{ Alpes-Maritimes.
Roubaud, Jean Louis	{ Var.
Deville, Jean Louis	{ Aisne.
Saint-Just, Antoine Louis Léon	{ Ardennes.
Florelle de	

¹ Not named in the decree of March 8.² This circumscription included the department of the Vaucluse, which was not created until June 25, 1793.

Deputies.	Departments.
Du Roy, Jean Michel	{ Calvados.
Jouënné (Lonchamp), Thomas François	{ Eure.
Ambroise	{ Loire-intérieure.
Esnüe de la Vallée, François Joachim	{ Mayenne.
Fouché, Joseph	{ Cantal
Faure, Balthazar	{ Haute-Loire.
Lacoste, Jean Baptiste	{ Allier.
Fauvre-Labrunerie, Charles Benoît	{ Cher.
Forestier, Pierre Jacques	{ Ariège.
Fayau, Joseph Pierre Marie	{ Pyrénées-Orientales
Gaston, Reymond	{ Aube.
Garnier, Antoine Marie Charles (of the Aube)	{ Yonne.
Turreau, Louis	{ Gironde.
Garrau, Pierre Anselme	{ Lot-et-Garonne.
Paganel, Pierre	{ Ardèche.
Gleizal, Claude	{ Lozère.
Servière, Laurent	{ Indre-et-Loire.
Goupilleau (de Fontenay), Jean	{ Loir-et-Cher.
François Marie	{ Finistère.
Tallien, Jean Lambert	{ Morbihan.
Guermeur, Jacques Tanguy Marie	{ Dordogne.
Lemalliaud, Joseph François	{ Lot. ²
Lacoste, Élie ¹	{ Seine-et-Marne.
Jean Bon Saint-André	{ Oise.
Lakanal, Joseph	{ Indre.
Mauduyt, François Pierre Ange	{ Vienne.
Lejeune, Silvain Phalier	{ Aude.
Piorry, Pierre François	{ Haute-Garonne.
Lombard-Lachaux, Pierre	{ Bas-Rhin.
Mailhe, Jean Baptiste	{ Haut-Rhin.
Louis, Jean Antoine (of the Bas-Rhin)	{ Doubs.
Pflieger, Jean Adam	{ Haute-Saône.
Michaud, Jean Baptiste	{ Creuse.
Siblot, Claude François Bruno	{ Puy-de-Dôme.
Monestier, Jean Baptiste Benoît	{ Basses-Pyrénées.
(of the Puy-de-Dôme)	{ Hautes-Pyrénées.
Petitjean, Claude Lazare	
Neveu, Étienne	
Ysabeau, Claude Alexandre	

¹ Not named in the decree of March 8.

² Including the present department of the Tarn-et-Garonne, which was not created until November 4, 1808.

Deputies.	Departments.
Perrin, Jean Baptiste (of the Vosges)	Haute-Marne.
Roux, Louis Félix	Vosges.
Pocholle, Pierre Pomponne Amédée	Seine-Inférieure.
Saladin, Jean Baptiste Michel	Somme.
Pons, Philippe Laurent (of Verdun)	Marne.
Thuriot, Jacques Alexis	Meuse.
Pressavin, Jean Baptiste	Rhône-et-Loire. ¹
Reverchon, Jacques	Saône-et-Loire.

On April 30, 1793, several of these deputies were recalled, but the majority of them remained on mission throughout the summer, and they were joined by other deputies despatched on special missions, to La Vendée or to combat the federalists, to raise supplies for the armies or to receive the acceptance of the Constitution of 1793 from the primary assemblies.

The second *general* mission sent to superintend the *levée en masse* on August 23, 1793, consisted of twelve deputies, whose names are given in Article 15 of the decree.

LIST B.

Boisset, Joseph Antoine.	Legendre, François Paul (of the Nièvre).
Chabot, François.	Mallarmé, François René Auguste.
Delacroix, Charles.	Paganel, Pierre.
Fayau, Joseph Pierre Marie.	Roux-Fazillac, Pierre.
Ingrand, François Pierre.	Taillefer, Jean Guillaume.
Lanot, Antoine Joseph.	Tallien, Jean Lambert.

The third *general* mission was despatched on October 2, 1793 to requisition horses for the armies. It consisted of eighteen deputies, each of whom had assigned to him four or five departments. They did not confine themselves to the duty for which they were nominated, but exercised freely their unlimited powers in points of general administration.

LIST C.

Deputy.	Head-quarters.
Beauchamp, Joseph	Gap.
Bentabole, Pierre	Carcassonne.
Bollet, Philippe Albert	Soissons.
Boursault, Jean François	Rennes.
Cavaignac, Jean Baptiste	Auch.
Delbrel, Pierre	Montpellier.
Dupuis, Charles François	Rouen.

¹ Divided into the two departments of the Rhône and the Loire in 1794.

Deputy.	Head-quarters.
Du Roy, Jean Michel	Châlons-sur-Marne.
Goupilleau (de Fontenay), Jean François Marie	Clermont-Ferrand.
Goupilleau (de Montaigu), Philippe Charles Aimé	Arles.
Guillemardet, Ferdinand Pierre Marie Dorothee	Versailles.
Guimberteau, Jean	Tours.
Harmand, Jean Baptiste	Angoulême.
Ichon, Pierre	Auxerre.
Lakanal, Joseph	Bergerac.
Pflieger, Jean Adam	Vienne.
Projean, Joseph Étienne	Saverne.
Vidalin, Étienne	Abbeville.

The fourth and most important *general* mission was that appointed on 9 Nivôse (December 29, 1793), to establish revolutionary government in the departments—that is, the Reign of Terror. The powers of these deputies were unlimited; they were directed to renew municipalities and district authorities, and to rule absolutely. Most of these men had had experience in former missions and shown their capacity, and many of them remained in possession of power until after the revolution of 9 Thermidor (July 27, 1794). According to the first article of the decree of 9 Nivôse it was resolved to send 58 deputies to establish revolutionary government; as a matter of fact only 51 were nominated. M. Aulard, Professor at the Sorbonne, has supplied me with the authentic list of their names, which has never been published hitherto, and which exists in the *Registre des Delibérations du Comité de Salut Public* in the *Archives Nationales* at Paris.

LIST D.

Deputy.	Departments.
Bar, Jean Étienne	Bas-Rhin, Meurthe.
Bentabole, Pierre	Eure-et-Loir, Orne.
Bernard, André Antoine (of Saintes)	Côte-d'Or, Saône-et-Loire.
Bo, Jean Baptiste Jérôme	Aube, Marne.
Boisset, Joseph Antoine	Aude, Hérault.
Borie, Jean	Gard, Lozère.
Bouret, Henry Gaspard Charles }	{ Calvados.
Fremanger, Jacques }	{ Manche.
Brival, Jacques	Vienne, Haute-Vienne.
Carrier, Jean Baptiste }	{ Loire-Inférieure.
Prieur, Pierre Louis (of the Marne) }	{ Morbihan.
Cavaignac, Jean Baptiste	Drôme, Isère.

Deputy.	Departments.
Chaudron-Roussau, Guillaume	Ariège, Pyrénées-Orientales.
Crassous, Jean Augustin	Paris, Seine-et-Oise.
Dartigoyte, Pierre Arnaud	Haute-Garonne, Gers.
Delacroix, Charles	Eure.
Legendre, Louis (of Paris)	Seine-Inférieure.
Dherbez-Latour, Pierre Jacques	Basses-Alpes, Hautes-Alpes.
Dubouchet, Pierre	Ille-et-Vilaine.
Esnüe de la Vallée, François	Mayenne
Joachim	Oise, Somme.
Dumont, André	Haute-Marne, Haute-Saône.
Du Roy, Jean Michel	
Fouché, Joseph	
La Porte, Marie François Sébastien	Rhône-et-Loire (<i>Lyons</i>).
Méaulle, Jean Nicolas	
Foussedoire, André	Haut-Rhin, Vosges.
Francastel, Marie Pierre Adrien	Indre-et-Loire, Maine-et-Loire.
Garnier, Jacques (of Saintes)	Loir-et-Cher, Sarthe.
Gouly, Benoît Louis	Ain, Mont-Blanc (Savoy).
Guyardin, Louis	Ardèche, Haute-Loire.
Ingrand, François Pierre	Deux-Sèvres, Vendée.
Lacombe-Saint-Michel, Pierre Jean	Corsica.
Lakanal, Joseph	Dordogne.
Laplanche, Jacques Léonard Goyre	Côtes-du-Nord, Finistère.
Le Bon, Ghislain François Joseph	Nord, Pas-de-Calais.
Lefiot, Jean Alban	Loiret, Nièvre.
Legendre, François Paul (of the Nièvre)	Cher, Indre.
Lejeune, Silvain Phalier (of the Indre)	Doubs, Jura.
Lequinio, Joseph Marie	Charente, Charente-Inférieure.
Maignet, Étienne Christophe	Bouches-du-Rhône, Vaucluse.
Mallarmé, François René Auguste	Meuse, Moselle.
Maure, Nicolas	Seine-et-Marne, Yonne.
Monestier, Jean Baptiste Benoît (of the Puy-de-Dôme)	Basses Pyrénées, Hautes-Pyrénées.
Monestier, Pierre Laurent (of the Lozère)	Landes, Lot-et-Garonne.
Paganel, Pierre	Aveyron, Tarn.
Petitjean, Claude Lazare	Allier, Creuse.
Ricord, Jean François	Nice, Var.
Roux, Louis Félix	Aisne, Ardennes.
Roux-Fazillac, Pierre	Corrèze, Puy-de-Dôme.
Tallien, Jean Lambert	
Ysabeau, Claude Alexandre	Gironde (<i>Bordeaux</i>).

APPENDIX XI.

THE ARMIES OF THE REPUBLIC.

THE succession of generals and of representatives on mission with the armies was so rapid during the first months after the establishment of the Republic that it has been decided to give the following analysis in an appendix :—

The first three armies formed in December, 1791, on the approach of war were termed the armies of the North, the Centre, and the Rhine, and were placed under the command of Rochambeau, Lafayette, and Lückner, and to them was added, in April, 1792, an army of the South, placed under the command of Montesquiou. In May, 1792, Lückner was transferred to the army of the North, to succeed Rochambeau resigned, and Biron took command of the army of the Rhine. After the capture of the Tuileries and the desertion of Lafayette, a different arrangement was made : Dumouriez took command of the army of the North, Arthur Dillon of the right wing of that army, now termed the army of the Ardennes, and Kellermann of the left wing of the army of the Rhine, now termed the army of the Moselle, while Biron and Montesquiou retained their former commands of the armies of the Rhine and of the South.

In an official statement of the armies of the Republic, as arranged on October 1, 1792, they are described as eight in number, and were called the armies of the North, the Ardennes, the Moselle, the Rhine, the Vosges, the South, the Pyrenees, and the Interior, or Reserve. On December 5, 1792, the army of the South was divided into the armies of the Alps and of Italy ; on January 24, 1793, on expectation of the declaration of war with England, an army of the Coasts was ordered to be formed ; and on March 15 the army of the Vosges was merged in that of the Rhine. On April 30, 1793, a new arrangement was made : the army of the Pyrenees was divided into the two armies of the Eastern Pyrenees and the Western Pyrenees ; and the army of the Coasts was divided into the three armies of the Coasts of La Rochelle, the Coasts of Brest, and the Coasts of Cherbourg ; while the army of the Interior, or Reserve, disappeared. The eleven armies thus formed were the armies of the North, the Ardennes, the Moselle, the Rhine, the Alps, Italy, the Eastern Pyrenees, the Western Pyrenees, the Coasts of La Rochelle, the Coasts of Brest, and the Coasts of Cherbourg. In July, 1793, two armies were added—the army of Corsica and the army of Reserve, which make up the total of the “thirteen armies of the Republic” These latter only existed on paper, and need not be taken into further consideration, but the other eleven will be studied in succession, and in the first list will be given the succession of generals commanding them ; in the second, the principal deputies on mission with them.

A.

SUCCESSION OF GENERALS.

I. Army of the North—

December 14, 1791. Rochambeau.

May 15, 1792. Lückner.

August 18, 1792. Dumouriez.

September 2, 1792. Moreton-Chabillant—*ad interim*.

September 28, 1792. La Bourdonnaye.

December 10, 1792. Dumouriez (with power of direction over the army of the Ardennes).

April 5, 1793. Dampierre.

May 8, 1793. Lamarche—*ad interim*.

May 27, 1793. Custine (with power of directing the army of the Ardennes).

August 1, 1793. Kilmaine—*ad interim*.

August 13, 1793. Houchard.

September 22, 1793. Jourdan (with power of directing the army of the Ardennes).

January 6, 1794. Ferrand—*ad interim*.

January 27, 1794. Pichegru (with power of directing the army of the Ardennes).

II. Army of the Ardennes (originally right wing of the army of the North)—

August 23, 1792. Arthur Dillon.

September 2, 1792. Dumouriez.

December 30, 1792. Valence (under Dumouriez).

April 5, 1793. Leveneur (under Dampierre).

May, 1793. Kilmaine.

August, 1793. Ferrand.

III. Army of the Moselle (originally left wing of the army of the Rhine)—

August 28, 1792. Kellermann.

November, 1792. Bournonville.

February 6, 1793. Ligniville.

March 29, 1793. D'Aboville.

April 28, 1793. Houchard.

August, 1793. Schauembourg.

September 30, 1793. Delaunay—*ad interim*.

October 31, 1793. Hoche.

IV. Army of the Rhine—

December 14, 1791. Lückner.

May, 1792. Biron.

January, 1793. Després-Crassier (under the direction of Custine).

March 15, 1793. Custine (merging the army of the Vosges).

May 30, 1793. Alexandre de Beauharnais.

August 17, 1793. Landremont.

October 2, 1793. Carle.

October 27, 1793. Pichegru.

January 14, 1794. Michaud.

* Army of the Vosges. September, 1792. Custine (merged in army of the Rhine, March 15, 1793).

V. Army of the Alps (originally army of the South)—

April, 1792. Montesquiou-Fézensac.

November 14, 1792. Kellermann.

April 30, 1793. Dornac—*ad interim*.

May 21, 1793. Kellermann.

September 10, 1793. Doppet.

October 29, 1793. Dours.

November 18, 1793. Carteaux.

December 23, 1793. Pellapra.

January 21, 1794. Alexandre Dumas.

VI. Army of Italy—

December 5, 1792. Anselme (formerly commanding the right corps of the army of the South).

December 27, 1792. Brunet—*ad interim*.

January, 1793. Biron (assumed command February 9).

May 4, 1793. Brunet.

August 8, 1793. Dumerbion.

* Army of Toulon—

September 4, 1793. Carteaux.

November 16, 1793. Dugommier.

VII. Army of the Eastern Pyrenees (army of the Pyrenees formed under

Servan, October, 1792, divided April 30, 1793)—

May, 1793. De Flers.

August, 1793. Puget de Barbantane.

September 18, 1793. Dagobert—*ad interim*.

September 29, 1793. D'Aoust—*ad interim*.

October, 1793. Turreau.

November, 1793. D'Aoust—*ad interim*.

November 30, 1793. Doppet.

December, 1793. D'Aoust—*ad interim*.

January, 1794. Dugommier.

VIII. Army of the Western Pyrenees—

May, 1793. Servan.

June, 1793. La Bourdonnaye.

July 4, 1793. D'Elbecq.

August 31, 1793. Després-Crassier.

October 8, 1793. Müller—*ad interim*.

October, 1793. Alexandre Dumas (not allowed to take command).

October 30, 1793. Müller.

IX. Army of the Coasts of La Rochelle—

May 1, 1793. Leigonyer—*ad interim*.

May 28, 1793. Biron.

July 17, 1793. La Barolière, commanding the right wing } *ad*
Chalbos " left " } *interim*.

July 31, 1793. Rossignol.

August 25, 1793. Santerre.

August 31, 1793. Rossignol.

Termed the army of the West, October 5, 1793, after the incorporation of the former garrison of Mayence.

October 8, 1793. Léchelle.

November 18, 1793. Marceau—*ad interim*.

December 23, 1793. Turreau.

X. Army of the Coasts of Brest—

May 1, 1793. Canclaux.

October 6, 1793. Rossignol.

XI. Army of the Coasts of Cherbourg—

May 1, 1793. Wimpfen.

July, 1793. Sepher.

October, 1793. Vialle.

B.

DEPUTIES ON MISSION WITH THE ARMIES.

It is quite impossible to give the names of all the deputies sent on mission to the armies; they succeeded each other so rapidly and irregularly. But fortunately there are two complete lists given in the decrees of April 30, 1793, creating the eleven armies of the Republic, and of July 19, which supply their names at two important periods, when the other deputies on mission were recalled. To these lists are added the names and dates of mission of certain of their most famous successors, and they are arranged under the headings of the armies, of which the succession of generals has just been given.

I. Army of the North—

April 30, 1793. Bellegarde, Carnot, Cavaignac, Cochon-Lapparent, Courtois, Delbrel, Duhem, Duquesnoy, Gasparin, Lequinio, Lesage-Senault, and Sallengros.

Of these deputies Cavaignac was at once removed to Brest, and Gossuin replaced Lequinio, who was ill, on May 10, while on May 4 Briez and Dubois-Dubais, who were at Valenciennes, were maintained in their functions.

July 19, 1793. Carnot, Charlier, Delbrel, and Servièrre (in addition to Briez and Cochon-Lapparent, besieged in Valenciennes).

Of deputies sent at a later date, note especially Élie Lacoste, Peyssard, Châles, Levasseur (of the Meurthe), Letourneur, Hentz, and Duquesnoy in August; Berlier and Trullard sent to Dunkirk. August 27; Isoré, Drôuet, and Bar nominated, September 9.

II. Army of the Ardennes—

April 30, 1793. Deville, Hentz, La Porte, and Milhaud.

July 19, 1793. Calés, Massieu, and Perrin (of the Vosges).

III. Army of the Moselle—

April 30, 1793. Levasseur (of the Meurthe), Maignet, Maribon-Montaut, and Soubrany.

July 19, 1793. Gentil, Richaud, and Soubrany.

Note among deputies sent at a later date, Prieur (of the Marne) and Jean Bon Saint-André, August 2; Ehrmann, Harmand, Hentz, and Cusset in September; Saint-Just and Le Bas in October.

IV. Army of the Rhine—

April 30, 1793. Du Roy, Ferry, Haussmann, Laurent, Louis (of the Bas-Rhin), Merlin (of Thionville), Pfieger, Rewbell, Ritter, and Ruamps.

July 19, 1793. Borie, Maribon-Montaut, Michaud and Ruamps (in addition to Merlin (of Thionville) and Rewbell besieged in Mayence).

Note among deputies sent at a later date, Guyardin, Mallarmé, and Niou, July 27 to November 19; Prieur (of the Marne) and Jean Bon Saint-André, August 2; Saint-Just and Le Bas, October; and Baudot and J. B. Lacoste, November 3. (Dentzel besieged in Landau).

V. Army of the Alps—

April 30, 1793. Albitte, Dubois-Crancé, Gauthier, and Nioche.

July 19, 1793. *The same.*

Dubois-Crancé, Gauthier, and Nioche were recalled in October, 1793; and Albitte, Gaston, and La Porte were the deputies on mission with the army of the Alps up to the overthrow of Robespierre on 9 Thermidor (July 26, 1794).

VI. Army of Italy—

April 30, 1793. Despinassy and Roubaud.

July 19, 1793. Pierre Baille, Barras, Beauvais, and Despinassy.

Note among deputies sent at a later date, Ricord and Augustin Robespierre, August; Escudier, Gasparin, and Saliceti.

VII. Army of the Eastern Pyrenees—

April 30, 1793. Bonnet (of the Aude), Fabre (of the Hérault), Leyris, and Projean.

July 19, 1793. Bonnet (of the Aude), Cassanyes, Fabre (of the Hérault), and Leyris.

Note among deputies sent at a later date, Espert, August; Gaston, September to December; and Milhaud and Sonbrany, December.

VIII. Army of the Western Pyrenees—

April 30, 1793. Chaudron-Roussau, Feraud, Garrau, and Ysabeau.

July 19, 1793. *The same.*

Note among deputies sent at a later date, Cavaignac, September; Dartigoyte, Monestier (of the Puy-de-Dôme), and Pinet.

IX. Army of the Coasts of La Rochelle—

April 30, 1793. Bourbotte, Carra, Dandenac, and Julien (of Toulouse).

July 19, 1793. Bourdon (of the Oise), Choudieu, Goupilleau (de Fontenay), Richard.

Note in addition, Merlin (of Thionville) and Rewbell, who acted with the former garrison of Mayence, August to December, 1793.

X. Army of the Coasts of Brest—

April 30, 1793. Cavaignac, Coustard, Gillet, Merlin (of Douai), and Sevestre.

July 19, 1793. Bourbotte, Cavaignac, Gillet, and Louis Turreau.

In addition, note especially Philippeaux.

XI. Army of the Coasts of Cherbourg—

April 30, 1793. Lecointre, Prieur (of the Marne), Romme.

July 19, 1793. Bonnet (of the Calvados), Du Roy, and Robert Lindet. (Prieur of the Côte-d'Or and Romme detained at Caen.)

XII. Army of Corsica—

April 30, 1793. Lacombe-Saint-Michel and Saliceti. (Antiboul and Bo detained at Marseilles.)

APPENDIX XII.


CONCORDANCE OF THE REPUBLICAN AND GREGORIAN CALENDARS.

	YEAR II. 1793-1794.	YEAR III. 1794-1795.	YEAR IV. 1795-1796.	YEAR V. 1796-1797.	YEAR VI. 1797-1798.	YEAR VII. 1798-1799.	YEAR VIII. 1799-1800.
1 Vendémiaire.	22 September, 1793	22 September, 1794	22 September, 1795	22 September, 1796	22 September, 1797	22 September, 1798	22 September, 1799
11 "	2 October	2 October	3 October	2 October	2 October	2 October	3 October
21 "	12 October	12 October	12 October	12 October	12 October	12 October	13 October
1 Brumaire	22 October	22 October	23 October	23 October	23 October	23 October	23 October
11 "	1 November	1 November	12 November	1 November	1 November	1 November	2 November
21 "	11 November	11 November	22 November	11 November	11 November	11 November	12 November
1 Frimaire	21 November	21 November	22 November	21 November	21 November	21 November	22 November
11 "	1 December	1 December	2 December	2 December	2 December	2 December	2 December
21 "	11 December	11 December	22 December	21 December	21 December	21 December	22 December
1 Nivôse	21 December	21 December	22 December	21 December	21 December	21 December	22 December
11 "	31 December	31 December	1 January, 1796	31 December	31 December	31 December	1 January, 1800
1 Pluviôse	10 January, 1794	10 January, 1795	10 January, 1796	10 January, 1797	10 January, 1798	10 January, 1799	11 January
11 "	20 January	20 January	21 January	20 January	20 January	20 January	21 January
21 "	30 January	30 January	31 January	30 January	30 January	30 January	31 January
1 Ventôse	9 February	9 February	10 February	9 February	9 February	9 February	10 February
11 "	19 February	19 February	20 February	19 February	19 February	19 February	20 February
21 "	1 March	1 March	1 March	1 March	1 March	1 March	1 March
1 Germinal	11 March	11 March	11 March	11 March	11 March	11 March	11 March
11 "	21 March	21 March	21 March	21 March	21 March	21 March	21 March
21 "	31 March	31 March	31 March	31 March	31 March	31 March	31 March
1 Floréal	10 April	10 April	10 April	10 April	10 April	10 April	10 April
11 "	20 April	20 April	20 April	20 April	20 April	20 April	20 April
21 "	30 April	30 April	30 April	30 April	30 April	30 April	30 April
1 Prairial	10 May	10 May	10 May	10 May	10 May	10 May	10 May
11 "	20 May	20 May	20 May	20 May	20 May	20 May	20 May
21 "	30 May	30 May	30 May	30 May	30 May	30 May	30 May
1 Messidor	9 June	9 June	9 June	9 June	9 June	9 June	9 June
11 "	19 June	19 June	19 June	19 June	19 June	19 June	19 June
21 "	29 June	29 June	29 June	29 June	29 June	29 June	29 June
1 Thermidor	9 July	9 July	9 July	9 July	9 July	9 July	9 July
11 "	19 July	19 July	19 July	19 July	19 July	19 July	19 July
21 "	29 July	29 July	29 July	29 July	29 July	29 July	29 July
1 Fructidor	8 August	8 August	8 August	8 August	8 August	8 August	8 August
11 "	18 August	18 August	18 August	18 August	18 August	18 August	18 August
21 "	28 August	28 August	28 August	28 August	28 August	28 August	28 August
1st Complementary Day, or "Sans-Culotide"	7 September	7 September	7 September	7 September	7 September	7 September	7 September
5th "	17 September	17 September	17 September	17 September	17 September	17 September	17 September
6th "	21 September	21 September	21 September	21 September	21 September	21 September	21 September
	22 September	22 September				22 September	

Note: Each month in the Republican Calendar consisted of thirty days, divided into three "Decades."



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